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    Abstract  
This study has been designed to provide and interpret information from classroom based 
practice about the implementation of controversial issues in the science curriculum and 
relate it to the discussion about conceptual frameworks that situate controversial issues in 
science education. Since no tools were available from the science education research area 
to fulfil the methodological aims stated above, the study has taken a methodological 
orientation which resulted in the selection and modification of Schellens’ (1985) 
argument typology scheme alongside Peirce’s (1905) classification of the sciences to 
describe the epistemic part of the lesson, and to the selection of Walton’s and Crabbe’s 
(1995) typology of argumentative dialogues to describe the dialectical context.  
The application of argument schemes was successful and it has enabled the description of 
the epistemic practices as situated in dialectical practice. The analysis has revealed the 
basic structural components in which the complexity of the discussion is built, 
consequences, needs (ends) and rules, and how these have been used within discussions: 
either to ground decisions about an issue, or to explain or evaluate societal agents’ and 
own selves’ actions, desires, decisions, views and positions, or own intentions towards a 
personal stated dilemma. Furthermore, they have revealed the instances in which each 
discipline, like Ethics, Natural Sciences, Psychology, and Sociology, had taken place. 
The results indicate an intersection of the disciplines and provide valuable information 
about how implementing controversial issues in the science curriculum might be related 
to enhancing thoughtful decision making, humanizing the science curriculum, or focusing 
on epistemological issues.   
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Area of study 
This study deals with the curriculum that is related to controversial socioscientific 
issues (SSI) in science classrooms. Implementing controversial issues in the science 
curriculum is a highly complex task. The complexity refers to the complex nature of the 
controversial issues, the diversity of teaching aims and priorities that situate them in 
science education, the confusing guidelines for teachers related to their stand in the 
classroom, alongside the involvement of teachers’ and students’ moral beliefs, emotions, 
needs and priorities in the discussion.  
Controversies are large, social phenomena: people are engaged operating as 
individuals, as members of groups, or as institutional agents, having myriad interests and 
priorities, different levels of access to resources, different perspectives, and different 
modes of reasoning (Ross, 2006). 
Disagreement might occur in different levels and for different reasons 
simultaneously, including the moral responsibilities of scientists, moral and other 
considerations regarding the use of science and technology products, considerations 
regarding the availability of government funds given for scientific research, the 
ownership of information and products, and the methods of science.  
Different groups or individuals interpret the situation according to their own means 
and interests.  Groups disagree over the authority in questioning and evaluating scientific 
evidence and in the ability of any groups, apart from scientists, to provide evidence at all. 
The limits of scientific knowledge and contextual factors that affect scientific endeavour 
are criteria used differently by individuals and groups during the discussion and 
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resolution of controversial issues. Finally, there are disagreements referring to the place 
of values in decision making, the context in which the decision is to be made, and the role 
of the public in decision making.   
Teachers and curriculum developers are therefore dealing with a really complex 
construction that might be used as the context, or the content, of a science lesson. A fact 
that makes the situation even more complex is that students and teachers are not only 
dealing with an “issue” existing out of them, but also act as members of the dispute, 
within the issue. When it comes to decision-making, values, emotions, ethical 
considerations of students alongside their personal experiences affect the way they deal 
with evidence: when presented with contradictory evidence students usually distort the 
evidence to adjust to their prior beliefs without being aware of doing so (Sodian, et al., 
1991, p.759; Bell, 1999, p.13). Students dismiss scientific knowledge as irrelevant to 
decision making when reasoning about controversial issues (Zeidler, et al., 2002), ignore 
data that they ought to consider when evaluating claims or assimilate such data in ways 
that do not damage their current theories (Sandoval, 2001, p.1; Chinn & Brewer, 1998; 
Klahr, et al., 1990; Kuhn, et al., 1998, as cited in Sandoval, 2001, p.15). 
When it comes to pedagogical decisions regarding controversial issues in science 
education, different perspectives describe different pedagogical outcomes from their 
instruction. Pedagogy on controversial issues provides several frameworks that include 
elements such as moral education, moral development, cognitive development and the 
support of the emotional belief system of the child. Those elements are presented as 
‘supplementary’ in a controversial issues lesson, but there is no clear image as to whether 
they are contradictory.  
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Different views of the relationship and status of science and society impose different 
descriptions of the nature of socioscientific issues and assign different tools that a citizen 
should hold for the participation in the discussion and decision making about those 
issues. Additionally, different perspectives about science education in general, create 
different relationships between socioscientific issues education and science education.   
The role of the teacher is not clearly defined, as several approaches proposed in the 
literature have conflicting elements and do not answer problems of what and how a 
teacher should or could teach about controversial issues in the science classroom. 
Because of this complexity and lack of clarity, teachers feel confused. They may highly 
value neutrality as an approach that safeguards them as professionals and provides a 
democratic classroom environment, but they struggle as they cannot provide balance 
under neutrality or avoid implicit expression of their views in the classroom. However, 
they seem more oriented in ‘what’ they want to teach, with  most science teachers relying 
on the ‘science part’ and thus on the ‘cognitive’ element of the controversial issues 
framework, few of them being attached to a moral dimension and even fewer that 
combine all directions (Cotton, 2006; Levinson & Turner, 2001; Sadler, et al., 2006).  
1.2 Focus of study 
The aim of this study is to investigate and describe the implementation of 
controversial issues within a science curriculum - an open ended, complex and 
problematic task - and contribute to the discussion about the relationship between those 
two areas with interpretations from real classroom data.  On the one hand, this study  uses 
teachers as experts that curriculum developers and professional development program 
designers should involve in the design phase of their intended proposed curriculum, or 
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professional development program. I actively stand from those positions while looking at 
the issue of curriculum development and professional development about controversial 
issues.  
On the other hand, it recognizes the need to consider the problem of controversial 
issues teaching in not only philosophical terms, but in practical terms too. There is a need 
to describe and analyze how theoretical assumptions about science teaching and 
controversial issues might or might not apply in real science classrooms. 
A primary methodological issue is the construction of research questions that would 
be able to address the aim of the study. The answers to those questions should be efficient 
in describing a controversial issues lesson in terms of curriculum situated in science 
education.   
At a first glance, I determine two areas that enter the research space: Citizenship 
Education and Science Education. Those two entities might be seen as distinct, but 
overlapping curriculum areas that could serve each other in the context of controversial 
issues teaching. Actually, I will talk about an infusion of those two areas with different 
rationales and priorities, as it will be explored in the chapter on “Controversial issues and 
Science Curriculum”.  
 The possible relationship between learning about controversial issues and learning 
science situates controversial issues and science education in different, but overlapping 
frameworks. Some of those frameworks describe citizenship education in the service of 
science education and use controversial issues as “context” (Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003; 
Fullick & Ratcliffe, 1996; Kolsto, 2000; Lewis & Leach, 2001; Zeidler, et al., 2005; Gray 
& Bryce 2006; Hall, 2004). They describe the relationship between controversial issues 
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and science education as “teaching science with controversial issues”; controversial 
issues are in the service of science education, for different purposes, including students’ 
epistemological development, the cultivation of argumentation skills and the humanizing 
of science curriculum with the introduction of morals and ethics related to science. 
Others (Wellington, 2004, p.34; Crick Report, 1998, p.35; Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003) 
describe the teaching of controversial issues as an end in itself, situated in pedagogical 
outcomes for citizenship education. According to those frameworks, science education 
serves the teaching of controversial issues, especially in the promotion of thoughtful 
decision making. Therefore, they describe the relationship between controversial issues 
and science education as “Science education for citizenship”, or, “teaching about 
controversial issues”. 
Finally, there are frameworks that introduce controversial issues as pedagogy by 
itself that serves the moral, emotional and cognitive development of the child (Zeidler & 
Keefer, 2003; Zeidler, et al., 2005; Sadler & Zeidler, 2003). Introducing controversial 
issues as pedagogy rests on a level above science education and citizenship education as 
distinct curriculum areas. The framework is not established on the grounds of citizenship, 
science, or moral education, but it is rather established on psychological grounds of how 
all those elements could contribute to the development of the child under a “functional 
scientific literacy”.  
The reason for considering theoretical considerations about the introduction of 
controversial issues in science curriculum is the need to find a method that could be able 
to describe the lesson, under the complexity and the problematic nature of the situation.  
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A methodological problem to be addressed is to formulate such questions that their 
primary data could serve the description of a lesson both in science lesson terms, but also 
in socioscientific issues lesson terms. One question that is raised is: if I describe the 
lesson alongside those two dimensions, do I automatically regard learning science and 
learning about socioscientific issues as epistemologically distinct activities? (Levinson, 
2006, p. 24) And if so, by which method would I address their boundaries?   
 A primary methodological solution for this problem is to set an ending point: describe 
one entity given the context of the other. Given the fact that this study is science 
education oriented, I define this study as one aiming to describe how controversial issues  
are “situated” in science education  (Tiberghien, 2008, p. v)  or vice versa, what science 
education is performed, and how this is done, under the context of controversial issues. 
How those areas were finally defined as epistemologically different is an issue to be 
explored in the methods and methodologies chapter of this study, as it has evolved as a 
research question in next stages of research.  
1.3 Key research questions  
Following  Scott’s and Mortimer’s (2003) analytical framework for making meaning 
in science classrooms , a  primary research need is to determine the “story” of the lesson 
and the “thematic pattern” of the dialogue (Lemke, 1990).  Students and teachers are 
constructing complex meanings about a particular topic by combining words and other 
symbols, semantic relationships. The pattern of semantic relationships constitutes the 
scientific, or other, content of the discourse (Lemke, 1990 p.13, Scott, 1998 p.56).  
The “scientific story” in a controversial issues lesson, as constructed both by teacher 
and students, should focus on elements - entities that their connection might describe the 
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lesson in terms of science curriculum in the context of controversial issues. Such entities 
would be scientific concepts, evidence, ethics and values as those interact with other 
information, morals, values and emotions from the wider social space. It should also be 
able to reveal the connection of those entities: claims about figures of authorities, conflict 
points and other relationships might be a product of analysis of the data that such an 
answer to a research question could provide. As a result, the description of “the scientific 
story” in the context of controversial issues constructs a question of:   
1. Which entities are found in a controversial issues lesson? (Scientific concepts, 
claims, values, ethical, metaphysical considerations, emotions, etc)  
Under this general question, two sub-questions help in the dimension of 
situating the lesson in Science Education:  
1.1 What is the relationship between the science, the personal and the social 
that those entities describe? 
1.2 What other areas of knowledge and expertise are infused in the lesson?  
In the case of the “scientific story” it is important, in order to understand participants’ 
linguistic actions, to know in what kind of communicative event they have been 
produced, where and when they have taken place, and who the participants were 
(Edwards, 1997; Pomerantz & Fehr, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Van Rees, 1992 as 
cited in Leitao, 2001). Therefore, there is a methodological consideration that derives 
from sociocultural perspectives, of relating content to context: content cannot be 
addressed without reference to a broader linguistic context and the knowledge of the 
speakers (Carlsen, 1991, p.162).  
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This study situates controversial issues as the “context” in the lesson. Consequently, 
I need a second question that would enable the description of the context in which the 
thematic pattern has been evolved, thus describing the matrix between controversial 
issues and science education, in terms of content.  
By this, I do not regard context as static (Carlsen, 1991). Context, as defined in this 
research would be better understood as “socially constructed through interactions among 
participants in a social situation” (Kelly, et al., 1998, p.26). The broader “social situation” 
I define here is a “discussion about controversial issues in classroom settings”. Any 
further information about this situation will be a product of analysis and not a pre-
research construction.  
Summarizing, a second question is set down, that could situate the thematic pattern 
in the context of controversial issues.  This question could be formed, following the 
previous sub-questions:  
2. Under which context do thematic entities come up in the lesson?   
Apart from describing what science has been talked in the classroom, I also need to 
describe what kind of science has been done in the classroom. Science curriculum 
includes, apart from conceptual and epistemological understanding, the development of 
science skills that include both procedural aspects of doing science alongside the 
development of thinking skills.  
Those skills, as defined in this study, do not refer to practical work skills, i.e. 
measuring, recording, and organizing data. The discussion-based nature of the lessons 
does not allow such an analysis since the lessons this study refers to, did not include any 
practical work at all, in terms of first hand experimentation. The interest of this study 
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focuses on the cognitive effort, the “minds on” activity, which is expressed through 
discourse in the classroom, the opportunities for pupils to talk their way into science 
(Mercer et al, 2004, p.83).  
This study accepts sociocultural perspectives that define language as both a 
psychological and a communicative tool (Mercer, 1996): we use language not only to 
communicate and to share meaning but also to make sense of our experience, to 
constitute our thoughts (as cited in Mortimer, 1998, p.68). The study starts therefore with 
the assumption that reasoning is observable in the form of socially structured and 
embodied activity (Garfinkel, 1991; Heidegger, 1977; Suchman & Trigg, 1991 as cited in 
Roth & McGinn, 1998).  
Zimmerman (2005) defines those discursive skills as conceptual and procedural 
activities included in scientific investigation and cites an expanded list of such activities 
deriving from literature:  asking questions, hypothesizing, designing experiments, making 
predictions, using apparatus, observing, measuring, being concerned with accuracy, 
precision and error, recording and interpreting data, consulting data records, evaluating 
evidence, verification, reacting to contradictions or anomalous data, presenting and 
assessing arguments, constructing explanations (to self and others), coordinating theory 
and evidence, performing statistical calculations, making inferences, and formulating and 
revising theories or models (e.g., Carey, Evans, Honda, Jay, & Unger, 1989; Chi, de 
Leeuw, Chiu, & Lavancher, 1994; Chinn and Malhotra, 2001; Keys, 1994; McNay & 
Melville, 1993; Schauble, Glaser, Duschl, Schulze, &John, 1995; Slowiaczek, Klayman, 
Sherman, & Skov, 1992; Zachos et al., 2000 as cited in Zimmerman, 2005, p.4).  
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Having clarified theoretical considerations about the third question, I can now set it 
down:  
3. By which conceptual and procedural activities are students and teachers negotiating 
the thematic pattern of the lesson?   
3.1 What type of “doing science” do those activities describe?  
As I regard the teacher an agent that, apart from constructing the scientific story -as 
the student does, orchestrates the whole procedure, I need to define his role beyond 
“negotiating” the thematic pattern of the classroom. I therefore regard him as one holding 
the authority to take and implement pedagogical decisions in the classroom. Learning is 
viewed as a process of social participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991), which requires 
modelling and coaching, and even in sociocultural perspectives that this study shares,  the 
teacher is the more able peer, providing a scaffold for the students’ performances and 
promoting their assumption of responsibility (Reigosa & Jimenez-Alexandre, 2007 as 
cited in Jimenez - Alexandre, 2007, p.98). 
However, teachers’ “strategies and approaches” that fall beyond his role as a peer of 
the group that also negotiates the thematic pattern through epistemic and other practices,  
are not going to be elaborated through this study, though there is enough data for 
performing such a description. The study focuses on curriculum, in a close definition that 
cannot encompass pedagogy, due to limitations of space.  
1.4 The bounds of the research  
This study is highly descriptive; it aims to describe what curriculum has been taught 
in the classroom alongside teachers’ pedagogical actions and decisions, rather than 
deciding from a theoretical basis, what the teacher’s “appropriate” stance should be, or 
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what the curriculum should be. That is why, in this particular research, “evaluative” 
weights are not to be put, at least a priori, to teachers’ stances or practices. The effort is 
not to find “exemplar” teaching, or define such teaching but seeking methods of 
describing and analyzing what is really happening in the classroom, under the glance of 
curriculum in terms of functional scientific literacy. 
Another aspect that needs clarification, is that this study does not aim to describe 
concepts or skills in terms of an impact of the lesson to the students’ behaviour: I do not 
describe what skills students have gained but rather what skills are they using during the 
lesson. Additionally, when talking about the scientific story I cannot assume that this 
story has been “conceptualized” as a “common knowledge” by all students (Scott, 2007). 
As Scott (2007) cites about a descriptive study about inquiry in science classrooms:  
“What does it mean to say that the students “engaged in 
common practices” or developed “common knowledge” in the 
classroom? What evidence can we bring to support such claims, 
what methodologies might be developed to generate that 
evidence?” (p. 497) 
 
Therefore, what is to be described is not what has been gained as a skill, but rather 
what has been performed as a discursive skill important for learning and practising 
science (Mercer et al, 2004). This study, consequently, uses procedural and conceptual 
activities to describe the procedural part of the curriculum. Those activities though 
conceptual, are identified and described through externalized behaviours and not through 
internal mechanisms. What is to be described is the intermental (social) and not the 
intramental (individual) intellectual development, though Vygotskian principles, and also 
other research, indicates that those two are highly interrelated (Mercer, et al., 2004, 
p.360). 
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1.5 Personal and professional commitment to the research  
In the years 2001-2007, I had been working in a team project at the Ministry of 
Education and Culture of Cyprus, aiming to enrich Science Curriculum with ICT tools 
(Lymbouridou & Sevastidou, 2008). Under this project, I have developed several 
webquests, which included, among others, environmental controversial issues, such as 
fox-hunting, handling mice overpopulation in an ecosystem, selection of renewable 
energy sources, and other topics.  
Very soon, I realized that what I had prepared as a curriculum developer was not 
enough to help me deal with the complexities of controversial issues teaching. Though 
the issues were very interesting for the students and their participation was high, I had a 
feeling of inadequacy in addressing difficulties related to students’ abilities to engage in 
an argumentative discussion, consider arguments beyond their position and weigh 
arguments. At first, I felt the need to find ways of improving my personal teaching 
practice, and reflect this experience on the teaching materials I’ve prepared.  
In my Master’s degree I have conducted research into such a lesson. I have tested the 
impact of an argument building software on students´ argumentative abilities, using a 
webquest related to the controversial issue of fox hunting. The perspective of the teaching 
intervention was oriented in promoting scientific argumentation: I was trying to help 
students include more scientific evidence to build their arguments, instead of  building 
arguments based on emotions or value based elements like “the fox is a beautiful 
animal”, which I had regarded as “personal”, “irrelevant” information. The research was 
presented at the Sixth International Conference on Computer Based Learning, 
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(Lymbouridou & Constantinou, 2003) and the criticism I received from that presentation 
referred to the categories of arguments I had used (relevant and irrelevant arguments, 
scientific and non scientific arguments). This was a first hint for me for further research 
on argumentation nature, but also on the relationship between science teaching and other 
areas such as emotional and moral development. A first attempt towards this dimension 
was a small scale research study referring to the place of argumentation on students´ 
epistemological beliefs. 
Going beyond myself, my experience as an ICT advisor helped me realize that 
empowering teachers to adopt new technologies in their classrooms goes far beyond 
preparing and delivering curriculum materials to them. The transfer of this experience in 
the area of controversial issues teaching revealed a need to include teachers in the design 
and implementation phase of the innovation of including controversial issues in the 
science curriculum. Unfortunately, procedures in Ministries do not always take the 
research path. There were no established procedures of including teachers in the design or 
evaluation phase. However, as soon I had this opportunity, to put things under the 
research perspective through my PhD thesis, I grasped it. This research, therefore, 
consists, among others, of a self reflection procedure that aims to question what I had 
prepared as a curriculum developer, and an effort to empower me as a future curriculum 
developer or School Advisor in the areas of ICT, Science, or Citizenship. 
1.6 Type of the study  
This study adopts a naturalistic qualitative approach since it seeks to develop detailed 
holistic descriptions of the field and the phenomenon/situation studied, which concerns 
controversial issues teaching within science education. The method of interpretive case 
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study was selected as appropriate to answer the questions of this study. The case was 
defined as “implemented curriculum for controversial issues in science education” and 
the lessons taught are considered as sub-cases of this case. The interpretive character 
refers to the capacity of the study to analyze data so as to provide categories that could 
interpret descriptions in terms of functional scientific literacy within a socioscientific 
dialectical context.  
1.7 Study setting  
The study used three lessons taught by primary school teachers that had acted both as 
designers and implementers of the suggested curriculum. The lessons were performed in 
primary Cyprus school classes, in typical science lessons of 80 minutes (two periods) 
with children of ages 10-12 years old (fifth and sixth graders).  
The teachers who taught the lessons had participated voluntarily in a professional 
development seminar that was proposed by the Pedagogical Institute of Cyprus and had 
the main aim to help teachers connect theory and practice, by reflecting on their own 
teaching by using videos of lessons conducted under the thematic units of the seminar. 
All of the lessons had been videotaped and teachers had been interviewed with the use of 
video stimulated recall sessions, a method used to enhance better understanding of human 
interactions within the classrooms (Cashwell, 2001). 
The main data sources for this study are video extracts, alongside extracts from 
conversations that took place during the video stimulated recall. Teaching materials, 
lessons plans, teachers’ presentations of their own lessons in conferences, are also used as 
secondary data sources.  
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1.8 The significance of the study 
At the time that this chapter is being processed a TV headline cites: “science out of 
ethics”. The trailer is referring to an announcement of a Cypriot fertility doctor, who 
claims to have cloned and implanted human embryos (CYBC, 23 of April, 2009). 
Whether this is “science out of ethics” is an issue under discussion. However, this is one 
of the many issues which involve methods and products of science and technology about 
which citizens, students included, need to decide upon, or take a position towards.  
Whatever the disagreements about the particular aims for science education in the 
context of socioscientific issues are, there is a widespread belief that the infusion of 
controversial issues into the science curriculum would be beneficial for science education 
as a discipline, and for students as members of the society. Several authors have argued 
that if scientific literacy represents the ultimate aim of science education, then scientific 
literacy must entail, at least in part, the ability to thoughtfully negotiate socioscientific 
issues and contribute to discourse regarding these topics (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994; Driver, 
et al., 2000; Hodson, 2003; Sadler, 2004; Zeidler, Walker, Ackett, & Simmons, 2002 as 
cited in Sadler, et al., 2006, p.354). Additionally, current perspectives on the nature of the 
scientific enterprise, which see argument and argumentative practice as a core activity of 
scientists, agree on the inclusion and central role of argument in science education 
(Driver, et al., 2000). A functional scientific literacy model should include personal, 
cognitive and moral development, since a cultural perspective towards education 
underscores the necessity to appreciate students as moral agents intimately involved with 
their own cultural, natural and technological environments (Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 365).  
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Science in personal and social perspective lies as one of the four central goals that 
define scientific literacy in the USA (National Science Education Standards, NRC, 1996, 
p.21), whereas movements such as Science, Technology and Society (STS) and 
statements by bodies as the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS, 1989), attempted a long time ago to introduce the discussion of teaching science 
for social responsibility (Cross and Price, 1996).  
In the UK, teaching with or about controversial issues has fallen into two distinct 
movements: the reinforcement of citizenship education, which has been a statutory 
National Curriculum subject in England for all young people in key stages 3 and 4 (ages 
11 to 16 years), since 2002, and the rehabilitation of the trust between science and the 
public.  
Democratic citizenship in a modern society depends, among other things, on the 
ability of citizens to comprehend, criticise and use scientific ideas and claims 
(Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 1998). On the other hand there has been an 
official concern about the attitudes of the general public towards science, deriving from 
the fact that society's relationship with science was in a critical phase, a “crisis of trust”. 
Mistrust of science was seen as dangerous to inhibit technological process and research 
due to public resistance in scientific advancements, and was breeding a climate of deep 
anxiety among scientists themselves (House of Lords, 2000). Science education has been 
called to educate future citizens both for enabling them to critically stand towards 
scientific claims and methods but also to avoid indoctrination, fear and mistrust in their 
decisions regarding the use of technological advancements.  
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In Cyprus there is not yet an official movement related to issues concerning science 
and society. However, several partial movements in different areas create a climate that 
shows the readiness of the educational system to seek new directions like the humanizing 
of science curriculum or reinforcing citizenship through science. The Ministry of 
Education and Culture has recently established a National Committee for Citizenship. 
The committee deals for the time being with issues related to drugs, youngsters and 
society and school bullying but, hopefully, they will deal with issues related to science 
and society in a time. Additionally, the National Curriculum is set under revision. Under 
the new mission stated, an active citizen is described, as “able to participate in work, 
politics, economy, culture and work” (Committee on Curriculum Revision, 2008). 
Science Curriculum is under revision within this project. Even if official statements 
regarding Science Education explicitly have not been published yet, I do hope that 
declarations about abandoning a “fact-transmitting” system to a “critical-reflective” one 
will be implemented and controversial issues find a place in science education because of 
the critical perspective they offer. Additionally, movements such as the inclusion of 
socioscientific issues as webquests for science lesson, a movement done under the 
integration of ICT in science, help towards this dimension.  
Science teaching nowadays hardly includes any argumentation opportunities for 
students, whereas science  teachers spend more time in transmitting facts and regard 
values as being out of the scope of science teaching (Levinson & Turner, 2001). 
Traditional science instruction has given a false impression of science as the 
unproblematic collation of facts about the world and makes controversies between 
scientists (historical or contemporary) look puzzling (Driver, et al., 2000). The traditional 
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science curriculum, with its absolute views, does not produce citizens prepared to deal 
with real-world science, ‘which is more often than not equivocal and conflicting’ (Sadler, 
et al., 2006, p. 354). Infusing controversial socioscientific issues in the science 
curriculum is therefore defined as an innovation.  
Science teachers feel unequipped in implementing such a change in their classrooms 
(Levinson & Turner, 2001; Gray & Bryce, 2006; Sadler, et al., 2004). A need that comes 
up, therefore, is teachers’ professional development: programs that will promote 
connections between ethics and science, to help teachers deal with challenges of 
organizing and facilitating argumentative discussions in the classroom. Additionally, high 
quality resources need to be developed, implemented, and evaluated (Sadler, et al., 2004). 
However, enabling teachers to deal with controversial issues teaching seems to be a 
difficult task. Professional development models, even if they had advanced better 
information with respect to knowledge and practical skills of teachers, required much 
more to enable teachers to deal effectively with the social, moral and ethical aspects and 
the shift in thinking required for tackling these issues in the classroom (Gray and Bryce, 
2006).  
A possible reason of failure of professional development programs, related to the 
infusion of science and ethics, is that any effort to develop and promote curricula must 
account for teachers’ perspectives on the issues being developed. Problems may arise if 
classroom teachers and their beliefs about reform are ignored (Bybee, 1993, as cited in 
Lumpe et al., 2000, p. 276). As Sadler, et al. (2006) cite:   
“Regardless of the impassioned positions of university-
based educators and researchers, if classroom teachers do not 
adopt and implement these suggestions for change, then reform 
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is restricted to the pages of academic journals and conference 
rooms.” (p. 355) 
 
There is a need, therefore, to change professional development programs from top-
down delivery from “experts” to teachers, to opportunities for reflection and personal 
feedback on them (Gray & Bryce, 2006). One cannot simply give quality science 
curriculum materials to teachers and expect quality science instruction: teachers need 
opportunities to identify and clarify their own beliefs about teaching science (Haney & 
Lumpe, 1995; Lumpe et al., 1999 as cited in Lumpe et al, 2000, p.288). 
Taking this a step further, Bernet and Hodson (2001) suggest that teachers should not 
only adopt and implement suggestions from outsiders, but also be included in the design 
phase of the innovation. There is a need to use teachers’ knowledge, as this has been 
recognized by increasing numbers of educators and curriculum specialists as the major 
factor in curriculum development (Barnett & Hodson, 2001 p.428). Teachers therefore 
should make conscious choices of what is being added and what is being discarded, and 
why (Loucks-Horsley, et al., 2003, p. 46 as cited in Gray and Bryce, 2006, p.172). Those 
choices, in the case of controversial issues teaching, refer to the selection and prioritizing 
of pedagogical outcomes regarding moral education, moral development, cognitive 
development and the support of the emotional belief system of the child in the context of 
science education.  
Summarizing the above paragraphs, the following implications are set down:  
• Education for Citizenship and functional scientific literacy require the infusion 
of socioscientific controversial issues in science curriculum. 
• There is a worldwide governmental and research based interest in the issue. 
However, 
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• There is a need to deal with the complexity of teaching that rests on the 
complicated nature of the issue, the personal involvement of students during the 
discussion and the selection and prioritizing of pedagogical outcomes that could 
connect science teaching and controversial issues.  
• There is an emerging need to design effective professional development that 
takes into account teachers’ considerations and provides them reflection 
opportunities and, finally 
• Teachers should be used as experts and designers of change. 
This study actually uses teachers as experts, designers of change, and looks for the 
solutions or the struggles they had, when called to design and implement science lessons 
with controversial issues. It therefore contributes to the direction of taking into account 
teachers’ considerations but also expertise in the design of related curriculum.  
There is a lot of theoretical - philosophical discussion about the infusion of scientific 
information, claims and values with those of personal or social unfounded evidence, 
ethics, morals and emotions in an argumentative discussion about controversial issues. 
However this philosophical discussion, though helpful, needs to be supplemented with 
information about classroom based practice that might reveal different relationships 
between those entities. This study, due to its setting but also to its descriptive nature, does 
not use any preconceived ideas about how the topic should be taught. That is why it could 
contribute to the theoretical discussion by providing instances that could question or 
backup existing theories about controversial issues and science teaching.  
Another gap that is cited in the literature, is one of taking into account fields like 
argumentation theory, for example, that stem from disciplines that philosophize about the 
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scientific enterprise and study scientific discourses and practices in situ (Bricker & Bell, 
2008). Those disciplines are not grounded in science education, but they can provide a 
means of analyzing and interpreting findings from science classrooms. As Bricker and 
Bell (2008) cite:  
“We argue that it is in our community’s (science education 
researchers) best interest to gather these various theoretical 
conceptualizations of scientific practices and discourses and 
then engage in thorough and thoughtful dialogue about what 
theoretical conceptualizations we wish to utilize in our research 
and practices and for what purposes.” (p.474) 
 
This study will actually try to use such conceptualizations deriving from 
argumentation theory (Van Eemeren, et al., 1996), Toulmin’s theory of argument 
(Toulmin, 1958), the classical view of argumentation by Aristotle (Posterior Analytics, 
Rhetoric, Prior Analytics), as well as from the area of informal logic (Walton, 1989), in 
the direction of determining a method of analysis of classroom argumentative talk, but 
also as “lenses” for discussing the results provided.  
Therefore, apart from contributing to the discussion of pedagogy and curriculum 
related to controversial issues, this study could be useful in methodological terms. 
Different studies have highlighted the importance of investigating classroom discourse 
and other rhetorical devices in science education (Candela, 1999; Halliday & Martin, 
1993; Kelly & Brown, 2003; Kress, Jewitt, Ogborn  and Tsatsarelis 2001; Lemke, 1990; 
Mortimer, 1998; Mortimer & Scott, 2003; Ogborn, Kress, Martins, and McGillicuddy, 
1996; Scott, 1998; Sutton, 1992 as cited in Scott, et al., 2006, p. 608). Additionally, a 
significant deficit in the literature is the lack of research on quantitative analysis of 
argumentation, not at the level of conversational analysis but at the level of conceptual 
categories that are of significance to science education (Erduran, 2008). I hope that this 
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research could contribute to both those directions:  situate controversial issues in science 
curriculum and provide data for the conceptual categories that are of significance to 
science education, by effective analysis of classroom discourse.  
1.9 Structure of thesis  
The thesis to be presented here is organized as an argument that supports several 
hypotheses related to the implemented curriculum of controversial issues in science 
education that emerge from classroom observational data and are interpreted in terms of 
dialectical practice and functional scientific literacy. Due to the additional 
methodological orientation of this study, this study also presents an argument supporting 
the description of the dialectical context as the socioscientific context for this study and 
also grounds the argument typology scheme used for the data analysis. Table 1 presents 
the structure of the thesis.  
Chapter Subchapter Purpose 
Literature 
review 
The nature of 
controversial issues  Describe the nature of controversial issues 
Controversial issues 
and science curriculum 
Describe and critically reflect on theoretical 
considerations about including controversial issues in science 
curriculum. 
Argumentation as a 
process 
Present the dialectical aspect of argumentation and 
identify the elements that can describe it as a process. 
Reasoning and 
argumentation: a 
justification of a 
typology of argument 
schemes  
Justify a typology of argument schemes that can be used 
as a means for analyzing argumentative talk in terms of 
arguments as products, and also describe the kind of 
reasoning  and epistemic practice that indicate. 
Method  Ground the data analysis process and provide basic schemes of analysis used in this study. 
Results  
Provide the results related to the interrelationship 
between science education and controversial issues teaching, 
alongside the methodological tools used in this study.  
Discussion  
Relate the relationship of functional scientific literacy 
and controversial issues as context with theoretical 
considerations regarding the implementation of controversial 
issues in science education. Present and justify the theoretical 
and methodological contribution of the study alongside 
limitations and suggestions for further research. 
Table 1: Structure of thesis 
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2. Literature review 
A first input from the literature review in this study was one of informing the study 
about the nature of controversial issues and the discussion that takes place within the 
science education field about their implementation within the science curriculum. 
This kind of review is presented in the sections 2.1The nature of controversial issues 
and 2.2 Controversial issues and the curriculum, within this chapter.    
A second role that the literature review had on this study was to provide 
conceptualizations from areas beyond science education that could be used for the 
selection, modification and application of tools that would be efficient for data 
analysis: tools that could provide the results needed to answer the questions of this 
study. However, this kind of review was actually interactive with classroom data: 
instances from classroom data had pointed in search for relevant categories in the 
literature, conceptualizations from the literature had pointed to new categories and so 
on. However, such a complicated process has to be presented as a linear one; as it 
was too huge to be presented in the data analysis chapter - actually this would make 
the chapter very difficult to be read - I have decided to present this chapter as a 
theoretical input that informs the study, interacting with its data.  In this sense the 
part 2.3 Argumentation as a process discusses the way in which data analysis can 
grasp the dialectical part of the lesson, whereas 2.4 Reasoning and Argumentation, a 
justification of a typology of argument schemes, grounds the decision about the 
selection and modification of Schellens’ (1985) typology of argument schemes and 
explains how argument schemes have been related with epistemic practices so as to 
describe the epistemic part of the lessons.  
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2.1 The nature of controversial issues 
Controversies are largely social phenomena: that is, they are those topics and issues 
about which numbers of people are observed to disagree (Bailey, 1971, p.69). The term 
controversy literally means ‘the clash of opposing opinions; debate; disputation’ (Brante, 
1993, p.181 as cited in Linn, et al., 2004). 
As mentioned in Crick Report (1998):  
“A controversial issue is an issue about which there is no one 
fixed or universally held point of view. Such issues are those which 
commonly divide society and for which significant groups offer 
conflicting explanations and solutions.” (p.58) 
 
This definition gives two important attributes of controversial issues; the first one is 
that they involve society groups. The use of the term “significant” emphasizes   the 
engagement of a great part of the society and not of minority groups. As Wellington 
(1986) points out, an issue should be considered to be important by an appreciable 
number of people if is to be defined as controversial (Wellington, 1986, p.3). Stradling 
(1984, as cited in Harwood & Hahn, 1990) stresses the density of the disagreement 
stating that controversial issues are those issues that deeply divide the society. 
The second attribute found in Crick’s Report (1998) definition, is that we are talking 
about issues for which we are looking for solutions. The controversy is not descriptive, it 
is not about what is right or not, it is not about only what we think about something, but 
also how we act towards each other (Bridges, 1986, p. 21). The issues are controversial 
since there is a decision to be made (Kolsto, 2000).  
The description of the nature of controversial issues is highly complex, as they are at 
the same time a product of discussion and a discussion, as a process, per se; individuals 
and social groups are engaged in those issues either as disputants, informants and 
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informed and have roles of understanding, interpreting, arguing and deciding. 
Additionally, people are engaged either operating as individuals, as members of groups, 
or as institutional agents, having myriad interests and priorities, different levels of access 
to resources, different perspectives, and different modes of reasoning (Ross, 2006). These 
differences inevitably lead to a multileveled and multilayered construction that we call 
“controversial issues”, a dispute about how social, political, and economic life should be 
organized and conducted. 
For the purposes of this study, controversial issues in which science plays an 
important role will be analyzed.  Specifically, I am going to analyze conflicts in and 
around science for insights into issues that concern the various roles of scientists and non-
scientists in creating and interpreting the situation, the social construction and negotiation 
of scientific knowledge claims by disputing scientists and the public (Martin & Richards, 
2005) and finally, the ways in which scientists and the public might participate in 
decision making. The role of science as an area of knowledge, but as a method of 
acquiring knowledge too, the role of the scientific community as a professional social 
group, but also the role of scientists as individuals - either in the generation or in the 
discussion of such issues- will be analyzed within the chapter.  
If we set the phenomenon under a time momentum, it would be described as a social 
process with a beginning and an end. The stages, though not linear, of this phenomenon 
could be described as follows:  
1. Conflict is created among several social groups, due to several reasons. Different 
social groups are engaged in a process of argumentation.  
2. Social groups and the public in general, understand and interpret the situation, 
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thus formulating or changing positions. Several dialectical moves take place, 
including argumentation, at a personal or social level.   
3. Decision making could be done in personal, community, professional, national 
and global level. However, as soon as no consensus comes out about the issue, 
the issue remains controversial.  
The controversial nature of the issue is evident in all three stages:  different actions of 
several groups create conflict in the society. Different groups of the society interpret the 
situation in different ways and finally, they use different priorities and procedures in 
order to come to a decision. The analysis that will follow will focus on the three stages -
creation, interpretation and decision making about an issue - aiming to describe the points 
and levels of conflicts within those stages. 
 
2.1.1 The spark of the dispute: An issue is generated  
The central and increasingly contentious role of science and technology in modern 
society has given rise to a plethora of scientific and public controversies over scientific 
and technical issues (Martin & Richards, 2005, Sadler, et al., 2004). Additionally science 
has a role to play in the resolution of many of the issues deemed controversial in all 
societies (Oulton, et al., 2004).  
 
2.1.1.1 Moral and social responsibilities of scientists  
Science and technology affect the social: as social practices, science and technology 
do not simply affect society but they literally produce the social. Society is no longer the 
same after genetically modified plants have been released in the environment or after a 
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specific virus (e.g., HIV) has been identified (Roth & Désautels, 2004, p.154).  
Questions arise concerning the ascription of responsibilities to the scientists:   
scientists produce entities (bacteria, hormones, materials, etc.) that affect our lives and 
reconfigure social relations. It is predicted that the rapid acquisition of new genetic 
knowledge and related applications during the next decade will have significant 
implications for virtually all members of society (Lanie, et al., 2004). Cloning, stem cells, 
genome projects, global warming, and alternative fuels have become common elements 
of the national vocabulary as well as the currency of political debates (Sadler, 2004, 
p.513). The modification of our environment and of human nature, are issues that concern 
societal groups in the age of the “risk society.” 
What are the responsibilities of scientists? And how can the risks be assessed?  What 
if new methods of science like xenotransplantation might result in the transmission of 
viruses that would not only kill the recipient but could spread as an epidemic throughout 
the human species? What if the release of genetically modified crops in agriculture leads 
to environmental consequences, like the damage of non GM crops that we will never be 
able to restore?   
 
2.1.1.2 The products of science under moral consideration 
Additionally, the products of science are under moral consideration. Values of several 
social groups may come in conflict with the products of science. The discussion about 
GMF for example, includes arguments based on moral or metaphysical grounds claiming 
that such foods are incompatible with the fundamental values of certain individual moral 
agents or groups, such as religious and consumers groups (Pascalev, 2003, p.583).  
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Cloning is considered to be wrong under certain religion frames that modern culture, 
or scientific endeavour might not be able to conceive. The importance that Orthodox 
Church, for example, gives to human sexuality in the person’s salvation frames cloning 
as wrong: as cloning includes the reproduction outside from the bodily union of spouse 
with the spouse, is considered as inferior (Bonikos, 2000, p.49). 
In what stage of research should moral and ethical considerations of various groups 
enter the discussion? What is the point of discussing the moral aspects of a use of a 
product or a scientific method when it is already released?   
  
2.1.1.3 Value of gaining knowledge  
The value of gaining “knowledge“, “seeking for the truth”, the main core of science, 
but not of other social domains, constitutes in many controversial issues a reason for 
conflict. The pursuit of science as an activity is itself an implicit endorsement of the value 
of developing knowledge of the material world (Allchin, 1999, p.2). A significant number 
of scientists believe they have almost a moral duty to investigate new areas for study 
(Reiss, 2001).  
However, this value can be questioned under the existence of other values or costs. 
There are views supporting that when carrying out a piece of research, information 
gained or ideas generated would be of worth, capable to increase the sum  of human 
happiness or produce some other desirable benefits (Reiss, 2001). As any other domains 
that shape public and private life, science and technology become legitimate objects of 
reflection on the part of all citizens (Roth & Désautels, 2004, p.150). The autonomy that 
scientists should have is questioned: public cannot assume naively that scientists can 
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choose without any constraints their subjects for study (Reiss, 2001, p.180). 
When it comes to government funds given for scientific research, significant 
disagreements may be sparked in the public because of the different value that groups of 
people assign to “gaining knowledge” under the microscope of other needs, or morality. 
Priorities, as regarding funds, come up to the discussion: how can we know whether there 
are alternative possibilities for a problem to be solved and how would their efficacy 
compare with, new promising but, as yet, risky or morally questioned methods of 
science? (Levinson, 2008) Why should we spend 6 million dollars for HIV diagnosis in a 
country like Uganda that is able to afford to spend some $57, 000 on malaria prevention?  
Who is legitimate to decide about the usefulness of such research? On the other 
hand, what if future research, that would really be useful, is banned, because of “useless” 
current research?  
 
2.1.2 Ownership of information and products  
Within the public, an undercurrent of fear is discernable in their concern that 
scientific developments could be misused (Gamble & Kassardjian, 2008, p.251). 
Scientists’ ethics and morals are under the microscope as there is a concern that scientists 
and science are untrustworthy and fallible.  
A crucial issue that creates conflict is the ownership of information about significant 
findings such as human reproduction methods or health issues. Who should be 
responsible for setting down guidelines to use this information, given the moral and 
ethical issues involved? (Lazarowitz & Bloch, 2005, p.439) How would the guidelines 
and border lines of embryo selection, for example, be established? Who is responsible for 
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setting those guidelines? Who should regulate cloning or the production of GMF? And 
what if, eventually, the use of new technologies becomes available, because of its cost, 
only to specific social classes?  
 
2.1.2.1 Methods of science 
In many cases the controversy, or parts of it, may arise regarding the procedures of 
science as well. Ethics in the society demand proper treatment of animals and humans, 
for example, regardless of whether they are subjects of research or not. Science is not 
exempt from ethics or other social values (Allchin, 1999, p.6) and the resolution of issues 
concerning science’s products or procedures entails ethical reasoning (Ratcliffe & Grace, 
2003).   
The embryonic stem cell research, for example, is under public discussion and even 
the research holds promise for the treatment and cure of devastating conditions such as 
Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s disease, diabetes, and spinal cord injury, there are 
conflicting beliefs of several groups that the destruction of human embryos in stem-cell 
research amounts to the killing of human beings (Sandel & Phil, 2004, p.207).  
 
2.1.3 Understanding and interpreting the situation      
Emotional intensity, cultural contexts, value assumptions, laws, and interests differ 
drastically from one conflict to the next. Yet, the vast majority of disputes have at least 
one common element: relevant facts (Schultz, 2004). In the context of socioscientific 
issues, information, data and knowledge claims possess central importance in 
understanding and interpreting controversial issues; to evaluate alternative positions, one 
 42 
must collect information about those options (Sadler, 2004, p. 527).  
There are issues for which facts are not the central issue; they actually play a 
secondary role as the dispute is essentially over valuative, moral or other non-factual 
issues. Other entities such as feelings of entitlement, cultural and religious values, are 
perhaps more important and therefore the issue cannot be reduced to a factual debate 
(Schultz, 2004). Additionally, even if the discussion about the issue is related to science 
products or methods, the scientific information presented on those issues is rather a 
“readymade science”. This science is characterized by a “stable consensus which 
scientists consider unproductive to challenge” (Bingle & Gaskell, 1994, p. 187 as cited in 
Kolsto, 2001a, p. 295). 
However, the information presented to social groups is often incomplete, because of 
conflicting or incomplete scientific evidence and inevitably incomplete or conflicting 
reporting (Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003, p.2; Sadler, 2004, p.527). Knowledge claims or 
theories about such issues might not have been established by the scientific community 
yet; there are issues about which the science involved is “frontier science”, “science in 
the making”, “disputed science” and sometimes there is disagreement between the 
experts involved (Kolsto, 2000, p.652; Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003, p.21).  
How can we tell the effects of genetically modified food on our health, if the 
consequences are to be met in a number of years after consumption of such foods? 
(Kolsto, 2001a, p.293)  How can we decide about whether power transmission lines 
constitute a health hazard when different researches and institutions have been giving 
different estimates and evaluations of the possible risk? (Sadler, 2004, p.516) 
When the issue comes to the public level, social groups and individuals make 
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different decisions on aspects related to the selection of evidence, the interpretation of 
evidence, and finally the evaluation of evidence in terms of relevance and validity.  
Disagreements upon the procedure of selecting, interpreting and evaluating 
information are shown up as epistemology interacts with the interests of the stakeholders 
(Geddis, 1991, p. 180). Scientists, citizens, or governments have different demands for 
evidence underpinning knowledge claims; those demands may vary as individuals and 
groups are influenced by different interests and values (Kolsto, 2000). Studies have 
shown, for example, that religious and ideological values appear to filter the influence of 
information disseminated by scientific institutions (Nisbet & Goidel, 2007). Finally, 
many conflicts are made worse because of information that is misinterpreted or 
misunderstood (Schultz, 2004).  
 
2.1.3.1 The role of the public in evaluating scientific evidence  
One question that arises in the context of evaluating scientific evidence is the role and 
status of the public in conducting such an evaluation. The question focuses on the ability 
of the public in the evaluation of experts’ statements, when experts still disagree.  
On the one hand, there is a view that the evaluation of scientific claims would not be 
possible to be done by the public, as lay people cannot adopt the same standards as 
scientists (Kolsto, 2001a, p.304). Still, a dominant perspective in the United States, the 
science literacy model, assumes that knowledge boosts public acceptance of the scientific 
worldview. Such a claim though if related to  different pieces of research suggesting that 
public’s knowledge is inadequate, might conclude that scientists should remain 
independent from societal control (Nisbet & Goidel, 2007, p.421).  
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Actually, there is a concern about the understanding of the concepts or scientific 
theories that are embedded in the subject. There are beliefs, even studies, that support the 
view that citizens lack the capacity to understand a scientific topic, describing lay 
people’s interaction  when entering the discussion as rarely if ever narrowly cognitive 
(Irwin, 2001; Jenkins, 1997 as cited Solomon, 1999, p.67).  
Those views describe naïve citizens who rely on experts because they lack the 
motivation or time to be informed on one hand, and the capacity to process that 
knowledge on the other.  Due to this expertise inadequacy, citizens -according to this 
view- might even imply that scientific knowledge is not relevant to the primary issues at 
stake. Science is presented as detached from the social, thus leaving citizens considering 
the debate to be really about morality or politics (Michael, 1996 as cited in Irwin, 2001, 
p.6).  
On the other hand, there are sides that support that, when the public is engaged in a 
procedure of evaluating scientific claims, is actually asking epistemological questions 
concerning the underlying contextual pressures that might guide scientific research; the 
interpretation of those questions does not necessarily require an understanding of 
scientific concepts or theories (Kolsto, 2001a, p. 304).  
If we accept that citizens have the right to be informed and evaluate scientific 
evidence then what information should made available to the general public about 
advances in science, like biosciences? (Irwin, 2001, p.6) For many people within the 
scientific community, there is a widespread belief that the general public is unable to 
conceptualize uncertainties associated with risk management processes: providing public 
with information about uncertainty would increase distrust in science and scientific 
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institutions as well as cause panic and confusion (Frewer, et al., 2003). A real problem 
that might arise is that scientific developments could be banned because of fear and 
panic. But is it better leaving the public in the blind just because panic is going to be 
spread? How can we trust evaluation from the public when most people get exposed to 
information about biomedical and other issues only through stories publicized in the 
media? (Blok, et al., 2008, p.189)  
Our society, after the crisis that the public had about its trust in science, enters a new 
era, where science and public could stand a dialogue in transparency. Citizens need and 
ask to be informed. In the discussion of health issues, for example, NGO’s in the US have 
called for the right-to-know-more: they demand that data about chemical use in 
manufacturing and products, not simply factory emissions, should be compiled and made 
publicly available (Iles, 2007, p.371). As science enters the public, a new type of science 
is generated: citizen science, a meeting point between different forms of understandings, 
opening up the possibility of cross-fertilization between them (Irwin, 1995).  
 
2.1.3.2 Epistemological issues concerning scientific evidence  
During the discussion of a controversial issue, scientific evidence, complete or 
incomplete, competing or not within the scientific community, becomes available to the 
public through different channels, but primarily by the media. In such cases, consciously 
or not, individuals perform evaluations of such evidence by asking several 
epistemological questions.  
Epistemological views of individuals influence the way in which evidence is selected 
and evaluated, and is considered to have bearing on views of the nature of socioscientific 
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issues (Zeidler &Keefer, 2003, p.13).  Knowledge of the nature of science as an 
institution holding on one side  epistemic values, but also vulnerable to contextual 
pressures, can serve as tools to interpret scientific statements, and help determine how 
results are interpreted and used (Sadler, et al., 2006, p.354, Kolsto, 2001b, p. 890). 
Different epistemological questions addressed to the same piece of evidence, or 
different standards applied for providing answers to those epistemological questions, 
might be a cause for different views regarding the trust, validity and relevance of selected 
evidence.  
The following paragraphs elaborate the characteristics of scientific knowledge and 
science as an institution that determines different questions and standards for the 
evaluation of scientific evidence. 
 
2.1.3.3 The limits of scientific knowledge  
In the discussion of controversial issues, different social domains impinge upon the 
decision making: religion, science, ethics, politics, law and others (Aikenhead, 1985). 
Science is a domain that has certain values that guide the actions of its members.  These 
are particularly epistemic values, which guide scientific research:  reliability, testability, 
accuracy, precision, generality, simplicity of concepts and heuristic power that define 
science’s character as a distinct way of knowing (Allchin, 1999). Even if scientific 
knowledge has an exceptional status in the society there is controversy concerning this 
status: the limits of scientific knowledge are questionable among several domains, like 
religion for example. The neutral, disinterested and objective expert that has been 
promoted in many cases as the rational and authoritative arbiter of public disputes over 
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scientific or technical issues has been eroded: scientific knowledge has obvious 
limitations in resolving issues of public controversy (Martin & Richards, 2005). 
Additionally, multicultural concerns also raise the issue of the status of knowledge in 
various cultural groups. In the science area, common sense and local (traditional) 
knowledge are considered as inferior or worthless types of knowledge (Roth & Désautels, 
2004, p.154).  Those evaluations might deal with the dichotomy between beliefs and 
knowledge and ask whether the cultural knowledge about natural world, as it is assigned 
to various beliefs, could constitute knowledge (Southerland, et al., 2001, p. 326). The 
dichotomy between beliefs-values and knowledge create questions such as “what is fact”, 
“is a statement a fact or a belief?” Those questions are answered differently because of 
different epistemological orientations and additionally, because of different standpoints 
as the authority of reason in acquiring knowledge are concerned.  
For example, the  positivists declare that only facts derived from experiment and 
observation, could be called truth, and they reject all talk about values (ethics, morals, 
religion, philosophy) not only as “preferences without foundation” but as meaningless or 
“non-cognitive” babble (Harris, 2004, p.5). On the other hand, there are other 
perspectives that, in trying to answer the questions of “What is a fact?” and “For whom is 
it considered a fact, and why?” they do not talk of “proving”; proof means different 
things within different knowledge domains. Those perspectives rather discuss the 
underpinning meanings of a piece of evidence (Kolsto, 2001a, p. 299-300).  
 
2.1.3.4 The social nature of scientific research   
The authority that individuals or groups assign to science can become a source of 
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conflict. Values that guide scientific procedures have given an authority to scientific 
knowledge above other forms of knowledge, as the conclusions of science themselves are 
accorded an image of value (Allchin, 1999, p. 11). Within the scientific community, 
objectivity and neutrality are highly valued (Kolsto, 2001a, p.299). There seems to be 
agreement on constitutive values to be an indivisible part of scientific inquiry 
(Aikenhead, 1985), but disagreement about to which degree contextual values trickle into 
science (Kolsto, 2001a, p. 301).  
The authority of science is challenged. The view that science represents a uniquely 
valid approach to knowledge disconnected from social institutions, their politics and 
wider cultural beliefs and values is strongly challenged by research (Lemke, 2001, p. 
297). Science is not value free; it is value-laden with contextual values (Casper, 1980; 
Longino, 1983; Mc Connel, 1982; Schurr, 1981; Ziman, 1980 as cited in Aikenhead, 
1985, p. 457). Experts cannot guarantee their “objectivity” by their specialist access to 
some rigorous scientific methodology: scientific research is a contingent practice and is 
subject to interrogation of the assumptions that underlie its moment-to-moment decision-
making process (Roth & Désautels, 2004, p.152).   
Science, as a human enterprise, is embedded in the culture from which it emanates 
and is affected by and reflects the values and norms of a given society at a given time 
(Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, & Lederman, 1998; McComas, Clough, & Almazroa, 2000 as 
cited in Sadler, 2004, p. 355). As a result, scientific theories tend to be “contextualized”, 
i.e. consistent with the prevailing norms of both the scientific community and of the 
greater society (Kuhn, 1970; Hubbard, 1990; Harding, 1993 as cited in Sadler & Zeidler, 
2006, p.263). 
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As Roth and Désautels (2004) cite, scientific knowledge can no longer claim 
epistemologically exceptional status but has to interact with other forms of knowledge on 
an equal footing in the decision making process (Roth & Désautels, 2004, p.154). Even if 
it holds an exceptional status in Western societies, science is still a way of knowing, not 
the only way of knowing (AAAS, 1993). 
 
2.1.3.5 Science vulnerable to contextual pressures  
The history of science provides examples of cultural prejudice based on scientific 
errors and unethical science practised by business and government as well (Sadler & 
Zeidler, 2006). When interpreting expert statements and their discussions over scientific 
knowledge claims, the consideration of epistemological factors serves as a tool for 
understanding and makes it easier to respect the views of antagonists (Kolsto, 2000, 
p.650). Examples of such epistemological factors are the impact of values or motives that 
scientists hold as individuals (i.e. funding), or values that science holds as community of 
practitioners, like peer recognition.  
Companies are likely to make a fortune through the development of scientific 
techniques that can improve or save human lives. Pharmaceutical companies are under 
pressure to make profits. Scientists, on the other hand, are under competitive pressure to 
obtain grants and to publish. How far are science and technology compromised by the 
quest for profit? (Levinson, 2008). Science, in many cases, can be seen as a combination 
of business and politics (Cross & Price, 1996, p.779) striving to maintain elimination 
toward the influence of political and economical interests on their theories.  
Scientists are not supposed to let personal or institutional interests have any impact 
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on their scientific work. Even if there is no doubt that objectivity and neutrality are ideals 
for most scientists, these ideals are sometimes difficult to achieve (Kolsto, 2001a, p. 299). 
In cases when scientific knowledge is inconclusive, science is more vulnerable to 
contextual pressures, making it more value-laden. Scientists involved in debates on 
controversial issues tend to be more critical of the evidence the antagonists are offering, 
than of the evidence their own conclusions are based on (Collingridge & Reeve, 1986 as 
cited in Kolsto, 2001a, p. 299).  
There is now a widespread public perception that experts can and do disagree with, 
and that their purportedly "disinterested" advice may be influenced by professional, 
economic, or political considerations (Martin & Richards, 2005).   
 
2.1.3.6 The status of anecdotal evidence 
The public uses its own knowledge base to produce its own evidence, known as 
“anecdotal evidence”. Anecdotal evidence is based on “popular epistemology”, as 
defined by Irwin (1995) and is concerned with local and specific situations, while science 
aims at universally applicable theories and explanations (Driver, et al., 1996).  
The role of anecdotal evidence has evolved numerous debates involving lay and 
professional views about the issue. Citizens seem to highly value “anecdotal evidence”, 
as it has been shown to be of great relevance and importance in several cases (Irwin, 
1995).  Scientists question the status of anecdotal evidence and usually accept evidence 
that has been produced with standards that are highly valued in the scientific community. 
Evidence has to be public, inter - subjective, and open to validation for anyone interested 
(Trany, 1986 as cited in Kolsto, 2001a, p. 301). Scientists assign citizens’ value to 
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anecdotal evidence to be caused by a lack of understanding.  
Though not accepted by the scientific community, anecdotal evidence can point to 
the existence of a problem; it could be used as the input of information of the public to 
the scientific community that hold the tools to provide statistical evidence that is needed 
to distinguish between competing explanations of it (Kolsto, 2001a, p. 301). In cases of 
products and methods that are related to human health risks, non-governmental 
organizations are critiquing regulatory science, attempting to change standards of 
evidence and proof, and introducing data about product use. We could argue that in an 
ideal mode, under a very complex process of science-policy-political interactions that 
Krimsky (2000 as cited in Iles, 2007, p.377) explores, regulatory agencies, researchers, 
and environmental health institutes should expand their research to scrutinize health 
outcomes, related to the use of specific products not previously included in research.  
On a different level, the synthesis of individual lay and professional views with 
research findings could point to some important factors that would have otherwise been 
missed. Synthesis of anecdotal evidence with that from scientific literature in widely 
debated public issues would help in filling the gaps in evidence base and in planning 
effect (Nagaraj, 2006).  
Recognition of and demands for further investigations on potential health hazards 
have often come through workers in gas industries, plastic workers, textile workers, and 
so on, with asbestos workers as the best known example (Irwin, 1995, as cited in Kolsto, 
2001a, p.301). Individuals and NGOs like consumer and environmental groups expand 
their role beyond of that of evaluating and criticizing scientific evidence to that of 
producing of technical knowledge.  Iles (2007) describes the case where very little 
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information was available on consumers’ exposures of phthalates, a family of existing 
chemicals used in chemical manufacturing primarily as a plasticizer additive in PVC. In 
this case NGOs are taking on a new role of producing scientific and technical data that 
can feed into regulatory science and influence decision-makers as well as citizens and 
consumers This data can be merged with  emerging scientific results that argue that some 
phthalate uses were “unsafe” (Iles, 2007, p.375-378).  
However, the case is not always like that. Anecdotal evidence is often ignored by 
scientists. Professional and social groups and government bodies use scientists’ authority, 
not only for providing evidence, but also to determine the focus of the study. As a result, 
what is perceived as technical ignorance by experts overlooks valuable forms of localized 
knowledge among networks of citizens, leading to feelings of alienation and distrust 
among the affected social group (Irwin & Michael 2003; Wynne, 1992 as cited in Nisbet 
& Goidel, 2007, p.422). Citizens feel fear that their concerns cannot be expressed and 
their observations and own conclusions, though unfounded, are not seriously considered. 
When it comes to public health issues, like the possible effects of the consumption of 
genetically modified foods, public concerns are arrogantly dismissed as irrational and 
emotional (Irwin, 2001).  
Science no longer represents “enlightenment,” but a force to be struggled against, 
especially when it comes to environmental and public health issues, where citizens’ 
experiences may suggest the opposite when met with scientifically based reassurances 
(Kolsto, 2001a, p. 303). 
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2.1.4 Decision making about controversial issues  
Controversial issues are not problems of scientists in the laboratory, or of politicians 
in the government board. There is always a decision to be made that affects the social. 
Controversial issues are problems of the society. Hess (2001) uses the term 
“Controversial Public Issues” stressing that some public either informs or makes a 
decision about such issues.  
Even if the public is not always capable of acting on societal level, these issues 
include, apart from forming opinions, the making of choices at personal or societal level 
(Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003, p.12). Finding solutions and deciding upon such issues is not 
easy, as the issues are by definition complex, open-ended, often contentious dilemmas, 
with no definitive answers (Sadler, 2004, p. 516).  
 
2.1.4.1 The role of values   
The discussion of controversial issues requires the consideration of ethical issues and 
construction of moral judgments about scientific topics via social interaction and 
discourse (Zeidler & Keefer, 2003, p. 9). Political, economic, ethical, scientific and 
ideological values give an ‘ethical’ context for conflict resolution as they frame the ways 
groups of people ought to act in relation to controversial issues (Aikenhead, 1985, p.453). 
Those values also affect the risk evaluations, in a cost - benefit analysis about the issue 
(Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003).  
Because we have different wishes, values and beliefs, society is loaded with these 
sorts of conflicts (Kolsto, 2000). Controversial issues are “moral”: they are associated 
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with the rightness or wrongness of an action towards such issues (Levinson & Turner, 
2001, p.16).  
As Bailey (1971) cites:  
“A controversy is about human action and thus, is only 
understandable if valuative considerations are included. That is, 
any attempt to explain the controversy, to one self or to others, 
that leaves out value positions will fall short of being an 
acceptable explanation or a coherent understanding.” (p.69) 
 
Reference to factual information, experiment, or evidence alone cannot settle 
controversial issues as political, economic, ethical, scientific and ideological values are 
interrelated in the decision making process (Bridges 1986; Wellington, 1986; Aikenhead, 
1985).  
Different groups offer different solutions to controversial issues as they are attached 
to different values (Aikenhead, 1985; Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003; Kolsto, 2000; Bridges, 
1986; Demopoulos & Koulaidis, 2003; Sadler, 2004; Wellington, 1986). Value systems 
differ both in personal and group level in the society and among societies as well. 
Members of the same society share a common life within a variety of activities, 
institutions, and traditions that they ‘agree’ on standards that lay down within each other 
(Elliot, 1973, p. 53).  
At another level, several sections of the society share a number of social activities 
and traditions and raise conflicting judgments to other different sections of the society.  
Moreover, even if several individuals, groups or nations hold the same values, they may 
assign different priority to the same value or different interpretation to the same value 
(Bridges, 1986, p.21).  
Pajares (1992) explained that clusters of beliefs around a particular situation form 
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attitudes, and attitudes become action agendas that guide decisions and behaviour. In 
other words, people act upon what they believe (as cited in Lumpe, et al., 2000, p.277). 
These differing views on an issue usually imply different emphases (based on a range of 
values) placed by individuals and groups on the needs of society and social groups and 
consequently, might affect the decision on the issue under discussion (Oulton, et al., 
2004, p. 413). 
Several studies designed to explore patterns of reasoning regarding socioscientific 
controversial issues have reported that ethical concerns are among the most important 
factors for individual decision-making in all ages and across a variety of issue contexts 
including genetic engineering, biomedical research, environmental problems, and animal 
rights (Sadler, et al., 2006, p. 354).  
Participants who are engaged in socioscientific issues base their decisions primarily 
on personal values, morals, ethics, and social concerns rather than on scientific 
knowledge (Bell & Lederman, 2003; Nisbet & Goidel, 2007). Beliefs regarding the 
spheres of science, spirituality, business - technology, nature - environment, and family -
society frequently emerge in the discussions of controversial issues (Small, 2003 as cited 
in Gamble & Kassardjian, 2008, p.246).  
Decisions are based on identification of values and on personal criteria rather than on 
knowledge of scientific data, especially when more emphasis is placed on “science in the 
making” (Aikenhead, 2004; Fensham, 2002 as cited in Albe, 2008, p.3).  Argumentation 
has been found not to differ among groups that hold different scientific backgrounds; 
groups in different educational levels, for example, tend to focus on similar, sociomoral 
themes as they negotiate socially complex, genetic engineering issues (Sadler & Flower, 
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2006).   
There is a strong implication that when the issue concerns values, equally rational 
possibilities come up and that reason will not help in the decision of which is the right 
one (Bailey, 1971). As a result, a controversial issue cannot be solved by means of value-
free evaluations or calculations, but has to be negotiated; because of values, there is no 
rational way by which we can come to consensus (Eliot, 1973). Therefore, we need 
politics and discussions to weigh values that in principle cannot be weighted (Kolsto, 
2001a, p. 298; Elliot, 1973). As Eliot (1973) cites: 
“The process of coming to view things in a different light is 
neither rational nor irrational; it is non-rational.” (p. 61)  
 
 
2.1.4.2 The context of the decision making  
An area of dispute is the framing of the decision to be made (Aikenhead, 1985). 
Within any issue there are many different types of question to address; additionally, 
people view the issue in different ways (Levinson, 2008). Interests, needs and values 
might frame the same problem under different limits and lead to different decisions. Not 
all sides of the society are involved in each issue (Aikenhead, 1985). However, framing 
the issue by one way or another, will lead to different decisions and solutions that leave 
out several groups. For example, in the genetically modified food discussion, there is still 
no single widely agreed ethical framework within which genetically modified crops can 
be evaluated (Reiss, 2001, p.180). Issues are framed and reframed as different people that 
inhabit different value systems both within and between cultures enter the discussion. 
However, whenever a decision is to be made at a collective level, this is taken under 
certain people, with certain needs, interests and values.  
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As a result, the definition of the problem to be managed is a controversial issue per 
se. How can the issue be defined?   Who gets to decide what counts as a legitimate 
problem for discussion? (Irwin, 2001, p.4)   
 
2.1.4.3 Macromorality and micromorality level  
The context of the decision making is also situated in two levels: one of 
macromorality and one of micromorality (Zeidler, et al., 2004). In a macromorality level, 
usually the effort is not to provide a decision towards one direction or another rather than 
to provide a frame for decision making balancing different benefits, risks and duties 
(Dawson & Taylor, 1998, p.318). Reasoning about societal constructs - laws, duty and 
social institutions- rests in a different level rather than trying to resolve differences in a 
personal level, via argumentation and discussion during face to face interactions (Rest, et 
al., 1999). Macromorality level, though providing support for more complex moral 
judgments by examining societal conventions from a theoretical perspective, has been 
criticized for inattention to the micromorality questions that arise in individuals’ 
everyday lives (Krebs & Denton, 2005 as cited in Ross, 2006; Rest, et al., 1999). 
The distinction between those two modes of reasoning might produce different 
outcomes in a decision making procedure, but also explain the distance between people’s 
beliefs and actions (Zeidler, et al., 2004). In real life people make moral decisions about 
themselves and others that matter; the consequences are real (Krebs & Denton, 2005, p. 
647). Micromorality thus, describes the level in which people grapple with everyday 
issues rather than philosophize about morality. 
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2.1.4.4 The role of the public in deciding  
Democratic ideology suggests that people must be able to influence policy decisions 
that affect their lives, being involved somehow in decision making about such issues 
(Dolbe, 1995; Irwin, 2001). Along with decline of public trust in the infallibility and 
neutrality of expertise has come a growing demand for greater public participation in 
scientific and technical decision-making and policy formulation (Martin & Richards, 
2005).  
 The public interacts in controversial issues in many levels. Does the public inform 
(Hess, 2001), being informed, just “presented” to such issues, does it offer solutions, does 
it decide? (Hess, 2001; Demopoulos & Koulaidis, 2003; Crick Report, 1998) The 
answers to those questions define the level of democracy in a society - citizens’ rights to 
decide for themselves- but also describe the citizenship level; the citizen’s willingness to 
act in such a mode.   
One of the problems arising when it comes to controversial scientific issues is the 
ability of the public to participate thoughtfully and effectively in the process of 
developing policy responses to such controversies. Many of the issues that society 
confronts today contain risk evaluations in the decision making process. One model of 
risk evaluations is based on the experts’ knowledge: through techniques of risk 
assessments, experts often come to define the boundaries of environmental problems as 
well as their proper solution. However, this tactic is widely believed to suffer from a lack 
of public understanding and legitimacy, thus leading to a “lay-expert discrepancy” (Blok, 
et al., 2008, p. 189). 
Different views of the situation spark conflict at a political level. There are 
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researchers, experts and government agencies which interpret the public’s demands for 
participation in decision making as:  
“endless demands from private interests and self-appointed 
representatives, who lack the requisite technical knowledge to 
assess decisions and thus making it impossible for the public to 
maintain a reasonable involvement in the decision making 
process.” (Doble, 1995, p. 45-46)  
 
Those who believe that scientific knowledge is one of great importance for evaluating 
scientific claims, express their concerns in the light of research that reveals lack of 
understanding about basic science related to an issue, like genetics for example, (Lanie, et 
al., 2004), about the significant implications of this lack when it comes to the decision 
making process. Risk evaluation of the public is thought to be done in terms of fear and 
of the unknown, as the far-reaching benefits in areas of medicine and public health from 
recent biomedical research cannot be enhanced if people do not have an understanding of 
basic concepts and terminology (Burke, et al., 2002).  
Expanding the sceptical of this technocratic view, decisions that would guide 
scientific endeavour could not be left in the hands of citizens guided by horror.  Why do 
we have such a horror of cloning? Why is this technology seen as particularly unnatural 
whereas other non-natural technologies are readily accepted by society? (Levinson, 2008) 
Is it a matter of time? Why are we regarding GMF as “Frankenstein” food whereas we 
are not surprised by dozens of chemicals used in conventional food? Should we let 
“ignorant” citizens take decisions?   
On the other hand, there is a widespread view that differences in risk perception must 
be understood at the level of social identities and not that of knowledge (Blok, et al., 
2008). Studies have shown that citizens’ considered judgments about controversial issues 
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were generally in line with the views of the scientists and that differences that persisted 
seem to stem from different values, not from different levels of technical expertise 
(Dolbe, 1995). According to Dolbe (1995), those results suggest that the general public 
can reach a clear, understandable, logically consistent, considered judgment about 
scientifically complex issues, though this is underestimated by government and expertise 
bodies (Doble, 1995, p. 107).  
Finally, there is a view that not only is the public able to engage in a decision making 
process, but its presence in policy making is essential. These views demand not only an 
“add on” participation of the public in decision making, but a  direct engagement which 
would be a “normal and integral part of the process of decision making” (Irwin, 2001, 
p.2). At present, it is increasingly being recognized that participatory techniques for the 
involvement of stakeholders, ranging from ordinary citizens to business people, are 
needed - with particular emphasis on public trust and the articulation of environmental 
and social values (Kasemir, et al., 2000; Irwin, 2001).  
Additionally to values and morals of public that have to enter the discussion, “civic 
epistemology” - “the practices, methods, and institutions by which the community 
identifies new policy issues, generates knowledge relevant to their resolution, and puts 
that knowledge to use in making decisions” (Miller, 2005, p. 406 as cited in Iles, 2007, 
p.171)  - can help illuminate how environmental health is being used to identify product 
risks and change the regulatory science that decision makers use to control products (Iles, 
2007). 
Therefore, experts and policy makers may, because of the demands of the citizenry, 
be forced to learn how to communicate more effectively about scientific issues and 
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involve the public in the decision-making process (Doble, 1995, p. 103). This requires 
much greater transparency and openness within decision-making. As the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) (2001) cites: 
“Those directly affected by an environmental matter should 
always have the accepted right to make their views known 
before a decision is taken about it. Giving them that opportunity 
is also likely to improve the quality of decisions; drawing on a 
wider pool of knowledge and understanding (lay as well as 
professional) can give warning of obstacles that, unless removed 
or avoided, would impede effective implementation of a 
particular decision. . . .” (As cited in Irwin, 2001, p.2) 
 
We live in the era of dialogue; things change and knowledge, values and morals are 
being assimilated in a new setting. This is a procedure that has always taken place; it is 
rather faster in our time. In this assimilation science and public, scientific knowledge and 
“civic epistemology” enter, or at least should enter, an arena of open dialogue:  science, 
policy, and politics are enmeshed and interactive, not separate realms of cognitive and  
societal activity (Jasanoff, 2005 as cited in Iles, 2007, p.173). 
 62 
 
2.2 Controversial issues and science curriculum  
Previous paragraphs have elaborated the nature of controversial issues as a societal 
construct that involves science and the society interacting in levels of knowledge and 
decision making. The aim of this subchapter is to elaborate how this complicated 
construct might be a subject in school science classrooms.  
The paragraphs that follow aim to shed light on perspectives related to the 
implementation of controversial issues in science education, not by mentioning all of 
them, but by trying to highlight the areas of conflict among them. Different frameworks 
will be presented according to the following areas that have been found as important, 
while analyzing them:  
• The relationship that they assign to science curriculum and controversial issues 
teaching, and  accordingly different pedagogical outcomes that they propose 
• The nature of science that is promoted through them 
• The role of values and moral development , and finally 
• The role of emotions  
By using the following classification of frameworks, I do not assume that the 
relationships of the dimensions mentioned above are static and definite. Actually, they 
fall under the interpretation of the writer. However, the way that the chapter is organized 
aims to shed light on how different pedagogical needs for including controversial issues 
in science education, or how controversial issues might contribute to scientific literacy, 
promote different pedagogical outcomes and views of scientific knowledge, but also are 
problematic either in philosophical or psychological grounds (is it right, is it 
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achievable?). Additionally, a classification like this might be helpful in realizing what is 
going on in a science classroom, when a controversial issue is explored.  
 
2.2.1 Science education for citizenship: Science view for thoughtful decision making  
One of the frameworks proposed for the use of controversial issues in science can be 
described as “science education for citizenship” (Crick Report, 1998; Wellington, 2004). 
According to this perspective, teaching with or about controversial issues is done under 
the use of science as a lesson, unique and indispensable, that could make a significant 
contribution to citizenship education (Wellington, 2004, p.34; Crick Report, 1998, p.35; 
Ractliffe & Grace, 2003). 
National curricula are called to meet the needs of preparing active citizens: those 
who are willing, able and equipped to have an influence in public life, citizens that should 
have the critical capacities to weigh evidence before speaking and acting (Crick Report, 
1998, p.11). Students should get learning opportunities, which require the use of higher 
thinking skills, such as analysis, synthesis, critical reflection, and evaluation of their ideas 
about social and ethical issues (Lazarowitz & Bloch, 2005, p.442). 
Pupils learn about how to make themselves effective in public life through 
knowledge, skills, and values (Birzea, 2005, p.910). Knowledge about scientific theories 
that embed the subjects under discussion, skills of enquiry and communication needed for 
the discussion of such issues, and responsible action and participation are the three 
pedagogical outcomes that fall on both areas: science and citizenship (Wellington, 2004; 
Ractliffe & Grace, 2003; Davies, 2004). Science education, thus, should enable students 
to develop skills such as  
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• the understanding and the ability to recognise bias 
• the ability to recognise and evaluate argument,  
• the ability to weigh evidence put before them, questioning and evaluating where 
information comes from, who put it there and how its presented (Wellington, 
2004, p.34) and to look for alternative interpretations, viewpoints and sources of 
evidence (Crick Report, 1998, p.61) and  
•  the ability to identify objective scientific evidence as well as evaluating the 
advantages and disadvantages of different possible solutions to a problem based 
on the available evidence (Ractliffe & Grace, 2003, p.40).  
The place of values according to this project could be described under a moral -
character education in which social and moral responsibility should be developed 
progressively as pupils move through schooling (Crick Report, 1998, p. 32). The ultimate 
goal is to educate students who will act as informed, responsible citizens when 
confronted with such issues. Students, under the moral education notion, are called to 
develop some “qualities of mind” such as  
• a willingness and empathy to perceive and understand the interests, beliefs  and 
viewpoints of others  
• a willingness and ability to participate in decision-making, to value freedom, to 
choose between alternatives, and to value fairness as a basis for making and 
judging decisions (Crick Report, 1998, p.59). 
There are general statements of the report that refer to the moral development of the 
students (Crick Report, 1998, p.59) declaring that:   
“Students should be helped, in particular, to reflect on and 
recognise values and dispositions which underlie their attitudes and 
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actions as individuals and as members of groups or communities.” 
(p.41) 
 
However, the emphasis given in the aims stated in the report is on the “duties” and 
“responsibilities” of students rather than self reflection procedures. The values are 
described as established morals and ethics situated in the community in an unproblematic 
manner, not recognizing the complexity of rearrangement of the social as an impact of 
scientific endeavour.  
The stronger connection between science and citizenship education, as far as moral 
character education is concerned, seems to be the transmission of values of science to the 
students, according to this framework. Science education is viewed as a discipline where 
values such as the willingness and ability to apply reasoning skills to problems and the 
respect for truth and evidence in forming or holding opinions (Crick Report, 1998, p. 59) 
could be cultivated. Students should base their decisions on science, according to this 
framework, which is interpersonal, and rooted in a community of scholars, based on 
accumulated evidence, open to scrutiny and falsification (Wellington, 2004, p.36). 
The nature of science presented in documents describing the “education for 
citizenship” framework, is rather an authoritarian one. Science is viewed as a place where 
“truth” can be directly connected to evidence and “reasoning skills” are seen to possess a 
vital role in the resolution of such issues. As Wellington (2004, p.36) argues, all the 
ethical and moral decisions we have to make about the distribution of resources, feeding 
the world’s population or preserving the ecosystem of the planet are grounded in the 
physical and natural world and therefore are grounded in science.  
This framework, even if it offers a strong connection to traditional science 
curriculum and citizenship education, has several shortcomings. Firstly, it fails to deal 
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with the social nature of scientific knowledge. How are students going to engage in 
controversy, weighing contrary scientific evidence when they are “seeking the truth” and 
not asking epistemological questions? How can the “science view” be applicable when 
scientists still disagree? One might argue that if science is presented as a discipline that 
holds the answer, there is a danger that science education would not  prepare citizens to 
deal with real-world science, which is more often than not equivocal, reversionary and 
conflicting (Bell, 1995, p. 63, as cited in Gray & Bryce, 2006, p.179). 
Additionally, the framework is problematic on psychological grounds as it leaves out 
students’ own values and interests - which are regarded as personal and unreliable - 
alongside values and methods of science. Methods like these present a “mystique” of 
science that makes it seem dogmatic, authoritarian, impersonal and even inhuman to 
many students (Lemke, 1990, p.12). This argument however does not seem to sound 
strong for those who believe that curriculum should be grounded on philosophical rather 
than psychological assumptions: what students like can never be the determinant of 
curriculum contnet (Hall, 2004, p.27).  
The problems that might be encountered though in pedagogical level, could go 
beyond students’ dislike of science. Giving the “science view” of the problem 
(Wellington, 2004; Kolsto, 2000), requires isolation of issues of evidence in a whole 
network of values and interests that students bring to the classroom. If evidence cannot 
settle those issues alone, how should  the science dimension be presented in the 
classroom? Which pedagogical decisions could make this possible?  
One possible solution that Wellington (2004) offers and seems reasonable in some, 
but not all issues, is promoting key ideas that should influence our ethics that are science 
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based. Science curriculum should actively promote an environmental ethic, a conception 
of human beings as being part of the environment and not apart from it, and a philosophy 
of education for sustainabiilty (p.38). Science education should promote a “global 
citizenship” and “enable students to develop the eclectic values of an educated member 
of society” from the global awareness perspective: students should learn about world 
problems, share the world and act in a worldwide perspective (Birzea, 2005, p.9; 
Lazarowitz & Bloch, 2005, p.438). A curriculum like that would  promote science as a 
way of influencing morals and thus, guiding decisions that go beyond scientific evidence.  
Finally, the frameworks’ manifest, the authority of scientific knowledge upon other 
forms of knowledge, is highly questioned if it fails to recognize the limits of scientific 
knowledge. Even if this argument gives a great strength in the relationship of citizenship 
and traditional science education, it is not applicable in issues where strong religion or 
emotional elements embed the issues under discussion. What would be the “science 
view” of cloning? Perhaps finding a reliable way to estimate the possible impacts of this 
endeavour and put it under the morals of sustainable development? Even if we agree, as 
science teachers, to do that, in the sake of promoting a science view, how could this be 
possible with moral agents in the classroom that might hold strongly religious beliefs 
towards one or another direction? Does this mean that we describe  religion as a 
“dogmatic” way of thinking, based on belief and faith, and thus, inferior to “scientific”, 
reason guided, based on accumulated evidence way of thinking and therefore, try to 
remove students from one momentum to the other? Which is the level, or status, that 
those elements - religion, emotions, science-  should be presented in the classroom? I 
would not say that “view from science” framework would give a definite answer to this 
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question, even if one could argue that this framework would rather promote  scientific 
authority upon other forms of knowledge.  
Not even a “view from religion” would give such an answer. The view of science 
and religion as areas  that hold the answers is problematic. If the answers were either on 
one discipline or the  other, then no need for discussion. Why has the Greek Orthodox 
Church established a bioethics committee - that includes scientists also - if it already 
holds the answers? On the other hand, why do scientists not always make the best 
decisions for their own lives?  
Concluding, I would say that helping students to see the science view of 
controversial issues is a vital part of introducing SSI accroding to this framework. If 
science teachers would not do it, who else would ? (Wellington, 2004) However, thinking 
scientifically about controversial issues implies a clear distinction beteween value and 
reason (Bailey, 1977), faith and science (Wellington, 2004), distinctions that might be 
evident only in a philosophical level, and also problematic when considering students’ 
moral and religious beliefs.  Furthermore, presenting the science view would be 
problematic in cases where there is no consensus in the scientific community for such a 
view, and additionally might be epistemologically and pedagogically problematic if it is 
introduced in a way that does not recognize the limitations of science as a discipline.   
 
2.2.2 Controversial issues for science education: Epistemological issues in focus   
Other initiatives, derived from the need of science education to meet the needs of 
citizenship education, located in the science education area, have given different 
perspectives to the role of science in the resolution of such issues (Ratcliffe & Grace, 
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2003; Fullick & Ratcliffe, 1996; Kolsto, 2000). Even if the starting point is the need of 
science teaching to meet the needs of citizenship education, the argument that socio-
scientific issues can make an important contribution in learning science is, perhaps, the 
greatest strength that frames the pedagogical decisions under this perspective (Zembylas, 
2005, p.717).  
Students consider socio-scientific issues in science lessons, developing skills of 
reasoning, communication and analysis, but they also engage in activities that aim to 
increase the appreciation of the strengths and limitations of scientific process and content 
in addressing the issue (Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003, p.35). 
As in the previous framework, the emphasis of the science dimension of 
controversial issues is also evident (Kolsto, 2000; Ractliffe & Grace, 2003). An important 
goal of science teaching should be to enable students to interpret scientific information 
and to recognise, construct and evaluate arguments where the issue in question has a 
science dimension (Lewis & Leach, 2001, p.4).  
Pedagogical activities aim to foster students’ logical development by focusing on 
scientific problems in activities that will allow the evaluation of evidence as well as 
thought. Students should be able to ask for evidence and clarify whether a claim is 
supported by evidence at all, or whether it is merely a guess, an assumption, or personal 
opinion or impression (Kolsto, 2001a, p.309).  
Additionally to the previous framework, socioscientific controversial issues are 
regarded as a fine opportunity for the teacher to initiate a discussion on the differences 
between knowledge claims from frontier sciences and established consensual scientific 
knowledge and on the different aspects of the nature and epistemology of scientific 
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knowledge (Kolsto 2000; Ryder, 2001). The processes, which students should engage in 
during the discussion of socioscientific issues, are akin to those which scientists pursue 
“when making decisions regarding the justification of scientific knowledge proper”  
(Abd-El-Khalick, 2003, p. 58). Students, accordingly, are called to:  
• recognize that measurements carry an inherent variability and, therefore, do not 
provide unequivocal access to a “true” value;  
• appreciate that many scientific questions are not amenable to empirical 
investigation because of the number and complexity of variables which would 
need to be controlled in an experimental study, the long-time horizons involved, 
and/or restrictions on study design following from ethical considerations; and 
•  understand that since proof is often unattainable, decisions may need to be made 
on the basis of estimates of risk (Ryder, 2001). 
Epistemological development of the students, under this perspective, is regarded as an 
essential skill for conflict resolution. Individuals capable of examining scientific 
knowledge critically can be considered scientifically literate in the decision - making 
sense (Aikenhead, 1985; Fleming, 1989; NSTA, 1982; AAAS, 1989 as cited in Kolsto, 
2000). This argument serves not only citizenship aims, but also offers an opportunity to 
include epistemological issues in science curriculum. Knowledge of the human character 
of science, values in science, limits of science, and its tactics for decision-making are 
regarded as prerequisite knowledge for thoughtful decision-making (Aikenhead, 1985). 
Therefore, the focus is on issues like evidence and its relevance, and on questions for 
social information, like sources of claims and evidence, possible interests involved, 
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competence of claim holders, and level of consensus among scientists (Kolsto, 2001a, 
p.304). 
The notion of using controversial issues to promote scientific literacy has certain 
differences from the framework described as “science for citizenship education.” In the 
first place, it emphasizes the “science part” and not the “science view” of controversial 
issues. This notion holds a dialectical move of science towards other domains of 
knowledge and beliefs. As Kolsto (2001a) argues: 
“If we, through school science, want to lay a more tenable 
foundation for the education of future scientists and citizens, raising 
awareness, that science is but one of several social domains 
relevant to decision making on socioscientific issues should not be 
rejected.” (p. 298) 
 
Under this perspective, new aims come alongside the teaching of controversial issues. 
Students should be able to: 
• Understand the limits of science (Ractliffe & Grace, 2003).  
• Understand that science is not the only relevant knowledge area for decision-
making and that it may not even be the most important one (Koslto, 2000).  
Engaging students in activities that would question scientific evidence would 
hopefully involve a dismissal of claims to “the best solution” and to primacy of scientific 
and technological aspects in one’s decision base (Kolsto, 2000). Taking this argument 
further, other writers support the view that students should examine how power and 
authority are embedded in scientific enterprise (Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 360) and realise 
that since scientific knowledge is vulnerable in contextual factors it can no longer claim 
epistemologically exceptional status but has to interact with other forms of knowledge on 
an equal footing (Roth & Désautels, 2004, p.154). This could not be a threat for scientific 
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literacy, as if students are to fully understand the power and potential benefit of science, 
they must also be aware of its shortcomings and drawbacks (Sadler & Zeilder, 2006 
p.280). 
One problem that might be encountered in the application of the framework is that 
the issues under discussion include levels of conflict that go beyond contradicting 
scientific evidence. Consideration of socio-scientific issues requires more than just 
discussion about the justification of scientific knowledge, but needs to engage with the 
many multiple perspectives, which have a stake in the issue and embrace complexity and 
uncertainty in its approach (Gray & Bryce, 2006, p.176). Selecting a pedagogic approach 
that focuses only on the scientific disagreement would be problematic in cases where 
students’ values and interests use hierarchies that do not necessarily deal with scientific 
evidence.  
The resolution of this issue seems rather “literal” and rests in the level of 
“declarations”, also. For example, Kolsto’s (2001a) consensus model rest on the idea 
that:  
“Such conflicts cannot be solved by means of value-free 
evaluations or calculations, but have to be negotiated; therefore, we 
need politics and discussions to weigh values that in principle 
cannot be weighted.” (p. 298) 
 
In other examples, also, even if students are called to “clarify personal and societal 
values and ideas of responsibility” (Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003, p. 41) there is no 
clarification of how this can be done. The complexity of students’ interactions with the 
values embedded in the issues for discussion is presented only under the “procedural 
understanding” goals of undertaking “ethical reasoning” in the decision making process.  
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Students are regarded as subjects for “moral development.” However, the aims 
presented that connect science education to controversial issues that fall under a 
knowledge - skills - attitudes scheme, create a profile of a student who is somehow 
“distanced” from the problem: a student who is able to “make distinctions between 
descriptive and normative statements” (Kolsto, 2001a, p.293) and “recognize how values 
and beliefs are brought to bear alongside other factors in considering socioscientific 
issues” (Ratcliffe & Grace, 2003, p.41). Whose values? Where is the place of students’ 
values and emotions? How are these going to be resolved in the decision making process? 
 
2.2.3 Focusing on the ethical aspects of Science: Moral development of students   
A third initiative for including controversial issues in the science curriculum derives 
from a need to infuse ethical aspects in science. The framework is based on the 
distinction between scientific understanding (what we know, we can do) and ethical 
judgments (what we believe we should do), which could contribute to the moral 
development of students (Fullick & Ratcliffe, 1996; Hall, 2004).  
Two arguments might support the infusion of ethics, under this definition, in science 
education. The first one derives from deductive connections between science education 
and ethics: the goal of science education is the promotion of scientific literacy; scientific 
literacy includes the negotiation of SSI (socioscientific issues); SSI are value-laden; 
therefore, ethics should be a part of science education (Sadler, et al., 2006, p.354). Even 
if this argument supports the infusion of ethics with science education, it does not 
actually explain why SSI should enter science education, as it takes it for a granted need.  
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The second argument derives from the need for “humanizing” science education 
since traditionally it is not related to ethics and morals. Teaching has been described as 
“moral by nature” meaning the very essence of good teaching involves the ethical and 
moral development of young people (Loving, et al., 2003, p. 183). In traditional science 
classrooms, students are not exposed to moral, ethical, and human value discussions 
while learning science and technology.  
“Students should be made aware that society became extremely 
sensitised to the need of ethics in human experimentation after the 
details of the Nazi atrocities, presumably performed in the name of 
scientific research, were made public” (Gottlieb, 1976 as cited in 
Lazarowitz & Bloch, 2005, p.438). 
 
Science education consequently, should be a place where moral development of 
students should take place, especially when it comes to science and technology 
applications in the social.  
One problem regarding this framework is the dichotomy that presents between 
science and ethics. Science is defined as the process of rational enquiry, which seeks to 
propose explanations for observations of natural phenomena whereas Ethics is defined as 
the process of rational enquiry by which we decide on issues of right (good) and wrong 
(bad) as applied to people and their actions (Fullick & Ratcliffe, 1996, p.7). As Hall 
(2004) cites, nowhere in science do we find an injunction to pursue the intrinsically good: 
science holds methodological rules and not values (p.25). For Hall (2004), there is no 
good or bad science but there is just science and non science. According to this view, 
ethics needs to be used alongside scientific knowledge in order to make decisions about 
complex socioscientific issues: 
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“Scientists grapple with it in ignorance of a sound ethical 
dimension and those with knowledge and skills in the ethical field 
are ignorant of science” (Hall, 2004 p.26)  
 
The dichotomy of science and ethics describes an “objective” nature of scientific 
knowledge that leaves outside the place of values and ethics in the reasoning and other 
acts of scientists. This rests on a fact-value distinction that, as Wellington (2004, p.34) 
argues, is as old as the steam engine and about as absolute: the facts are value laden; 
values are fact laden. Any effort to preserve the “objectivity” of science by excluding 
values and ethics from the science classroom, when dealing with complex controversial 
issues, shelter students from the complexities of science as it is conducted in and applied 
to society (Hughes, 2000 as cited in Sadler, et al., 2006, p.353; Allchin 1999). Presenting 
the “science part” as unproblematic, could only be effective in issues that might not deal 
with contradictory evidence. Otherwise, as several scholars have argued, science 
education for citizenship ought to include content-transcending goals or topics as 
knowledge of the nature of science, limits of science and values in science (Driver, et al., 
1996; Millar & Wynne 1988; Norris, 1995 as cited in Kolsto, 2000, p.650; Aikenhead, 
1985; Allchin, 1999). 
Another problem, regarding the application of the framework, refers to its 
applicability in a classroom with students morally and emotionally involved in the issue. 
Fullick and Ratcliffe (1996) introduce an “ethical enquiry” framework that involves 
interpretation, analysis and argument, critique and decision making for the resolution of 
socioscientific, ethical issues (p.10). The dichotomy between facts and values calls 
students to be aware of the “type of truth” of statements in a statement asking questions 
like:  
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• Are they assuming that it is true? 
•  Have they defined it as true?  
• Is it true because they are unable to find a contradictory example?  
• Have they demonstrated that it is true by providing relevant evidence? (p.10)  
 
On the one hand, one would argue, how can we define “truth” in such complex issues, 
in a complete rational way that is presented in the above questions? Even if we agree on 
this level, how can students be distanced from a problem and analyze it from the level of 
others’ rational and emotional procedures? Students, according to this framework, are 
called to avoid fallacies in such cases: 
• when the same word means different things to different people 
•  when metaphors or other “tricks” of language are used 
• when ideas are “disproved”  by personal innuendo rather than  logical analysis 
• when truth is defined by an appeal to authority, arguing that if an expert says 
something is true it must be so 
•  when false assumptions are employed to make a case (Fullick & Ractliffe, 
1996, p.12).  
Even if those “fallacies” could feed a good discussion about an issue, the way 
presented here describes a student that keeps a “distance” from the problem. The student 
is assumed to be able to recognize “the common fallacies and sources of confusion that 
can arise in loose or over-emotional discussion” in a way that some other people are 
discussing and fell to fallacies and confusion and not the student herself. How is the 
student going to understand “common fallacies” if she falls in such “fallacies”?  
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Even though basic principles of the framework seem problematic, the framework is 
the only one that provides practical guidance on how value issues may be resolved. 
Focusing on ethical aspects, even if this is done under the dichotomy of science and 
ethics, might serve as an acknowledgment that they are both essential to the solution of 
problems (Hall, 2004, p.26). 
Projects like the “Science, Ethics and Education Project”, “highlight the importance 
of including and resolving ethical aspects in science, as an opportunity for a thoughtful, 
rigorous approach for inquiry” (Fullick & Ratcliffe, 1996).  By proposing a structured 
framework, Fullick and Ratcliffe (1996) encourage open- mindedness and a willingness 
to listen to and respect the points of views of others by including steps in their framework 
that deal with the values and ethics embedded in the issue like:  
• arguing priorities which should determine the choice between  alternative 
judgments (values) 
• deciding on a final judgment and the particular reasons for the choice (p.10) 
The problem again is that the whole framework looks like a rational and simplistic 
one; students are thought to come up to decisions through a well - structured procedure. 
However, the argument that, “it makes no sense to suggest that value-issues of this kind 
must be capable of being resolved in a rational way” (Elliot, 1973, p.62) strongly 
questions the project’s suggestion that decision making could be a process of rational 
inquiry and  ethical inquiry that  is presented as a rational one also. 
On the one hand, one would argue that moral reasoning judgments entail prescriptive 
judgments of right and good applied to social situations (Kohlberg, 1986 as cited in 
Zeidler & Keefer, 2003) and therefore, moral reasoning is based on specific features of 
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thought processes. However, those processes reflect the individual’s interpretation of 
rules, principles (i.e. justice) in conflict situations (Zeidler & Keefer, 2003). Coming to a 
conclusion on matters of value is more than we can expect of a rational enquiry (Bailey, 
1971, p.73). The process of coming to view things in a different light is neither rational 
nor irrational; it is non-rational (Elliot, 1973, p. 61). As Bailey (1971) argues:  
“The open enquiry is not to seek truth, but only to demonstrate 
to the sceptical the equal validity of diverse views. This does appear 
to rest on not only a fact-value distinction but a reason-value 
distinction as well.” (p.74) 
 
 
2.2.4 Socioscientific discourse for the cognitive, psychological, social and emotive 
growth of the child  
One framework that addresses socioscientific discourse  and connects the complexity 
of the socioscientific controversial issues  and science teaching in terms of the 
psychological, social, and emotive growth of the child, is  the model of Zeidler and 
Keefer (2003) that derives from a cognitive-moral reasoning perspective.  
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Figure 1: Socioscientific elements of functional scientific literacy (source: Zeidler and 
Keefer, 2003, p.362) 
 
The main difference of this framework from the others presented before is the 
relationship that it assigns between functional scientific literacy and child development. 
Functional scientific literacy, according to the framework, “falls short of the mark if it 
ignores the fundamental factors aimed at promoting the personal, cognitive and moral 
development of students”  (Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 362). 
Socioscientific controversial issues under this framework are not considered as a 
context that science uses in order to promote specific knowledge, attitudes, and skills. 
The term refers rather to a distinctly developed pedagogical strategy that focuses 
specifically on empowering students to consider how science-based issues and the 
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decisions made concerning them reflect, in part, the moral principles and qualities of 
virtue that encompass their own lives (Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 359). Students are not 
thinking about controversial issues and deciding what should or should not be done under 
a notion of macromorality (Rest, et al., as cited in Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 359). They 
engage in the resolution of socioscientific controversies in a level of micromorality: their 
emotions alongside their beliefs are considered as important in the decision-making 
procedure. From these perspectives, socioscientific issues may be equated with the 
consideration of ethical issues and construction of moral judgments about scientific 
topics via social interaction and discourse (Zeidler, et al., 2005).  
Actually, this could be described as the main difference of this framework from the 
others. It positions the resolution of the issues in the micromorality rather than in the 
macromorality mode, giving a place to the emotive belief systems of the child under a 
psychological, and not a “fallacy” ground. As Zeidler, et al.  (2005) cite:  
“Once this distinction is made, it exposes a more robust 
conceptualization of the complex relationship that exists 
between moral reasoning and action and has implications for 
decisions related to pedagogy.” (p. 363) 
 
The framework is psychologically grounded: as there is empirical evidence 
suggesting the importance of emotions in the resolution of SSI (Zeidler & Schafer, 1984; 
Sadler & Zeidler, 2004), an emotion-based morality and care (Belenky, et al., 1986; 
Gilligan, 1987; Noddings, 1984 as cited in Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 365) emotions should 
not be left out of scientific decision making. Additionally, the framework questions the 
Kohlbergian paradigm, which suggests that emotive decision-making represents 
inherently underdeveloped moral reasoning, citing a piece of research that indicates that 
evaluative distinctions among emotive and other forms of reasoning in terms of students’ 
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decision-making adequacy were unfounded (Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 365). The dichotomy 
of emotion and rationality is questioned, as individuals might rely on emotions for the 
resolution of SSI, but that informal reasoning based on emotion is often equivalent to 
strictly cognitive approaches to decision making in terms of logical constructs such as 
internal consistency and coherence (Sadler & Zeidler, 2005).    
Consequently, the teacher is not “seeking the truth” but must suspend both his own 
judgments, and encourage his students to do the same, until arguments are imaginatively 
and sensitively explored (Elliot, 1973, p.60). Students are called to frame their positions, 
and consider how belief convictions influence their emotions and moral commitments to 
moral issues. The instruction has a meta-cognitive character that helps students to listen 
seriously to others and reconsider their views rather than treating the whole event as an 
elaborate game or contest (Cotton, 2006, p. 238).  
Nature of science issues are not only seen as a way of engaging students in authentic 
science episodes and gaining epistemological understanding, as perceived in Ractliffe’s 
and Grace’s (2003) knowledge-skills-attitudes scheme, for example, but also as a factor 
that influences the way in which evidence is selected and evaluated, and is considered to 
have bearing on students’ pre-instructional views of socioscientific issues (Zeidler & 
Keefer, 2003, p. 13). Scientific knowledge is regarded as personally relevant and socially 
shared: it therefore, relies on careful analysis of cases involving considerations of data, 
evidence, and argumentation that may be in conflict with one’s existing conceptions 
regarding various socioscientific moral and ethical issues (Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 370).  
Using elements from the previous frameworks, as far as the nature of science is 
concerned, supporters of this framework assume that individuals who progress through 
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the higher stages of moral development, make decisions with perspectives more distant 
from the primitive reliance on an immediate authority figure, even if this figure is 
science. Students should have the skills to judge the merit of scientific activity and 
discovery independent of the authority the name carries (Sadler & Zeilder, 2006, p.280). 
While this seems contrary to what would count as scientific literacy, according to the 
framework of “science education for citizenship”, the authors argue that they are not 
trying to recommend that the aim of science education should be to tear down science. 
They are however, suggesting that students should be given the opportunity to free 
themselves from blind reliance on science, an ability that requires moral skills (Zeidler, et 
al., 2005, p. 358). That’s why they suggest that moral issues connected to science, such as 
the discussion of historical instances when the power of science was over-used or abused, 
should be explored within science classrooms (Sadler & Zeidler, 2006, p. 263).  
Comparing this framework to the others, I detect a main difference: the framework is 
not established on the grounds of citizenship, science, or moral education, but is rather 
established on psychological grounds of how all those elements could contribute to the 
development of the child under a “functional scientific literacy”. Under scientific literacy 
several elements like the moral development of the child, epistemological and cognitive 
development along with student’s feelings and personal values are brought together, in a 
single framework. The effort is not to move students to one or another direction, but to 
engage students in self reflection procedures: this line of thought better fits to the 
argument that the role of education should be to encourage independent thought and not 
to promote a specific world-view, moral or scientific (Aldrich-Moodie & Kwong, 1997 as 
cited in Cotton, 2006, p.68). However, this argument would strongly be challenged by 
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those who support the view that science education should promote the science view of the 
problem, thus promoting the scientific, thoughtful thinking, whereas supporters of the 
moral development would also argue that self reflection procedures might drive to an 
endless relativism and would never have an impact on the moral development of the 
students.  
An additional level where this framework could be problematic is the selection of a 
didactical proposal that could fit under its philosophical description. Having all those 
elements co-existing in a single framework creates questions as to how NOS issues and 
cognitive reasoning/development could go alongside moral development, while 
respecting emotive belief systems. No one assumes that all these elements could be found 
in a single lesson. However, how all these elements might co-exist in a single lesson, 
remains an issue. As the proposals of this framework cite:  
“It would seem, then, that opportunity to engage in informal 
reasoning through argumentation allows for the evaluation of 
evidence as well as thought, but finding appropriate 
pedagogical strategies to seamlessly integrate such dynamic 
social interaction in the science classroom remains a high 
priority.” (Zeidler, et al., 2005) 
 
 
Summarizing this chapter, I would suggest that the notions for implementing 
controversial issues in the science curriculum have common but also conflicting 
elements. Teaching controversial issues in science education is set under different 
perspectives that describe different pedagogical outcomes from their instruction. Those 
perspectives, though overlapping, are sometimes conflicting in a multileveled and 
multilayered construction. Different views of the relationship and status of science and 
society impose different descriptions of the nature of socioscientific issues and assign 
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different tools that a citizen should hold for the participation in the discussion and 
decision making about those issues. Additionally, different perspectives about science 
education in general create different relationships between socioscientific issues 
education and science education. 
The notion of including controversial issues in the curriculum, as a distinct area that 
uses science education to achieve socioscientific education in the light of citizenship 
education, raises questions about the place of the curriculum where those subjects should 
be elaborated and the impact in science curriculum that such a notion holds. On one edge, 
one can see the humanizing of the science curriculum- using controversial issues for 
science education- and on the other the scientific literacy of the public in order to be able 
to engage in thoughtful decisions about controversial issues: the use of science for the 
resolution of controversial issues. Both edges share similar but also conflicting elements. 
Finally, there are views that perceive controversial issues as a pedagogical method that 
could contribute to the functional scientific literacy that includes beyond cognitive and 
moral development, the exploration of emotional belief systems of the child. 
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2.3 Argumentation as a process 
This sub-chapter aims to provide an overview and discussion about different 
perspectives for analysis and evaluation of argumentative talk, outside classroom 
settings. It also aims to critically use this literature to support an analysis scheme, the 
typology of argumentative dialogues (Walton & Crabbe, 1995), which has finally 
been used for the analysis of classroom talk regarding the description of the 
dialectical context that was created by the discussion of a socioscientific issue. 
The definition of the dialectical context has to be related to argumentation 
theories, since the nature of the issues and the talk performed in the classroom had an 
argumentative nature. A first distinction among definitions that argumentation 
theorists provide is that of process and product. Some definitions refer to 
“argumentation” or “argument” as the process of arguing, which is defined 
accordingly in different disciplines. Others refer to the product of the process, the 
“argument”, which rests on a different level as a construct, than the discussion that 
has generated it, does.  
Definitions of argumentation as process and product should not be seen as 
conflicting but rather as complementary (Walton & Godden, 2007). Endorsing this 
view, we study argument as a complex process, called argumentation and situate 
argument as one of the products within this process, or outputs of the process. 
Studying argumentation as a process was the method that had provided the means to 
describe the dialectical context of the study. The conceptualizations about 
argumentation as a process are presented below.  
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2.3.1 The beginning of argumentation: A question or doubt: The disagreement 
space  
Aristotle in his Rhetoric suggests that rhetorical talk consists of three distinct 
parts: the issue, the arguer, and the audience.  
All dialogues arise from a problem, difference of opinion, or question to be 
resolved that has two sides that constitute the issue of the dialogue (Walton, 1989, 
p.10). Those arguing have a position about whatever the subject (issue) that is being 
argued is (Bricker & Bell, 2008). The conflict or difference (stasis)  that is the origin 
of the argument could be of different kinds: it could be a conflict of opinion, an 
unsolved problem, an unproven hypothesis, or even a situation where both parties are 
blocked from further actions they are trying to carry out (Walton, 1990, p.412).   
Those definitions use the terms, “thesis”, “view”, “difference of opinion”, and 
“standpoint” related to the “issue”. Mbasakos (1999) places all those entities in a 
“disagreement space”. If we set the “issue” in “space” then to take a standpoint and 
argue to back a thesis, means to “view things from a specific perspective”, as we do 
for every object in a related physical space. Respectively, if we accept that there are 
many such perspectives to view an object, what has been gained from taking a 
“position” towards the object, loses a perspective taken from a different “stand’, 
“thesis” or “position” (Mbasakos, 1999, p.15). It is remarkable that all those words - 
stand, thesis, position - represent where we physically stand towards an object, 
whereas the “view” has a meaning of what can we actually see from where we stand. 
It is also remarkable that the same meanings are found in both languages, English and 
Greek.  
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The agents and their standpoints towards the issue construct the “disagreement 
space”. As Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2000) cite “the disagreement space is a 
structured set of possible standpoints associated with an act, issue” (p.5).  
The disagreement space constitutes therefore the “place” where the 
communicative event of argumentation takes place. At the same time though, the 
definition of such a space defines accordingly the nature of argumentation as a 
dialectic practice (Leitao, 2000a; Mbasakos, 1999).  Since a position determines the 
angle and the way that someone views the issue, an argument is by definition 
defensible (Mbasakos, 1999). Respectively, the discipline of dialectics is 
distinguished from that of analytics since it is defined from the possibility to stand on 
the other side and therefore, argument is classified as being different from that of 
syllogism or proof (Mbasakos, 1999, p.15).  
Furthermore, disagreement serves as a means of identifying argumentation. 
Argumentation requires that at least two opposite positions be distinguished, which 
are dialectically construed as the position of a proponent and that of an opponent 
(Leitao, 2000a). As Van Eemeren et al. (2002) cite “an analysis of argumentation 
must begin by identifying the main difference of opinion” which arises when one 
party’s standpoint meets with doubt from another party (p.5).  
Consequently, the notion of standpoint is one that draws a distinction between 
argumentation and other forms of discourse, such as explanation, elaboration, and 
clarification (Van Eemeren, 2002 as cited in Bricker & Bell, 2008, p.481). 
Explanations, elaborations, and clarifications are used when discussing matters that 
are already accepted, whereas argumentation is “always brought to bear on a 
standpoint that has not yet been accepted” (Van Eemeren, et al., 2002, p. 43). 
Therefore, to identify a passage and classify it as an argument, as opposed to different 
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speech acts like explanation, or from different kinds of discourse like informative 
discourse one has to draw a distinction on the basis of how the proposition put 
forward has been advanced as part of the dialogue (Walton & Godden, 2007, p.7; 
Goldman, 1994, p.31). 
 
2.3.2 The agents  
Argumentation involves, by definition, two parties: a proponent and an opponent; 
an arguer and an audience, real or potential (Leitao, 2000b; Rieke, et al., 2008). The 
term “audience” is used to include all argumentative situations ranging from 
interpersonal interaction between two people to talk radio or chat rooms on the 
Internet, from readers of letters to the editor to those who watch C-SPAN (Rieke, et 
al., 2008). ”Audience” might include entities such as a person, or an unspecific 
addressee - whether an institution, a body of beliefs, or the universal audience 
(Perelman & Olbrecht-Tyteca 1969). There are even cases where the audience is a 
“virtual other”, which represents an internal construction who anticipates some of the 
reactions which might come from an external audience (Leitao, 2001, p.333).  
In a larger scale, where the “controversy” as a social phenomenon takes place, 
“spheres” of people are the agents of argumentation. Spheres, according to Rieke et 
al. (2008) are collections of people in the process of interacting upon and making 
critical decisions within which rules of interaction were developed and enforced, 
values were established, acceptable reasons were identified, and the appropriate 
decision makers emerged over time (p.5).  
The dialectical roles of proponent and opponent in argumentation are described in 
terms of their commitment to their initial position. For pragma-dialectical theory, for 
example, the proponent is expected to advance a viewpoint and to defend it against 
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counterarguments and the critical questioning raised by the audience, who takes the 
role of opponent (Leitao, 2000a). Not all perspectives though assign proponents and 
opponents such a static role. Elements of argumentation might be modified in many 
ways: new actors (human or otherwise) may be introduced, others may be discarded, 
positions may change, more resources may be rallied to increase support for or to 
refute a claim (Fountain, 1988, p.122). Argumentation is seen therefore, as a form of 
discourse that has a unique potential to set off processes of changes in view (Miller, 
1987 as cited in Leitao, 2000b).  
Additionally, the roles of proponent and opponent depend on the nature of the 
dispute. Not all disputes have an asymmetrical case where one party puts forward a 
claim, and the other party questions it (Walton, 1990, p.412). If the other party is not 
only doubtful but adopts an opposing standpoint then the difference of opinion is 
mixed, and if there is more than one proposition involved, the difference of opinion is 
multiple (Van Eemeren, et al., 2002, p. 3). As a result, proponents’ and opponents’ 
roles are interchangeable.  
 
2.3.2.1 Argument: In dialogue or not?  
A first issue that comes up as we define the agents of argumentation is the role of 
dialogue as a prerequisite for the existence of argumentation. How can argumentation 
be explained in cases that the “other” provides arguments to an audience that is not 
there to refute its position?  
Argumentation only exists as a form of exchange between an arguer and an 
audience who prompt each other's discursive actions (Leitao, 2000a). In the case of 
the “virtual” anticipation, the audience anticipations are raised by the proponent, and 
thus confronted.  
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Walton (1990) defines dialectical reasoning, as opposed to monological, as the 
interactive reasoning that occurs where “there are two participants reasoning together 
and the reasoning of each participant contains steps derived from the reasoning of the 
other” and, accordingly, assumes that the reasoning that occurs in argument can be 
called dialectical reasoning (p.412). However, it is not clear whether this reasoning 
always takes place in dialogue. If we accept this definition, then reasoning about 
others’ possible anticipations and arguing about them, could be classified as 
dialectical reasoning. 
Goldman (1994), on the other hand, describes this type of argumentation as a 
non-dialectical one. According to his definition, this type of talk occurs when one 
party asserts a proposition that according to the informer might not suffice to apprise 
or convince the audience of its truth and therefore does not only assert it, but backs it 
up with reasons or grounds as well. What is performed then is a “reasoned-backed” 
assertion which Goldman classifies as a type of informative rather than argumentative 
discourse (p.30).  
The difference between Walton (1990) and Goldman (1994) rests on the unit of 
analysis: Walton deals with reasoning. Accordingly, he defines reasoning as 
dialectical when possible anticipations are taken into account. On the other hand, 
Goldman refers to the discussion; dialectical includes two parties and thus a single 
party that backs its assertions is seen as arguing “non-dialectically”.  
The issue of defining argumentation as situated in dialogue, or not, is important 
for the purposes of this study, as the mode of talk in which students and teachers are 
engaged defines the context in which different entities come up. Taking this 
discussion into account we might conclude that argumentation could be dialogical or 
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monological - in a discussion level, but always dialectical in a reasoning level - it 
always needs disagreement.  
 
2.3.3 Goals of participants and typologies of dialogue  
Argument is a social operation, which is oriented to context and to purpose (Mork, 
2000). The notion of argumentation, as cited in pragma - dialectics, is a goal-directed 
form of interactional activity and entails both the content of argumentation and the 
discourse structure within which it evolves, which are sensitive to the goals the 
arguers pursue in specific contexts (Van Eemeren, et al., 1987 as cited in Leitao, 
2001; Walton, 1990, p.411).  
According to Costello and Mitchell (1995) an argument can be understood as a 
means for diverse goals: to put forward a position in preference to others, to discover, 
a perhaps shared perspective,  to arrive at a decision,  to publicize, to persuade and to 
win (as cited in Mork, 2000). There is however, an issue that highly concerns any 
kind of argumentative talk analysis: if argumentation is defined by the presence of a 
standpoint that has to be defended, a self standing goal, how can discovering a shared 
perspective be argumentative? Or how can arriving to a decision be understood in 
terms of defending a position or a decision? I will leave this question open, and try to 
refine the aspects that relate to its answer by looking at different classification 
schemes about types of argumentative and non-argumentative talk.  
Walton (1990, p.390) describes different types of argumentative talk, by 
providing a classification scheme based on the goals on argumentation and the initial 
situation that has sparked the dispute (see table 2).  
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Table 2: Eight types of argumentative talk (source: Walton, 1990, p. 390) 
 
This typology has been based on the initial situation, the goals of the participants 
and the benefits that could be described as the “desired outcome” of the dialogue. 
 
2.3.3.1 Critical discussion-persuasion dialogues 
In a critical discussion, the analysis starts from the assumption that the difference 
of opinion is approached in a reasonable way and that “those involved are assumed to 
view it as an occasion for overcoming doubt or opposition and expect each other to 
deal with this doubt or opposition by advancing reasonable arguments” (Walton, 
1990; Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). However, this is an ideal construction 
since the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is, in fact, a description of 
what argumentative discourse would look like if it were solely and optimally aimed at 
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resolving a difference (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2000), a situation that does not fit 
always in what happens in a real argumentative discussion.  
Additionally, even if arguments are put down in order to convince a “reasonable 
critique”, any interlocutor aims at getting the best of the discussion: as a protagonist 
he aims at persuading the antagonist of the acceptability of his standpoint while an 
antagonist will try to convince the protagonist to withdraw from defending his 
standpoint (Van Laar, 2006). The issue that arises is clear: how can the goal of 
persuading another party, the rhetorical aspect, be compatible with a discussants’ 
commitment to reason?  
Walton and Krabbe (1995) in their typology of dialogues have solved this 
problem by adopting the term “persuasion dialogue”, a broader term that might 
include critical discussion in an ideal situation, thus being able to create a descriptive 
and not normative typology of dialogues.  
 
2.3.3.2 Expert consultation and pedagogical talk: argumentative? 
Expert consultation and pedagogical talk are referred as “types of argumentative 
talk” but not as types of “dialogues”. Walton (1990) has assigned to pedagogical 
discussion and expert consultation an argumentative character since the teacher has 
access to knowledge and his role is to impart that knowledge to the student and 
accordingly, a layperson consults an expert in a skill or domain of knowledge in order 
to obtain advice on a decision or a problem (p.414). 
It is not easy though, based on these definitions, to justify pedagogical talk, or 
expert consultation as argumentative, since there is no opposition apparent in the 
procedure of pedagogy or expert consultation either. Pedagogical talk might be 
described best as explanatory or as “non-dialectical”, “informative discussion” as 
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Goldman (1994) defines it, which gets the form of argument, as the informer grounds 
a proposition based on an impression of possible refutation from the audience (p.31).  
As Walton (1992, p.112) cites in a later work on classification of types of 
dialogue, this classification is not complete and the types of dialogues do not all rest 
on the same level ; actually some are subtypes of others (p.111) (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Typology of basic dialogues (source: Walton, 1992, p.112)  
 
Walton, in this later work defines as “argumentative dialogues” only persuasion, 
negotiation and eristic dialogues that aim at the resolution of a difference. An eristic 
dialogue starts from an antagonism and the goal of each party is to defeat the 
adversary (Walton and Krabbe, 2005, pp. 76-79). 
 He argues that “in some types of dialogue, argumentation is the main function 
that holds the thread of dialogue together and gives it its special character as a type of 
dialogue, whereas in other types of dialogues, argument is peripheral - it is not the 
main engine that moves the dialogue along (Walton, 1992, p.111). 
According to this new classification, pedagogical talk, or expert consultation and 
interview are classified as information seeking dialogues, where one participant seeks 
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the answer to some question(s) from another participant, who is believed by the first 
to know the answer(s) (Mc Burney & Parsons, 2002).  
 
2.3.3.3 Persuasion, rhetoric and argumentation  
The issue that has been stated in the very first paragraphs of this subchapter is still 
there: Walton (1992) classifies persuasion dialogue as one that aims to resolve the 
difference and to arrive at truth, whereas he does not assign any need for truth in 
negotiation or eristic dialogues.  
However, there is a view that persuasion, or rhetoric as an art of persuasion, is 
incompatible with truth providing. The first level of objection rests on the goals of the 
participants. The criticism of rhetoric as synonymous with the act of persuasion and 
its incapability of providing truth is not new. A man who uses rhetoric appears to have 
something to hide and uses his talk for selfish aims and unjust purposes (Nichols, 
1987, p.657). Socrates, who has carried Aristophanes' criticism of rhetoric to 
philosophic grounds, has argued that rhetoric is not based on the truth (Nichols, 1987, 
p.658). Rhetoric in this sense is not a means to convey knowledge; it is rather a tool 
used by those who would distort the truth for their own purposes (Van Eemeren & 
Houtlosser, 2000).  
In the other edge of rhetoric as seeking for truth, one might locate negotiation, in 
which the goal is not to show that a proposition is true or right, based on evidence, but 
the goal is to “get the best deal” (Walton, 1990, p.414). The goal of negotiation has 
nothing directly to do with finding the truth or with defending or maintaining one’s 
principles. It is outright self-interest (Walton, 1996b, p.187). The same stands for 
quarrel (eristic dialogues) where the goal is to hit out verbally at the other, a 
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procedure that is characterized by an almost total absence of logical reasoning and by 
heightened emotions (Walton, 1990 p.414). 
Aristotle (Rhetoric) has defended rhetoric and its relation to truth and reason, but 
Kennedy (1991) in his writings distinguishes two types of rhetoric: one making moral 
and logical demands on a speaker and one looking more towards success in debate 
(Kennedy, 1991 as cited in Van Eemeren & Hootloser, 2000). Rhetoric therefore, is 
not a practice that uses any available mechanism of persuasion, but as Siegel (1995) 
states “argumentation - whatever else it may be - is aimed at the rational resolution of 
questions, issues and disputes” (as cited in Driver et al, 2000, p.292). However, this 
definition of rhetoric is a normative but not a descriptive model of persuasion 
discussion, as I have already mentioned.  
As Aristotle (Rhetoric) says “by appealing to anger, envy, and pity, rhetoricians 
move the judges to the decision that they desire, but allowing judges to decide cases 
on such a basis, is like measuring something with a crooked ruler (as cited in Nichols, 
1987, p.659). However, if the ideal of an art of persuasion is rhetoric, as described by 
Aristotle, persuasion is not, because it is practised by real interlocutors and not ideal 
ones.  
The second level of objection relating to persuasion as a means of arriving to 
truth deals with the incompatibility of the goals of the participants in terms of 
reasoning procedures. Even if we accept that persuasion dialogue can be performed as 
an agreement between two ideal interlocutors, who are knowledgeable, reflective, 
open and dialectically acute (Goldman, 1994, p.35), we still cannot explain how one 
might persuade about a position and still be seeking the truth for that position. As 
Scott (1965) cites, “it would be absurd for anyone who begins with the attitude that he 
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possesses “truth”, to embark on any genuine enterprise of cooperative critical inquiry” 
(p.15).  
Supporting this line of reasoning, Mbasakos (1999) suggests that dialectical 
argumentation does not form any new syllogism and those who argue do not learn 
anything new from the reasoned process of providing premises to support a claim. 
“Dialectics does not produce truth; it already knows it with different ways and from 
different sources. It uses logic though, not for seeking the truth, but to convince” 
(Mbasakos, 1999, p.31) It is questionable, therefore, to assign “finding the truth” as 
one of the goals of persuasion dialogue. Since persuasion deals with issues of beliefs 
and actions and not only issues of fact, arguments used in philosophical discussion are 
not proofs but means to help someone see things he had not noticed before (Levison, 
1964, p.261).   
How can then truth be created or grasped? One way to accept Walton’s (1992) 
view of persuasion as seeking for “truth”, in other words regard persuasion as 
epistemic, is the following:  as Scott (1994) assumes, when the speaker and the 
audience open themselves and exchange views, they come to an understanding that is 
different from either's beginning position. In that sense no absolute “truth” is defined, 
rather than knowledge contingent on the experiences of the community. This 
description is even compatible with theories that accept that such a “truth” exists and 
is held partly and differently by members of the community.   
As Aristotle demonstrates, there is no “common opinion”, for common opinion is 
composed of different and even contradictory viewpoints. Those viewpoints however, 
in different ways grasp some elements of the truth (as cited in Nichols, 1987, p. 669).  
If we accept this view of persuasion as truth seeking (but not necessarily truth 
providing) we have to distinguish between two phases of persuasion: the first refers to 
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“when the speaker and the audience open themselves and exchange views” (Scott, 
1994), and support views, we would add, and when because of this process they 
change their views, “in an attempt to find a fit among one’s beliefs, other individuals’ 
beliefs, and the problem solving task at hand” (Laudan, 1984 as cited in Zeidler, 
1997). This is not a linear process. It might not even be conceptualized by the 
participants: “skilled argument” as a product of discussants, moves in some directions 
and has goals of its own beyond the roles of individual participants (Berelter, 2002 as 
cited in Kuhn, 2007, p.115).  
The issue stated at the beginning of this chapter - if arguing about a position and 
inquiring are compatible- seems to be resolved in a micro-level and macro-level of 
analysis of persuasion, or argumentation as a means of persuasion:  in a local, micro-
level the context is argumentative-persuasive, if a proponent cites a position and 
supports it.   
However this act might be performed in a macro-level context, where possible 
positions might be collected, analyzed and evaluated within the aim of arriving to a 
“common best conclusion”. In this case, the role of the argumentative process is to 
encourage and explore alternative interpretations (perspectives), even in a monologue 
where a single “discussant” takes alternative views and cites conflicting arguments in 
an effort to arrive at a decision.   
This process though, seems to resemble inquiry or deliberation rather than 
persuasion. In this sense, argumentation is a form of inquiry: both individually and 
collectively, then, people advance their interests and objectives through argument and 
in the process enhance their knowledge, either intentionally or not. (Kuhn, 2005, 
p.113) 
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The discussion above might convince one in the direction of accepting persuasion 
dialogue as one that might “seek for truth”. However, the relationship between inquiry 
and argumentation-persuasion needs further exploration if they are going to be 
classified as different types of dialogue.  
 
2.3.3.4 Inquiry  
Inquiry is a “hierarchical procedure of reasoning where the premises are supposed 
to be better known or established than the conclusion to be proved from them” 
(Walton, 1990, p.414), and consists of a cumulative type of dialogue. What makes 
inquiry differ from persuasion dialogue is the absence of the conclusion, the position, 
as a pre-existing entity that drives the discussion.  In a persuasion dialogue an opinion 
is expressed from the beginning and the goal is to “prove” that one opinion is more 
plausible than another, whereas the inquiry is based on an initial position, but the 
position here has a certain degree of lack of knowledge that must be overcome 
(Walton, 1990, p.415). This definition of inquiry draws the distinction line between 
inquiry and argumentation.  
For a dialogical exchange to turn into genuine argumentation, the participants 
must propound and justify their viewpoints while leaving room for these views to be 
examined in the light of the opposing claims and critical questions posed by the 
audience (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Freeman, 1991 as cited in Leitao, 
2001). Therefore, since argumentation is defined and distinguished from other types 
of talk from the presence of opposition, inquiry cannot be described as an 
argumentative - persuasion talk, as opposition is not evident, at least in the beginning 
stages of it.   
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Another difference between inquiry and argumentation for persuasion is 
evidential priority, for the inquiry “is strongly directed toward deriving conclusions 
from premises that can be well established on solid evidence whereas in persuasive 
dialogue the best one can hope is plausible commitment to an opinion based on 
reasoned (but not conclusive) evidence” (Walton, 1989, p.7). This difference of 
inquiry and argumentation for persuasion is therefore attributed to the factual nature 
of inquiry: inquiry is a knowledge building procedure. Therefore, inquiry seeks out 
proof, or the establishment of as much certainty as can be obtained by the given 
evidence. However, argumentation seems to be a part of a factual inquiry.  
Inquiries come up to explanations that are presented to a community of peers so 
they can be critiqued, debated, and revised (Driver, et al., 2000; Duschl, 2000; 
Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Vellom & Anderson, 1999 as cited in Sampson & Clark, 
2008, p.450). In this sense, the knowledge building process becomes a persuasive 
process through which scientists attempt to persuade others of the validity of their 
claims. Within the process scientists build arguments that are informal, material, 
contextual, and controversial (Prelli, 1989, p.5 as cited in Bricker & Bell, 2008, 
p.482) and are criticised through standards of reasonableness (versus the truth of 
argument) as well as through what community will count as claims in the first place 
(Bricker & Bell, 2008 p. 482). The acceptance of explanations in scientific domains 
therefore, is based not only on logical or empirical criteria but on whether an 
argument is capable of persuading other members of the community (Forman et al, 
1988). 
This view of inquiry situates argumentation within inquiry. There are scholars 
who state that this view of argumentation is not compatible with its persuasive nature, 
citing that argumentation in this sense is used to solve problems and advance 
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knowledge (Duschl & Osborne, 2002) rather than as an effort to justify or refute a 
standpoint (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 2002, p. 38 as cited in 
Sampson & Clark, 2008, p.456). In this line of reasoning, Meiland (1989) cites that 
argumentation for the purposes of inquiry, differs from argumentation for the purpose 
of persuasion in two ways:  
1. Argumentation for persuasion usually does not develop objections to the 
position or to the arguments given to it, but if one's purpose is inquiry, one 
must consider objections; otherwise, one will not create a sufficiently severe 
test of the argument in question (p. 188). 
2. In inquiry, one might reach no conclusion about the position or hypothesis 
being investigated - one might find good reasons from both sides or enter a 
really complex investigation- but such a situation would not be possible in a 
case of persuasion. In persuasion, the conclusion which is the focus of the 
persuasion has been identified first, and the whole point of the process of 
argumentation is to establish that conclusion (p.189). 
Meiland (1989) tries to defend the view that although persuasion is a purpose of 
argumentation on some occasions, we must recognize that argumentation can and 
does have the purpose of inquiry (p.185). How can this be compatible with the 
“position defending” definition of argumentation? The “level” distinction, mentioned 
earlier, that could explain how discussants can argue but also arrive at “truth”, is one 
that explains how discussants can do this intentionally. Discussants hold beliefs about 
minor sub-issues and use arguments to evaluate and process those issues in order to 
arrive at an unknown position.  In this case what is to be defended is not the major 
issue at hand, for which there is still no answer, but other issues. Arguments, 
therefore, represent the substance of what is conveyed by the community and as 
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Yerric (2000) cites “constructing arguments is about the journey not the final 
destination” (p.814). 
What happens though when the issue at hand is not factual? How can inquiry be 
performed in a policy issue? How can deliberation be considered as inquiry? 
   
2.3.3.5 Planning committee and deliberation 
Walton and Krabbe (1995) define deliberation, as a special type of dialogue, as 
shown in table 3 below.  
 
Table 3:  Typology of dialogues (source: Walton and Krabbe, 1995, p.66) 
 
The planning committee (a term that has been replaced by deliberation in latest 
typologies of Walton & Krabbe, 1995) type of dialogue, often involves logical 
reasoning and persuasive debate (Walton, 1989, p.425).  However, Walton (1989) 
regards it as a different type of argumentation since the conclusion reached through 
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this type of dialogue should use practical reasoning by reaching agreement on 
common goals and the best means to implement them (p.414). Goldman (1994) does 
not agree that a discussion aiming at a consensus can be a critical discussion since, if 
a consensus was the sole aim, norms of argumentation should discourage 
argumentation appropriate to upset a pre-existing consensus (p.33).   
The persuasive nature of deliberation is evident since the best course of action for 
a group may conflict with the preferences or intentions of each individual member of 
the group. Additionally, not every single participant has all the information required 
to decide what is best for the group (Mc Burney & Parsons, 2002).  
However, as Meiland (1989) supports, deliberation might resemble inquiry when 
a group of people get together to come to a  conclusion, with none of them initially 
having any belief of which he or she wants to persuade the others (p.189). Even if this 
situation is ideal as Meiland (1989) admits, and might be applicable in cases of 
inquiry purely for the sake of  knowledge, it might even happen in cases where groups 
come together to try to solve a problem. The process is described as follows:  
“In such cases, perhaps no one persuades anyone or 
tries to do so, but people do become persuaded in the course 
of the discussion. It might even happen that one person gives 
an argument which he does not believe and with which he is 
not trying to convince anyone - he gives it perhaps as an 
argument which should carry little weight, just to get that 
argument out of the way - but which in fact convinces 
another person.” (Meiland, 1989, p.200) 
 
Lucaites, et al. (1999) seem to endorse this view of deliberative rhetoric as 
inquiry: deliberative rhetoric is a form of argumentation through which citizens test 
and create social knowledge in order to uncover, assess and resolve shared problems 
(p.251). In this sense deliberation is an inquiry process for solving social problems: 
argumentative endeavours characteristically involve, among others, the creative 
resolution and the resolute creation of uncertainty (p.250). Deliberation does not hold 
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the conclusion from the beginning and it might not hold it even in the end of the 
process, because, even if the reasons tested were good or bad reasons, one might 
never be sure whether we have discovered and tested all the relevant arguments 
(Meiland, 1989, p.193). The basic steps of an argumentative process of inquiry, 
according to Meiland (1989) are as follows: 
• Determining a question or problem to be inquired into; 
• Formulating a hypothesis or position on the question or problem; 
• Constructing an argument for the hypothesis or position; 
• Developing objections to the argument for the hypothesis or position; 
• Devising replies to these objections (p.187) 
One objection to this view of deliberation would be the fact that in our lives we 
reach  most of the judgments we make without deliberating on them at all (Wright, 
1995) and thus, we are sceptical to the claim that one could enter a deliberation 
without holding any belief about an issue. Actually, we perform judgments before 
deliberating. However, if we do deliberate even after an initial “blind” judgment, 
deliberation acts as a form of reflection (Meiland, 1989, p.569). Meiland (1989) also 
assigns to this type of reflective deliberation the nature of inquiry: one might conduct 
inquiry into beliefs that he already holds. The process of inquiry in this case aims at 
testing those beliefs by testing the reasons one does or can have for having those 
beliefs (p.192) 
Summarizing the discussion so far we might conclude that:  
• Inquiry as a process that seeks “truth” as an existing entity, or as a 
community constructed entity, includes argumentation. 
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• Argumentation can be used both to persuade, but also seek the “truth”. 
Because of argumentation people come to the “truth” as they share 
viewpoints that grasp different parts of it, or collectively construct it. 
• Argumentation about inquiry is different than persuasion, as it considers 
objections and does not hold the conclusion from the beginning. 
• Argumentation about inquiry rests in a lowest level related to the inquiry 
issue at hand.  
• Inquiry is not restricted to factual issues, but could be used for solving social 
issues: in this case deliberation can be regarded as a form of social inquiry.  
After those issues clarified I suggest that Walton’s and Krabbe’s (1995) typology 
of dialogues (table 3) could be used to grasp the dialectical context of the study, since 
it entails elements that could describe argumentation as a process: the agents of the 
process and their goals towards the discussion. Furthermore, the application of the 
typology is extremely helpful for identifying and analyzing argumentation.  
Actually, the selection of Walton’s and Krabbe’s (1995)  typology of 
argumentative dialogues was a mutual interaction between relevant literature and 
instances from classroom data, and as will be further elaborated in the data analysis 
and results chapters, this typology has been broadened so as to include other 
categories that had emerged.  
 Another issue that had to be elaborated though was one of analyzing the products 
of argumentative process, the arguments. The conceptualizations used for perceiving 
arguments as products are elaborated below.  
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2.3.4 The products of argumentation   
Argument is defined as a piece of reasoned discourse, a product, which consists of 
something linguistically expressed through a set of statements of which at least one is 
offered as a justification for another (Leitao, 2000a, p.333); a set of propositions 
founding a text of discourse; a series of premises one of which is chosen as the 
conclusion while the others represent premises logically supporting that conclusion 
(Walton & Godden, 2007, p.6; Walton, 1990, p.408).  
 
2.3.4.1 Argument as syllogisms  
Aristotle defines a syllogism as a discourse in which, certain things having been 
laid down, something different from the things laid, down follows of necessity in 
virtue of the fact that these are the case (as cited in Kolbel, 2008). Certain things that 
are laid down are the premises and the different element that comes out is the 
conclusion which follows those premises. One classic example of a syllogism is:  
                   Major Premise: All men are mortal 
Minor Premise: Socrates is a man 
________________________________ 
                Conclusion: Therefore Socrates is mortal 
 
In this sense an argument is a type of syllogism, since the premises that construct 
an argument are put down, and the product-claim that comes out of them is different 
than the premises that have constructed it. In its simplest form an argument needs a 
conclusion, a claim. This claim is supported at least by one premise (Freeman, 1991).  
Arguments as syllogisms are classified on different criteria. According to the 
relationship between the premises and the conclusion, arguments could be classified 
as serial, divergent, linked or convergent (Freeman, 1991, p.2) (see Figure 3).   
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Figure 3: Types of arguments according to the relationship between premises and 
conclusion (p: premises, c: claim) (source: Freeman, 1991, p.2) 
Convergent and linked arguments are types of single arguments, whereas serial 
and divergent refer to relationships between arguments. Where several premises are 
required together to support a claim argument structure is referred to as ‘linked’, and 
where multiple premises act independently, the structure is referred to as ‘convergent’ 
(Reed, et al., 2007, p.88). Accordingly, when two claims share the same premise, their 
relationship is referred to as ”divergent” whereas when one claim becomes a premise 
for a second one, their relationship is described as “serial”.  
 
2.3.4.2 Form of arguments: Arguments as probative  
Logic is the field that studies the evidential relations between premises and 
conclusions (Jason, 1994, p.15). The argument is analyzed in terms of how premises 
are capable of supporting the conclusion or vice versa, what is to be tested is 
arguments’ capability to provide truth, given the truth of the premises. In this line of 
reasoning, arguments are probative types of talk, and what is to be tested is how they 
preserve, or provide “truth" (Leontsini, 2006). Arguments are classified as deductive, 
when the truth of conclusion is probable, inductive, when the conclusion is possible 
and abductive when the conclusion is plausible given the premises.  
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In a deductively valid argument, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be 
true, meaning that the conclusion follows the premise by deductive validity of the 
argument (Walton, 1989, p.110). Validity is a conditional concept: it is the 
relationship between the truth or falsity of the premises of an argument and that of the 
conclusion (p.117).  
The validity of an argument is judged on whether one produces the correct 
syllogistic form in accordance with the governing rules of formal logic (Bricker & 
Bell, 2008, p.477). Evaluation of arguments as valid or not, depends on the forms they 
have, according to their logical structure. Examples of such argument forms are 
Modus Ponens (If A then B, A., Therefore, B.), Modus Tollens, (If A, then B, not A, 
Therefore, not B), Hypothetical syllogism (If A then B, If B then C, Therefore, if A, 
then C), Disjunctive Syllogism (Either A or B, Not A. Therefore, B) (Walton, 1989, 
p.118), Categorical Syllogisms (All A’s are B’s, All B’s are C’s, Therefore, All A’s 
are C’s) (Copi & Cohen, 2007). Apart from categorical, hypothetical, categorical and 
disjunctive syllogisms, arguments based on mathematics or other axiomatic 
disciplines, or arguments based on definition of a term are forms of deductive 
arguments. Inductive arguments are distinguished from deductive arguments by the 
fact that they lack the ability to guarantee their conclusions (Hughes & Lavery, 2004, 
p.197). 
The conclusion, given the premises of an inductive argument, is probable, and not 
certain. A functionality difference between deductive and inductive arguments is that 
the ability of a valid deductive argument to guarantee its conclusion derives from the 
fact that deductive argument draws out information that is already contained in the 
premises whereas inductive argument provides conclusions whose content exceeds 
their premises (Salmon, 1984; Hughes & Lavery, 2004). Inductive arguments are 
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classified by different schemes - arguments from example, statistical generalizations, 
arguments from effect to cause etc (Salmon, 1984).  
Peirce (1990) has introduced a third type of argument, in terms of “truth 
preserving”: abductive arguments. He uses the following examples (Peirce, 1990, as 
cited by Flach, 1996, p.2) to show the difference between deductive, inductive and 
abductive form of arguments: 
Type of 
arguments 
Truth preserving  
(as cited by 
Walton, 2001 p.142) 
Example from Peirce  
(1990 as cited in Flach, 1996 p.2) 
Deductive 
In a deductively 
valid inference, it is 
impossible for the 
premises to be true and 
the conclusion false. 
All the beans from this bag are white.  
Those beans are from this bag.  
Therefore, those beans are white.  
Inductive 
In an inductively 
strong inference, it is 
improbable (to some 
degree) that the 
conclusion is false, given     
that the premises are 
true. 
 These beans are from this bag. 
These beans are white. 
Therefore, all the beans from this bag are             
.       white. 
 
Abductive 
In an abductive 
weighty inference, it is 
implausible that the 
premises are true and the 
conclusion is false (The 
abductive type of 
inference tends to be the 
weakest of the three 
kinds). 
All the beans from this bag are white. 
These beans are white. 
These beans are from this bag. 
 
Table 4: Arguments as probative: deductive, inductive and abductive  
 
This classification though, has little to say about reasoning schemes employed on 
different occasions. For example, there is a view that induction is not reasoning at all, 
whereas abduction and induction are (Peirce, 1990 as cited in Flach & Kakas, 2000a, 
p.3). Even though deduction, induction and abduction are terms that will dominate in 
the discussion about reasoning and argumentation, they are not enough to capture the 
complexity of it. Reasoning and argument was a vital issue that has to be elaborated 
within this study since the description of the reasoning used when forming specific 
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forms of arguments could be used to grasp the epistemic part of the lesson. Section 
2.4 (Reasoning and Argumentation: a justification of a typology of argument 
schemes) of this chapter is devoted to such a discussion.   
However, before the presentation of this chapter I need to refer to another level of 
perceiving arguments as products: the use of arguments as propositions in a meta-
level discussion, an issue presented in the following paragraphs.  
 
2.3.4.3 Argumentative discussions as complex structures: Arguments as propositions 
Argumentative discussions are complex constructs. In the simplest case, the 
argumentation is limited to mentioning one positive or negative effect, but more 
extensive forms of argumentation provide a detailed consideration of the various 
advantages and disadvantages of a number of alternatives, in which the feasibility, 
acceptability and cost of an action are taken into account (Meiland, 1989, p.187). Real 
debates about war, social security and climate change, for example, never consist of 
isolated arguments. The central positions of these debates are typically supported or 
attacked by multiple arguments which in turn are themselves backed or challenged by 
further arguments (Betz, 2009, p.234).  
Subsequently, a position, or thesis expressed as a claim may be linked to a series 
of other claims that constitute a case. When a claim is used to justify another claim, it 
is called a sub-claim   (Rieke, et al., 2008, p.7). This chain of arguments, claims, and 
sub-claims builds a case which creates for everyday language a third meaning for the 
term “argument” (beyond that of the process of argumentation and the single product 
of a syllogism-argument). As Walton (1990) describes, an “argument” is not just a 
localized step of inferences, but instead, it is a long thread or fabric that runs through 
and holds together an extended discourse or argumentative text, being a linked 
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sequence of sub-arguments, ranging over even an entire book, for example (Walton, 
1990, p.410). 
The series of arguments is getting more complicated as attacks enter the debate. 
An objection, if fully stated, is an argument, and so is each reply: objections and 
replies are themselves arguments, meaning that each objection and reply can become 
the beginning and the focus of new lines of argumentation which (when the purpose 
of argumentation is an inquiry) aim at testing the strength of the objection or reply in 
question (Meiland, 1989, p.187). 
Wooldridge et al. (2005) refer to two widely used notions of attack as found in 
the field of logic: the rebuttal (where the conclusion of one argument is logically 
equivalent to the negation of the conclusion of the other) and undercutting (where the 
conclusion of one argument is logically equivalent to the negation of some element of 
the support) (p.46). Toulmin’s (1958) view of rebuttals however includes 
undercuttings for warrants, as he regards as rebuttals arguments that defeat the 
conclusion, the applicability of the warrant and the authority of the warrant (as cited 
in Erduran et al., 2007, p.65).  
Verheij (2005) however, even broadens the term of rebuttal and cites five 
different types of rebuttal using Toulmin’s (1958) argument structure: an argument 
against the datum, an argument against the claim, an argument against the warrant, an 
attack on the connection between data and claim, and finally, an attack against the 
warrants’ applicability (Verheij, 2005, as cited in Erduran et al., 2007, p.64.) The 
different types of attacks are shown respectively in the Figure 4 (c: claim, w: warrant, 
r: rebuttal, d: data).  
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Figure 4: Kinds of rebuttals (source: Verheij, 2005 as cited in Erduran et al, 2008, 
p.64) 
 
Erduran et al. (2008) note that all the statements (data, warrants) can be 
considered as claims in themselves; what makes them rebuttals is that they are 
positioned to be data or warrant relative to the main claim that creates a force for the 
generation of the subsequent elements, thus being considered as “nested”: data of one 
argument counts as a claim for another argument (p.58). 
One issue that comes up in such nested arguments is the calculation needed for 
determining the force of support or rebutting of a single claim, given the initial thesis 
which has sparked the dispute. Additionally, as the discussion moves further, there is 
a possibility of one contradicting even his or her own self. As Betz (2009) cites: 
“Given such a variety of conflicting, supporting and 
attacking arguments, can the central thesis still considered 
be well justified, or true? Supposed I wanted to claim t, what 
else would I have to maintain in order not to contradict 
myself? Is my position coherent in the light of all these 
arguments at all?” (p.284)  
 
Interlocutors seem to develop several mechanisms for dealing with such a 
complexity. One such mechanism is to use meta-statements describing the “position” 
in the discussion where they are: when discussions are lengthy, meta-statements serve 
monitoring functions, such as summarizing where the person "is" in the argument, 
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planning where the person is "to go," and question asking, which is an information 
gathering or clarification function (Voss, Greene, Post, & Penner, 1983 as cited in 
Means & Voss, 1996, p.143). 
A more sophisticated “economy” mechanism is one of transferring arguments to 
the level of propositions. Instead of referring to argument as reasons and the view that 
they are given to support, we refer to arguments as the reasons alone (What is your 
argument for that view?) (Wright, 1995, p.565) When arguments are treated as 
propositions calculation is enhanced. The process is described by Wright (1995) as 
follows:  
“We regularly ask for arguments, give them unsolicited, 
complain of their lack or about their quality, and weigh them 
in making up our minds. We may denounce a view as 
unreasonable or irrational if its holder has no argument to 
give for it.”(p.565) 
 
This process is referred to argumentation theory in the context of evaluation of 
criticism of arguments: argument evaluation can be done seriously only if one gives 
reasons supporting the claim that evaluates the argument. Such an evaluation is an 
argument about argument: it is a meta-argument (Finocciaro, 2007). 
The level of treating arguments as propositions is defined as a “meta-dialogue” 
and it is distinguished from forming arguments at a first place, which is defined as a 
“ground level” one. Krabbe (2003) accordingly names as a “ground level dialogue” 
any dialogue that is not a meta-dialogue (p.641). 
The notion of meta-argumentation is better established in the branch of computer 
science that studies argumentation and reasoning. Wooldridge et al. (2005, p.46) 
describe a meta-arguments hierarchy as presented in Figure 5:  
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Figure 5: A hierarchy of arguments (source: Wooldridge et al. 2005, p.46) 
 
The hierarchy is explained by Wooldridge et al. (2005, p. 46) as follows. 
Level Description 
Object 
level 
Δ0 
Does not contain arguments at all. It consists of statements about the domain of 
discourse and defines interrelationships between the entities  
Example of legal setting:  
Δ0 (object level)  consists of the established facts of the case, (such as evidence 
that may be introduced), as well as non-logical axioms about the domain. 
Ground 
Arguments 
Δ1 
Arguments exist for the first time as first class entities of the hierarchy. They 
consist of a conclusion and some supporting statements, with a logical consequence 
between them. At this level also, we can make statements that are about object-level 
statements, for example, we can assert that a particular structure represents an 
acceptable argument 
Meta 
Arguments 
Δ2 
The main construction used in Δ2 is that of argument referring to an argument. 
Properties of arguments that involve referring to the axioms or procedures via which 
we in fact establish that they are arguments may be captured in this level of 
argumentation.   
Table 5: A hierarchy of arguments (source: Wooldridge et al., 2005) 
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Meta-arguments therefore, argue about arguments: they argue about them as being 
valid or invalid, fallacious or not, good or bad (Finocchiaro, 2007, p.456). Relating 
this discussion to the relationship between argumentation and inquiry, one might 
place the processes of inquiry of discovering arguments that are relevant to a position 
as belonging to the ground level. Accordingly, when those arguments are criticized 
for their strength or weakness of those arguments we proceed to the level of meta-
argumentation.  
The conceptualizations cited above are helpful for describing the dialectical part 
of a lesson. However, as arguments are extracted as products of the talk one needs to 
analyze them in terms of content so as to gain information about the reasoning behind 
the argument and the epistemic practice performed. The next part of this chapter deals 
with this issue: to find a way to describe reasoning alongside epistemic practice that is 
performed when agents of the discussion cite down different forms of arguments.  
 
2.4 Reasoning and argumentation: a justification of a typology of argument 
schemes  
The purpose of this subchapter is to justify the use and modification of Schellens’ 
(1985) typology of arguments as an efficient tool that has been used to describe 
epistemic practice performed in the lessons and the rejection of other relevant 
typologies found in the literature.  
The effort is not to list all typologies; it is rather an effort to capture elements 
from typologies - since classification of argument schemes show striking similarities, 
use common sources (Whately, 1965 as cited in Garssen, 2001, p.94) and have 
influenced one another. Those elements are to be criticized under moral and scientific 
reasoning theories, and be used to create a coherent argumentation scheme that could 
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effectively serve the purposes of this study: capture and describe different types of 
reasoning - moral, cognitive-scientific, emotional-that might occur in a socioscientific 
discussion. By doing so I adopt Blair’s (2001) account of “no correct” typology, but 
also Garssen’s (2001) account that “a typology is theoretically adequate if it lives up 
to the goal it is designed to serve” (p. 94).  
2.4.1 Arguments as products of reason 
Arguments capture many types of inference mechanisms, and combine to form 
chains of reasoning (Moulin, et al., 2002, p.185). Reasoning in argumentation has 
been described under different classification schemes by several scholars (Hastings, 
1963; Schellens, 1985; Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Freely & Steinberg, 
1965/2008; Walton, 1996, 2008).  Blair (2001) has stated that since systems of 
classification are relative to their purposes there can be no “correct” typology of 
reasoning schemes, and the only pertinent question is whether any particular 
classification successfully or optimally fulfils its purpose (as cited in Godden & 
Walton, 2007, p.240).  
When we extract arguments as products of argumentation we actually treat them 
as products of reason. Reasoning, in a comprehensive definition, can be defined as a 
“mental activity that consists of transforming given information, called the set of 
premises, in order to reach a conclusion” (Galotti, 1989, p.333 as cited in Cole 
Wright, 2004). Some other definitions broaden this one by including the making or 
granting of the premises as part of the procedure: “Reasoning is the making or 
granting of assumptions called premises (starting points) and the process of moving 
toward conclusions (end points) from these assumptions by means of warrants.” 
(Walton, 1990, p.402) In this sense one might assume that reasoning is identical to 
forming arguments. However, reasoning can be used in different speech acts, or 
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contexts of discourse and thus “argument” and “reasoning” are conceived as non-
equivalent terms: reasoning is used in argument (Walton, 1990, p.403) and arguments 
are defined as “the intentional explication of the reasoning of a solution during its 
development or after it” (Krummheuer, 1995, p. 231 as cited in Forman, et al., 1988). 
 
2.4.2 Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Reasoning 
A very first distinction of reasoning in arguments rests on the level of theoretical 
reasoning on one hand, and utility (Kincannon, 2003 as cited in Cole Wright, 2004), 
practical (as cited in Thornton, 1982 p.59; Walton, 1989, 1990), pragmatic (Schellens, 
1985), or instrumental (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992) reasoning on the other.  
The distinction rests on the nature of the conclusion: inference and reasoning are 
regarded as psychological processes leading to possible changes in belief (theoretical 
reasoning) or possible changes in plans and intentions (practical reasoning) (Harman, 
1986). Theoretical reasoning, therefore, is concerned with what we ought to believe, 
whereas practical reasoning is concerned with figuring out what we ought to do; it 
seeks out a prudential line of conduct for an agent in a particular situation (Thorpe, 
2008; Wallace, 2003 as cited in Cole Wright, 2004, p.23; Walton, 1990, p.405; 
Aristotle as cited in Thornton, 1982 p.60).  
Aristotle affirms that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action. By 
citing this definition he is not contrasting action with choice, but the practical with the 
theoretical: 
“When the two premises are combined, just as in 
theoretical reasoning the mind is compelled (ananke) to 
affirm (phanai) the conclusion, so in practical reasoning one 
is compelled at once to do it (prattein)” (as cited in 
Thornton, 1982 p.59).  
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Not all typologies infer to pragmatic argumentation as a distinct category. One of 
the reasons for doing so is that they use as the criterion of their classification the type 
of the warrant from premises to conclusion, instead of the nature of the conclusion. 
For example, Freeley and Steinberg (1965/2008, p.175-177) include examples of 
practical reasoning as analogical reasoning, or reasoning by example, categories that 
can both be applied to theoretical reasoning as well. Pragma dialectical theory (Van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992) does not concern arguments that point to an action as 
different from theoretical ones, as their classification criterion refers to the process of 
how each scheme is to be evaluated: causal relationships are evaluated differently 
than symptomatic relations for example. Pragma dialectical theory actually 
reconstructs pragmatic argumentation as a type of causal argument in the case of a 
means end practical syllogism, and as instrumental when it comes to reasoning from 
consequences. 
Hastings (1963), on the other hand, includes pragmatic argumentation in his 
scheme as a case of argument from definition, from principle to application. Even if 
elements of such considerations might be included in a typology of pragmatic 
argumentation, I have two main reasons for including pragmatic argumentation - 
practical reasoning- as opposed to a theoretical one, in a higher level hierarchy - a 
distinction made by Schellens’ typology (1985): 
1. Practical reasoning does not deal with matters of fact and their explanation, 
but with matters of value, of what it would be desirable to do (Wallace, 
2008). When agents think practically they also think of themselves doing the 
action. Since desires are interfering, the kind of reasoning implemented gets 
complex. Actually, there is not a consensus among scholars which inference 
mechanisms are implemented in different types of pragmatic argumentation; 
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even if practical reasoning is propositional in expression, there is a 
complication in describing the inference behind the syllogism as identical to 
it. There are even views that confront the existence of “reasoning” when 
referring to pragmatic argumentation. 
 For example, Hume (1973) argues that since our passions, volitions and 
actions are not susceptible to any agreement or disagreement either to the 
real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact, they can never 
be the object of our reason (as cited in Mintoff, 1998). An extended 
discussion about the place of reason and passions in moral practical 
judgment can be found in Appendix A of this study. Theoretical 
conceptualizations regarding moral reasoning had indicated that there is a 
disagreement about the place of reason when actions are involved. Practical 
judgments, moral or not, cannot be classified alongside theoretical ones since 
they entail beyond cognition, emotion and volition as well. Given this 
disagreement, the safest path to take is to assimilate practical “reasoning” as 
a different category than theoretical reasoning.  
2. Scientific reasoning, either deductive, inductive, causal, analogical etc, is a 
type of theoretical reasoning. It deals with facts and explanations of facts 
(Wallace, 2008). If we understand theoretical reasoning as concerned about 
questions of explanation and prediction of facts, we have to distinguish it 
from pragmatic argumentation that deals with values, desires and passions. 
One of the purposes of this study deals with such a distinction: situating 
socioscientific discussion about an action to be taken, within science 
education that includes, among others scientific reasoning, which is a type of 
theoretical is reasoning. A classification scheme that does not distinguish 
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between practical or theoretical argumentation but classifies them as “causal” 
or “analogical” reasoning, like pragma dialectical theory, will need further 
elaboration to determine the scientific thinking that takes place. For 
methodological alongside epistemological reasons, therefore, this study 
distinguishes pragmatic from theoretical argumentation in a first level 
classification system of argument schemes.  
Since among different typologies that have been studied (Hastings, 1963; 
Schellens, 1985; Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Freely & Steinberg, 2008; 
Walton, 1996, 2008), Schellens’ typology is the only one that makes a distinction 
between pragmatic and theoretical reasoning argument schemes, this study has taken 
Schellens’ typology as the departure point for argument schemes used for analysis. 
Both the typology and the modifications made are presented in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
2.4.3 Argument schemes for practical reasoning 
In his typology of reasonable argument forms Schellens (1985) distinguishes 
between two types of pragmatic argumentation, based on the role of the consequences 
of the behaviour: one relates to the probability of consequences and the second in the 
desirability of the consequences.  Schellens and De Jong (2004) recognize another 
type of pragmatic argumentation in which the desirability of the behaviour is 
considered separately from its consequences; the behaviour in this case can be 
advocated on the basis of an appeal to rule-based argumentation in which the conduct 
is judged on the basis of one or more relevant rules of conduct. 
Practical reasoning therefore, is found in three types of syllogism that can be 
reconstructed as three different types of argument schemes: means end syllogism, 
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reasoning from consequences and rule case syllogism. Each type of syllogism-scheme 
represents different worldviews and philosophical considerations regarding practical 
and moral reasoning. The following paragraphs further explore those three practical 
argument schemes.  
 
2.4.3.1 The structure of a means-end syllogism 
Reasoning that is based on the desirability of the consequences resembles what 
Aristotle defines as a means-end syllogism: practical reasoning (deliberation, 
bouleusis) starts from an 'end' which is wished for (boulesis) and terminates in a 
choice (proairesis). The action chosen is the agent's starting point in attaining, or 
partly attaining, the “end” (as cited in Thornton, 1982, p. 52). What an agent happens 
to want constitutes his ends; reason then calculates how those ends are to be achieved 
(Price, 2008 p.2).  
If we reconstruct this type of reasoning as a syllogism, then the major premise of 
the practical syllogism indicates that the agent desires something, has a goal, wish or 
desire (Aristotle actually cites that the agent desires something that is “good”). The 
minor premise of the syllogism indicates a way in which this desire may be realized 
(Thornton, 1982 p.58). The conclusion of a practical inference states that the agent 
ought (practically) to carry out the action cited in the second (minor) premise 
(Walton, 1990). 
We might represent this pattern of reasoning, which is called “instrumental”, or 
teleological (Thorpe, 2008), ta pros to telos, (Aristotle, as cited in Thornton, 1982 
p.58)   as follows: 
“1. Promote end E. 
2. Action A promotes end E. 
                  3. Perform action A.” (Thorpe, 2008. p.161),    
 122 
or in an example:  
“1.I should be healthy (goal, end) 
 2. If I take this medicine, I shall be healthy (means) 
                   3. Therefore, I should take this medicine (conclusion)” (Thornton, 
1982 p.56) 
 
The relationship between the means and ends varies. Walton (1990, p.407) 
describes two types of practical inference: a necessary-condition scheme and a 
sufficient condition one, as shown in the following syllogisms (where a is an agent, A 
is an action, and G is a goal): 
Necessary condition practical inference 
G is a goal for a. 
Doing A is necessary for a to carry out G. 
Therefore, a ought to perform A. 
 
Sufficient condition practical inference  
G is a goal for a.  
Doing A is sufficient for a to carry out G.  
Therefore, a ought to do A.”(Walton, 1990 p.407)  
 
 
2.4.3.1.1 Means  end and theoretical reasoning  
Means end is an “instrumental” type of reasoning, one of calculating which means 
would bring us the desired end. However, it is not a theoretical type of reasoning: 
instrumental reasoning is practical in the following basic sense: it tells us what to 
intend, not just what to believe (Brunero, 2005). However, there are several instances 
of theoretical reasoning that could either enable the calculations performed for this 
kind of reasoning, or act as supporting or countering such reasoning.  
Thorpe (2008) makes a useful distinction between theoretical and practical forms 
of reasoning when running a means end syllogism. Deciding whether specific  means 
are ways of realizing ends, and whether they are sufficient or necessary for those 
ends, requires reasoning that is distinguished from practical reason. When a person 
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runs a means end syllogism, she figures out what she ought to do; however, when 
figuring out what the case is and which actions further realize a given goal, end or 
desire, she actually calculates: she reasons in a theoretical level. An example of such a 
calculation is one of an economist who can figure out whether tax cuts better 
distribute the wealth without having any interest in acting on this information 
(Thorpe, 2008, p.161).  
  
2.4.3.1.2 Means end and moral reasoning  
In a means end syllogism, the end to be promoted can be viewed as connected to a 
moral principle (Cole Wright, 2004). In this sense, pragmatic argumentation of a 
means end type might not be sufficient for persuasion by its own: it needs to be 
supplemented by other forms of argumentation such as ethical argumentation 
referring to the desirability of the course of action from an ethical perspective (Feteris, 
2008, p.492). Ends therefore, have to be situated in a system of principles and be 
supported in a process of rule based argumentation in which it is argued, on the basis 
of an evaluation rule, that the end is desirable (Jan Schellens and De Jong, 2004).  As 
Aristotle argues:  
“He who persuades must show that those things to which 
he exhorts are just, lawful, expedient, honourable, pleasant 
and easy of accomplishment.  Failing that, when he is 
exhorting to that its execution is necessary…It is for these 
qualities …that those who seek to persuade or dissuade must 
look.” 
(Aristotle, as cited in Kock, 2006 p.254) 
 
Kock (2006) assumes that by doing this Aristotle provides a useful warrant 
typology for practical reasoning. The categories that Aristotle actually uses are the 
following:  
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1. Just (dikaia) 
2. Lawful (nomima) 
3. Expedient (sympheronta)  
4. Honourable (kala, or  “noble”)  
5. Pleasant (hedea)  
6. Easy of accomplishment (rhaidia) (as  cited in Kock, 2006) 
Apart from moral evaluation of the end, the means could be set under moral 
evaluation also; in this sense a means end syllogism could be regarded as moral by 
itself, if the principle “The end justifies the means” is applied. In this sense, if a 
means end syllogism has to be evaluated for its morality it would be classified as 
consequentialism since the morality of an action is evaluated through its 
consequences.  
In the cases that this principle is not applied, then alternative means might be put 
under moral evaluation for selecting the action which is less morally problematic. 
What is concluded from the previous paragraphs is that  means end reasoning, a 
kind of practical reasoning, represents a moral stance, consequentialism - by its own - 
if it is used to justify the morality of an action - but might be also be the starting point 
for evaluating ends and alternative means.  
2.4.3.2 Reasoning from consequences  
In argumentation from consequences, a position on the desirability of a given 
action is advocated on the basis of its advantages and/or disadvantages (Schellens, 
1985, pp. 153-178; Walton, 1996, pp. 75-77 as cited in Jan Schellens & De Jong, 
2004 p.299).  
This kind of reasoning involves an attempt to decide what will be the wisest 
choice as far as the future is concerned, but as the future is never certain, practical 
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reasoning involves presumptions in the form of hypothetical guesses about 
consequences of the action under deliberation (Walton, 1990b p. 139).  Walton (1996) 
regards this type of reasoning from hypothesis or supposition to the consequences, as 
a modus tollens kind of deductive inference: 
“If you the respondent bring about A then B will occur. 
B is a very good/bad outcome, from your (the 
respondent’s) point of view (or desirable/undesirable, as 
constructed by Van Schellens and De Jong, 2004).  
Therefore, you (the respondent) should not bring about 
A.”  
 
When reasoning from negative consequences it is evident that this type of 
reasoning is different from means end syllogism; however it is not easy to distinguish 
between means end syllogism and reasoning from consequences when the 
consequences lie on the positive side of the issue. For example, how could we decide 
if a certain consequence is an “end”, by what means can we tell if the conclusion 
refers to the desirability but not to the probability of behaviour?  
Pragma dialectical theory, actually, does not  set clear boundaries between those 
two, as it reconstructs reasoning from consequences as a syllogism based on a causal 
relation: it is argued that a particular action X is desirable or undesirable because it 
“causes” certain desirable or undesirable effects (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
1992). From a pragma-dialectical perspective, therefore, the basic form of reasoning 
from consequences is similar to a means end syllogism causal scheme that can be 
represented as follows: 
“1. Action X is desirable 
1.1.a Action X leads to Y 
1.1.b Y is desirable 
Underlying this scheme is also the following implicit 
premise: 
1.1c ‘if action X leads to Y and Y is desirable, then action X 
is desirable” (Feteris, 2008, p. 493).  
 
 126 
Feteris (2008) assumes that reasoning from consequences can be distinguished 
from means end syllogism from the way consequences are presented. The 
argumentation can be analyzed as teleological (means end, desirability of behaviour) 
if the consequences are presented as the attainment of a particular goal, whereas it 
could be reconstructed as a policy argumentation, (policy based on consequences) if 
those consequences are presented as the implementation of a particular policy (p.491). 
Reasoning from consequences therefore, could be distinguished from the warrants in 
the argument scheme. Aristotle, for example, refers to two types of warrants for 
practical reasoning:   
1. Predicable  warrants (dynata)  
2. Necessary warrants  (anagkaia) (Kock, 2006, p.254) 
Predicable warrants, we could say, refer to consequences; i.e. what would have 
happen if the action has to be taken. This type of syllogism would be classified as 
reasoning from consequences. Necessary warrants, on the other hand, refer to means 
end syllogism as has been elaborated in the previous paragraphs.  
 
2.4.3.2.1 Reasoning from consequences as moral reasoning 
Reasoning from consequences might be classified as a utilitarian type of moral 
reasoning.  This type of syllogism might be reconstructed as a rule case syllogism, 
where the rule (warrant) that connects the premises to action is a principle of utility 
(Thorpe, 2008, p.163).  In that sense, the moral worth of an action is determined by its 
contribution to overall utility.  
However, since the principle of utility is not the only rule that guides moral 
thinking, reasoning from consequences might lead to moral argumentation regarding 
the moral status of consequences. Apart from deciding whether a consequence is 
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possible or not, agents have to establish whether a consequence is desired or not 
(Feteris, 2008). As a result, they might be engaged in a kind of substantive reasoning 
aiming to relate the consequence to moral principles, laws and duties. This kind of 
reasoning might take the form of explanation of attitude, when what is elaborated is 
not the consequence’s moral status, but the agents’ preference for it.  
 
2.4.3.2.2 Theoretical and moral reasoning for argument from consequences  
Statements about the probability of a consequence (If you bring A then B will 
occur) may be supported by sub-argumentation in the form of argumentation from 
cause to effect, in which it is argued on the basis of one or more causal links that the 
predicted effect is likely to occur (Jan Schellens & De Jong, 2004). The hypothetical 
nature of reasoning from consequences, is evident: for our actions to be justified by 
their ends (consequential logic), it must be certain not only that the ends are right and 
good but that they would be right if they increased the good  and furthermore that they 
occur with certainty (Pavlovic, et al., 2009). Certainty of the consequences however, 
is always under question and might lead to sub-argumentation with the purpose of 
establishing such a certainty.  
When agents reason from consequences in a dialogue, they rarely base their 
decision on a single consequence. Usually, a number of consequences, presented as 
pros and cons are considered and evaluated in order to lead to a decision. Extensive 
forms of argumentation from consequences provide a detailed consideration of the 
various advantages and disadvantages of a number of alternatives, in which the 
feasibility, acceptability and cost of an action have to be taken into account. This kind 
of reasoning involves both a kind of moral, normative reasoning where consequences 
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are evaluated and weighed, but also a kind of instrumental reasoning which actually 
calculates the “overall utility”. As Sosa (1993) defines consequentialism:  
“It is right for S to A (S ought to do A or S should do A) if no 
total state of affairs that would be a consequence of S’s doing 
any alternative to A would be better than the total state of 
affairs that would be a consequence of S’s doing A.” (Sosa, 
1993, p.101) 
 
 
This “total state of affairs” is not easily available to the agent. It is an entity that 
has to be calculated; and this is a kind of instrumental, theoretical reasoning, that 
actually calculates the overall situation, given the possible consequences of an action. 
This level of argumentation, according to Wooldridge et al (2005), could be classified 
as a meta-argumentation. It is a process of reasoning about arguments - in this case 
consequences - as propositions, trying to weigh, evaluate or even find ways to 
diminish them by proposing solutions.  
This latter kind of thinking, proposing solutions for negative consequences is a 
type of productive thinking: a type of problem solving technique. The issue is 
perceived as a problem to be solved and agents propose, produce, possible solutions 
for it, either to further ground a positive position about the issue, or just solve the 
problem.  
Summarizing, reasoning from consequences, a utilitarian type of moral reasoning, 
has to be established by theoretical reasoning that establishes the certainty of the 
consequence, weigh consequences and calculate the “overall utility”, whereas moral 
reasoning might be employed to establish the desirability of the consequences and the 
definition of their moral status. 
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2.4.3.3 Rule case syllogism   
A first conception of a rule case syllogism is one attached to virtue theories: the 
action stated in the conclusion does not promote any specific end, other than 
following the rule expressed in the syllogism. A man is acting virtuously if he chooses 
his acts for their own sake (Aristotle, as cited in Thornton, 1982, p.60). An example of 
this type of syllogism is the following:   
I should be courageous 
Courage in this situation consists in not running away 
Therefore, I should not run away 
 
The action of not running away does not lead to any other end, but consists of a 
“means” to being courageous, thus it is a courageous act chosen “for its own sake” 
(Thornton, 1982). Accordingly, the type of inference employed in this type of rule, is 
one of figuring out how one could constrain his/her actions, in the particular case, in 
the way recommended by the rule, (Thorpe, 2008, p.164) a “rule guided” process, that 
should be reconstructed as different from a means end syllogism.  
As Thorpe (2008) cites, this kind of reasoning is indirectly mediated by rules:  the 
rule plays an indirect or regulative role in the person’s reasoning about what she ought 
to do in particular cases, but the person does not appeal to the rule each time she acts: 
she rather appeals to it periodically, when she reflects on what sort of person she 
ought to be or what general sorts of conduct she ought to engage in (p.164). 
In a rationalist approach however, rule case syllogism is directly mediated by the 
rules. According to the rationalist approach, actions are moral insofar as they are the 
direct result of principled reasoning: one's acceptance of a moral rule/principle must 
play a causal (inferential) role in the acceptance or rejection of resulting moral beliefs 
and/or actions or other mental states (Cole Wright, 2004). A rationalistic approach 
describes a “rule guided” than a “rule-followed" action. 
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Rule case syllogism respectively, according to a rationalistic approach, can be 
reconstructed as a deductive form of principle based syllogism. Principle based 
syllogism, or “from principle to an application of that principle” (we should not kill 
communists because we are Christians”, (Hastings, 1963, p.49) belongs, according to 
Hastings, to a kind of reasoning from definition to characteristics: an event or 
situation is defined in a certain way and, on the basis of this definition, either 
attributes or characteristics of the event or logical implications are drawn. In the 
warrant, the consequences or implications of the definition are mentioned. 
Another view that confronts this conception of a rule case syllogism for its own 
sake is a teleological one. According to teleological views, there is no practical 
reasoning beyond teleological reasoning: a person’s action is goal-directed or 
teleological, meaning that a person performs that action in order to promote some 
goal, end or desire. A belief-desire theory of action assumes that we perform the act to 
implement the rule to arrive at Eudaimonia (Happiness) (Thorpe, 2008 p.157; 
Thornton, 1982 p.56).  
Stocker (1981) counters the teleological view by arguing that it is inappropriate 
for understanding some forms of intentional action like acts of friendship and 
courage. Those acts are performed out of or from character, rather than in order to 
promote the goal of friendship and courage (as cited in Thorpe, 2008).  
Conclusively, we might say that syllogisms using rules might be reconstructed as 
“appealing to rules”, “principle based syllogisms” or as a special kind of “means end” 
syllogism, according to different views. What is to be kept for an argument typology 
though, is not the kind of inference employed to such a kind of a syllogism, but 
actually its content: it is based, one way or another, on a moral rule, and represents a 
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deontological or virtue based moral stance, rather than a consequentialist stance that is 
represented through a means end or from consequences practical syllogism.  
 
2.4.3.3.1 When principles, rules, aims and consequences are conflicting  
Each kind of practical syllogism might give contradicting claims. Agents have to 
weigh up consequences, rules and aims. When they reason from consequences, for 
example, agents might be engaged in a type of reasoning in order to choose the “lesser 
of two evils”.  
Weighing conflicting claims becomes more complicated when conflicting claims 
rest on warrants belonging to different dimensions, e.g. honour and utility in the 
guises of, respectively, bioethics and livelihood (Kock, 2006, p.253). An action, for 
example, may by “honourable” but not very “expedient” (convenient, useful); it may 
be “just” but not “lawful”; and so on (Kock, 2006). The difficulty in this case is that 
of weighing incommensurate warrants on the same scale, as we lack the common 
measure that will enable us to do this with certainty, necessity and rationality (Kock, 
2006, p. 452). 
Toulmin (1950) rejects the existence of the universal supremacy of any single 
principle (as cited in Kock, 2006, p.253). Thus, arriving to a decision goes beyond 
establishing a moral rule through practical judgment: humans face moral problems 
that require them to strike equitable balances (Kock, 2006).    
According to Simonneaux (2001) there is an order of importance between 
different warrants. The theory behind this claim, the economics of consensus, or 
sociology of justification, considers that there are several “worlds” in which action 
takes place. Those words have different higher principles and orders of importance 
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that are attached to objects of debate. Respectively, consensus in a debate becomes 
possible when there is a “consensus” on these orders of importance.  
Beyond appealing to orders of importance, agents use other resources that can 
help them weigh alternatives whose weight cannot be measured. Those resources are 
according to Aristotle (as cited in Kock, 2006, p.452) analogies, opposites, and 
examples.  
This line of reasoning is compatible with Hastings’ (1963) and Schellens’ (1985) 
typologies of arguments where arguments from example and analogy are defined as 
not bound to a special type of conclusion arguments: they can both be used to support 
theoretical and pragmatic argumentation.  
Examples that support pragmatic argumentation are what Kock (2006) names as 
parallel arguments. Instead of universal principles, agents use parallel arguments:  
they draw on the outcomes of previous experience, appeal to the procedures they used 
to resolve earlier problems and reapply them in new problematic situations. In the 
same way they might use analogies, authorities and other ways that might help them 
arrive to a practical decision. 
Summarizing the discussion about arguments that support a practical 
conclusion we get the following schemes (* indicates free floating arguments that are 
going to be further elaborated in next sections):  
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Reasoning scheme  Moral Practice 
Means end Defend an action as a means for another end  
(Utilitarianism)  
From Consequences  Defend an action based on its consequences 
(Utilitarianism) 
Rule Based  Defend an action based on a rule (Deontological) 
From Analogy * Defend an action based on an analogous example  
From Example* Defend an action based on an example  
Authority* (Expert, 
source)  
Defend  an action based on an authority’s 
prescription  
Table 6: Argument schemes that conclude to practical statements  
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2.4.4 Theoretical reasoning 
Theoretical reasoning is oriented to finding reasons for accepting a proposition as 
true or false (Walton, 1990, p.405). Schellens (1985) classifies theoretical reasoning 
as occurring in bound argumentation forms - those whose application is limited to a 
certain type of position or conclusion (as cited in Garssen, 2001, p.90).   
The discussion that follows, aims to describe the reasoning behind accepting and 
modifying Schellens’ (1985) typology of theoretical argument schemes, and to 
connect specific argument schemes with epistemic practices that might locate the 
interlocutor in the inquiry cycle, as this is described by Klahr (2000) as the SDDS: the 
Scientific Discovery as Dual Search, a model that describes the process of the 
establishment of a knowledge claim through hypothesis generation-the hypothesis 
space- and hypothesis testing –the experiment space. (For more details on SDDS 
model see Appendix B).  
According to Schellens (as cited in Schellens & De Jong, 2004, p. 34) those 
schemes belong to the “restricted argumentation schemes” and we can distinguish 
between regularity-based argumentation that is used in support of a descriptive 
statement about the present, the past or the future and rule-based argumentation used 
in support of a normative statement about the value of a situation or process. The third 
type or scheme of restricted argumentation is pragmatic argumentation, described as 
practical reasoning that has already been elaborated in the previous section of this 
chapter.  The typology is diagrammatically presented in Figure 6 below. 
. 
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Figure 6: Schellens’ (1985) typology of arguments 
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2.4.4.1 Normative and descriptive statements 
A first problem to be addressed, regarding Schellens’ typology, is the distinction 
between normative and descriptive statements, a philosophically questioned 
distinction. For example, it would be difficult for emotivism (see Appendix A for 
further elaboration) to draw such a distinction, as it takes the view that value 
judgments do not actually express judgments or normative statements but they 
express emotional attitudes or preferences. This view however, is compatible with 
viewing a normative statement as a factual one, and being subject to truth or falsify as 
one’s sentimental situation.  
On the other hand, prescriptivists would not accept a value judgment as a 
theoretical conclusion capable of being true or false.  For prescriptivists, a judgment 
of the nature “Killing is wrong” expresses nothing but the command “Do not kill!”  
Finally, moral realists even if they accept value judgments as being true or false, 
would not classify them as moral values but as moral facts: for something being good 
or bad is not a human construction, but a property of facts and entities (Jacobs, 2000, 
p.141).  
The need, however, to draw a distinction between normative and non-normative 
statements is related to methodological purposes of this study. Either expressing 
emotional attitudes, prescribe action, or describing a property of an entity, normative 
statements that are related to morality have to be isolated. This process would enable 
the description of the moral reasoning that takes place during the lesson- even if this 
“reasoning” could refer to different things (reflections, prescriptions, descriptions) 
according to different scholars, as mentioned before. We need therefore to keep a 
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category for moral judgments, that judge a behaviour/action as, expedient, lawful, 
just, pleasant, honourable, easy of accomplishment etc (Aristotle, as cited in Kock, 
2006, p.254). This category could refer to those normative statements that could 
function as moral practical judgments and be used in a practical syllogism to point to 
an action.  
This line of thinking is compatible with Schellens’ (1985) classification of 
normative generalizations. Schellens (1985) classifies as normative arguments 
“arguments based on evaluative rules” where something is evaluated by referring to a 
certain quality, and “arguments based on rules of conduct”. In the latter category, 
which is identical to moral practical judgments, the step from premise to conclusion is 
legitimated by a rule that states when the measure or step mentioned in the conclusion 
should be taken;  in other words, the action is evaluated according to a rule of conduct 
(p.96).  
Aristotle’s category of warrants might provide a further classification of moral 
evaluation. For example, lawful or fair and just evaluation of action might point to 
deontological theories of moral reasoning: the evaluation of behaviour in accord with 
our moral obligation as morally right; behaviour not in accord with our moral 
obligation as morally wrong (Devettere, 2000, p.17). Accordingly, evaluations of 
behaviour as pleasant might be classified as indicating hedonism (Bentham, 1948 as 
cited in Smart & Bernand, 1973) and expedient evaluations as indicating Ethical 
Egoism or Utilitarianism, that represent Consequalist moral theories (Moore, 1912 as 
cited  in Sinnot-Armstrong, 2006).(see Appendix A for further discussion about moral 
stances). 
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2.4.4.2 Descriptive factual statements  
Having clarified the normative statements category, by subdividing them into 
normative arguments based on rules of conduct (moral practical judgments) and  
normative arguments based on evaluative rules, we proceed with the  descriptive 
factual statements, the third branch of Schellens’ (1985) typology of argument 
schemes.  
Summarizing the typology for arguments that have as a conclusion a descriptive 
statement we might distinguish the following types of reasoning, as shown in Figure 
6:  
• Defending a prediction  
o Cause to effect (defending predictions via causal generalizations, 
accepted causal laws) 
• Defending an explanation 
o Effect to cause (from the existence of something that is presented as an 
effect, something else is inferred as the cause) 
o Sign (an observed or known event is taken as an indication of the 
existence of an unobserved event) 
o Time to causality (an argument that defends a causal connection by 
pointing on the simultaneous appearance of two events) 
We might add, according to Schellens (1985), in any place of the list (either 
defending a prediction or an explanation) unbound argument forms that can support 
any type of conclusion:  
• argument from authority 
• argument from example  
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• argument from analogy  
 
2.4.4.2.1 Arguments defending predictions 
Schellens’ typology about descriptive-factual arguments, compared to other 
typologies has a main difference. The classification criterion does not rest primarily 
on the relationship between the premises and the conclusion (the warrant) but the 
nature of the conclusion. This is of special interest for this study; forming predictions 
might point to different epistemic practices than defending explanations, even if they 
both share a kind of causal reasoning, for example. Causal reasoning that actually is 
captured by the nature of warrant, does not precisely describe epistemic practice.   
Other typologies, like Hastings’ (1963) typology for example, are interested 
mainly in the type of the warrant from the premise to the conclusion, and since the 
warrant refers to a causal generalization, then the form of the argument is described as 
“causal” and then classified as reasoning from “cause to effect” or “effect to cause”.  
Arguments defending predictions, as described by Schellens, are akin to 
Toulmin’s (1958) “warrant using arguments”. Toulmin (2003) refers to a category of 
arguments that are “warrant using arguments” and defines the process of reasoning 
behind them as deduction. As he cites:  
“Outside the study the family of words “deduce”, 
“deductive”, “deduction” is applied to arguments from many 
fields; all that is required is that these arguments shall be 
warrant -using ones, applying established warrants to fresh data 
to derive new conclusions. It makes no difference to the property  
of these terms that in step from data to claim will in some cases 
involve a transition of logical type - that it is - for instance, a 
step from information about the past to a prediction about the 
future.” (p.112) 
 
However, not all scholars use the term “deduction” in the same way. For others, 
like Freely and Steinberg (2008), the word “deductive” refers to the logical form of 
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argument, its probative force: This kind of argument can ensure the truth of the 
conclusion, given the truth of the premises, compared to inductive ones that cannot do 
that.  
Freeley’s and Steinberg’s (2008) typology therefore uses the deduction - 
induction distinction as a primary classification criterion (Figure 7), regarding 
reasoning from cause to effect as an “inductive form of argument”.  
 
Figure 7: Freeley and Steinberg (2008) typology of argument schemes 
 
How do Freeley and Steingberg (2008) view reasoning from cause to effect as 
inductive whereas Toulmin defines it as “deduction”?  The first refers to the strength 
of the syllogism towards validity tests; the latter to the acceptability of the premises 
and the use of them in deriving new conclusions. According to Freeley and Steinberg 
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(2008) the relationship between cause and effect is not an “airtight” one, since there 
are probabilities that other undesirable effects might result from the particular cause, 
or a new cause might affect the system and the effect would not be the expected one 
(p.116). Therefore advancing a particular cause as a premise in the syllogism does not 
ensure the effect in the conclusion in the way that a deductive categorical syllogism 
would do.   
On the other hand, Toulmin (2003) uses the term “deduction” referring to the 
capability of the syllogism to provide a new claim. As Schellens (1985) also cites, in 
causal generalizations, it is claimed that what is mentioned in the argument in general, 
leads to what is mentioned in the conclusion,  in other words the relationship between 
cause and effect is already established and used by the argument; it is not established 
through the argument.  
Therefore this category of Schellens (1985), defending predictions via causal 
generalizations, is akin to Toulmin’s warrant using arguments, and refers to the use of 
accepted causal laws in predicting facts about the future. The above lines explain why 
this study uses a typology that is not based on probative logical forms of the argument 
(inductive-deductive) for describing the theoretical reasoning that was expressed 
through arguments in the lessons: logical forms of arguments deal with validity; they 
cannot describe the epistemic practice performed.  
This view of cause-to-effect arguments though has a problematic point: if the 
relationship between the cause and effect is known and accepted, then the syllogism 
performed is not an argument, but an explanation.  
Aristotle refers to those types of syllogisms and defines them as 
“demonstrations”, as processes that reveal the cause or explanation of something, 
explain why the predicate belongs necessarily to the subject. Demonstration starts 
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only from premises that can be established as "verified" or "known to be true" within 
a field of scientific knowledge (Walton, 1990 p.414).  
How can demonstrations (explanations) be used as arguments? They both have 
the same structure; a premise for a prediction is an explanan for an explanation. 
However, the difference between those two refers to the event about which they deal: 
explanation refers to an event that has already occurred and thereby provides the 
cause for it, whereas an argument defending a prediction refers to an event that has 
not taken place yet; its occurrence is still in question, and that is what the argument 
points to: its probability to happen.  
In other words, the dialectical nature of a cause-to-effect argument rests on the 
acceptability of its conclusion from the interlocutors: whereas explanations use the 
causal link to explain the occurrence of the effect - the conclusion- which is accepted 
by the interlocutors, arguments of the same kind use the causal link to support that the 
effect is likely to happen, a fact that might be under question.  
Consider the following two cases:  
Case 1 
-Child: Mom, why do the ice cubes melt when they are left 
outside the fridge?  
Mother: Because outside the fridge the temperature is high, 
and high temperature causes ice to melt.  
 
Case 2  
Child: I’m going to leave here my drink; I’ll come again 
after playing with my friends to finish it. 
Mother: But the ice cubes are going to melt! 
Child: No, I believe it would be OK after one hour.  
Mother: But the temperature is high outside the fridge, the 
ice cubes are going to melt! 
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The fact that the temperature out of the fridge is high is a reason that can explain 
why the ice cubes have melted outside the fridge in case 1. However the same reason 
can dialectically be used to support the fact that the ice cubes are going to melt if left 
outside the fridge, in case that this fact is doubted.  
Even if it is difficult to distinguish between an argument and an explanation when 
both share a causal structure, the dialectical nature of the argument that might be 
grasped from the context of the conversation might help in this direction. As Mayes 
(2010) cites:  
An argument is a piece of reasoning in which the reason is intended to provide 
evidence for accepting a doubted conclusion. An explanation is a piece of reasoning 
in which the reason is intended to provide a cause for an already accepted 
conclusion….Whether reasoning is understood to providing evidential or causal 
support depends crucially on the context of utterance.  (Mayes, 2010 p.95). 
 
2.4.4.2.2 Arguments defending an explanation  
According to Schellens (1985) there are three forms of argumentation that defend 
an explanation: argument from effect to cause, argumentation from sign and 
argumentation from time to causality (Schellens, 1985, pp.77-102 as cited in 
Schellens & De Jong, 2004, p.299). The question is, which is the relationship of those 
forms of argumentation with scientific reasoning, in other words what epistemic 
practice does each one indicate?  
According to Schellens (1985) in argumentation defending an explanation, from 
the existence of something that is presented as an effect, something else is inferred as 
the cause; therefore those arguments explain why the particular event has taken place 
and in that sense they support explanations. 
2.4.4.2.2.1 Argument from time to causality  
An argument from time to causality is an argument that defends a causal 
connection by pointing out the simultaneous appearance of two events (Schellens, 
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1985). This kind of argument would be dropped from a mechanistic account of 
causality, which accepts that two events are causally related if and only if there is a 
mechanism that connects those (Psillos, 2004). (For an extended discussion about 
accounts of causality see Appendix C). However, it would be finely adopted by a 
counterfactual approach of causation, that accepts that causes make a difference to 
their effects, and this difference-making is cashed out in terms of counterfactual 
dependence (Psillos, 2004, p.291). 
2.4.4.2.2.2 Argument from sign and cause to effect arguments  
Argument from sign is one of the most puzzling categories of argument schemes.  
A first question that rises is why keep two separate categories, effect to cause and 
argument from sign if, according to the definition of the category of arguments 
defending explanations are both described as effect to cause ones? How can those two 
categories be distinguished?  
The answers between different scholars differ and in some cases are even 
contradictory. For example, Jan Schellens and De Jong (2004) interpreting Schellens 
(1985) typology cite that the recurring empirical link that supports a proposition of a 
factual or descriptive nature could be causal, but also correlative or sign, thereby 
distinguishing sign from correlation and causality. In the same article they cite that “in 
argumentation from effect (or sign) to cause a diagnosis is made; the regularity of a 
causal link makes it possible to make an assertion with some degree of probability 
about its cause, on the basis of observed consequences (or symptoms)” (p.299). By 
this definition they accept that a sign relationship is one of effect to cause, and thereby 
assign to a sign relationship a causal nature.  
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Hastings (1963) also comprises the category of “reasoning from sign to 
unobserved event” as a subcategory of causal reasoning main category. For Hastings, 
when reasoning from sign to an unobserved event, an observed or known event is 
taken as an indication of the existence of an unobserved event. The unobserved event 
is the cause of the observed event, and the warrant is a causal generalization between 
cause and effect. 
In the same line of reasoning, Aristotle (Prior Analytics) describes as illustrations 
of semeia, or signs, enthymemes (arguments) that are based on a sign relation: “He is 
ill, because he has a fever"; "he has a fever, because he breathes rapidly"(as cited in 
Braet, 1999, p.115). Aristotle argues that in those kinds of enthymemes well known 
generalizations such as “someone who has a fever is sick” are usually omitted. 
According to this definition of sign relation, argument from sign is causal in nature, 
but it is actually a kind of converse causal argumentation (effect to cause) (Walton, 
1996c, p.47). Therefore there is no clear indication as to how a sign 
reasoning/argument form can be distinguished from an effect to cause one.  
What’s the difference therefore between reasoning from sign and reasoning from 
effect to cause? The answer rests on the directness of the causality between the cause 
and the effect, the cause and the sign of the cause. As Huber and Snider (2006) 
explain, the signs or symptoms could be effects arising from some cause, but the 
cause behind these signs are complex and numerous; in many cases they are distinctly 
indirect: “event one is an effect that is called a “sign” for event two which is a cause 
that is rather indirect or circuitous in its relationship to that effect” (p.139).  
Actually, this form of argument is what is best described from Hempel (1965) as 
inductive statistical explanation: the arguments of this kind show that given the 
particular circumstances and the laws in question, the occurrence of the phenomenon 
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was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation enables us to understand 
why the phenomenon occurred (Hempel 1965, p. 337, as cited in Woodward, 2009) 
(See Appendix C for a discussion about scientific explanations). The fact to be 
explained was to be expected on the basis of the explanatory facts (Hitchcock & 
Salmon, 2001). This type of reasoning is non-monotonic, it might collapse in the light 
of further information (Bell & Staines, 1983, p.47), and this explains why two 
explanations of this kind of model might come to a contradictory conclusion.  
There are views that this kind of reasoning, apart from monotonic, is restricted in 
supporting explanations only for particular facts and not generalizations, laws. Those 
kinds of explanations and arguments cannot support a law, but only a particular fact: 
they only intend to explain certain events or phenomena (Bell & Staines, 1983, p.47). 
 
2.4.4.2.2.2.1 Reasoning from sign as non-causal /explanatory  
Not all typologies of arguments, however, regard reasoning from sign as causal in 
the way described above. For example, Freeman (1994, as cited in Moulin, et al., 
1992, p.186) argues that a sign relationship represents a correlational link between 
data and assertion. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) also distinguish between a 
symptomatic relation (e.g. argument from sign) and a causal relation.  
In Freeley’s (1993) view which is compatible with Freeman’s  (1994, as cited in 
Moulin, et al., 1992), reasoning by sign is based on a correlation between two 
variables and the claim of such a reasoning is that the two variables mentioned are so 
closely related that the presence or absence of one may be taken as an indication of 
the presence or absence of the other (p.87). Accordingly, this kind of reasoning does 
not explain why the proposition is valid, contrary to causal reasoning, but is to show 
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that the proposition is valid. Therefore, a syllogism using a sign link cannot be 
regarded as an explanation of why the effect had happened, but an argument 
supporting that the cause has happened.  
This view however would be contradicted by counterfactual approach for 
causation who takes it that causes make a difference to their effects (Psillos, 2004, 
p.291). (Appendix C). We could assume therefore, that Schellens’ (1985) category of 
reasoning from sign is compatible with a counterfactual approach for causation, which 
accepts that when two variables are invariant, until we discover the third cause we 
think of the two of them as cause to effect (Sober, 2006, p.46). 
How can we describe then reasoning from sign as an epistemic practice? In 
Freeley’s (1993) and Freeman’s (1994, as cited in Moulin, et al., 1992) view is non 
explanatory, but has the form of evidential support for a particular fact. In this sense 
the practice is akin to one of predictions: instead of using a cause-to-effect 
relationship to predict facts, they use an accepted sign-effect relationship to support 
that facts had happened. Reasoning from sign therefore describes a “warrant using” 
argument and is situated in the practices of using ready-made knowledge to predict or 
support facts.  
If reasoning from sign is accepted as causal though, the form of inference cannot 
be described as a linear process of moving from effect to cause.  As other causes 
might have the same effects, reasoning from effect to cause, or from sign to cause is a 
special kind of inference that is described by Peirce (1992) as “abduction” or 
inference to the best explanation (as cited by Flach & Kakas, 2000a, p.11). This kind 
of inference not only generates an explanation of why the particular fact (effect) has 
taken place, but also evaluates this explanation (hypothesis) against other plausible 
hypotheses. An example of such an inference is the best diagnosis of a disease given 
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the symptoms in medicine (Magnani, 2001, p.25). This kind of explanation has the 
following syllogistic form, according to Harman (1965):  
H is a hypothesis. 
D is a collection of data. 
H explains D. 
No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does. 
Therefore H is probably true (as cited in Walton, 2001, p.147).  
According to Magnani (2001) this kind of practice is described as hypothesis 
evaluation and according to Toulmin therefore, it would be a “warrant establishing” 
process, and to Klahr (2000) would be a practice of hypothesis testing situated in the 
experiment space. (See Appendix A for a further discussion about Klahr’s SDDS 
(Scientific Discovery as Dual Search) model for scientific discovery, which 
distinguishes between hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing phases as 
including different epistemic practices)  
However, scholars admit that this kind of inference could also be used in an 
initial process of coming up with explanatorily useful hypothesis alternatives. 
Abductive inference, moving from effect or sign to cause, has been perceived as the 
creative generation of explanatory hypotheses, as Peirce discusses: “Hypothesis is 
where we find some very curious circumstances which would be explained by the 
supposition that it was the case of a certain general rule, and thereupon adopt that 
supposition” (as cited in Magnani, 2001, p.27). 
Coming up with an explanatory hypothesis is distinguished from the process of 
critical evaluation where a decision has to be made as to which explanation is best. 
The need to distinguish between those two connected but, still, different in 
epistemological level practices - generate and evaluate hypothesis - is important when 
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it comes to the evaluation of such reasoning. As Magnani (2001) cites, having a 
hypothesis that explains a certain number of facts is far from being a guarantee of 
being true. Therefore, reasoning from sign to generate a hypothesis, is far from 
reasoning from sign to identify a cause based on its symptoms, and would require a 
different type of argumentation to defend or counter it. 
Concluding the above paragraphs I suggest the following:  
1. Reasoning from sign can be perceived as one defending an explanation of 
why the effect had happened only if a counterfactual approach of causation is 
accepted; otherwise it has to be perceived as a reasoning that proves that the 
cause had happened.  
2. Reasoning from sign, or from effect to cause is a complex process that could 
both be described as an inference to the best explanation, and situated in a 
latter inquiry phase which includes hypothesis evaluation, but also as a 
hypothesis generation process, which could be the start for a new inquiry 
cycle.  
Therefore, to accept Schellens’ typology for arguments defending an explanation, 
as far as sign reasoning is concerned, is problematic. Reasoning from sign as a 
syllogistic form cannot guarantee that the epistemic practice performed is one of 
defending an explanation (either in a primary or latter stage of inquiry). It might be a 
kind of proof. This issue cannot be solved at a theoretical level; we cannot defend, in 
any grounds of argumentation that reasoning from sign IS causal, if the interlocutor 
uses signs not to explain, but to prove that an event has happened. Schellens does not 
have any place in his typology for this kind of argument, perhaps because, as Garssen 
(2001) cites, since his main interest was in rhetorical and not scientific argumentation 
he does not deal with evidential supports. A solution for this problem is to use 
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“reasoning from sign” as an argument form that supports an explanation of why the 
effect had happened, but also find ways to fill in gaps in Schellens’ typology about 
proof-type arguments, a discussion that will take place in latter stages of this 
subchapter.  
 
2.4.5 Free floating forms of arguments  
According to Schellens’ but also to Hastings’ view, there is a category of 
arguments whose schemes are unrestricted, meaning that they are not used 
specifically in support of pragmatic, descriptive of normative statements, but maybe 
used for either category or position (Schellens, 1985). In other words the form of 
reasoning is not linked to a specific type of conclusion. Those are arguments from 
example, from analogy and from authority.  
2.4.5.1 Argument from analogy  
Argument from analogy is a kind of argument used by many typologies and its 
definition seems to be uncontroversial. It involves a kind of comparison between two 
cases: one that is accepted and one that is controversial. According to Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (1992, pp.98-99) the conclusion (standpoint) is defended by 
presenting the controversial as something that has similarities with something that is 
not controversial (as cited in Garssen, 2001, p.92). Walton (1996b, p.143) defines the 
syllogistic form of reasoning from analogy as follows: 
Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2 
A is true in case C1 
Therefore, A is true in case C2 
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Salmon (1984) describes these similarities in terms of properties and describes 
reasoning from analogy as an inductive type of inference which has the syllogistic 
form of:  
Objects of type X have properties F, G, H ….; 
Objects of type Y have properties F, G, H …… and also property Z; 
Therefore objects of type X have property Z as well. 
  
In this sense reasoning from analogy is a kind of categorical syllogism. Freeley 
and Steinberg (2008) on the other hand, perceive reasoning by analogy as a form of 
inductive reasoning, in which the advocate seeks to show that the factors of his or her 
analogy, which are accepted for case 1 are either a cause or a sign of the conclusion 
presented which refers to case 2. In this sense reasoning from analogy can support 
predictions, but also causal relations or even generalizations (p.165). That’s why it is 
included as a category of arguments that is “free floating”. 
 
2.4.5.2 Argument from example  
Argument from example takes the form of an inductive generalization where a 
case is made for the fact that something is always, often or sometimes the case (Jan 
Schellens & De Jong, 2004, p.309). The example takes the form of a kind of evidence 
for the generalization provided in the conclusion and according to Hastings (1963) the 
most important is not the number of examples used but their typicality.  Sometimes a 
single case may be used to establish the generalization but more often a number of 
cases will be offered as a basis for the conclusion. Freeley and Steinberg (2008) 
define this form of reasoning as inductive and suggest that it involves either a cause or 
sign reasoning: the advocate is trying to show that the examples or cases are a cause 
or a sign of the conclusion presented (p.175).  
 152 
 
 
2.4.5.3 Argument from authority  
Argument from authority is also an unrestricted scheme of argumentation and can 
be used to support any sort of position. For example, it might support a statement that 
something is factually true, or argue for the desirability of behaviour on the basis of 
the judgment of an authority (Jan Schellens & De Jong, 2004, p.309). Argument from 
authority cannot be described as a deductive form of argument; however it has a form 
of epistemic practice that uses appeals to ground a knowledge claim, when talking 
about a theoretical claim. 
A first conception of this type of argument is one of formal logic which regards it 
as a logical fallacy, the fallacy of ad-hominem: an argument which criticizes another 
argument by questioning the personal circumstances or personal trustworthiness of the 
arguer who advanced it (Walton, 1987, p.313) and not the argument per se. 
Aristotle (Rhetoric) also perceives an appeal to the character of the rhetorician as 
one kind of persuasion that is differentiated from one of appealing to reason (to which 
we could add all the previous argument schemes referring to theoretical reasoning). 
However, he does not regard it as fallacious. When our evidence is poor we have to 
trust somebody; the case is not that we cannot process the data by ourselves (Nichols 
(1987). Aristotle therefore, does not locate the source of the authority solely in the 
audience's inability to understand a complex argument, but he rather argues that we 
trust worthy people where precision is not possible. (Aristotle, as cited in Nichols, 
1987, p.669)  
Argument from authority in this sense implies that the fact that a specific person 
(or institution) has made a statement is a sign of the truth of that statement (Hastings, 
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1963). As an argument though, does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. And it 
is in this sense that this argument is perceived as a formal logical fallacy.  
Apart from argument from authority, there are also other similar schemes -
regarded also as fallacies - that share the same structure. For example, there are 
arguments that base the truth of their statement on the majority of people who believe 
it as true (appeal to people, or argument from common knowledge). Their syllogistic 
form is as follows:  
 
Most people believe that a claim, X, is true.  
Therefore X is true 
 
The common core of those arguments is that they do not base the truth of their 
statements on evidence, but to an external “authority”, a source which claims that this 
statement is true. This “authority” might vary from an expert in the field, a source of 
knowledge (books, journals and articles), the majority of people and finally, even 
common sense.  
 
2.4.6 Beyond Schellens 
2.4.6.1 Evidence based generalizations 
Summarizing the typology of Schellens so far, we can say that he cites arguments 
that support predictions and explanations/hypotheses. A question to ask at this point 
is: are there any other reasoning schemes that would have a theoretical conclusion, 
beyond those referred to by Schellens? A first issue to note is that Schellens’ typology 
does not deal with evidential support for a theoretical claim.  
Apart from argument from example there is no place for arguments that their 
conclusion is a descriptive generalization in Schellens’ typology. Schellens does not 
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deal with arguments that stem from data. For example, Freeman (1994) recognizes 
two types of warrants: wtype1 warrants classify the relationship between assertion 
and data as explanatory or sign, whereas the wtype2 warrant, which includes 
evidential warrants, represents the strength with which the assertions can be drawn 
from data (as cited in Moulin, et al., 1992, p.186). We could say that Schellens does 
not deal with the second type of warrants.  
Argument forms that are related to evidence and point to descriptive 
generalizations are described as inductive arguments and are encountered as 
arguments based on samples (Salmon, 1984 as cited in Flach & Kakas, 2001a; 
Grennan, 1997, p. 163-165, as cited in Walton, 2006b). According to Salmon (1984) 
in arguments based on samples, a generalization is defended based on a sample. 
Those arguments have the following syllogistic form: 
X percent of observed Fs are Gs; 
Therefore (approximately) X percent of all Fs are Gs  
 
Toulmin (1958) describes those arguments as “warrant establishing arguments” 
which demonstrate that “a warrant is successful for a number of instances of Datum 
and Conclusion” (p.120). This is a kind of induction that refers to the process of 
establishing rather than using warrants, which is differentiated from formal logic’s 
definition of induction as a propositional relationship. The use of the term by Toulmin 
resembles the older meaning of term “inductive” coming from Aristotle and refers to 
the process of generalizing from a set of particular cases, moving from a part to the 
whole (Walton, 2001 p.116). This process is differentiated from deduction where a 
general law applies to a particular case, moving from the whole to its parts.  
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Peirce also defines this kind of reasoning as “induction” and describes it as the 
process of confronting a hypothesis, through selected predictions, with reality: 
“(…) an experiment (…) is a question put to nature (…). 
The question is, “Will this be the result?” If Nature replies 
“No!” the experimenter has gained an important piece of 
knowledge. If Nature says “Yes,” the experimenter’s ideas 
remain just as they were; only somewhat more deeply 
engrained.” (Peirce, as cited in Flach, 1996, p.3)  
 
This kind of a process, according to the SDDS model (Klahr, 2000) would be 
described as evidence evaluation, a process that is described as the decision made on 
the basis of the cumulative evidence to accept, reject, or modify the current 
hypothesis (as cited in Zimmerman, 2007). 
Those kinds of arguments however, do not always support explanations. They 
support hypotheses, but not all hypotheses are explanatory (Flach and Kakas, 2000a). 
In this sense we have two types of inductive generalizations: those that are 
explanatory and those that are descriptive or confirmatory (p.30).  
 
2.4.6.2 Statistical syllogisms   
A second type of argument that is not included in Schellens typology is that of 
statistical syllogisms. Those kinds of syllogisms are described by Peirce (as cited in 
Fetzer, 2000) as “probable deduction”, which is equated to “the use of a priori 
probabilities for the prediction of statistical frequency” (Keynes, 1921 as cited in 
Fetzer, 2000). The syllogistic form of those arguments is presented by Salmon (1984, 
p.32 as cited in Flach & Kakas, 2000b, p.6) as follows:  
X percent of all Fs are Gs  
a is an F;  
therefore a is  G. 
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In this sense a statistical generalization is used for making inferences about 
individual matters of fact. This kind of reasoning has a predictive power, but for 
others has an explanatory power as well. For example, Hempel’s (1965) model of 
deductive statistical explanation is akin to a statistical syllogism presented above. In 
DS (deductive statistical explanations) the laws are not universal generalizations but 
have the form of statistical generalizations (Mayes, 2005). (See Appendix C for 
further exploration of Hempel’s model of explanations.)  Those that perceive 
statistical syllogism as explanatory accept that as we can explain scientific 
phenomena deducing them from more fundamental general laws, we can also have 
deductive explanations of statistical laws on the basis of more basic statistical laws 
(Hitchcock & Salmon, 2001, p.472).  
This kind of practice, according to Toulmin (1958) would also be a warrant using 
one. Since a statistical generalization is accepted, then it can be used as a basis of 
warrant using arguments that could use it to predict future facts, or explain current 
facts. Those syllogisms therefore, are akin to cause-effect syllogisms used to defend 
predictions or explanations with a main difference: there is not a causal relationship 
between variables, however there is one of statistical generalization.  
Even if Schellens (1985) admits that there are also “non-causal” ways of 
defending a prediction, and might refer to statistical syllogisms as having a predictive 
force, he surely does not assume that those kinds of arguments could support an 
explanation, in other words indicate causality. However, since there are views that 
accept those as explanatory, we have to include them also in a typology of argument 
schemes for a reason that has been elaborated before in this study: philosophical 
considerations as to what counts as causality is one aspect; one might argue on behalf 
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of each school of thought and endorse a view. However, how those considerations are 
expressed in the classroom or in any scientific debate is another matter. If a student 
for example, uses a statistical syllogism to defend an explanation then, we should 
keep a category of such an argument scheme, even if several scholars would classify 
such reasoning as non-explanatory, inconsistent, or fallacious.  
 
2.4.6.3 Analytic arguments  
Analytic arguments (Toulmin, 2003) are another scheme of arguments missing 
from Schellens’ (1985) typology. Toulmin (2003) describes those arguments as those 
in which in their conclusion do not tell us anything that it is not included in the data 
and warrant - backing (p.139). The conclusion necessarily comes out from data and 
there is no need to further explain or ground the warrant between the data and the 
conclusion. With analytic arguments there is no need to explain “how did we get 
there” from data, and the conclusion, once the data accepted, cannot be challenged. 
Toulmin (2003) provides an example of such an analytic argument:  
Anne is Jack’s sister; 
Every single one of Jack’s sisters has red hair;  
So (necessarily) Anne has red hair (p.140).  
 
As he cites, we should not confuse this category with deductive arguments of the 
type “All A’s are B’s” or with the category of warrant using or warrant establishing 
arguments.  
It is evident that this kind of argument is far from the definition of a dialectic, or 
rhetoric argument. A critical element of the definition of argument in dialectics is that 
is defensible (Mbasakos, 1999) and that’s why dialectics is distinguished from 
analytics, since it is defined from the possibility to stand on the other side: argument 
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is not a proof as the above analytic “argument” is.  An argument in this sense is 
logically incomplete since it needs a “field” in which it can be situated and evaluated: 
political, ethical, law argument for example (Allen, 2007, p.13). Toulmin (2003) calls 
arguments that are situated in a field as substantial and differentiates them from 
analytic ones. Analytic arguments are rather proof syllogisms. 
There are two options for the issue set above: either accepting analytical 
arguments as mere “inferences” and omit them from an argument scheme typology, or 
accept them as potential arguments and include them in a typology. The answer for 
such a dilemma rests on two aspects: a pragmatic and a methodological one. 
The pragmatic aspect refers to the use of such analytic syllogisms from students 
in the classroom as arguments that counter a premise of another argument as false, or 
support it as true. Consider the following episode:  
“446. Student 1: We should not clone people, because, for 
example, if I meet in the street someone I know and he does not 
talk to me, (and he is the clone) I would feel that he has a 
problem with me…It would create misunderstandings… 
447. Teacher: Yes, but remember that when we clone a 
person of 33 years old, for example, he will not come as a 33 
year old grown up. He will come as a baby...” 
 
The teacher here performs an analytical syllogism:  
The clone comes as a baby.  
Therefore, it’s not possible that the clone will come as a grown up 
person. 
  
This kind of syllogism drops the premise of the previous argument as false. It 
might not stand as an “argument” as defined by Mbasakos(1999) as it has not a gap in 
its syllogism, no one who accepts that a clone comes as a baby would by any way 
deny that she does not come as an adult. However, the dialectical strength of this 
syllogism is one of a counterargument: it drops the data of the previous argument as 
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false. Since, analytical syllogisms are used as such they should have a place of an 
argument scheme typology.  
The methodological aspect refers to the unit of analysis about arguments when 
chains of argumentation are created in the classroom. Regarding analytical arguments 
as such, enables us to define the unit of analysis for arguments as the argument 
scheme: two premises, serving as data and warrant, leading to a conclusion. How 
about other elements that Toulmin (2003) suggests such as rebuttals or backings? If 
we accept analytic arguments as an argument scheme, then a rebuttal would have the 
form of an analytic argument that drops the warrant as false in special circumstances. 
The backing would also be an analytic argument (though not always) that supports the 
warrant as true.  
As Toulmin (2003) cites, warrants are defended according to the fields that they 
belong to; one warrant is defended if related to a system of taxonomical classification, 
another by appealing to the statutes governing the nationality of people, others by 
referring to statistics (p.96). This kind of analysis allows us to grasp every movement 
in an argumentative dialogue that aims to support or counter any component part of 
the argument, as a standalone argument, that can be described by the schemes 
included in the typology.  
A backing is a reason - that can be reconstructed as a standalone argument - 
supporting the warrant. A rebuttal is an exception to the claim, and therefore it might 
have the form of an analytic argument of the type since not all A’s are B’s and since 
A leads to C then not all B’s lead to C. (B leads to C refers to the Data-Claim whereas 
not all B’s lead to C is the rebuttal in this case). A qualifier, finally, is a statement that 
evaluates how strong the claim is. It is therefore an argument (analytic or not) that 
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deals with the Data-Warrant-Claim argument as a proposition and evaluates it. A 
qualifier therefore is a kind of a normative argument that rests in meta-level.  
This kind of perception is in line with other scholars that have modified Toulmin’s 
argument pattern so as to be feasible to apply it in real classroom discussions. For 
example, Erduran et al. (2008) note that all the statements (data, warrants) can be 
considered as claims in themselves; what makes them rebuttals is that they are 
positioned to be data or warrant relative to the main claim that creates a force for the 
generation of the subsequent elements, thus being considered as “nested”: data of one 
argument counts as a claim for another argument (p.58).  
By adding the analytical argument scheme though, we do not imply that all 
analytic syllogisms are arguments in the way presented above. Many of them might 
be steps for a syllogism that could add a premise for an argument for example. Others 
might be just implications of the conclusions of other arguments with no dialectical 
strength of supporting or countering anything else. The reasoning pattern of an 
analytical argument might be the same as an analytical syllogism, an implication, in 
the same way which a prediction from cause to effect has the same reasoning pattern 
with a D-N explanation. The difference rests on the dialectical strength of the 
conclusions: implications and explanations deal with conclusions that are already 
accepted; analytical arguments and other types of arguments question, or defend such 
a conclusion.  
 
2.4.6.4 Appeals to passion (emotional appeals) 
Aristotle talks about three kinds of appeals that a rhetorician has in order to 
convince his audience: appeal to logos (reason), Ethos (the virtue of the rhetorician’s 
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character), and Pathos (the emotions of the audience) (Kock, 2006). The differences 
between these forms of argumentation are akin to Toulmin’s categories of arguments: 
in a substantive argument the warrant tells us something about the way in which “the 
things in the world about us” relate to one another, in a motivational argument it tells 
us something about the emotions, values, desires or motives which can make the 
claim acceptable to the person to whom the argument is addressed, and in an 
authoritative argument it says something about the reliability of the source from 
which the data are drawn (Brockriede & Ehninger, 1960 as cited in Van Eemeren, et 
al., 2000 p.56). 
Argument from authority is captured in Schellens’ typology as a free floating 
form of argument and has been presented before. However, authoritative arguments 
do not refer to an initial argument scheme in which a proposition is asserted as true, 
desired, good etc because an authority has stated so. Those kinds of arguments ground 
the quality of data on the reliability from its source, the authority that has stated it. An 
argument that uses as data the fact that a doctor is an expert in his field might 
conclude that the doctor’s view about a dilemma should be seriously taken, for 
example. In this sense authoritative arguments are arguments supporting the quality of 
the data based on the authority’s character, reliability etc. However, these types of 
arguments are captured by Schellens’ typology as normative arguments.  
The category not captured by Schellens refers to argument schemes that are in a 
sense motivational, they are trying to convince about the truth of a statement, or a 
desirability of a behaviour arising emotions from the audience. Those arguments are 
known as “appeals to emotion” and therefore regarded as logical fallacies; their use 
by a rhetorician is accepted as a rhetorical type approach of proof, from an 
Aristotelian perspective.  
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The connection between reason and passion implies that a rhetorician should use 
passionate (emotional) appeals to arouse his audience’s passions to the argument of 
the speech itself; in other words, make his audience get interested in the reasons 
provided to convince for a particular view. Additionally, the same arguments that 
arouse the passions of the audience also reveal the rhetorician's character and in this 
sense the three proofs of rhetoric - reason, pathos and logos- are in the best case 
inseparable from one another (Nichols, 1987, p.662). The case is not always the best 
though; there are rhetoricians that appeal to emotions not to make their audience get 
interested in particular reasons, but rather use the emotional situation as a way to 
convince about a case, to use emotions instead of reasons. And it is in this case that 
those arguments should be described as specific type of arguments. We need therefore 
a particular individual scheme to capture them.  
Examples of such arguments are appeals to fear (If you continue to drink, you 
will die early as your father did!), appeals to emotion (I’ve worked too much to 
prepare this thesis, please do not reject it!) and wishful thinking (It will rain 
tomorrow, I want it so much!). Appeals would have been a “free floating” form of 
arguments according to Schellens as they can support a belief about a fact to be true, 
but also might be used to convince a person towards a specific action.  
A category of Schellens that could capture emotional appeals is one of pragmatic 
argumentation based on rules (rule case syllogism). If we translate an appeal as a rule 
case syllogism, we get the following syllogistic form:  
Rule: You should feel sympathy for persons that do not have 
a job and have big families 
Case: I’m such a person and you are such a man (that 
sympathizes) 
Conclusion: You should offer me a job.  
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Notice that the reason offered to support the candidate is not related to his abilities 
to perform the job, but is a way to raise awareness of the employer to sympathize with 
him and offer him the job. In a strictly logical analysis this is not a reason. On a 
different, more naive perspective however, it could be a reason: helping people with 
big families to raise their children, could be a reason for offering a job to a man who 
has many children.   
Due to this slight differentiation  of emotional appeals to rule case syllogisms, 
and due to the fact that emotional appeals might not only tell us what to do, but also 
what to believe, it would be better to keep them as a distinct argument scheme under 
the category of “free floating” arguments.  
Summarizing the discussion about arguments that support a theoretical, factual 
conclusion we get the following schemes: 
Reasoning 
scheme  
Epistemic Practice  SDDS stage  
Cause to effect 
Defend a prediction   
Explain a fact (present or 
past)  
 (D-N explanation)  
Use ready- made knowledge  
Effect to cause  
From sign  
Defend an explanation (I-S) 
of a particular fact, or a law , 
defend a postdiction  
Hypothesis generation 
Inference to the best explanation- 
diagnosis or hypothesis evaluation  
From time to 
causality  
Defend an explanation - a 
causal relation (Counterfactual 
account of causality) 
Hypothesis generation  
Evidence to 
hypothesis (From 
samples) 
From example*   
Defend a descriptive 
generalization (either explanatory 
or not explanatory) 
 
Hypothesis testing-Evidence 
evaluation 
Statistical 
syllogism  
Predict a fact  
Explain a fact (D-S 
explanation)  
Use readymade knowledge to 
deduce a fact, or a categorical syllogism 
From Analogy * Defend a generalization Hypothesis testing, Evidence evaluation  
Authority* 
(Expert, source)  Defend any type of 
conclusion  Any stage Popularity* 
Emotion * 
Table 7: Argument schemes that conclude to descriptive factual statements 
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The typology that has been proposed above, as mentioned elsewhere is a result of 
theoretical thought concerning theories about reasoning and argument schemes and 
how those could be used to describe epistemic practices; this theoretical thought 
though has been affected by classroom instances which actually fed the discussion in 
two ways: firstly they pointed to the demand to seek for such tools and 
conceptualizations and in a second place they have been food for thought for 
refinement and modification of existing theories and schemas (like the argument 
scheme’s typologies). Actually, the modification of Schellens’ (1985) typology is an 
example of this process: specific schemes of syllogisms encountered in the lesson 
could not be captured by the typology, or specific epistemic practices described as 
processes of the SDDS model (Klahr, 2000 as cited in Zimmerman, 2007), like 
hypothesis testing through evidential support, could not be described and therefore the 
typology has been modified/expanded so as to include categories that could fulfil 
those needs.  
The application of argument schemes alongside other tools that have been used in 
this study were a result of the need to reconstruct argumentative talk in the classroom 
on the one hand, and  describe controversial issues as the dialectical context in which 
epistemic practice was situated, on the other. Both processes will be further explored 
in the method and methodologies chapter that follows, within the data analysis 
section.  
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3. Methodology and Methods  
3.1 Introduction - Restatement of Research Questions  
The aim of this study is to investigate and describe the implementation of 
controversial issues within science curriculum, as performed by primary school 
teachers that had acted both as designers and pedagogues of such a proposed 
curriculum. The implementation of controversial issues in the science curriculum is 
perceived as an open ended, complex, and problematic task. This study recognizes the 
need to consider the problem of controversial issues teaching in its practical alongside 
its philosophical aspect. In other words, it aims to describe and analyze how 
theoretical assumptions about science teaching and controversial issues apply or not, 
in real science classrooms.  
In other words this study aims to describe how controversial issues are “situated” 
in science education (Tiberghien, 2008, p. V) or vice versa, what kind of science 
education is performed, and how this is done, under the context of controversial 
issues. As noted in the introduction chapter, a methodological problem that had to be 
addressed was the description of the lessons both in science lesson terms, but also in 
socioscientific issues lesson terms. One question that arises is: if we describe the 
lesson alongside those two dimensions, do we automatically regard learning science 
and learning about socio-scientific issues as epistemologically distinct activities 
(Levinson, 2006, p. 24)? And if so, by which method would we address their 
boundaries?  This issue actually assigns a new aim for this study: to define what a 
“socioscientific issue lesson” is and what a “science lesson” is, in order to describe 
them as distinct.  
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A theoretical construct that was used to refine this relationship was the definition 
of socioscientific elements of functional scientific literacy, as defined by Zeidler and 
Keefer (2003) (see Figure 1, in section 2.2.).  
According to the construct they propose, functional scientific literacy related to 
socioscientific issues includes cognitive/reasoning development, moral reasoning, 
moral character education and the reflection of emotive belief systems. In this sense, 
socioscientific elements of functional scientific literacy are used as a priori theory that 
enables the definition of the areas which this study should describe: cognitive 
reasoning, moral reasoning and emotional reflection.  
The selection of such a construct does not imply that the relationship between 
controversial issues teaching and science education should entail all those elements, 
or that a single lesson should include all those elements. In other words, the construct 
is not selected as an evaluation weight, but as a descriptive means. An additional 
reason for the selection for such a construct is that it has the capacity to endorse all 
other frameworks about controversial issues teaching: Zeidler’s and Keefer’s (2003) 
framework entails all those elements that could be used to describe any  curriculum, 
that either includes elements that use controversial issues teaching as a means for 
humanizing science curriculum and an opportunity to deal with moral, social and 
epistemological issues, or uses it as an environment through which  students should 
develop their scientific literacy  in order to be able to engage in thoughtful decisions 
about controversial issues. 
The question therefore of describing how socioscientific issues are situated in 
science education has been restated in the following form:  
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How can the lesson be described in its moral, emotional-reflective and 
cognitive dimension, and how can this be related to the context of 
controversial issues?  
This new view had restated the research questions in a form that could capture the 
elements of functional scientific literacy and situate them within controversial issues 
discussion. As soon as this clarification has been made, two methodological problems 
have been raised:  
1. How could moral, emotional-reflective and cognitive elements be described 
as content and process within the lesson?  
2. How can we define “controversial issues” as the context for those areas?  
The initial questions have been restated as follows:  
 
Research Question Restated Research Question 
1. Which entities are found in a controversial 
issues lesson? (Scientific concepts, claims, values, 
ethical, metaphysical considerations, emotions, etc)  
1.1. What other areas of knowledge and 
expertise are infused in the lesson? 
1. How can moral, emotional-reflective and 
cognitive processes be described in socio-
scientific lessons? 
2. What is the moral, reflective and 
cognitive part of the lesson? 
2. By which conceptual activities do students 
and teachers negotiate the thematic pattern of the 
lesson? 
2.1 What type of science do those activities 
describe?  
3. Under which context do thematic entities 
come up in the lesson?   
3. How can “controversial issues” be 
described as a context for functional scientific 
literacy?  
4. What is the context for the moral, 
reflective and cognitive part of the lesson?  
Table 8: Restatement of research questions  
The restatement of the research questions as presented above does not change the 
initial aims of the study: deciding to describe the moral, emotional-reflective and the 
cognitive does not actually differs from identifying scientific concepts, claims, values, 
ethical and metaphysical considerations or emotions.  
However, finding a way to describe those entities both as content and as process 
and situating them in dialectical context has been more than a methodological issue 
  
for this study. The way that dialectical has been described as the context and the tools 
used to describe both the dialectical and epistemic within this study are actually 
results of this study. They are products of mutual interaction between theoretical 
consideration and instances from classroom data that pointed to the seek and 
modification of existing tools, or the proposal of new tools. The description of those 
tools could not be done within the strict limits of the methodological chapter. And 
since are described as results, they had to be stated as problems, as research questions 
that have been answered within this study beyond their role as methodological tools 
used to provide the answers for the theoretical part of the study.   
 
3.2 Methodological approach  
3.2.1 Qualitative approach 
Since this study is situated in the hypothesis space, in other words it would serve 
better to “generate a hypothesis” (Merriam, 1988, p.3) rather than to prove or disprove 
a hypothesis about controversial issues teaching and science education, it has 
followed a qualitative research tradition.  
Another reason suggesting qualitative research is its naturalistic character 
(Bogdan & Bilken, 1998). Being naturalistic, qualitative research seeks to develop 
detailed holistic descriptions of the field and the phenomenon/situation studied, and 
this is actually the purpose of the study: to develop a description about controversial 
issues teaching. The data needed to answer the questions of this study should derive 
from actual learning processes; therefore, the adoption of a qualitative approach was 
appropriate as it is focused on the natural settings where the phenomenon or the 
situation under study takes place (Bogdan & Bilken, 1998).  
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3.2.1.1 Case study approach  
Case study design was selected as more appropriate for this study, because of its 
qualitative character and its capacity to answer the research questions appropriately. 
As a descriptive means “the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events 
when the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated” and as a method of analysis it 
has the ability to examine a “full variety of evidence - documents, artifacts, interview 
and observations” (Yin, 2003, p.7-8).  
Science curriculum related to controversial issues, implemented in primary 
school classrooms, is perceived in this study as the case, as a “bounded system” 
(Stake, 2000). Each of the lessons would constitute a sub-case of this case. Perceiving 
implemented curriculum as a system is grounded on several criteria that this system 
fulfils: this system is bounded by time and place. Delivered curriculum (a lesson, an 
instruction) is conducted by agents (students and teachers) in a specific place 
(classroom) and time (80-minute science lesson) and includes the processes by which 
this curriculum is delivered and shaped. Theories about what constitutes science 
education or dialectic practice are used to bind the system in its theoretical 
dimensions. Additionally, in the system under study the researcher has limited control 
over the case of the study whereas she can be the primary observer (Merriam, 1988; 
Yin, 1994).  
Yin (2003) argues that the system can be studied with one of three types of case 
studies: exploratory case studies, explanatory case studies, and descriptive case 
studies. Merriam (1988) on the other hand proposes an analogous classification of 
case studies based on the analysis and reporting of the results: he proposes the 
categories of descriptive, interpretive and evaluative studies. Descriptive case studies 
use the data for the purpose of achieving a better understanding of the current status 
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and serve as an initial step for theory building; interpretive case studies use 
description to develop conceptual categories or to illustrate, support or challenge 
theoretical assumptions prior to the data gathering; and finally, evaluative case studies 
involve description and interpretation to evaluate the merit of the case (lesson, 
program, event) whereas the efficacy of this study relies on the competence of the 
researcher to use the available information to make judgments (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994).   
Even if this study has a highly descriptive character, the major focus is to 
interpret the data in an effort to classify and conceptualize the information in terms of 
functional scientific literacy and controversial issues. Therefore, even if situated in the 
hypothesis space, this study goes beyond mere description, to interpretation of 
descriptions, and therefore is defined as an interpretive case study aiming to support 
or challenge theoretical assumptions related to functional scientific literacy and 
controversial issues teaching.  
A note to be taken is that the lesson, as defined in this study, has been finally 
equated to the “discussion” about controversial issues. The majority of the time of the 
lessons has been devoted to classroom discussion, whereas little time was given to 
students either to study relevant information or to write down arguments that would 
be discussed in later sessions in the classrooms. Unfortunately there was not a way to 
capture small groups’ discussions when trying to form decisions (in mobile phones 
lesson, an activity that had lasted 7 minutes) and announce them to the teacher. 
Though this is a shortcoming of the study, I believe that it could add some missing 
categories from classroom discussion, but surely does not affect the analysis of the 
rest of the discussion in the classroom. In a way therefore, this study analyzes 
classroom discussions rather than lessons about controversial issues, to provide 
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information about related curriculum. The case therefore, the bounded system to be 
studied, is the discussion about a controversial issue within a science classroom.  
 
3.2.2 Study setting 
For the purposes of this study, the main focus has been three 80-minute lessons, 
by three Cypriot science teachers. The instructions took place in the academic year 
2006-2007, two in 6th grade classrooms (10-11 year-old students) and one in 5th grade 
(9-10 year-old students). The teachers were participants in a larger professional 
development seminar that was proposed by the Pedagogical Institute of Cyprus and 
had as its main aim to help teachers connect theory and practice, by reflecting on their 
own teaching, with the help of videos of lessons conducted under the thematic units of 
the seminar. The seminar was set on a volunteer basis. One of the units of the seminar 
was related to controversial issues teaching. I was the instructor of this part of the 
seminar.  
The teachers were informed from the very beginning of the seminar that their 
video-taped lessons would be used for research purposes, and their permission was 
taken for such a use. Additionally, parents of the students participating in the research 
were informed by letters, and those that did not approve of their child’s participation 
in the video were omitted from the lessons (only two occasions within 82 students). 
The seminar has the goal of informing teachers about controversial issues and 
science teaching, an aspect that has the status of an innovation for the Cyprus 
curriculum, but on the other hand, has presented the issue in its problematic sense, 
thereby leaving space for the teachers to act as experts, perhaps not about teaching  
controversial issues, but surely as experts in teaching other issues, to design their own 
instructions in the way that would reflect their own beliefs and understandings.  
  172 
This kind of study is not an interventionist one; I did not want to “inform” 
teachers how to teach such a lesson, thereby using a top-down model of professional 
development, based on an informed by the literature, but still, limited conception of 
how teaching about controversial issues could be situated in science lessons. In this 
sense therefore, teachers have been used both as designers of a new proposed 
curriculum but also as subjects for professional development for such a curriculum.  
The role of the instructor, me, as a researcher is not problematic in this sense, 
since the setting is naturalistic and not interventionist. My role was clarified during 
the first meetings as an informed- in a theoretical basis - member of a group of 
teachers that was trying to find solutions for a complicated problem that was set as 
“controversial issues teaching in science classroom”. I did not have the solutions from 
the beginning; I was searching for such solutions and this was clearly set out to the 
teachers.  
Actually, I gave little, to almost no guidance to the teachers while they were 
preparing their teaching; my role was limited in helping them clarify their thoughts, 
being there as a peer to which they could talk about their concerns, and I was there 
only when asked to do so. There were teachers who did not ask for such help. For 
others, I helped as far as logistics of the lesson were concerned: I had been looking 
with them to find relevant information that could be used in the lessons as information 
or evidence about the issue they have selected, translate resources from English to 
Greek when not available, and in some cases suggest available possible activities that 
could be used in the lesson.  
By this, I do not assume that the selection of information or type of evidence is 
not of importance, or it does not affect the whole setting of the lesson. Additionally, 
the suggestion of activities also was an input from the researcher to the teachers; 
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however, the way that this was done had the form of free selection among possible 
different activities, rather than dictating the use of one versus another activity. 
Actually, there were lessons that took the form that I would never suggest for myself 
being situated more in the “science” and “more positive” side of science teaching, I 
would never suggest a lesson being more closed to social rather than natural sciences. 
However, those lessons, in the end, have been very valuable in indicating issues that I 
would never think of before, and this is actually fulfilling the purposes of this study: 
using teachers as experts.  
The meetings lasted two and a half periods and were conducted in afternoon 
hours. The following structure of the seminar reveals its peer reflecting nature:  
• One face to face meeting about the nature of science using Nott’s and 
Wellington’s (1995) critical incidents (This was actually a way to bring up 
considerations about epistemological issues that are not typically addressed 
by Cyprus National Curriculum for Science).  
• One online meeting for the discussion of genetically modified food as an 
issue for their own reflection. Teachers were talking about the issue, not 
about its instruction.  
•  One face to face meeting which was a reflection between the participants 
about controversial issues and their place in science teaching.  
• One online meeting in which the teachers should provide a lesson plan for 
controversial issues instruction and the others make a comment to at least 
two members of the group.  
• A face to face meeting where participants created groups in order to discuss 
further their lesson plans.  
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• An online meeting where they submitted their final lesson plan and asked for 
help. 
• A final face to face meeting where a discussion of parts of each lesson was 
conducted, with the use of videos and transcripts. 
 
3.3 Data sources 
Teaching observation (recorded on video) was the main data collection method for 
this study. Transcripts from classroom discussion were the primary data for analysis. 
For students’ data there was no secondary data collected, though, as will be 
mentioned in the next sessions of data analysis, this was one of the shortcomings of 
this study.  
The language of the lessons was the Greek language. This was not a problem for 
me as I am a Greek speaker also; therefore I regard the language as not an obstacle in 
analysis. Classroom talk reconstruction is not affected by the language, since the 
researcher and the participants share both the same language and culture. However, 
the presentation of episodes had to be done with care so no messages would be lost in 
translation, but also the modifications for an accurate translation would not affect the 
original meaning as expressed in mother tongue.  
Another language-cultural aspect refers to the gendered pronouns used in the 
study. In Greek language the masculine pronoun (he, his etc) is dominant and 
expresses both masculine and feminine. Using the term “she” is not natural in Greek 
language. Respecting though issues that require equal treatment of men and women, 
this study uses the conjectures he/she, his/her etc to express a neutral gender and uses 
the actual genders of the interlocutors when analyzing their talk in the classroom.  
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For enhancing the description and interpretation of teachers’ strategies, but also 
for triangulation reasons, secondary data was collected: teachers’ notes and lesson 
plans, materials and teaching aids, alongside with teachers’ descriptions of the lessons 
as those presented in a symposium that took place during the works of the 5th National 
Conference of History, Philosophy and Teaching of (University of Cyprus, Nicosia, 
11-14 June 2009) have been used to describe teachers’ practices.  
Another data collection method that was applied in this study was the interview 
by the use of video stimulated recall. The following steps, proposed as a guideline for 
conducting a recall session have been followed (as those cited in Cashwell, 2001)   
1. The researcher has reviewed the videos  prior to the recall session.   
2. The teacher has been informed that the purpose of the session was to reflect 
on thoughts and feelings of him/her during the session(s) that will be 
reviewed. Actually, we reviewed the whole lesson, a process that took a lot 
of time to be completed (several sessions within weeks). 
3. The tape begun to play; at appropriate points, either person (researcher-
teacher) stopped the tape and asked a relevant lead to influence the discovery 
process. If the teacher stopped the tape, he/she would speak first about 
thoughts or feelings that occurred at that time in the counselling session. The 
researcher facilitated the discovery process by asking relevant open-ended 
questions.  
4. During the recall session, no evaluative weights were put at all; the purpose 
was for the teacher to explore thoughts and feelings to some resolution 
(Bernard & Goodyear, 1992).  
Actually, the use video stimulated recall sessions in this study served two different 
purposes: on one hand, they have increased my awareness of teachers’ thoughts and 
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feelings and therefore enabled me to describe teachers’ strategies in a more valid way. 
On the other hand, and this is the greatest input for this study, they have broadened 
my view of what could constitute teaching about controversial issues in a science 
lesson; this process really enabled me to “understand and act upon perceptions to 
which they- I - may otherwise not attend “(Cashwell, 2001), and have a view of the 
lessons that I would never have without the inputs from the teachers. This input also 
determined the way that the literature review is organized and presented in this thesis, 
and  has reformed my perception of what “teaching science through controversial 
issues” or “implementing controversial issues in science curriculum” consists of.  
  
3.4 Data Analysis  
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to describe in detail the process that has 
been followed so as classroom data could be reformed in a way that could inform the 
study about the epistemic practice as this is situated in the dialectical practice, and 
therefore fulfil the aims of this study. In the first place, the study had to face the 
methodological problem of situating controversial issues in science education and 
define clearly this relationship, so appropriate tools would be used to describe it. The 
process by which this problem has been solved is described within the first part of this 
subchapter, 3.4.1 Defining dialectical context alongside socioscientific content as 
dialectical context for this study.  
As soon as it was clarified that what was to be described was the epistemic as 
situated in the dialectical, there was a need to define the “epistemic” part, a process 
described in the second part of the subchapter, 3.4.2 Describe Moral, Emotional-
Reflective and Cognitive part of the lesson. Any effort though to describe the 
epistemic part had, among others, to extract arguments as products from the talk, a 
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process that has been enhanced by conceptualizations from speech act theory which 
had enabled the identification of propositional and non-propositional, simple and 
complex speech acts; this process is described within the sections 3.4.3 Thematic 
content of the lesson -Epistemic content and 3.4.4 Propositional content of 
argumentation. Finally, the process of reconstructing argumentative talk as to extract 
arguments as products is described in the last section of the data analysis subchapter, 
3.4.5 Reconstructing classroom talk: extracting the products of argumentation. 
 
3.4.1 Defining dialectical context alongside socioscientific content as dialectical 
context for this study 
The restatement of the research questions had provided a methodological question 
of: how can “controversial issues” be described as context for functional scientific 
literacy? This question has been used as a data analysis scheme for the second, that is 
“What is the moral, reflective and cognitive part of the lesson?”  
Since controversial issues include by definition argumentation, there was an initial 
effort for data analysis methods related to argumentation. Studies related to 
argumentation revised from the science education area (Erduran, et al., 2004; Zohar & 
Nemet, 2002; Aufschnaiter, et al., 2008; Osborne, et al., 2004) would be sufficient for 
providing different schemes that could be used for argument evaluation in terms of 
their epistemic quality. However, they are not sufficient in providing valuable 
information about how the “socioscientific context” of the study would by described.  
A distinction between argumentative process and epistemic actions can be found 
in the Pontecorvo and Girardett (1993) study. Their study, situated in history 
education, distinguishes between historical epistemic actions and argumentative 
operations. Argumentative operations “are used by the children as a means of 
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constructing and supporting their claims, and consequently, their reasoning and 
thinking” (p.368). Those operations are:  
• Claim: Any clause that states a position (that can be claimed). 
• Justification: Any clause that furnishes adequate grounds or warrants for a 
claim.  
• Concession: Any clause that concedes something to an addressee, admitting 
a point claimed in the dispute.  
• Opposition: Any claim that denies what has been claimed by another, with or 
without giving reasons.  
• Counter opposition: Any claim that opposes another's opposition, which can 
be more or less justified. 
Pontecorvo and Girardett (1993) have assumed that those operations had to be 
identified within a lower level of analysis and should be applied to the idea unit that 
was under discussion, and rests on an upper level of analysis. Duschl (2008) however, 
who has used those operations for analyzing argumentative talk, criticizes them as 
being too broadly defined, a fact that led to a difficulty of distinguishing the structure 
and patterns of arguments, but also for identifying epistemic operations. He also cites 
that the idea units did not work well with the argumentative operations (p.169). 
A similar approach was adopted by Jimenez-Alexandre et al. (2000) who had 
separated argumentative operations from epistemic operations for the determination 
of the capacity of students to develop and assess arguments during a high school 
genetics instructional sequence. Jimenez-Alexandre et al. (2000) use Toulmin’s 
(1958) argument components as argumentative operations: claims as hypotheses, 
warrants as reasons, qualifiers as conditions for the claim and rebuttals as conditions 
for rebutting the claim (p.768).  
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Even if this heuristic approach might be used to describe argumentative 
operations as the socioscientific context with epistemic operations as a way to 
describe epistemic practice, there were two major problems in such an analysis:  
1.  The talk in the classroom is not always argumentative; there was a need to 
define moral, reflective and cognitive aspects of the lesson within and 
without argumentation.  
2. There is very little information as to how this single pattern of an argument 
would be applied in complex argumentation structures. For example it gives 
us very little information as to what could count as a unit of analysis for a 
single argument, or where an argument ends and a new one emerges. 
 
Actually, the process used from Jimenez-Alexandre et al. (1998) was intuitively 
used in this study as the first attempt to give classroom talk its context. Information, 
Argument, Conflict Point, Dilemma, Acceptance of argument, Link for Argument, 
Evaluation of Argument, alongside other “elements” were  all  identified in the same 
way as Jimenez- Alexandre et al (1998) have described “argumentative operations”, 
and have used as categories that could describe the “socioscientific context” of the 
study. However, when trying to group categories of such elements the task was really 
difficult and eventually it was abandoned.  
The need for further elaboration of argumentation studies was evident. After the 
inputs of argumentation studies, the reason for such a failure was clarified: products 
of talk, like argument, explanation, and information were infused in a single category 
with processes like countering, supporting, dropping arguments, setting a dilemma 
etc. However, they could both be used to grasp a part of the socioscientific context.  
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Since argumentation studies located in science education were not sufficient for 
providing  processes and schemes for analysis, this study has used conceptualizations 
that could describe argumentation as  a process like Rhetoric (Aristotle, (Rhetoric); 
Mbasakos, 1989), Pragma Dialectical Argumentation Theory (Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1989; Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2000; Van Eemeren, et al., 2002) 
and has adopted schemes for analysis such as the Typology of Argumentative 
Dialogues (Walton 1990; 1992; Walton & Crabbe, 1995). For readability purposes 
those conceptualizations have been included in the literature review session and have 
already been presented in the subchapter 2.3 Argumentation as a process.  
My literature review has enlightened the definition of the “socioscientific 
context” with the following implication: the process of discussing a socioscientific 
issue, the dialogue, has primarily a dialectical aspect. This aspect could inform 
analysis about the “socioscientific context”. In other words the epistemic, moral, or 
reflective practices to be described and analyzed are viewed as epistemic processes 
and products situated in a context that was created by the discussion of a controversial 
issue. Therefore, a part of what could be described as “socioscientific context” could 
be grasped from the dialectical context.   
What is defined as resting in a “different epistemological level” therefore -
returning to Levinson’s (2006) question about different epistemological activities- is 
not learning about science or learning about controversial issues, but learning about 
anything while discussing about a controversial issue with the purpose of resolving it, 
or defending a view, a pre-held position. A primary distinction therefore, is situated 
between epistemological and dialectical activity. A construct that was used for the 
description of the dialectical context was Walton’s and Crabbe’s (1995) typology of 
dialogues as cited in Table 9 below.  
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Type of 
dialogue Initial situation Participant’s goal Goal of dialogue 
Persuasion Conflict of opinion Persuade other part Resolve or clarify issue 
Inquiry Needs to have proof 
Find and verify 
evidence Prove (disprove) 
Negotiation Conflict of interest Get what you most want 
Reasonable settlement 
that both can live with 
Information-
seeking Need information 
Acquire or give 
information Exchange information 
Deliberation Dilemma or practical choice 
Co-ordinate goals 
and actions 
Decide best available 
course of action 
Eristic Personal conflict Verbally hit out at opponent 
Reveal deeper basis of 
conflict 
Table 9: Walton and Krabbe’s 1995 typology of dialogues 
 
A first attempt to use the above categories and apply them to classroom talk was 
disappointing; the discussions were chaotic, and actually students and teachers have 
been arguing about anything! The first codes that have emerged from this analysis had 
revealed that the agents of the classroom discussion might argue, but not necessarily 
to convince about a judgment regarding the issue set in the beginning of the lesson.  
A heuristic approach that enabled data analysis in aspects of socioscientific 
context was the description of the “socioscientific content”. The socioscientific 
content as used in this study refers to the substance of the discussion related to the 
issue for each lesson. Since the whole discussion in the classroom was related to a 
socioscientific issue, referred to the issue from so far, and since any issue creates a 
disagreement space (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2000; Mbasakos, 1999) this 
disagreement space could be a reference as to what else might have been discussed in 
the classroom. This decision has been made after lots of rounds of analysis and had 
actually enabled the description of the dialectical context in this study: relating the 
content of any conclusion to the issue under discussion and relating any other issue 
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that has been elaborated in the classroom to the disagreement space created by that 
issue.  
Since the results of the socioscientific content analysis have affected the further 
steps of analysis, they are presented here, in the data analysis, and not the results 
chapter.  The questions that have driven such an analysis were the following:  
• What is the agent (student or teacher) talking about?  
• How is this related to the issue? 
An open coding process was selected as appropriate for describing socioscientific 
content as it involves "breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and 
categorizing data" (Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 61). The data in this case has to be 
categorized related to an issue that was concerned about an action that has to be taken. 
Open coding process revealed the following categories which the agents of the 
discussion had referred to.  
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Table 10: Socioscientific content categories 
Socioscientif
ic Content Description Example 
Issue and 
Sub-Issues 
 
About the issue under 
discussion or to sub-Issues that 
emerged as chains of argumentation  
Issue: We should not clone humans because there is a danger of cloning really bad people like 
Hitler that could destroy society (Cloning)  
Sub-Issue: Since our religion allows us eating meat there is no moral issue regarding meat eating 
(Hunting)  
Issue Case About the issue, the dilemma, as a standalone entity, per se. 
Cloning or not humans is a really big dilemma (Cloning) 
Talking about buying a mobile phone to a 10 year old is a different issue than talking about buying 
a mobile phone to a teenager  (Mobile Phones)  
Self 
About them, in order to 
describe their position towards the 
issue, inform about their decisions 
on personal dilemmas or reflect on 
their own views and actions. 
I am against cloning animals (Cloning) 
I would not clone my dead cat (Cloning) 
I would like to buy a mobile phone, that’s why I say that the information that mobile phones harm 
health is nonsense (Mobile phones)  
I go for hunting because I like it as a sport (Hunting)  
Societal Agents 
About the society members 
including the scientific community 
members, their motives, 
preferences, desires and actions. 
Members of the parliament support hunting because they need votes from the hunters. (Hunting) 
My mother and father do not buy me a mobile phone because it harms health. (Mobile phones)  
There are people who clone their beloved animals, when they die from an accident, to have them 
back (Cloning)  
 
Classroom 
Agents 
About each other within the 
classroom discussion, either 
describing their views and 
positions, or attacking them. 
Most of you have been in favour of animal cloning, but very few about human cloning (Cloning) 
Since you say that mobile phones create health problems you are against them (Mobile phones) 
Petros is an idiot for believing that argument 5 is the best argument of all  (Cloning) 
I think that you became a hunter because you like it (Hunting) 
Products 
About their arguments, claims 
and explanations in a meta-level 
discussion. 
This argument is very important because it deals with health (Mobile phones) 
What you have said about the animal is the same as the human being (Cloning) 
What you have told me is not a reason for buying or not a mobile phone. I need reasons (Mobile 
phones) 
Argumentation 
and Decision 
Making Process 
About argumentation process, 
or decision making process and 
their elements. 
An argument is a reason in favour or against a view (Cloning)  
I cannot just count pros and cons and decide about an issue. I have to weigh arguments (Mobile 
phones)  
We should take sub-issues one by one in order to have a good discussion (Hunting)  
Pedagogy About pedagogy, or the lesson.  I do not want to go through this issue because this is another issue (Cloning) 
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When the analysis had provided the socioscientific content entities, then the 
typology of dialogues (Walton & Crabbe, 1995) was applied to classroom talk.  
A criterion to describe dialectical context as a type of dialogue described by 
Walton and Crabbe (1995) was that the conversation had to be identified in the issue 
or sub-issue level. In other words, argumentation for persuasion, deliberation, 
information seeking and eristic (from the ancient Greek word Eris meaning fight or 
conflict dialogues) were all classified as such, if and only if agents have been talking 
about the issue, or any other sub-issue that had come out due to argumentation chains.  
Put as an example, if an agent was supporting the view that we should hunt 
because this is a sport and it is healthy, his context had been defined as 
“argumentation for persuasion (about the issue)” whereas, if he was arguing that 
hunters like hunting because they discover how ancient people had lived, an argument 
supporting an explanation of why people hunt (with no other link indicating that this 
explanation supports or not hunting) his context has been described as “argumentation 
for action explanation”.  
Argumentation for action explanation, alongside other contexts that were 
identified is going to be presented in the results chapter, in the socioscientific context 
section. A clarification though that has to be done at this stage is that the description 
of context refers to each interlocutor whose utterance was to be analyzed. The fact 
that agents of the discussion have been identified as holding different goals - some 
supporting a view, others admitting that they do not hold a position and others 
deliberating by bringing up information but do not link it in any argumentative way to 
the issue under discussion, all in the same episode, implied that context has to be 
assigned in a personal, topical level, even though the task that the teacher had 
assigned might have an argumentative, or deliberative nature, for example.  
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3.4.2 Describe Moral, Emotional-Reflective and Cognitive Processes 
The first research question of this study, that has a methodological character, 
refers to the identification and description of moral, reflective and cognitive processes 
in the lesson as distinct areas.  
Again, there was no input from science education about what could be used as a 
methodological tool that could capture those areas. The inputs from the literature 
review related to moral reasoning (see Appendix A) had enlightened the study 
towards the following direction:  
Moral reasoning cannot be regarded as independent from cognition. Feeling, 
willing and thinking, are regarded as inseparable elements of moral reasoning (Poole, 
1995), whereas moral judgment, according to cognitivists is a product of inquiry, a 
reasoned guided process.  According to a cognitivist’s view of moral reasoning, moral 
sentences are subject to truth or falsity, and the state of mind of accepting a moral 
judgment is typically one of belief (Van Roojen, 2009). 
Even if we do not endorse a cognitivist view of moral reasoning and endorse an 
emotivist view, which interprets the process of moral judgment as one of depending 
on feeling and desire, we still have to admit that reason has a place in this process, 
since, according to Hume (as cited in Jacobs, 2000, p.131) moral judgments are based 
on moral emotions: emotions that recognize the situation as morally relevant by 
identifying morally relevant features in one’s environment, in order to be reasoned 
about. Reason is in service by giving us the relevant data, even if, in Hume's words, 
"reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions." (Hume, 1739-1740 as cited in 
Fieser, 2006).  
On the other hand, if we endorse an emotivist view of moral reasoning then we 
have no need to draw a border line between moral judgment and emotional reflection 
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since, emotivists think of moral terms in grammatically assertive utterances that 
function primarily to express emotion and perhaps also to elicit similar emotions in 
others; they thus assume that moral evaluation such as “right”, “good” or “virtuous” 
signals a non-cognitive pro-attitude such as approval or  preference (Barnes, 1933; 
Ayer, 1952; Stevenson, 1946 as cited in Van Roojen, 2009).  
The conclusion from the above paragraphs is that the three areas mentioned in 
Zeidler’s and Keefer’s construct (moral reasoning, cognitive reasoning and emotional 
reflection) were overlapping either accepting cognitivist, or emotivist views of moral 
reasoning. Therefore, Zeidler’s and Keefer’s (2003) construct could not be used as a 
methodological tool for analysis. The problem was identified in the “cognitive” part 
of the construct and was resolved at a content level. Morality and emotional reflection 
could be regarded as distinct, perhaps not as process, but as they refer to different 
objects: morality deals with states of affairs and regulates human conduct, whereas 
emotional reflection refers to desires, attitudes and preferences. The problem was the 
definition of the “cognitive” part. How could cognitive elements be defined in terms 
of content? What does cognition deal with? It is evident that cognition deals with 
everything, and states of affairs are a part of it, even observing and analyzing our own 
emotions might be a part of it. And if the cognitive part might exist in moral 
reasoning and emotional reflections, to what else might it refer?  
Primary data analysis had enlightened this process, since categories such as 
“Natural Sciences”, “Sociology” and “Psychology” had emerged as areas describing 
the content of the lesson. The direction moved from describing the “cognitive part” to 
describing the “epistemic part” of the lesson. There was a need therefore, to have a 
tool that could help towards the direction of describing the different epistemic - or 
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other areas - of the lesson and accordingly assign epistemic practices of classroom 
agents to those areas.  
A theoretical construct that was used for determining the border lines between 
those areas was Peirce’s (1839-1914 as cited in Pietarinen, 2006, p.130-132) 
taxonomy of the Sciences (Table 11). 
A. Science of Discovery (Heuretic science, Explanatory 
science) 
a. Mathematics 
1. Formal logic 
2. Discrete mathematic 
3. Continuous mathematics 
b. Philosophy (cenoscopy, philosophia prima) 
1. Phenomenology (phaneroscopy) 
2. Normative sciences 
i. Aesthetics 
ii. Ethics 
iii. Logic 
a. Speculative grammar 
b. Critic (Logic proper) 
c. Methodeutic (Speculative rhetoric) 
3. Metaphysics 
i. Ontology 
ii. Physical metaphysics 
a. Cosmology 
b. Time and space 
c. Matter 
iii. Religious metaphysics 
a. Theology 
b. Theory of freedom 
c. Doctrine of another life 
c.  Special sciences (Idioscopy) 
1. Physical science 
i. Nomological (general) physics 
1. Molar physics (dynamics, gravitation) 
2. Molecular physics (thermodynamics) 
3. Etherial physics (optics, electrics) 
ii. Classificatory physics 
1. Crystallography 
2. Chemistry 
a. Physical 
b. Organic 
c. Inorganic 
3. Biology 
a. Physiology 
b. Anatomy 
iii. Descriptive (explanatory) physics 
1. Geognosy (geology, geography) 
2. Astronomy 
2.  Psychic sciences (psychognosy, human sciences) 
i. Nomological physics (general physics, 
psychology) 
1. Introspective psychology 
2. Experimental psychology 
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3. Physiological psychology 
4. Developmental psychology 
ii. Classificatory physics 
1. Special psychology 
a. Human psychology 
b. Social psychology (economics) 
c. Animal psychology 
2. Linguistics 
a. Phonetics 
b. Word linguistics 
c. Grammar 
3. Ethnology 
a. Social 
b. Development 
1. Customs 
2. Laws 
3. Religion 
c. Technology 
iii. Descriptive physics (History, Individual 
subjects) 
1. History proper 
a. Monumental history 
b. Ancient history 
c. Modern history 
2. Biography 
3. Criticism 
Literacy criticism 
Art criticism 
B. Science of review 
C. Practical Science 
Table 11: Peirce’s (1990) classification of the Sciences (source: Pietarinen, 2006, 
p.130-132) 
 
Peirce’s (1990 as cited in Pietarinen, 2006) classification was selected as it 
provides a means to analyze an interdisciplinary area that is controversial issues 
teaching in its basic building blocks, in other words describe the “disciplines” that 
form the “interdisciplinary”. Peirce classifies Aesthetics, Ethics, and Logic as 
belonging to a branch of Philosophy which he calls Normative Science. He also 
classifies Metaphysics as another branch of Philosophy. The Sciences belonging to 
Philosophy are not based on experiences or experiments in order to set theoretical 
questions, and therefore are distinguished from Special Sciences (Idioscopy) that 
resort to special experience or experiments in order to settle knowledge claims. 
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Physical (Natural) Sciences are a class belonging to Idioscopy which includes 
Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Geognosy and Astronomy.  
The second branch of Idioscopy refers to “Psychical”, the Sciences that study the 
human and not the nature (psychi: soul, physi: nature).The group of Psychical 
includes Psychology, Ethnology, Linguistics, and finally descriptive Psychics 
(History, Biography).  
He also follows the Aristotelian tradition as he proposes a distinction between 
theoretical sciences of discovery and the practical sciences of human conduct and art, 
whereas he adds a third main class, the retrospective sciences of review, a class that 
includes issues concerning the history of science, the classification of sciences itself, 
and synthetic forms of philosophy, the philosophy of science (Pietarinen, 2006, 
p.134). 
Even if Peirce’s taxonomy has been published a century ago, it is selected as an 
appropriate classification tool because, as Pietarinen (2006) cites, “the boundaries of 
the overall classification of the sciences that Peirce provided have not been probed to 
any great extent in terms of their breadth, even though the content has, of course, 
accumulated in depth” (p.129).  
Actually, Peirce’s taxonomy could describe both moral reasoning (Ethics as a 
Normative Science belonging to Philosophy) and emotional reflection, as this could 
be assigned to the class of Introspective Psychology, which is defined as the science 
of self-observation and reporting of conscious inner thoughts, desires and sensations.  
Data analysis had applied this tool as a methodological scheme to classify 
propositional statements to the disciplines described above and therefore describe the 
epistemic content of the lesson. A primary step though to this kind of analysis was to 
extract the thematic content of the lesson.  
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3.4.3 Thematic Content of the lesson - Epistemic Content 
The thematic content of the lesson had to be captured under an analysis of the 
content of the discussion in the classroom. We therefore had to adopt an approach to 
analyze classroom talk in terms of propositional statements and accordingly 
categorize those statements.  
This study shares the view that both reasoning practices and concepts are in part 
cultural constructions; consequently, this study does not focus on individual students’ 
constructions of identities but rather uses classroom talk as records of communication 
events rather than reports of private sense making (Hogan, et al., 2000, p.382). As 
cited in the introduction chapter, when talking about the thematic pattern of the 
lesson, “the scientific story” (Mortimer, 1993) we cannot assume that this story has 
been “conceptualized” as “common knowledge” by all students (Scott, 2007). The 
thematic content of the lesson stands as an entity that is differentiated from private 
sense making; it rather refers to “collaboratively shared knowledge objects” (Hogan, 
et al., 2000).  
The thematic content of the lesson, therefore, as perceived in this study, is the 
substance of the conversation, the substantive matters being discussed. It is captured 
from the meaning of the statements, the topics about which students and teachers 
speak.  
As Bridges (1988) cites, one cannot simply “discuss”, nor have a “discussion”; 
discussion always involves a subject, question matter or issue which is “under 
discussion” (p.16). Lemke (1990) provides some insight as to what could be captured 
as “content” in a science lesson. He recognizes two patterns in a science dialogue in 
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the classroom: an organizational pattern, represented by its activity structure and a 
thematic pattern (p. 13). As he argues:  
”In all dialogues there are at least two different things going 
on. First, people are interacting with one another, move by 
move, strategically playing within some particular set of 
expectations about what can happen next (the activity structure). 
But they are also constructing complex meanings about a 
particular topic by combining words and other symbols (the 
thematic pattern)” (p. 14)  
 
He also assumes that every move of a dialogue has meaning both as a part of a 
thematic pattern and as a part of an activity structure, and thus, it is not always easy to 
carry out both a thematic development strategy alongside a social interaction strategy 
and sometimes the teacher has to choose between them. The implications for analysis 
of classroom talk are evident: it must always take into account both of these two 
dimensions and how they relate to one another, moment by moment (Lemke, 1990). 
 
3.4.3.1 Conceptualizations from speech act theory  
In order to be able to differentiate between thematic and activity structure, this 
study has used conceptualizations from pragmatics and especially speech act theory 
(Austin, 1962; Searle, 1985). 
According to the speech act theory, any speech act has two distinct dimensions: the 
proposition, which is communicatively inert, and the “move in a language game” that 
the utterance consists of, the illocutionary force of the utterance (Green, 2007). The 
illocutionary force can be used to characterize and group illocutionary acts, and is 
categorized according to Searle (1985) in the following categories:  
1. Assertives: we tell people how things are  
2. Directives: we try to get people to do things (ask, order, request, beg, plead, 
pray, entreat, and also invite, permit and advice)  
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3. Commissives: We commit ourselves to doing things  
4. Expressives: We express our feelings and attitudes  
5. Declarations: We bring about changes in the world through our utterances  
(p.vii, pp.1-9) 
This categorization provides a useful unit of analysis in terms of describing the 
thematic content of the lesson. However some issues have to be discussed and refined.  
 
3.4.3.2 Propositions and thematic content  
A first issue of discussion is whether all speech acts could be used to describe the 
thematic content of the lesson.  According to the speech act theory, illocution acts 
presented above, differ in the forms of propositional content but also in their direction 
to fit the world. According to Searle (1985), some illocutions have as part of their 
illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly, their propositional content) to 
match the world, others to get the world to match the words (p. 12). Accordingly, 
those acts have differences in expressed psychological states. How illocutionary acts 
vary alongside those dimensions (Searle, 1985, p.253-270), is presented in Table 12.  
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Table 12:  Illocutionary speech acts (source: Searle, 1985, p.253-270) 
 
 
Type of proposition Propositional content Direction of fit Point of purpose 
Assertive: I think the film is 
moving. 
States, explains, asserts or 
claims 
p: the proposition 
uttered  The words fit the world  
Commit the speaker (in varying 
degrees) to something’s being the ease, to 
the truth of the expressed proposition 
Directive: Close the door! 
Asks, orders, commands, 
requests, begs, pleads, entreats, 
invite, permit, advise  
The hearer H does 
some future action A. The world fits the words  
The speaker is attempting (in varying 
degrees) to get the hearer to do something.   
Commissive:  I will bring 
you that book. 
promises, vows, threatens  
The speaker S does 
some future action A. The world fits the words  
Commit the speaker (in varying 
degrees) to some future course of action 
Expressives: I’m sorry for 
the mess I have made. 
“thank", "congratulate 
"."apologize", "condole", 
"deplore",  "welcome” 
Different possible 
psychological states 
expressed  
There is no direction of fit (In 
performing an expressive, the 
speaker is neither trying to get the 
world to match the words nor the 
words to match the world; rather the 
truth of the expressed proposition is 
presupposed). 
Express the psychological state 
specified in the sincerity condition about a 
state of affairs specified in the 
propositional content 
Declarative: I declare the 
meeting open. 
p: the proposition 
uttered   
Both words-to-world and world-
to-words  
The successful performance of one of 
its members brings about the 
correspondence between the propositional 
content and reality, successful 
performance guarantees that the 
propositional content corresponds to the 
world. 
Assertive declarations a 
special class of declaratives: 
You are guilty 
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3.4.3.3 Speech acts out of thematic content 
Speech acts as defined above were used as a unit of analysis for this study. Each 
utterance was analyzed to one or more speech acts, according to their force and 
propositional content. Not all speech acts however could be used to describe the thematic 
pattern of the lesson. Table 13 shows how speech acts informed the thematic pattern 
analysis, a process elaborated in the next paragraphs.  
 
Simple speech acts Unit of analysis: speech act 
Speech acts Elements 
Thematic 
pattern of the 
lesson 
Example 
Assertives 
Knowledge 
claims, 
information, 
descriptions, 
hypotheses,  points 
of view, positions  
Propositional 
content  
Scientists clone animals to save the 
food chain.   
Cloning is bad.  
I am against cloning. 
Mobile phones might harm brain.  
My brother is 10 years old.  
Even nuns in monasteries eat meat. 
Commissives 
Intentions 
related to personal 
dilemmas  
Propositional 
content about the 
speaker  
I would clone my dead cat.  
Declarative 
assertions 
Decisions  Propositional 
content  
We have decided that buying your 
brother a mobile phone is not a right 
action.  
Directives Instructions  Out of content  Write down three arguments against cloning.  
Indirect 
directives 
Descriptions- 
Instructions  
Out of content  I am sure you can write more than 
two arguments.  
Declaratives Declaratives  Out of content  The presentation about cloning has just finished. Our lesson has ended now.  
Table 13: Simple speech acts propositional content  
 
Directives were taken out of content since they are speech acts that do not describe 
the world, but they rather make the world fits the words. An utterance of the type Please 
open your notebooks and write three arguments against cloning is a move that hasn’t got 
any meaning as a part of the thematic pattern of the lesson. It can only be analyzed as a 
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part of an activity structure, it cannot describe what students and teachers have talked 
about.  
Additionally, questions were taken out of the thematic content. According to Searle, 
questions are a special class of directives as they ask from the hearer to perform the 
speech act of asserting what is asked in the question. Therefore, according to Searle the 
question “Do scientists’ discoveries affect our lives?” is a directive with propositional 
content “students answer this question”.  
According to Walton (1989, p.27) questions do not have propositions, but they do 
have presuppositions: propositions need to be acceptable to the respondent when the 
question is asked so the respondent becomes committed to the proposition when he/she 
gives any direct answer. In this way, asking a question may be a form of asserting 
propositions in a dialogue. However, since the content of a question is probably going to 
be a set of propositions (the possible answers to the question) and not a proposition 
(MacFarlane, 2009) questions cannot be used for analysis of the thematic content of the 
lesson.  
Another category of speech acts that does not describe the world but fits the world 
into words is one of commissives. Utterances of the type “I will write down everything 
you tell me” commit the speaker to do the action uttered and consequently do not need to 
be included in the thematic content of the lesson. The action uttered in this commissive is 
not related to the thematic content of the lesson since it refers to the activity structure.  
  196 
The problem arises when we have to deal with speech acts of the type “I would (not) 
clone my dead cat” that actually consists of decisions related to personal dilemmas. Are 
those commissives or not?  
 
One problem about commissives is that even if they commit the speaker, student or 
teacher, to perform an act in the future, a hypothetical one when talking about a 
hypothetical dilemma, utterances of this type could be translated into assertives. Consider 
the example given above:  
I would clone my dead cat. 
When a student commits himself to cloning or not his cat, at the same time he/she 
informs his teacher and classmates about his/her intentions, or points of view.  
The use of commissives related to personal dilemmas as assertives is important for 
this study since self reflection processes are to be described and evaluated.  When issues 
are not put in a macromorality but in a micromorality mode (Zeidler, et al., 2004) 
students do not express points of view but their personal intentions or decisions towards 
hypothetical dilemmas (clone a dead cat, go for hunting). They both take a position but in 
the same time they inform the others about themselves.  An analysis that would allow the 
description of self reflection processes in terms of lesson content, needs to consider those 
types of commissives - when a student or teacher commits him/her self in doing action A 
(related to the issue under discussion) - as a special type of assertives: student or teacher 
is informing the rest of the class about his/her intention to do action A.  
Another issue that concerns propositional content are utterances that are expressions 
of points of view. A range of such utterances can be found in any argumentative 
discussion and in the lessons under study:  
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Hunting is unfair for birds (Lesson C)  
Birds have soul (Lesson C)  
Mother of Dolly is the one that gave DNA and not the one that 
gave birth (Lesson B)  
Mobile phones affect our health (Lesson A)  
In a first place, those utterances, according to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 
p.96) are difficult to be classified as assertives since the criterion that Searle assigns to 
this category, is that the propositional content must always be capable of being 
characterized as true or false. Points of view cannot always meet this criterion, especially 
when they are of the form of ethical, aesthetic or normative statements. However, as   
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) cite, attitudes or points of view need not refer  
exclusively to propositions that are either true of false but may also relate to other 
propositions whose acceptability (in the broader sense) may be a point of discussion. 
Another issue concerning the expression of points of view is non-propositional 
points of view. Utterances of the type: 
I agree with cloning. 
I’m against cloning. 
I’m fanatical about cloning. 
have to be differentiated from utterances of the type  
Cloning is unethical  
Cloning is bad  
We should not clone.  
The first group of utterances refers to the psychological state of the speaker towards 
the issue. Should they be classified as expressives?  
According to Searle (1985) an expressive is a speech act that expresses the 
psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in 
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the propositional content. The key point here is that, what is expressed refers to a state of 
affairs between the speaker and the hearer. As Searle comments, “I cannot congratulate 
you on Newton’s first law of motion”. Expressives then, should be differentiated from 
speech acts that express feelings or describe the position of the speaker towards an issue. 
Those speech acts are assertives; they are not about a state of affairs between the 
interlocutors, but they rather describe the speaker’s psychological state; even if they 
cannot be tested as true or false, their propositional content fits the world - the internal, 
psychological state of the speaker - into words. 
This consideration is even more evident in expressions of non-points of view like:  
I am both yes and no.  
I have not decided yet.  
 
Those utterances have the same force as “I would not clone my dead cat”. They have 
though different propositional content: some refer to citing, describing the speaker’s 
position or point of view towards an issue, and others to intentions/decisions towards 
hypothetical personal dilemmas.  
Another issue that had to be taken into account is the existence of indirect speech 
acts. For instance, to use Searle’s example, the remark that you are standing on my foot is 
normally taken as not an assertion that only describes reality, but it is  in addition, a 
demand that you move;  accordingly my question whether you can pass the salt is 
normally taken as a request that you do so. An assertive sentence might be an indirect 
directive (Searle, 1985). This creates an issue for data analysis as some utterances could 
be categorized in more than one category.  
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Such examples were evident in the lessons, where one speech act was an indirect 
other type of speech act. One class of indirect speech acts refers to assertions that served 
the purpose of indirect directions. For example, a teacher in an effort to make students 
cite more arguments says:  
- I’m sure that you can find more arguments than those you have already told 
me.  
A speech act of this kind is rather categorized as a directive, rather than an assertive 
statement. Recognizing indirect directive speech acts however, could not be based on a 
single, stable criterion. It depends on the context of the conversation. As Green (2007) 
cites, the identification of an indirect speech act would seem to depend on the 
discussant’s intentions. Consequently, indirect speech acts, can be explained within the 
framework of conversational context. 
Assertives as indirect directives however, are not the only examples of indirect 
speech acts. Searle (1985) refers to another kind of indirect speech act. Those refer to 
speech acts whose meaning is different than their propositional content. Searle cites the 
following example of dialogue:  
-Are you going to the cinema tonight?  
-I have to study for an exam.  
Studying for an exam is not directly related to going to the cinema. However, it is a 
reason for not doing the action proposed in the first utterance. Providing reasons for 
doing or not doing, willing or not willing to do something is argumentation.                        
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) regard argumentation not as an indirect speech 
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act, but as a complex speech act (p. 32). This act differs from the others in the following 
aspects: 
a. Unlike other speech acts (asserting, requesting, promising etc) in argumentation 
more than one proposition is always involved.  
b. The utterance of an argumentation, as a speech act, always has a dual 
illocutionary /communicative force: besides functioning as argumentation, it is 
also an assertion, a question, a form of advice, a proposal, or whatever.  
c. Argumentation cannot stand by itself, but is always in a particular way linked to 
another speech act that expresses a standpoint. If this specific relation is absent, 
referring to the speech act as argumentation is not justified (Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1989, p. 368).  
The issue is of special interest for the purposes of this study. The discussions about 
controversial issues in the lessons under analysis were in a great part argumentative. 
Extracting the thematic content of argumentation was one of the most difficult parts of 
this study. The process is described in the next paragraphs.   
 
3.4.4 Propositional content of argumentation and epistemic practice  
A question that had to be answered is: what is an argument? How is this defined and 
therefore extracted from an argumentative discussion?  The answer rests on a process-
product analysis of argumentation. Blair and Johnson (1987) identified four central 
features as characteristic of a dialectical conception of argumentation:  
• A product/process link: an argument understood as product - a set of 
propositions with certain characteristics - cannot be properly understood except 
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against the background of the process which produced it- the process of 
argumentation 
• The roles of arguers: “The process of argumentation presupposes a minimum of 
two roles” (here identified as that of questioner and answerer) 
• The beginning of argumentation: The process of argumentation is initiated by a 
question or doubt - some challenge - to a proposition.  
• The purposive nature of the activity of argumentation: “Argumentation is a 
purposive activity. Each participant has the goal to change or reinforce the 
attitude of the interlocutor or of himself (Blair and Johnson, 1987, as cited in 
Walton & Godden, 2007, p. 3). 
The last point reveals the interrelationship of process and product: the participants’ 
goals to support or counter on one hand, but the existence of a propositional content in 
which they refer, on the other. This description is in line with other scholars who define 
argument as a social operation, which is oriented to context and to purpose (Mork, 2000), 
or a goal-directed form of interactional activities in which both the content of 
argumentation and the discourse structure within which it evolves are sensitive to the 
goals the arguers pursue in specific contexts (Van Eemeren, et al., 1987 as cited in 
Leitao, 2001; Walton, 1990, p.411).  
The above conceptualizations imply that extracting argument as a product cannot be 
isolated from adopting a process analysis for describing argumentation moves. In other 
words, an analysis that aims to extract the propositional content of argumentation needs 
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to take into account the goals of the participants on one hand, and the propositional 
content to which those participants were referring.  
A unit of analysis used by many studies for extracting arguments from argumentative 
talk is Toulmin’s’ (1958) argument pattern. Studies that have used Toulmin’s argument 
pattern (1958) admit that the application of such a pattern has yielded difficulties when 
applied in classroom-based verbal data, with the main difficulty the clarification of what 
counts as claim, data, warrant, and backing (Erduran, et al., 2004, p.919). The same 
authors imply that only careful attention to the contextualized use of language could 
provide information as to how different elements of speech could be classified as 
Toulmin’s pattern elements. This is compatible with Toulmin’s view that the entities in 
his model do not represent static, abstract entities but they rather describe processes 
alongside products.  
According to Toulmin (1958) the utterances that make up an argument have different 
functions: claims can be questioned in the context of a discussion when two or more 
participants disagree between them, grounds are the “the facts we appeal to as a 
foundation for the claim” but as soon as they are challenged then become claims (as cited 
in Russell, 1983, p.33), warrants are situated in the steps, in the movement from data to 
claim (Toulmin, 2003, p.93). A careful reading of those lines implies that the components 
of this model have to be situated in the process of “disagreeing”, “backing” and 
“rebutting”.  
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3.4.5 Reconstructing classroom talk: Extracting the products of argumentation  
Reed and Walton (2007) describe the process of extracting arguments from an 
argumentative talk as follows:  
“First, to identify the argument, and to classify it as an 
argument, as opposed to some other speech act like an explanation, 
one has to identify the conclusion as a specific proposition that 
doubt is being expressed about, or at least that is open to 
doubt”(p.2).  
 
The identification of the doubted conclusion leads to what Walton and Godden (2007, 
p.8) describe as the product view of argumentation (Figure 8):  
 
Figure 8: Product view of argumentation (source: Walton and Godden, 2007, p.8) 
 
Although Walton and Godden refer to a process of evaluating argument, this study 
has used this approach in terms of reconstructing argument. It follows the steps of 
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identifying premises and conclusions and applies the argument scheme in order to extract 
arguments as outputs of the process of argumentation.  
A step that has enabled the analysis of this study was one of answering the question: 
if not argumentative - support or doubt - then what goals would a discussant have in a 
discussion? The need to identify the goal of a participant as argumentative was important 
as it served as a criterion to classify the speech act as complex and therefore complete 
any missing statements, and not as an unlinked premise. The identification of the context 
was enabled from the process analysis described above that was used to describe the 
dialectical context of the study.  
The following step that had to be taken was the application of argument schemes in 
order to extract the arguments as products. The ground for the typology of argument 
schemes that has been used in this study is presented in the subchapter 2.4 Reasoning and 
argumentation: a justification of a typology of argument schemes. As supported in this 
subchapter, the unit of analysis for each argument was the argument scheme, and the use 
of analytic arguments as an argument scheme had enabled the analysis of complex chains 
of argumentation. A special case of arguments that had to be further clarified was that of 
convergent arguments (Conway, 1991 p.145)  
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Figure 9: Linked and convergent argument examples (source: Conway, 1991, p.145) 
 
As Conway (1991) argues, “premises that are individually relevant to a conclusion 
are to be diagrammed as providing convergent support for that conclusion whereas 
premises that are relevant to a conclusion only when conjoined are to be diagrammed as 
linked”. The problem for analysis though is that convergent arguments need to be 
reconstructed as such for reasoning purposes: considering the premises together gives 
more support for the conclusion rather than considering them as two separate arguments, 
and therefore the conjecture between the two cannot be omitted from an analysis that 
aims to capture the reasoning process. On the other hand, if we look carefully at the 
diagram of the convergent argument above, we soon realize that convergent arguments 
actually contain two linked arguments, in that the premises need different warrants to 
reach the conclusion. If the agent had promised Harry to go into partnership with him, he 
needs a warrant of the type “I should keep my promise”, in order to get the conclusion for 
actually getting into the partnership, whereas, making a lot of money is a means end 
If I go into 
partnership with Harry, 
I will make a lot of 
money 
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syllogism that implies the action as necessary/efficient for achieving the means of being 
wealthy. In that sense a product analysis of a divergent argument of this type should 
consider not only both syllogisms, but also the fact that the agent had used them together 
in order to further support his/her conclusion. 
The use of divergent arguments also resembles what Wooldridge et al (2005) label 
propositional use of argumentation. The creation of a divergent argument rests on a meta-
level of argumentation, the two premises used in a divergent argument are actually two 
different arguments - though they might need each other in order to be strong- and 
actually indicates a higher level of thinking. The agent goes beyond forming individual 
arguments to the calculation of them by combining them, using the convergence criterion.  
The above considerations imply that the linked-convergent criterion has to rest in a 
prior level of analysis, before the application of the argument scheme. As a result the 
application of argument schemes had been done after identifying the relationship between 
the premises and the conclusion, linked or divergent. 
The application of argument schemes to classroom discussion was a process that was 
enabled by talk reconstruction. This process has applied what Van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst, (1989, pp. 375-380) describe as four dialectical transformations that an 
analyst needs to carry out in order to reconstruct argumentative discourse:  
 
a. Deletion 
b. Addition  
c. Permutation  
d. Substitution  
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The following paragraphs show how those transformations have been applied in 
classroom discourse in order to reconstruct classroom talk and apply argument schemes.  
 
3.4.5.1 Deletion 
Deletion is defined as the selection of elements from the original discourse that are 
immediately relevant to the processes of resolving the dispute: elements that are 
irrelevant such as elaborations, clarifications, anecdotes, and side-lines, are omitted (Van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1989). Consider the following episode as an example of 
deletion from Cloning lesson:   
 
“186Teacher: Nicholas, are you in favour or against? (cloning 
animals)  
187.Student: I’m against, because all animals will be the same 
and they will lose their value.  
188Teacher: Ok then, Nicholas says… who is against. 
190. Teacher:  He says that all animals will be the same and will 
lose their value, they will lose their attribute of being unique, it will 
not have… 
 191Student: They will not be unique 
192Teacher: They will not be unique, very nice!   
193. Teacher: I will write down: Uniqueness, what about this?  
 194. Teacher: This is Nicholas’s argument. Let’s hear another 
student” 
 
What we need to keep from this argumentative session is the argument that all 
animals will be the same and this is something bad for the student as it supports his 
negative position. Line 190 is regarded as different from line 187 since the teacher makes 
a deductive syllogism of the type: since all will be the same they will not be unique, 
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that’s why they will lose their value. The teacher in this case acts as an analyst and 
provides the unstated premise to fill the student’s chain of reasoning. All the other 
sentences repeat/clarify the same propositional content of the statements composing the 
argument in line 187, or are irrelevant in the issue resolution; an argument scheme cannot 
be applied here.  
Line 194 though is propositional, and rests in a metadiscussion level: the teacher 
extracts the argument and “sends” it back to the classroom.  
The argument scheme to be applied here is a practical scheme, reasoning from 
consequences, and the product we get from this episode is the following:  
Syllogism Scheme 
All animals will be the 
same. 
Deduction 
Animals will not be unique.  
Theoretical  
Analytical argument  
Animals will not be unique. 
Being unique assigns value. 
Animals will lose their 
value.  
Theoretical 
Normative (value of being 
unique)  
Animals will lose their 
value. 
This is an undesired 
consequence. 
We should not clone 
animals. 
Practical 
From consequences  
Table 14: Applying argument schemes by deletion  
3.4.5.2 Addition  
Addition is described as the process of completion which is the supplementation of 
those elements left unexpressed in the original discourse: unexpressed premises, 
conclusions and other elements in the various stages of discussion (Van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1989). Consider the following episode as an example of addition from the 
cloning lesson:   
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“245.     Student A: If I had a pet, cat or anything, and it had an 
accident and died, I would like to clone it and have it back again.  
246.        Student B:  And have it back?? 
(……….) 
252.        Student C: I disagree with this.  
253.        You have lived good and bad times with the authentic 
cat and not with the cloned one.” 
 
The statement “you have lived good and bad times with the authentic cat and not with 
the cloned one” has to be connected somehow with the reason “I would like to clone my 
dead cat to have it back again”. There is something unstated here, a premise that might 
bridge the two in terms of reasoning.  
Additions however, have to be done with care: the reconstruction needs to be as 
close as possible to what has been said.  Missing statements can be added with the 
application of argument schemes. 
 
Figure 10:  Additions for argumentative discourse reconstruction  
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If we reconstruct the first argument as a means end practical argument (actually it is 
an explanation of intention which takes the form of a means end practical syllogism) then 
the student supports his action of cloning the cat as a means to his goal to have his cat 
back. The second student explicitly cites that she disagrees with the previous argument. 
So we need to find out what does she counters when she provides the reason “you have 
common experience with the authentic and not the clone”.  If we add a new premise 
“Common experience is part of being your cat” we easily reconstruct the syllogism as 
rebutting the efficiency of cloning as a method of “bringing your cat back”. This of 
course is under question, since another analyst might have reconstructed differently the 
discussion. One of the rules that this study has applied, is that additions were as little as 
possible and did not add more than one warrant in the argument map. For example, in the 
above example, once you add the unstated warrant, “common experience is part of being 
your cat” the other syllogism is deductively reconstructed with no need to add any further 
warrant. 
Another factor that was taken into account when adding missing statements was that 
of dialectical context. Where the student did not explicitly add a disagreement or 
agreement and just cited a premise that could confront a previous argument the analysis 
did not reconstruct the talk as argumentative but as deliberative or inquiry and therefore, 
missing statements were not added; the utterance was regarded as an unlinked premise.  
Unlike Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1989) for considering the discussion as 
maximally argumentative, this study has applied a “minimally” argumentative 
reconstruction for the following reasons:  
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a) Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1989) reconstruct an ideal model of discussion, 
a critical discussion in which the two interlocutors have agreed to engage , since 
they both have difference in opinion. Any statement therefore that the 
interlocutors exchange may be a part of “winning the game”. Students in the 
classroom are not committed to such a role; they are just there and might be in a 
deliberation mode and not a persuasion one; therefore, by citing a premise that 
could construct an argument they could express a doubt but not a rebut, they 
might contribute to the pool of reasons that could be used to construct arguments 
but still, not argue. There might be more reasoning beyond the uttered premise, 
but also may not. Therefore, reconstructing the discussion as maximally 
argumentative might be inappropriate in describing classroom argumentative 
discussions.  
b) A critical discussion is a normative model of argumentative discussion. This 
implies that the reconstruction aims at last to define where the reasons stated are 
relevant to the conclusion, strongly support the conclusion etc. That’s why an 
interlocutor or an analyst of such a discussion should analyze it as maximally 
argumentative in order to perform such examination of soundness, validity or 
relevance of arguments and thus accept them or not. However, this is not the 
purpose of this study. There is no need to evaluate arguments, but describe them. 
Therefore, if there is even a small possibility that they are not arguments, but 
just unlinked premises, this study analyzes them as single claims and not as 
complex argument structures.  
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An example from lesson B further explains the above paragraphs:  
23. Student: I think you should not buy your brother a mobile 
phone because it has radiation and will affect his hearing. 
24. Teacher: Ok, you cite health problems. 
…………………………………. 
34.  Student 2: I think that …..I have heard from TV that radio-
energy goes through all children’s brain but in the case of adults it 
does not go through all the brain.   
35.  Teacher: So you say no because my brother is a child. No, 
because he is a child.  
36.   Is that what you say?  
37.  Student: Yes.  
  
In the case above, in line 34 the second student has stated a piece of information that 
is not directly connected to a conclusion at stake (buying or not a mobile phone). The 
student had just cited that radiation might be dangerous for the child’s health. However 
he does not assume that the teacher should not buy her brother a mobile phone, he does 
not assume that this is good or bad; he does not even assume that he is convinced by TV 
or not, about the truth of the statement.  
The teacher above uses a maximally argumentative approach for analyzing students’ 
talk. Since the other students were citing arguments against or in favour of buying a 
mobile phone for a 10-year old child and the previous argument was related to radiation, 
she regards the statement of the student as supporting the conclusion “Do not buy your 
brother a mobile phone”, something that is not evident from the student’s sayings. We 
will not further analyze the teacher’s strategy at this point, but we would say that at least 
in such a reconstruction the student had been probed to agree to such an analysis and 
therefore had the opportunity to refuse and provide another conclusion in case he did not 
mean so (if there was a way to assume that he is not driven by the teacher’s authority in 
the classroom). If the teacher had not elaborated student’s reasoning, how could we say 
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from that single statement that the student was in favour or against buying a phone? How 
can we know that the conclusion is “Do not buy a phone” or is it “Mobile phones harm?” 
or “There is a possibility that your brother will harm himself” or even assume that there is 
a conclusion at all? We could even assume that the student hears about mobile phones in 
a classroom and cites a coherence of the type: “Now you are talking about mobile 
phones….Oh! I’ve heard somewhere that they harm health”. That’s why we believe that a 
“minimally” argumentative reconstruction allows us to be on the safe side, having the 
possibility of leaving some implicit, unstated reasoning beyond analysis, but at least 
being as valid as possible to analyze what has been said in the classroom.  
Returning to our example, if the teacher didn’t clarify the scene, though in a 
questionable way, the student’s utterance “I’ve heard that mobile phones harm health” 
should be reconstructed as an unlinked premise and not an argument.  In the cases where 
the teacher had cited the premises, analysis was enhanced with triangulations with 
teachers’ IPR transcripts. However, this was not possible to be done with students’ 
arguments also, and this is actually one of the limitations of this study: there was not an 
opportunity for students to reflect on their own views, as teachers have done by watching 
the video in the classroom and reflecting on what was going on. A question like, “Ok 
mobile phones might affect a child’s brain.  What does this mean to you? Why have you 
cited this in the discussion?” would help us deal with those kinds of statements. A study 
of this kind though would not be feasible for the limits of this study, as 115 students have 
participated in the lessons taught. Nevertheless, I point out the need for extra data that 
could help towards a more valid description of students’ contributions to the discussion.  
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To increase the validity of the analysis, part of the discussion of each lesson 
(approximately 25%) was reconstructed by a second analyst. The second analyst was a 
PhD student with a background in classroom talk analysis and argumentation from her 
Master Thesis. The occurring disagreements between me and the second analyst referred 
to the level of analysis. The second analyst sometimes has adopted a maximally 
argumentative analysis, therefore connecting the utterance to the global level and 
therefore, more additions had to be done to the original text. Discussions were made in 
order to define the “shortest path” of the syllogism, with the fewest additions possible. In 
this way the analysis has been kept as close to the local level as possible.  
 
3.4.5.3 Permutation  
Permutation is the process of ordering or rearranging elements in the original text in 
such a way that the dialectical process of resolving the dispute is made as clear as 
possible (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1989). Consider the above episode as an 
example of the need for permutation from phones lesson:   
“53. Teacher: Tell me reasons why should I buy my brother a 
mobile phone 
54.  Student A: If he goes to private lessons.  
55.  Teacher: OK 
56.  Student A: If you go and get him he will hold it when he 
finishes. 
57. Teacher: Ok, therefore we need a mobile phone to find my 
brother. To locate him.  
58 Student B: You have to tell him that when he buys a mobile 
phone he has to use it only for a few hours a day.  
59.  Teacher: But the problem that I have told you and I need 
you to answer me about this, is if I should buy him a mobile phone 
or not. 
 60. Teacher: Wait until I buy him one or not and then you will 
tell me what to do. 
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61.  Student B: You should buy him because he might need it, 
but also no … 
62.  Teacher: Therefore you tell me both yes and no.  
63.  Student C: I am also both yes and no.  
64.  Teacher:: Therefore, I will put a question mark here.  
65.  Student D: I am also both yes and no. 
66.  If he uses it for useless things, then no. 
67.  If he uses it for useful things, then yes.  
68.  Teacher:: So, it depends on how he uses it, you say. 
Aggelos;   
69. Student E: No, because when he wants to call when he is in 
private lessons, he might find other mobiles phones to use; there is 
no need to use his own mobile phone.”  
 
The extract above shows the need to reorder statements that are related, either 
supporting or rebutting the same conclusion, or a premise from an argument. In lines 54-
57 there is a collaborative constructed argument supporting that we should buy  the 
teacher’s brother a mobile phone, since we need to locate him when he is in private 
lessons. A rebuttal to this argument comes in line 69, (12 lines after, some may come 
much later since we have a group discussion and interlocutors do not respond to each 
other but may need to have permission to cite their views)  after a discussion  irrelevant 
to the specific argument issues. Permutation, therefore, refers to the process of 
rearranging the discourse so that the utterance in line 69 is considered as a rebuttal to the 
argument, even if it occurs later in the discourse. 
3.4.5.4 Substitution 
Substitution, according to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1989) is an attempt to 
produce a clear and explicit presentation of elements which fulfil the same function 
(some elements may function as arguments although they are formulated as rhetorical 
questions)   
  216 
However, as they cite, this process is also done under a maximally argumentative 
analysis (Van Eemeren, 1987, p.201). According to Van Eemeren (1987), since a 
standpoint has been stated in the dialogue for acceptance or rejection, with the principle 
that the relevance of a speech act is being dependent on the presence of the other, 
elements such as rhetorical questions should be actually reconstructed as statements in 
arguments. An example of such a rhetorical question is given by Van Eemeren: (1987, 
p.210): 
Taking on Gadaffi (Times, April 28, 1986)  
If you hear about an accident or two on the highway, will you 
stop driving an automobile? Please do not allow the terrorists to 
think they have succeeded.  
Alexandros Panagopoulos, Athens  
 
Van Eemeren (1987) analyzes the question as rhetorical and assumes that it has to be 
analyzed as “A traffic accident or two in the highway would not stop you from driving an 
automobile or a similar formulation”, which is actually an argument that could serve the 
justification of the standpoint “Do not allow the terrorists to think they have succeeded”.  
Van Eemeren (1987) supports the reconstruction of such a question as an argument 
statement, among others, to the essential condition of an argumentative discussion: 
“Advancing the constellation of one or more speech acts constituting the point of view 
counts as taking responsibility for a positive or negative position with regard to the 
propositional content of these speech acts, i.e. assuming an obligation to defend that 
position if challenged to do so” (Van Eemeren, 1987, p.207).  
The application of a substitution therefore, assumes that the interlocutors had already 
advanced a point of view. The application of such a process though in classroom settings 
has to be done with special considerations. 
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Classroom argumentative discussion, as we have already mentioned, cannot be 
reconstructed according to a normative model of a critical discussion, since the 
pedagogical moves in the classroom might not always have the goal of the resolution of 
the dispute, nor are the participants divided into two groups where the one acts as the 
proposal - defender of a viewpoint and the other one is trying to reject it, or advance 
another one. Classroom settings are far more complicated with each student being in 
his/her own context - affected by the classroom context, but still his own - and the teacher 
as not an equal participator, but as one who also organizes and orchestrates discussion but 
also acts as a pedagogue.  
An example of substitution of a rhetorical question to an argument premise is 
presented in the following episode: 
“7 Teacher: The question is the following: Should people of our 
age hunt?  
8 Student: They should hunt because as soon as birds or 
animals give birth and give life to other animals, if we did not hunt 
animals they would be increased a lot.  
9: Teacher: Therefore, we hunt to control animal population, so 
it does not increase a lot.   
10: Student: Yes. 
(…..) 
39: Teacher: In countries where people do not hunt or in 
jungles that people cannot even walk does animal population 
increase a lot?”  
 
The teacher in the episode above assigns a rhetorical question in line 39. Actually, the 
teacher advances a possible rejection to the student’s argument that humans need to 
control animal population, but he does not do it by directly citing his objection. If a 
student had advanced such a question we would be much more sceptical as to analyzing it 
as an objection and we would rather regard it as an inquiry about the issue, as a 
  218 
hypothesis stated that could form an objection but still as not an objection, thereby 
following a “minimally” argumentative analysis as supported in previous sections. Why 
then assign a teacher such an argumentative mode?  
One possible solution to the problem is to follow the conversation and see what 
happens next:  
39      Teacher: In countries where people do not hunt or in 
jungles that people cannot even walk does the animal population 
increase a lot?  
(…) 
41 Nature does not find alone the way to ……Konstantinos? 
42 Student: In jungles where no human beings hunt, other 
animals eat them.   
43 Teacher: If no human beings are in the jungle then other 
animals will eat them. 
 44 Student:  Animals that eat them are like hunters, like us.   
45 Teacher: Conclusively, the jungle finds its balance. It 
finds its balance because there are other hunters. 
 
It is evident here that the teacher orchestrates the construction of a rebuttal to the 
argument that hunting is a necessary means for animal population. Triangulation with 
transcripts from IPR also validates this substitution. This teacher himself says about his 
own intervention:  
“I had noticed that nobody had advanced a reason like “in 
places that there are not human beings animal population is 
controlled”, and I had to tell it. However, I thought of this reason 
this particular time. I had not planned something like this…It was a 
hard job. “(Teacher of Hunting lesson, IPR, p.7)  
 
Data analysis in this case therefore, has gone through the substitution process 
transferring the rhetorical questions to statements forming arguments - rebuttals as 
follows:  
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Figure 11: Substitution of rhetorical questions in argumentative talk reconstruction 
 
Interventions were not so clear in all instances, though. There were cases where the 
teacher-challenger asked questions, but he/she did not advance a rebuttal; he/she rather 
needed a clarification of students as to what their actual thought was. An example of such 
an intervention is shown in the example from lesson B:  
An argument has been stated in previous stages of the 
discussion that people with special gifts should be cloned so 
they could advance technology and society. A student raised an 
objection by citing that there is a possibility to clone really bad 
people, like Hitler, and then the consequences would be 
disastrous for humanity.  
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 448        Student: If the clone is not good, then you kill him.  
449.        Teacher: To do what?  
450.        Student: You kill him.   
451.        Teacher: You kill so easily a life? Why?   
452.        Student: But he is a clone! 
453.        Teacher: Therefore, you consider that clones are 
not humans?   
454.        Student: Well, if he is bad…. 
455.       Student B: If the clone, teacher, is not good what 
are we going to do with him? 
  
A maximally argumentative analysis in this case would substitute the question of 
“You kill so easily a life? Why?” with an objection of the type “You should not easily 
kill a life!”  However the text below shows that the teacher really tries to find out why the 
student indeed supports the view that it is so easy to kill a life. This question is not 
rhetorical. As the teacher says:  
“I just wanted him to tell me how he conceived the issue of 
clones as human beings. I have to admit that Demetris (the student) 
is one of the cleverest in the classroom; he is out of sentiments and 
stays in logic. He has understood the whole process of cloning as 
an industrial process… he is good you keep him, he is not good you 
kill him”.  (Teacher of cloning lesson, IPR p.15)  
 
Nevertheless, the question stated by student B at the end of this dialogue, is rhetorical 
and could be reconstructed as a different version of the previous argument: “If the clone 
is bad, then you have no option but kill him”.   
In summary, data analysis has used the following schemes-typologies for analysis: 
1. Searle’s (1985) speech act theory for the identification of propositional/non 
propositional, simple and complex speech acts. 
2. Schellens’ (1985) modified argument scheme typology for extracting 
arguments/syllogisms as products-complex speech acts from classroom talk. The 
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typology has been revised in the light of argument schemes which emerged from 
data with a combination from relevant literature input.  
3.  Van Eemeren’s and Grootendorst’s (1989) dialectical transformations for 
reconstructing argumentative talk, with the modification of using a minimally 
rather than a maximally argumentative analysis, which Van Eemeren (1987) 
advocates.  
4. Walton’s and Crabbe’s (1995) typology of argumentative dialogues for 
describing the dialectical context  which respectively had affected the  decision 
of  whether  a speech act might be classified as simple - unlinked premise- or as 
a complex indicating argumentative, explanatory or exploratory force. 
5. Peirce’s (1839-1914, as cited in Pietarinen, 2006) taxonomy of the sciences for 
describing epistemic content and practice. 
The unit of analysis was the speech act. (Searle, 1985) The speech acts were 
classified in simple and complex, propositional or not. Walton’s and Crabbe’s (1995) 
typology of dialogues was used to identify whether the talk was argumentative or 
deliberative, so argument or simple speech act could be distinguished and  extracted from 
the text. The unit of analysis for the argument – as a complex speech act- was the 
argument scheme (modified Schellens’ (1985) typology of arguments).  
Once the argument was extracted then the reasoning scheme applied with the 
contextual context enabled the description of the epistemic practice performed according 
to the stage of the scientific discovery (Klahr, 2000). For example, an argument from 
cause to effect was indicating a forming of hypothesis in an initial stage of scientific 
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inquiry or the evaluation of the hypothesis as the best explanation among others in a latter 
inquiry stage, whereas a cause – to – effect argument might point to an explanation or 
prediction with the use of accepted /established causal law (knowledge claim).  
The following tables provide examples for argumentative talk reconstruction, the 
application of argument schemes and the assignment of propositional content into 
disciplines.  
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Reconstruction of argumentative talk  
Episode line  Reconstructed  As  Argument 
scheme  
Epistemic 
practice 
SDDS  
stage  
Situated in 
Discipline  
145. Teacher: Could human 
beings survive only 
with vegetables; 
without meat?   
 Question (Non Propositional)  
 
 
 
    
146. Student: No. Because 
if we did not have 
meat we would not 
take energy for our 
body.   
Argument (complex speech 
act)  
 
If we take meat we take 
energy. 
We need energy to survive 
(unstated premise) 
 We cannot survive without 
meat.  
 
From cause to 
effect  
Explains a fact  
 
 
 Uses an 
accepted 
knowledge 
claim to explain 
another  
Biology 
147. Student 4: Proteins. 
Our bones would not 
be able to grow 
regularly.  
Meat has proteins. 
Proteins are essential for bones 
to grow.  
Without meat our bones would 
not grow. 
From cause to 
effect  
Predicts a fact  Uses an 
accepted 
knowledge 
claim to predict 
another. 
Biology  
148. Student 4: I am 
vegetarian and I do not 
have problems with 
my bones, I am fine!   
I am vegetarian and I do not 
have problems with my bones, I am 
fine!   
Vegetarians are 
healthy.(unstated conclusion)   
From example   Defends a 
descriptive 
generalization  
Hypothesis 
testing   
Biology 
149. Teacher: You do not 
eat meat?  
Clarification question (non 
propositional)  
    
150. Student: I eat meat, but 
very little. 
Clarification answer 
(propositional but its proposition 
has always been encountered in the 
argument scheme in line 150) 
    
151. Teacher: How about 
you Valentina?  
Pedagogical Question (Non 
Propositional)  
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152. I know many persons 
that eat only 
vegetables and are 
fine. Because 
vegetables provide 
vitamins. It is not 
necessary to eat meat.  
Two arguments:  
Argument 1:  
I know many people that are 
vegetarian and do not have problem 
with their health.  
 
Vegetarian people do not have 
problem with their health.  
Evidence to 
hypothesis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defends a 
descriptive 
generalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 
testing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biology 
Argument 2:  
Vegetables provide vitamins.  
Vitamins can ensure health. 
(unstated premise) 
(That’s why) Vegetarian 
people are healthy.  
 
Cause to effect  
 
Explains a fact  
 
Uses an 
accepted 
knowledge 
claim to explain 
another 
Biology 
153. Teacher: It is not 
necessary to eat meat. 
Hm… 
Repetition     
154. Student: Nuns do not 
eat meat and they are 
OK.   
Nuns do not eat meat and they 
are OK (healthy) 
It’s OK not to consume meat.  
From example  Defends a 
descriptive 
generalization 
Hypothesis 
testing  
 
Biology 
155. Teacher: So, our 
religion allows us 
eating meat. Did we 
spend the time for 
discussing whether we 
should eat meat or not 
with no purpose?  
Our religion allows us to eat 
meat  
Since our religion implies so, it 
is ethical to act so. (unstated 
premise- Appeal to Divine Law, or 
Commitment to Religion)  
It is ethical to eat meat. (There 
is no need to discuss about the 
ethical status of the action)  
Appeal to 
Divine Law  
Evaluates action 
(Practical 
Judgment)  
Practical 
Reasoning –not 
related to SDDS 
stage  
 
Moral 
Reasoning: 
Establishing 
moral rules  
Ethics 
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156. Valentina: Our 
religion allows us to 
eat meat, but does not 
force us to eat only 
meat. We can eat 
anything. Because we 
are omnivorous 
animals.  
Two arguments with a 
convergent link  
 
Argument 1 :  
Our religion allows us to eat 
meat.  
Allowing eating meat does not 
mean forcing eating only meat.  
Our religion does not force us 
to eat only meat.  
Analytical 
argument  
Deduces a 
knowledge claim 
from another 
accepted claim 
 
 
Religion  
Argument 2:  
We are omnivorous animals 
(by nature)  
If you act according to nature 
you are OK (ethical, right, proper) 
It is OK (ethical, right, proper) 
to eat both meat and vegetables.  
Appeal to 
natural law  
Supports a practical 
claim  
Practical 
Reasoning –not 
related to SDDS 
stage  
 
Social/Private 
Policy   
157. Teacher: Ok. We 
should eat all food, 
including meat. There 
is no problem eating 
meat.  
 
Repetition       
158. Teacher: We have 
finished with this issue 
I think. Let’s go to 
another issue 
     
Table 15: Reconstruction of argumentative talk from hunting lesson  
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The epistemic practices performed by students and the teacher in the episode  above 
(predicting, explaining facts, providing evidential supports and examples to support a 
descriptive generalization) have been situated in the dialectical context of establishing the 
necessity of means (eating meat) for an end (be healthy) as true.  
This kind of analysis allowed a quantitative representation of results: the description 
of the situation of epistemic within the dialectic practice uses numbers that actually 
present the frequency of speech acts assigned to each epistemic area, or epistemic 
practice. The above episode for example, would provide, two explanations about why 
meat is necessary, one prediction and three descriptive generalizations (two from 
examples and one from evidential support), that support that meat is not essential. 
Establishing meat as necessary for the organism is a practice assigned in Biology and 
performed within the dialectical context of establishing the necessity of means for the 
practical judgment about hunting or not.   
The numbers are used to describe the results of the study, but it is apparent that they 
do not hold any generalization force due to the nature of the study. On the other hand, 
even one instance in the lessons might be enough to indicate that this kind of 
reasoning/epistemic practice can be encountered while discussing a controversial issue. 
The numbers though might be important if pedagogy is going to be explored. Why 
do some aspects of reasoning occur more than others? Why in some lessons have 
consequences been more dominant than means, for example? However, those 
considerations fell beyond the scope of this study. I do not imply that the nature of the 
issue does not affect the answers to such questions, but I do believe that pedagogy is an 
interfering factor, and given this situation it is very difficult to draw “conclusions” based 
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on numbers. However, since numbers constitute a result of this study, they are presented; 
they might serve the role of data collected used to form initial hypotheses that could be 
tested through other studies.  
Summarizing the consideration of using numbers to describe the results of this study, 
I would say that this study presents the results as instances, or rather as “opportunities”: 
while discussing about controversial issues children or teachers had the opportunity to 
engage in those epistemic practices, either a lot of times, a few times, or even once. The 
numbers indicate the frequency of each instance in the lesson, and will be food for 
thought. The above consideration is applicable for all results presented in this study. 
Another issue that has to be clarified is the presentation of the results as the mutual 
contribution of students and teachers in the classroom, for all lessons. The term “agents 
of the discussion” dominates in the presentation of the results indicating both students’ 
and teachers’ inputs in the discussions.  
By this, I do not assume that there is no importance if students or teachers perform 
specific strategies, as one might argue that those are opportunities for the teacher, and not 
for the student (For example one might argue that those are higher level strategies that 
students could not use). However, evidence presented in the following graph indicates 
that, apart from Informal Logic, students have entered all the other sciences in equal 
footing and even in greater extent than the teacher, who had the role of the chairman of 
the discussions.  
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Graph 1: Contribution of students and teachers to the discussion  
 
It would have been a shortcoming of the study though, if it had not used teachers’ 
inputs in the classroom, as they add to the content analysis types of syllogisms that enrich 
the data for this study, as the teacher might be regarded as an “informed” fellow of the 
students.  
Pedagogical strategies such as assigning tasks, or enforcing discipline had been 
omitted from this analysis. The teacher is analyzed as cited above, as “an informed 
fellow”, on equal ground with the students. The following chapter will present the results 
that came from the data analysis applied as described within the methods and 
methodologies chapter.   
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4. Results 
4.1 Description of the implemented curriculum: The sub-cases  
The lessons presented in this study refer to the following issues: Cloning, Hunting 
and Mobile phones. The lessons are described below, both from the lenses of the teacher, 
as those presented in a symposium in the 5th National Conference of History, Philosophy 
and Teaching of Science that took place in the  University of Cyprus, (Nicosia, 11-14 
June 2009), the extracts of the IPR, and my perspective.  
 
4.1.1 Cloning lesson 
The teacher has selected cloning as an issue because as she says “by definition 
cloning is an issue that emerges because science methods are criticized as ethically 
problematic, but also for its probable consequences to the wider social space”.  The 
lesson was structured in such a way so students have been given the opportunity to take a 
position about animal and human cloning, but also see the issue from a personal angle 
and take decisions in dilemmas about cloning a dead pet or a beloved person.  
The instruction has been addressed to 24 students of the 6th grade (11-12 year old) 
and had a duration of two teaching periods (80 minutes) which is the usual teaching time 
for a science lesson per week. The lesson has been designed, having as its core the 
process of argumentation. The teacher, a 34 year old female, has been involved with 
argumentation in her master thesis (Master in Science Teaching) and she perceives that 
argumentation is a skill that can and has to be taught. She also believes that through the 
use of argumentation, she could enforce epistemological and conceptual understanding. 
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The teacher has selected the issue because it is a contemporary issue that creates social 
and scientific discussion, and therefore, could be an opportunity to discuss issues 
regarding the relationship between the scientific activity and the society, ethics and 
religion.   
Her instructional goals referred to the conceptual understanding of cloning, the 
development of argumentation skills and the understanding of some issues related to the 
nature of science. Specifically, the teacher wanted her students to understand and get 
involved with the concept and process of “argument”, and be able to refer to ways that 
science affects the social and vice versa.  
Her preparation had taken the form of personal involvement with the issue, as an 
effort to get more information about it. She needed to have inputs of many sides of the 
aspect, whereas as an individual could not take a position towards it. She was trying also 
to find information that would enhance students’ understanding about the issue, since 
genes and DNA are not concepts elaborated in those ages in Cyprus Science Curriculum. 
She had therefore put an extra effort to simplify information about cloning practice. 
Additionally, she had structured her lesson based on four different issues concerning 
cloning: Should we clone animals? Would you clone your own pet? Should we clone 
humans? Would you clone your dead son?  
She had perceived animal cloning as less complicated than human cloning. She had 
also perceived personal involvement in taking decisions about personal dilemmas as 
more complicated than discussing neutral issues. That’s why she had designed her lesson 
in a way that, according to her view, would move from more simple to more complicated 
forms.  
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She had also prepared a PowerPoint presentation for the informative part of the 
lesson and a handout with structured questions about the four dilemmas stated above, 
with a small informative text about cloning.  
The lesson began with a PowerPoint presentation with the title “Cloning: A blessing 
or a curse?” The specific title was intentionally selected by the teacher, because she 
wanted her students to take a position towards the issue of cloning and thereby, be ready 
for argumentative tasks that would follow.  
The lesson proceeded with a series of argumentation activities with the goal of 
engaging students to the complication of the issue, step by step, as stated before. So the 
teacher had addressed a “neutral” issue at a first place, proceeding with issues that had 
the form of dilemmas, with the goal to involve students personally and emotionally.  
The first issue that was stated was “Are you in favour or against cloning farm 
animals?” The task had the form of a debate, with those who had stated a positive 
position, trying to cite arguments in favour of cloning animals, and those with a negative 
position acting accordingly. Students’ arguments were about the value of being unique as 
a negative point, and the opportunity to save food chains in the case of endangered 
animals, as a positive point. A remarkable point is that students did not have a lot to say 
about this issue and after those two arguments the discussion came to an end soon. The 
teacher believes that this fact was due to the very little information they had about the 
issue, alongside the fact that they did not have a personal interest about it. However, in 
the end of the lesson, after lot of argumentation tasks about other dilemmas, students had 
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started to process pieces of information and had asked questions about cloning animals 
such as “Would the milk and meat of cloned animals be of good quality?”  
In a second phase the teacher stated the personal dilemma “Would you clone your 
dead cat?” The teacher gave worksheets to her students with a small text describing the 
opportunity to clone a dead pet and assigned some questions which they should answer. 
She had actually used it as a technique to let the students rest from an endless oral 
argumentation session that would make non-participants to create noise, and generally get 
students tired.  After having some time reading and writing the students had stated their 
position - answer to the dilemma and had tried to defend it.  
The main discussion point was about whether cloning could “bring” the dead pet 
back. The discussion had a sentimental character. The students were trying to describe 
their emotions when having a cloned cat that was created as a substitute for their beloved 
pet. Those emotions have been the bases for their arguments. However, not all students 
have been emotionally evolved with the situation; some of them had regarded other 
aspects of the issue like the possibility of “failure”, and the high cost of the practice.    
In a third phase the students were asked to take a position about cloning or not 
human beings. Even if the dilemma was stated as a neutral issue, very soon it had turned 
to a personal one, and students were grounding intentions about the dilemma “Would you 
clone your beloved person that had died?” This dilemma was not explicitly stated by the 
teacher, but in a later stage the teacher had stated the dilemma of “Would you clone your 
dead kid?” 
This discussion took the greatest part of the lesson. Students had been involved in 
different ways in the issue. The discussion about cloning human beings has been similar 
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to cloning own pet, as far as the emotions of the presence of a clone but not the original 
were concerned. However, students when dealing with what emotions they would feel in 
such a case, they had to agree on what a clone is, and how  a clone comes in life, the age 
in which he comes in life and the time he needs to grow up so he/she would really “be 
back with us”.  
Additionally, the fact that the students had situated the personal dilemmas to their 
own cases (for example, a student had lost her mother because of cancer the previous 
year) enabled further theoretical discussion about whether a clone would inherit the 
prototype’s diseases, and what the emotional cost of having back a sick person again 
would be. Accordingly, some students had started to produce solutions for the issue of 
disease inheritance, like the selection of “healthy” genes for the clone, an issue that has 
taken the status of a sub-issue by the teacher, who had explicitly addressed it to the 
classroom: “What if we had the opportunity to go to a lab and order our son?” 
The discussion took another route; students who discussed issues about selecting 
genes for a new baby, or the clone, were concerned about how they would remove bad 
characteristics like diseases, but not “removing all of them, as we do not need perfect 
people because other people would envy them and this could be worse”. 
Students were also concerned with issues related to the consequences of the presence 
of clones in the society and with issues concerning the social status of the clone. The 
issue of social confusion was the first issue to be elaborated. The previous issue, about 
cloning an own pet, had framed their understandings in such a way that they perceived 
that a clone would come up as a single copy and they did not consider the possibilities to 
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have a great number of same clones. So, the issue of social confusion took the form of 
confusing two persons, the clone and the prototype, an issue that was dropped because of 
the different age of the two, since the clone comes in life as a baby. 
Some of them perceived the clone as a person totally related to the presence and the 
needs of the person who had decided to clone him. Therefore, they had concerns about 
how the clone would continue his life in the case where the one that had decided for 
his/her cloning would die, for example.  
Furthermore, students supported cloning human beings, especially people with 
special characteristics, for example very clever persons that could enforce technological 
development and therefore would offer a social progress. This issue was a start for further 
discussion concerning the possibilities of creating really “bad” clones with characteristics 
that would be disastrous for the society. The argument led to a discussion concerning the 
quality of a “scientist” as a person that is by definition concerned with the wellbeing of 
the society, the “scientist with good character” who could be apart from clever, motivated 
to move society to progress or distraction. Einstein was stated as an example of a clever 
person that should be cloned again, whereas Hitler was stated as a possible danger: a very 
clever man who had been disastrous for society. The complexity of the issue was 
revealed and students started to set social issues - conflict points such as:  
«Who is going to choose who is to be cloned? And how can 
we know in advance whether the clone will be a good 
character? »  
 
The discussion proceeded with discussing - establishing solutions of the type “if the 
government decided then this would not be a problem” or that “cloning would be a 
controlled process, so those problems would not appear.  
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The above discussion about the possibility of cloning really bad people had driven 
some students, who were positively positioned in favour of cloning, to produce solutions 
of the type: “Ok if the clone is not good, then you can kill him”.  
This solution was a start for negotiating the status and the value of the life of a clone. 
The arguments of this session regarded the existence of a soul in the clone, the respect to 
a human life that has or does not have a soul, and the status of the life of a clone, an 
entity that was assigned to the authority of the person that has decided to clone him.  
There were students that had perceived clones as totally connected to personal or 
social needs of the persons or groups that had taken the decision for their cloning, and 
therefore supported that when the needs of the “cloners” were not fulfilled then the clone 
would not have any purpose in this life. This issue was further elaborated, with arguments 
related to the status of the life and the “purpose” of the life of the clone, as well as his 
rights as a “human” or “living” being.  
It is remarkable that those metaphysical and ethical concerns were not a primary 
argument that has been used for grounding a decision about cloning or not human beings. 
In other words, if clones would have a soul was not an issue about which the students 
have been concerned in a first place. It came up in a “naïve” if we could evaluate it, 
solution of a student when discussing about the danger to clone really bad people, if 
people with special characteristics are to be cloned.  
Another ethical issue that was raised was the right of bringing in life a clone without 
his permission, since the process would not be a regular one. Again, this issue was an 
opportunity to refine the concept of the “clone” since some students had perceived that 
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the clone and the original would be the same entity, and therefore there would be no need 
to take the permission of the clone since you would have taken it from the prototype. This 
branch had led students to think of further possibilities like cloning dead persons, where 
the “permission” could not have been taken. The discussion had ended because of lack of 
information about such an issue (cloning dead persons). 
In the final stage of the lesson the teacher wrote on the board all the arguments that 
had been cited in the discussion as reasons supporting or countering cloning. She had 
then assigned the students the task of selecting which argument would be the “strongest” 
of all, if they had only one to support their position. Students had voted for the “best 
supporting” or the “best countering” argument.  
The teacher perceived that such an activity would enable students to use evaluation 
criteria for argument validity and soundness. She also supported that such a task would 
be a reflective one, since students would have to consider apart from their own arguments 
other arguments also, and that’s why she had forbidden them to vote for “their own 
argument”. She further supported her decision to her students also by citing that “I know 
that you have your own opinion and that will not change”.   
Unfortunately, there was no time for students to further discuss their evaluation of 
arguments. The time was coming to an end and the teacher finished the lesson with an 
investigation of how many students had a positive, negative or a neutral position about 
the issue and which of them had changed their minds during the discussion. Finally, she 
ended her lesson by stating that:  
“Those issues are so puzzling….we should always think and 
learn more and more before we take a decision about them”.  
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4.1.2 Mobile phones  
The teacher selected the issue of mobile phones because, as she believes, it is a 
questionable issue which creates controversy between several groups and does not have 
“one correct solution”. The issue of young children using mobile phones has fulfilled 
those criteria. Additionally, it was a very interesting issue for the students. As the teacher 
said “I’ve been a science teacher for those kids for one year, and I knew that the issue of 
mobile phones was one of a high interest, especially outside classroom settings”.  
Teaching about mobile phones has been a challenge for this teacher. On one hand, 
the topic is not included in the formal Cyprus Curriculum in any lesson and this was of 
special interest for her, as a teacher. Additionally, it was an issue in which she knew that 
she was negatively positioned, even prejudiced about young children using mobile 
phones (her central issue). Therefore, the challenge for her was “to try to drop out any 
personal charge, and try to let students take decisions based on information and 
arguments that would not come from me, but from other sources that I would provide 
them with.”   
The teacher considered that she should clarify her thought about a complex issue and 
that’s why she had thought about pros and cons about mobile phones and put them down 
in a form of a concept map. (Figure 12) The concept map presents the pros in green 
colour and the cons in red. The teacher has considered health issues, addiction, financial 
issues, distraction from the classroom in case it is used within it and issues related to 
personal data as possible cons for holding mobile phones. The pros were far fewer and 
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included the need to hold mobile phones for communication and emergency cases and the 
development of human relations that communication enhances. 
 
Αν έχεις 
κινητό είσαι 
“in”
ΚΙΝΗΤΑ 
ΤΗΛΕΦΩΝΑ
Σε περίπτωση που 
κάποιος έχει χαθεί ή 
κινδυνεύει
Αναπτύσσει 
διαπροσωπικές 
σχέσεις
Χρήσιμο σε 
έκτακτη ανάγκη
Ευκολία στην 
επικοινωνία
Μορφή 
ψυχαγωγίας
Υποκλοπές 
Χρήση κατά την 
οδήγησηà δυστυχήματα
Πρόβλημα στον 
αντίχειρα
Εντοπισμός 
από CYTA
Μπορεί να τύχει 
εκμετάλλευσης από 
κάποιους
Μόδα
Υποψίες για επιπτώσεις     
της ακτινοβολίας
Εξάρτηση 
από τη μόδα
Εύκολη παραβίαση 
προσωπικών δεδομένων 
Εντός τάξηςà 
απόσπαση προσοχής
Εξάρτηση 
Αλλαγή κινητού σε 
τακτά χρονικά 
διαστήματα: 
κοινωνική πίεση
Οικονομικός 
παράγοντας 
Καρκίνος; Πονοκέφαλοι 
;
Κόστος 
κλήσεων
Υπόμνημα: 
πλεονεκτήματα: 
πράσινο χρώμα, 
μειονεκτήματα: 
κόκκινο χρώμα
 
Figure 12: Concept map from the teacher about mobile phones’ pros and cons 
 
Her preparation proceeded with a search in local or foreign press and the Internet for 
relevant to the issue information. The task was time consuming since most of the sources 
available were in English and even sources in Greek were too complicated for the 
conceptual level of a 5th grader (10-11 years old). Therefore, the next step for the teacher 
was a preparation of sources in a way that they could be conceivable from the students 
(translate, use synonyms for difficult words, remove irrelevant information, slim texts, 
etc).  
This teacher had stated explicitly the goals for her lesson. She wanted her students:  
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a) To develop an ability to study available sources and select relevant information  
b) To be able to identify potential arguments in available sources and evaluate their  
pros and cons  
c) Realize the complexity of the issue  
d) Form an opinion, either positive or negative and defend it with the use of 
arguments 
The teacher also structured her lesson and she actually followed the structure in the 
classroom.  
Her instruction was addressed to a 5th grade class (10-11 years old), with 24 students 
and had a duration of two teaching periods (80 minutes). The teacher selected a specific 
case as an issue for her lesson, presented in the following form:  
“My brother is 11 years old. His name is Constantinos and he 
recently had his birthday. When asked what he would like for a 
present, his answer was immediate: He would like a mobile phone; 
he even knew the brand and the model of the mobile phone he 
would like to get. I was puzzled…. 
I do not have a formed opinion about mobile phones, but from 
time to time I come up to various information….that they cause or 
do not cause harm to young children or to adults in general. I do 
not know what to do. Buy or not buy my brother a mobile phone?”  
 
The teacher wanted to know her students’ initial positions and arguments and 
additionally, she needed an activity where students could express themselves as a 
reflection process. That’s why in a first place she had asked students to cite reasons for 
buying a mobile phone to her brother.  
The activity had the form of “reason citing” rather than a debate, or an argumentative 
dialogue, even though there were students that did not cite their “reasons” but had 
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dropped other reasons as false or irrelevant. The main arguments that have been used in 
favour of buying a mobile phone to the teachers’ brother were arguments for 
convenience, referring to communication enhancement. Some of those arguments that 
had the form of means end (mobile phones are a means for communication, location etc) 
were dropped as mobile phones were proved as not necessary when alternatives had been 
presented.  
Additionally, some arguments had the form of emotional appeals. Students cited that 
the teacher should feel pity for her brother being sad because he did not have a mobile 
phone. This argument was dropped by the teacher as “not a reason”. Additionally, there 
were arguments supporting that the teacher’s brother was a kid and therefore the teacher 
had to do favours for him. They additionally cited that if the teacher’s brother was well 
behaved, or a good student, then the teacher should buy him the phone as a gift.  
This made the teacher realize that the case in which the dilemma was set was really 
important for the discussion to follow. When she realized that the students were stuck on 
the age of her brother she changed the issue by asking “Well if my brother was not a kid, 
but a teenager would you advice me to buy him a phone? How would the situation 
change?” Students compared the cases in terms of social exclusion: they had perceived 
having a mobile phone as a social necessity for teenagers, but not for kids, so there was 
no question for them whether a teenager should have mobile phone or not.  
The discussion proceeded with further reasons for the issue. Most negative points 
were related to health issues, with students claiming that mobile phones harm hearing, or 
health and others just citing that they have heard from their parents or the TV about such 
information. Finally, there were students that did not have a clear opinion about the issue, 
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and others that provided conditional decisions such as “you should buy him a phone only 
if he uses it for “useful” purposes”, or “only if he uses it in extreme occasions”, and so 
on.   
In a second phase, the teacher gave handouts to the students that included several 
pieces of information that could be evaluated as arguments supporting or countering 
buying a mobile phone to a young kid. She gave a different piece of information to each 
group of students (she had four groups of five and one group of six students) because as 
she believed, this would feed a fruitful discussion in the classroom.  
The students worked in groups and highlighted with red colour the information that 
was evaluated as cons to mobile phones, and with blue the pros.  
Then, the teacher asked the groups to take a group decision about the issue stated, 
after being informed about the issue. The discussion that followed had the form of 
defence to the specific decision of the group which was initially announced in the 
classroom. Four groups decided that the teacher should not buy her brother a mobile 
phone, whereas only one decided in favour of it. The first group grounded its decision for 
not buying a phone on the reason that “from all relevant information that we encountered, 
only one was evaluated as positive”. Afterwards the specific group started to cite all the 
arguments situated on the negative site. Since the information available in handouts 
contained technical terminology or issues that the teacher had perceived as “difficult” for 
her students to perceive, the teacher elaborated on each argument, so she could ensure 
that the students understood the concepts involved in each argument.  
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An argument that was confronted from other groups was one of mobile phones as a 
source of family members’ isolation, as some students had perceived it as a means of 
communication between family members, whereas others had perceived it as a means of 
distracting parents from family, since mobile phones extend working time at home.  
There were many arguments that cited available evidence regarding the relationship 
of mobile phones’ effects on health, directly from the sources:  
“We have found that the use of mobile phones for many hours 
per day might affect the hearing nerve.  This is negative”.  Or, “The 
possibility for brain cancer to appear exists, and even gets bigger, 
with the use of hands free”. 
 
Finally, the same group cited as “positive” the piece of evidence indicating that after 
ten years of use, mobile phones do not affect the hearing nerve”.  
The second group grounded its decision on the fact that “negatives, when counted 
were much more than positives” and continued by citing negatives and positives. This 
group’s information included “a positive thing”: the fact that there has been a research 
that did not find a positive relationship between mobile phone use and brain cancer. The 
teacher grasped the opportunity to bring them in front of a problem, according to her, 
which was the fact that they had two contradictory results from research: mobile phones 
being and not being responsible for brain cancer. Actually she selected the information 
presented to the students in such a way that this contradictory result would appear. She 
needed to explore issues related to research credibility, evidence validity and therefore 
she had addressed questions to the students like “Can those contradictory results (mobile 
phones affecting, or not affecting brain cancer) be both right? True?” 
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The students reacted in various ways. Some of them did not even go through the 
process of evaluating research credibility but cited alternative explanations in the form of 
“Perhaps it depends on the organism of each person”; others cited their trust on one side 
of the results grounding it on circumstantial evidence like “one woman had died from 
brain cancer and she had been using her mobile a lot”. Other students confronted the 
evidence as not reliable since it did not come from research, but when the teacher asked 
what to do because of contradictory evidence, students proceeded with questions like “Is 
your brother going to use it a lot?” They used the answer of the teacher to calculate the 
danger as they had available evidence indicating that the danger is related to the hours of 
use per day. Others supported that since there was conflicting evidence, it was not sure if 
her brother would have a problem with brain cancer when using a mobile phone and 
finally, there were students that insisted on one of two sides (mobile phones create/do not 
create brain cancer) by just appealing to one of the two pieces of evidence.  
A student changed the subject of the discussion citing that the teacher should not buy 
her brother a mobile phone since there were really important negatives about mobile 
phones and what is of importance is not how many, but how important the negatives are. 
This brought a new session to the lesson in which the teacher asked her students to weigh 
arguments in terms of how important was the pro or con mentioned in them.  The teacher, 
before entering this new task, in an effort to collect more arguments, had asked the 
students to explain to her why they have mobile phones, writing their explanations as 
arguments on the board, alongside all other arguments encountered from the sources. 
Some students explained the necessity of mobile phones for communication, others 
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mentioned it as a means of entertainment, whereas others even “apologized” for having 
mobile phones, defending their action by saying that “I did not want to play, I had to 
communicate with my mother”. Finally, some others recognized that there was not a 
special reason for having a mobile phone, or had one because they just “wanted it”. 
The lesson ended with the activity of weighing the arguments. However, there was 
not enough time for that and the teacher ended the lesson by saying:  
“When go home I will evaluate each argument and try to weigh 
it. Afterwards I’ll take a decision based on this evaluation. My 
advice for you is to do the same”. 
 
  
4.1.3 Hunting  
The instruction was addressed to 22 6th graders (11-12 year-olds) and lasted for 80 
minutes. The teacher was the Science teacher for the school. 
The initial wish of the teacher, a 35 year old male - was to teach about evolution and 
especially human evolution as the theory had been proposed by Darwin. He had actually 
come across information which indicated that among 25 countries Cyprus was 23th in 
accepting Darwin’s’ theory. He had a personal interest to see students’ reaction when 
confronted with the theory, given their prejudice created by their parents, teachers and the 
church.   
However, he did not proceed with his idea, as he had realized that the principle of the 
school was not very supportive and he did not have the strength to challenge any religion 
or other beliefs of children, parents, teachers and school principals. Instead of natural 
selection he decided to teach about hunting, with the dilemma “Should contemporary 
human beings hunt?” He had thought that the discussion about hunting could have been 
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in an environment where issues about natural selection might come up indirectly and 
naturally, and therefore they would not be a “risk” for him.  
The teacher decided to go to the class with no special lesson plan. He wanted the 
children to lead the discussion, and perceived his role as one that could “tidy up” their 
thoughts, and do not let them go from one subject to the other. He also wanted to 
encourage all students to engage in the discussion and prevent ironical comments for any 
view presented in the classroom. Finally, he wanted his students to come up with 
arguments to support their position. 
He had perceived the issue of hunting or not as an issue that does not have right or 
wrong solutions, therefore he could not predict if the discussion could lead anywhere. 
Therefore, his goals were oriented to the creation of a fruitful discussion, with his 
students having the opportunity to realize that there is always another view, apart from 
their own, a situation that is not regular in the classroom.   
He included in his plan a “break” in which the students could rest from discussing 
and do some written work concerning issues related to hunting, like the use of swallows 
for hunting practice in Malta. He was concerned with having the students talking for 80 
minutes, as he believed that this is a fact that would make them tired, anxious and not 
disciplined. He was concerned with whether the students would like to engage in such a 
discussion in a controlled classroom environment.  
Another issue that concerned him was a logical coherence for the discussion topics. 
The fact that many questions during discussion would remain with no answer, in addition 
to the chaotic nature of such discussion made him anxious about how he could survive in 
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such a situation. He could not define what would be the “end” of each subtopic and the 
“start” of a new one. Finally, he had a concern about students’ experience with the topic. 
He did not expect his students to have a lot to say about this issue and he was worried 
that the discussion would unexpectedly come to an end.  
Eventually, the lesson was beyond his expectations. Students had so many issues to 
discuss that the time of 80 minutes was not enough to explore them all. Students were 
highly engaged in the discussion and according to the teachers’ view the discussion was 
of a high quality. Many children that were traditionally silent in the classroom had a 
voice in the discussion; this fact was mentioned from all the teachers participating in the 
seminar.   
He had started the lesson directly with posing the dilemma “Should contemporary 
human beings hunt?”  
The discussion had begun with children advancing arguments in favour of, or against 
hunting. A student advanced the reason of hunting to control animal population. Other 
students cited that there should be a limit, otherwise animals would be extinct, and others 
stated other arguments like “we have to live, to eat, we need to kill animals”, or “it is 
unfair to kill birds”. The teacher informed his students that he wanted the discussion to be 
sub-issue clustered, in other words, he would like them to discuss in depth about each 
argument, so the issue would be somehow “finalized” and they would not need to return 
to it in later sessions.  
When students had no more arguments regarding animal population, the teacher 
advanced his own reason, through a rhetorical question: “In jungles, when no human 
beings are present, is animal overpopulation evident?” The question was answered by the 
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students which started advancing further reasons like the one that natural death could 
control animal population. This last argument was confronted by the teacher, also by a 
rhetorical form, with an analogy of human beings’ population which is not controlled by 
physical death. As the issue was taking a distance from the initial question (hunt or not to 
hunt) students started talking about how to control human population, with a student 
supporting that there can be such a control, since in China population control methods are 
applied.  
When the teacher realized that the students had stopped discussing about animal 
population control and started to deal with other issues, he ended the animal population 
sub-issue and started a new session about hunting as an unfair activity, an argument 
stated by a student in an earlier stage, but dropped as irrelevant to the animal population 
issue being discussed at this time. Anthropomorphism was evident in this session since 
students had expressed perceptions about birds and hunted animals, citing that they “have 
soul” or “have rights to be treated as we would like to be treated”, thereby attributing 
human characteristics to animals and respectively, establish moral rules related to hunting 
activity.  
The teacher confronted the unfairness argument by advancing an analogy supporting 
that in nature animals are also “unfair” to each other:  an eagle hunts and eats a rabbit, the 
human does the same. Anthropomorphism was also evident in this session, as students 
did not accept the teachers’ argument, by citing that the eagle is not in advantage like 
human beings, it catches only what it needs and does not “store” food as human beings 
do; they had further mentioned that an eagle does not have alternatives for eating. 
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Students also cited their own experience in hunting as evidence supporting that human 
beings do not hunt because of food need, but because of pleasure, bringing up examples 
of hunters that do not even eat the food.  
In the end of the session a student supported that unfairness to birds is not a problem 
since birds are also unfair to human beings because of transmitting human beings the bird 
flu and kill a lot of them. The last argument was confronted by students and the teacher 
supported that this was not done “intentionally”.  
A new session was initiated after this argument by the teacher, which was each time 
announcing the transfer to one sub-issue to the other (“Ok enough about this”, “let’s 
move to the next issue”, or “to this argument” etc). The new issue to be discussed was 
raised in the previous session by a student and referred to the explanation that human 
beings hunt because it is a pleasure for them. Talking about hunting as a pleasant activity 
brought chains of explanations and arguments. The students and the teacher tried to 
advance explanations as to why hunting is pleasant and further situate hunting as a sport 
or as an activity that would make us feel like primitive people (However the last 
explanation was confronted as primitive and contemporary hunting methods have been 
compared).  
Additionally, they brought evidence to ground the truth or to falsify that hunting is 
really pleasant by referring to friends’, relatives’ or even their own experiences and 
feelings after hunting. Finally, there were students that did not perceive hunting as 
pleasant but as a very difficult and dangerous activity, a view confronted by others that 
had perceived those characteristics as criteria for an activity to be “pleasant”.  
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Other students changed the context of the discussion from one of situating hunting as 
a pleasant activity to one defending the action of hunting because of that.  Those students 
cited that “There are so many other things to do than killing birds for pleasure”, or “There 
are other alternatives for sports in nature”.  
During this discussion the teacher brought up the issue of hunters that kill only wild 
animals able to protect themselves, and not animals that have been raised in farm 
conditions and then left in nature for hunting, being unable to be protected. He actually 
asked students to explain and evaluate such an attitude, as it was difficult for him to 
understand the morality behind this action. This move however, removed students from 
the main issue under discussion and a discussion started to ground whether hunters really 
do this, bring evidence from themselves and their parents - as hunters - to prove that they 
act or not in such a way etc. The teacher had realized that the discussion was derailed and 
decided to end this session.  
The teacher returned to an issue that needed further exploration, according to his 
view: whether human beings really have alternatives for food apart from animals, and if 
meat is  necessary for the human body.  
Some of the students did not enter the discussion of eating meat; they mentioned that 
this was an irrelevant for them  issue as hunting was not a means for eating, as far as they 
were concerned, but a means for pleasure and exercise.  
Other students tried to establish meat as necessary for the human body because of its 
proteins. On the other side, there were students that supported that such a necessity does 
not exist by bringing evidence from vegetarians and vegans who do not seem to have 
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health problems. The teacher grasped the opportunity to relate the issue with evolution 
theory, by guiding his students to cite that human beings have the teeth of carnivore 
animals and therefore humans are created for such an activity.  
A student brought nuns as such an example of healthy vegetarians and the teacher 
distracted the discussion from the necessity of meat to the human body and transferred it 
to an issue of morality, by appealing to a Divine law: “If our religion allows us to eat 
meat (some children cited that there are nuns that eat meat) then what’s the point 
discussing whether we should eat meat?  
After that the teacher tried to bring up the main issue back, to hunt or not to hunt, by 
referring to a student’s argument about human beings as having alternatives for food (an 
argument advanced to ground that the eagle is not unfair to its prey whereas humans are). 
The teacher had used this argument as an argument against hunting. The student had 
denied that her argument had been advanced for supporting or not hunting, however the 
discussion proceeded with the teacher looking for further arguments supporting or not 
hunting. A student had cited that eating animals is irrelevant for him, as he hunts animals 
but does not eat them. This has been the start of a new session in which several sub-issues 
had been explored:  
• Is killing animals ethical if you do not do it for their meat? 
• What’s the difference between killing and eating an animal from slaughtering 
one? 
• How did we come up to decide which animals are domestic animals for eating 
and others are pets for care and love?  
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Students were trying to establish moral rules by appealing to attributes of animals 
akin to human ones. For example they have cited that animals should feel grateful for the 
people that had fed them for their whole life and therefore they should give back what 
they have got (an argument establishing slaughtering as moral). Others had supported that 
since wild animals have such a difficult life to survive, it is so unfair to kill them, because 
this makes their life even more difficult.  
A student had advanced an argument supporting that there is no reason dealing with 
animals’ lives since they are going to die one day, one way or another. This argument 
was directly confronted by the teacher who has cited his perception that an animals’ life 
should be respected as a human life and since we make so many efforts to extend human 
life (medicine) it is not fair to treat animal life as not important.  
Other students had advanced reasons referring to animals having the perception to 
realize that they are going to be slaughtered and thereby establish the cruelty of the 
action, an argument that brought other chains of argumentation. Students had started to 
bring examples that could prove that animals really have such a perception, whereas 
others were advancing arguments that were questioning the existence of such a 
perception.  
Finally, there was a group of students that had not perceived the issue of slaughtering 
or hunting animals as a moral issue related to the status of animals’ life or the methods of 
death, but as an issue of convenience. They therefore discussed whether slaughtered or 
hunted animals’ meat is healthier, or easier and cheaper to get and by this way they have 
answered the question “Is it better to slaughter or hunt animals?” 
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The discussion had gone so long that when the teacher had asked a student what her 
opinion was, her answer was: “About what? Hunting or not? Eating animals? 
Slaughtering or hunting animals?” After that the teacher asked his students to tell him 
whether they had formed an opinion about hunting or not. Most of them were in favour, 
whereas others cited solutions “hunting with limits”, and a few of them were negative.  
The next activity was a silent one. Students had to read a text about policemen 
(hunters) in Malta who were killing swallows for practice, a second piece of information 
referring to the hunters’ habit to abandon their dogs in nature after the end of the hunting 
season, and finally a paragraph talking about members of the parliament as supporters of 
hunting in Greece. Students had to read the information and write down some comments. 
After that a discussion had started again. 
The first issue that was discussed was about dog abandoning. Students had not 
perceived the hidden message of the teacher that was explicitly cited in the end of the 
session (hunters cannot claim that they love nature as a reason to support hunting, since 
they are so cruel to their own dogs). They were rather being concerned to the direction of 
establishing such a fact as true or false. They had started to talk about dog prices, bring 
evidence about finding abandoned dogs, or defending themselves as hunters that do not 
act like that.  
When the discussion came to the issue of killing swallows for practice, students had 
defended the immorality of such an action for its cruelty and not necessity, since there are 
shooting centres for practice purposes, whereas others - especially students that were 
hunters (going with their parents for hunting) had defended the necessity for “real life” 
practice. The discussion was derailed when students had started talking about which birds 
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would be better for practice, because of their number, availability etc. It was evident that 
the students did not perceive all issues cited by the teacher as moral. The teacher referred 
to extra arguments hidden in the text about the illegality of the action and called his 
students to explain why the policemen acted illegally.  
The teacher asked from his students to explore members’ of the parliament motives 
for supporting hunting, and then students had started citing reasons like “people in 
Greece are poor and they need food”, etc. When the teacher had realized that he did not 
get what he wanted, he guided his students through cued elicitation to cite that parliament 
members need hunters voting and that’s why they support hunting, and that hunting is a 
profitable activity, since hunters have to pay their hunting license to the government for a 
lot of money, whereas other society members get also their profit by selling guns and 
other hunting equipment.  
The lesson was coming to an end and the teacher told his students that “As I realize 
from our discussion, human beings like hunting...”. After that he started a reflective 
session and asked his students to cite their own experiences, if they were hunters, if they 
like it, why they like it or not and if they would like to become hunters etc. Students 
reflected their experiences about hunting and explained why they liked it or not, or how 
they started the hobby.  
The last session of the lesson started with a teacher’s question: “Do we finally 
become what our parents are? If our fathers are hunters, then we will probably become 
hunters, won’t we?” He cited himself as evidence of not being a hunter, because his 
father has never been one and he asked his students to further discuss this issue. Some 
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students agreed with him, but others brought evidence to support that there were hunters 
that started the activity at a later age or others that have been hunters but their parents did 
not like it. In some point of the discussion, students changed the issue of how we become 
hunters, with the issue of comparing shooting centres and hunting swallows for practice, 
whereas others started to explain why people like hunting by citing information that 
hunting gives an internal feeling of satisfaction of completing a difficult task. The teacher 
grasped again the opportunity to discuss about natural selection issues, and asked his 
students to discuss whether human beings are by nature hunters, as they have carnivorous 
teeth, nails, can run fast etc. The students started again comparing primitive hunting with 
nowadays hunting and cited differences and the fact that contemporary human beings are 
in advantage because of guns and therefore cannot be regarded as hunters by nature.  
The time ran out and the teacher had to finish the lesson. No concluding session was 
included and the teacher said after the lesson:  
“I had a feeling of standing to nowhere…I did not know 
what the students concluded from this lesson.” 
  
4.2 Socioscientific content and dialectical context 
As explored in the method chapter, the description of the dialectical context was 
enabled by the use of the socioscientific content: the term that relates the substantive 
matter of the discussion to the issue that relates to the decision for an action (cloning, 
buying a mobile phone for a young brother, hunt) to be taken. As also mentioned, the 
analysis had provided that the agents of classroom discussion talked about the issue and 
sub-issues that had emerged as chains of argumentation, about themselves, societal 
agents and their classmates, about solutions and finally, about issues related to the 
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decision making process. Below I present the results that describe the dialectic context as 
related to the categories of socioscientific content.  
 
4.2.1 Talking about the issue: Expressing beliefs about the action to be taken 
When the agents of the discussion were talking about the issue, the dialectical context 
was defined according to Walton’s and Crabbe’s (1995) typology of dialogues. When the 
typology was applied in classroom data though, new categories emerged. The categories 
are shown in Table 15. 
Talking about the issue: Expressing beliefs about the action to be taken 
Goal of the participant Dialectical Context Example 
Present  a view about the issue, 
or sub-issue, defend or counter 
such a view 
Argumentation for 
persuasion 
You should not buy him a mobile phone 
because it would harm his health. 
Seek for a solution Deliberation Mobile phones harm youngsters’ health. This is a negative argument. 
Seek for a truth about a factual 
sub-issue  
Inquiry-
Argumentation for 
inquiry 
Do mobile phones really harm health? 
The claim that mobile phones do not 
harm human brain comes from scientific 
research; they have investigated a lot of 
people for claiming that. 
Provide information about 
concepts related to the issue Informative 
Radio-energy is a special kind of energy 
that is used in mobile phones and other 
electrical appliances. 
Establish and defend a solution 
towards the problematic 
situation 
Practice 
establishing/Defence
* 
You should tell your brother, when you 
buy him one, to use it only for a few 
hours, so he will not harm his health. 
Provide a solution based on 
conditions  
Conditional decision 
making* 
If your brother will use the mobile for 
useful thinks, yes you should buy him 
one, otherwise not. 
Provide claims with the aim of 
answering a teachers’ prompt 
while teacher uses it to advance 
argumentation through cued 
elicitation. 
Teachers’ guided 
argumentation* 
T: Are we born to be hunters? How are 
our teeth? 
S: They are sharp, some of them are. 
T: Which animals have sharp teeth? 
S: Carnivorous animals 
T: We have sharp teeth as carnivorous, 
nails; we are born to be hunters. 
*Contexts not described by Walton and Crabbe (2005)  
Table 16: Talking about the issue (expressing beliefs about the action to be 
taken) 
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The context named after “teachers’ guided argumentation” actually describes a type 
of an IRF (Initiation-Response-Feedback) exchange in the classroom. However, IRF is a 
scheme that describes the organizational pattern of the dialogue and the role of the 
student is described as a respondent to the teachers’ initial prompts; IRF therefore cannot 
describe the dialectical dimension, it cannot describe the teacher’s and students’ goals 
regarding the resolution or the defence of a controversial issue.  
The context named after “teachers’ guided argumentation” actually describes a type 
of an IRF (Initiation-Response-Feedback) exchange in the classroom. However, IRF is a 
scheme that describes the organizational pattern of the dialogue and the role of the 
student is described as a respondent to the teachers’ initial prompts; IRF therefore cannot 
describe the dialectical dimension, it cannot describe the teacher’s and students’ goals 
regarding the resolution or the defence of a controversial issue.  
Teacher’s guided argumentation therefore describes the speech acts under which 
students are actually manipulated by the teacher who is using his authority as one that can 
carry an IRF dialogue, to advance an argument in the classroom. If the setting was not 
educational then the type of dialogue could be described as a manoeuvre, a rhetorical 
strategy that uses rhetorical questions that eventually will lead to a proposition, or an 
argument in favour of the one who uses the strategy. However, since the setting is 
educational and the teacher does not stand as an equal interlocutor but he/she is an 
interlocutor via educator (or vice versa) the context is not named after the IRF (due to the 
limitation of describing the dialectical aspect), nor after the manoeuvre term (due to the 
limitation of describing the educational aspect). Teacher’s guided argumentation 
therefore describes the context in which an educator helps his students advance, or 
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discover a proposition, or an argument that can be used in a controversial issue’s 
discussion.  
 
4.2.1.1 Argumentation for persuasion: Disagreement Space 
Students and teachers, agents of the discussion, have been located in the disagreement 
space, holding positions and arguing about the issue, or sub-issues that had emerged. This 
context is defined as “argumentation for persuasion” according to Walton and Crabbe’s 
(1995) definition: the initial situation is a conflict of opinion and the goal of the 
participant is to persuade the other party.  
 
Space SSI Content SSI Context Example 
Disagreement space 
Criteria: Holding 
and defending a position 
about the issue or a Sub-
Issue. The goal of the 
speech act is the defence 
or doubt of such a 
position 
issue 
Argumentation 
for persuasion 
 
We should not clone 
because all animals will be the 
same and they will lose their 
value 
Sub - issue 
(issue) 
Argumentation 
for persuasion 
(Local level) 
Eating meat is morally 
ethical, since our religion 
allows us to eat meat. 
Products of 
the Discussion 
(arguments) 
Argumentation 
for persuasion 
If your brother is a good 
student then you would buy 
him a phone.  
Yes, but this is not a reason. 
Tell me a reason for buying 
him or not (Your argument 
does not consist a reason). 
Table 17: Talking about the issue within the disagreement space  
 
As shown in Table 16, the discussion has also moved to a meta-level. Agents had 
used meta-arguments (Wooldridge et al, 2005 p.46): they have been dropping arguments 
as not being “reasons”, or as being irrelevant to the issue at stake, for example.  
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A very difficult problem that had to be addressed was the identification of the agents’ 
context while talking about a sub-issue. As the sub-issue at stake might get distant from 
the initial issue, it was hard to say whether the agent supporting a view about the sub-
issue, was also supporting the view that was resting levels above it. For example, a 
student supporting that meat is necessary for humans, did not necessarily support hunting, 
even if another student had provided the necessity of eating meat as an argument 
supporting hunting. Students have been found to act in a local and not necessarily in a 
global level. One episode in the hunting lesson provides evidence for this:  
“39. Teacher: Ok let us discuss another issue. Panayiotis, 
please tell us again….you have said that hunting is unfair. 
40. Student: Yes, it is unfair because birds have life, they 
have soul. Imagine, as we kill them, they could kill us… 
41. Teacher: Yes, but in nature? Let me tell you an example 
from nature: a predator and a prey. Think, not humans, think of 
an eagle and a rabbit. It’s the same situation, isn’t it? The 
eagle…. 
42. Student: No.  
43. Teacher:  What, the eagle is not in an advantage 
position?  
44. Student: Ok the eagle is in an advantage position, but it 
does not kill as much as human beings…it might not even catch 
the rabbit.... 
52. Student 2: The eagle kills because it is the only food it 
can eat, whereas we have many alternative solutions for food.  
53. Teacher: Like what?  
54. Student 2: we can eat vegetables, it is not necessary to 
eat meat.  
55. Teacher: Do you all agree that we are in advantage 
position?  
56. Students: Yes  
57. Teacher: However, I do not think that you all agree that 
it is unfair. Do you agree that it is unfair to kill birds? Is it 
unfair because we are cleverer than them? Vassilis?  
58. Student: We are subject to be unfair also. Sometimes our 
parents die, our relatives…We are treated unfairly…. 
59. Teacher: So you say that nature is unfair one way or 
another…. 
(After discussing whether we should eat meat or not)  
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160: Teacher: Ok let us go back now, if we should hunt or 
not. Valentina (student 2) said that we should not hunt. 
Valentina you said that we should not hunt. Why did you say so?  
161: Student 2: I did not say that we should not hunt! 
162. Teacher: But you have said that we have other 
alternatives to eat than meat! 
163. Student 2: I did not say that that we should not hunt!” 
 
The diagrammatic representation of the argument structure is shown in Figure 13. As 
shown, the student supports that an eagle is not unfair to a rabbit as a man is, because he 
does not have alternatives for food. However, either this student does not have the 
capacity to realize how this argument connects to the upper levels of argumentation that 
had preceded her own argument, or she really acts in a local level, under a deliberation 
mode: she does not have a problem considering arguments that might contradict each 
other. However, she is conscious enough to cite that she did not argue about hunting or 
not, even if this was the initial flow of the argument. She locates herself in the local level 
and does not relate this to the global level.   
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Figure 13: Acting in a local and not in a global level 
 
What can we infer, therefore, for the context of this student? We still do not know if 
she holds a view about the issue, hunting or not, but she argues to persuade for a sub-
issue that could drop a counterargument for an argument defending not hunting - 
therefore supporting not hunting, as the teacher has analyzed.  
Actually, in many cases during discussion, there is no evidence indicating students’ 
commitment to the global issue when being in a local level. Unfortunately, there was no 
secondary data collected from students, such as interviews or stimulated video 
discussions, as done with the teachers, which might help to further define their dialectical 
context. The solution for this problem was the following: 
When contextualization cues, like positioning before uttering the local level 
argument, or the same student was furthering support an initial claim that he/she has cited 
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in the discussion, then the context of the student has been described as argumentation for 
persuasion and hidden premises were completed respectively. However, when those cues 
were absent, then the context was described as “local argumentation for persuasion” 
indicating what has been elaborated in previous sessions: arguing in a local but not 
necessarily for the global level. Hidden premises were reconstructed accordingly.  
 
4.2.1.2 Deliberation and Inquiry: Peripheral Space  
Agents have also been located in the “periphery” of the disagreement space, seeking 
for a position and therefore acting under a “deliberation” context (Walton and Crabbe, 
1995). Speech acts that did not reveal any goal of persuading the other parties, but they 
rather contributed in the direction of deciding which was the best action to take upon the 
issue, were indicating a participant acting in a deliberation context, not having a thesis, a 
viewpoint to defend.  
Space SSI Content 
SSI 
Context Example 
Peripheral 
Space 
Criteria: Seek for 
a position towards the 
issue, reveal their 
context 
Issue Deliberation Mobile phones harm health. This is a bad consequence.  
Products Deliberation Most of the arguments about mobile phones are negative. 
Sub-Issue Inquiry Do mobile phones really harm health? 
Table 18: Peripheral Space: Inability to take a position, Deliberation, Inquiry 
 
One of the most important contributions of locating the agent to the peripheral and 
not to the disagreement space was the reconstruction of speech acts as unlinked premises 
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and not arguments, following a “minimal” rather than a “maximal” argumentative 
analysis of discourse (as proposed by Van Eemeren,1987), as already explored in the data 
analysis section of method chapter.  
 
4.2.1.2.1 Inquiry 
When a factual sub-issue has been put under question and agents of the discussion 
were trying to define whether this was true or not, then according to Walton and Crabbe’s 
(1995) definition the context of the talk was described as Inquiry. This kind of definition 
grasps the philosophical account of inquiry, and only a part of what could be  described  
as “Inquiry-based learning”, that includes also pedagogical and curriculum approaches 
based on the need to find the truth about a factual statement. Inquiry is a puzzling context 
related to the disagreement space. Even if I argue that since an agent seeks for an answer 
and does not hold it, he/she is actually located in the peripheral space and deliberates 
about the issue, the episodes from the classroom indicate that there were cases that 
inquiry was not only a means of questioning a factual claim that has emerged as a sub-
issue, but also as a way to advance a new argument to further support or counter a view 
about the issue. The following example explains the above statement:  
“373. Student: Yes, but you might want to clone a man, but 
the clone might not want to be born like a clone! 
374. Teacher: Yes, this is another issue; did we ask the clone 
if he would like to be reproduced in such a way?  
375. Student: But we can ask them before cloning them.  
376. Teacher: Paul, I am not talking about the original, I am 
talking about the clone! 
377. Student: You can still ask him before you clone him if 
he wants to be reproduced in this way.  
378. Student 1: Is there a possibility that you can reproduce 
a clone only using the bones from a dead man?  
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379. Teacher: I do not know, Demetris. We should not talk 
about issues that we are not sure about.”  
 
The last question is a start for an inquiry session that ends very quickly since the 
teacher does not seem to be interested in this issue. In the first reading of the episode I 
have encountered confusion, as the teacher does. In the second and third reading though, 
issues have been clarified: students regarded that the clone and the original are the same 
person and since the original is asked for permission then the clone rights are not 
violated. However, another student implied that if there is a possibility to clone a dead 
man, then his permission cannot be taken and then the argument is dropped. 
Another similar example is when a student, during an argumentation session about 
animal cloning, asks whether the milk of cloned animals will be of as good quality as the 
regular’s one. The teacher grasps the opportunity, brings data from American market, and 
an inquiry episode has started. I still do not have further data to support that this student 
advanced such a question for defending or countering animal cloning, but the direction of 
the talk points to such a direction. Milk quality is a potential argument; he actually seeks 
for arguments, however I do not know if he is located in the disagreement or the 
peripheral space. If his intention was to use the answer of such a question as a possible 
argument against or in favour of cloning he is located in the disagreement space, seeking 
for further arguments that could support his thesis. However, he could also be located in 
the peripheral space reasoning about possible consequences of the action of animal 
cloning and after a careful analysis of such consequences find a view for himself.  
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That’s why the Inquiry context cannot be easily located in the disagreement or 
peripheral space and is a puzzling context. Only secondary data taken from methods like 
students’ interviewing might enlighten this direction. 
 
4.2.1.3 Informative dialogues  
According to Walton (1992) there are types of dialogues where argument is 
peripheral - it is not the main engine that moves the dialogue along. Informative dialogue 
is a kind of such a dialogue: the agents do not advance reasons for supporting or not a 
view, nor do they seek for such a view. They however, have gaps of knowledge that need 
to be overcome and need further information to understand the issue.  To put it in other 
words, it would be extremely difficult for a third participant to identify whether the agent 
that provides the information supports or not anything, whereas the information provided 
could be transformed into arguments from a fanatic towards an issue.  
When the teacher says that “cloning is the creation of an exact copy of an 
organism…..scientists take DNA from an organism and actually copy it and create a new 
organism”, she actually defines cloning. She provides the necessary conceptual means by 
which the students will be able to contribute to the discussion. She enhances 
understanding. Accordingly, when a student in the same episode asks: “And how do 
scientists do that?” she also acts under an informative context. There are not further 
moves to support that she needed this information to support or drop anything. She needs 
it to understand the issue, not to decide towards it, even if the first one might enhance the 
second.  
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4.2.1.4 Solution establishing/defence   
When Walton’s and Crabbe’s (1995) typology had been applied to classroom talk, it 
was evident that students had some goals that could be not be described by the typology. 
Practice establishing indicated that the agent was talking about the action to be taken but 
he/she did not deal with the issue of whether should he/she should the action or not; 
he/she was actually dealing with the issue as a problem and not as a dilemma and  
therefore, had provided solutions that could actually diminish or eliminate undesirable 
consequences.  
For example, a student citing that “We should hunt with limits, otherwise animal 
population might be extinct” does not deal with hunting or not; she actually perceives the 
issue of hunting as a problematic situation, as it might cause problems to animal 
population and therefore, she provides solutions for this problem.  
A second thought about this dialectical context was to remove it from the issue 
socioscientific content level, as those utterances did not talk about whether agents should 
do the action or not, even though they are related to it.  They were actually talking about 
solutions, which in this sense becomes a new socioscientific content category. 
This context has to be distinguished from conditional decision making, even though 
they both share a similar kind of thought that relates to diminishing undesirable 
consequences. For example, advancing an advice of the type “You should buy him a 
phone, only if he uses it for useful things and not for entertainment” is differentiated from 
the solution of “You should tell your brother to use his phone only for useful things, and 
not for entertainment” in terms of dialectical force. Conditional decision actually uses a 
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rule based practical reasoning, which accepts an action only if a rule is true; it is therefore 
a kind of argumentative dialogue that advances a rule of “Mobile phones should be used 
only for useful things and not for entertainment” and applies it as a condition for  a 
decision to be made.  It deals with the issue.  
 
4.2.2 Talking about own selves (SELF)  
The agents of the discussion were expressing beliefs about the resolution of the issue. 
However, there were cases in which the interlocutors explicitly talked about themselves 
for two different purposes: the first one relates to their need to inform their interlocutors 
about their positions or their intentions when a personal dilemma was set down. The 
second one is not related to their role as opponents in a critical discussion, but rather 
refers to a process of personal inquiry into their actions as members of the society. 
Students and teachers had tried to locate themselves as society members acting upon the 
issue, trying to explain or defend their actions. The contexts described when agents were 
talking about themselves are further explored below.  
 
4.2.2.1 Beliefs about the issue, or reflections about our decisions, positions and views  
A dichotomy that had to be done was to identify when classroom agents were 
expressing beliefs about the issue, or they were describing other psychological states 
towards the issue, and therefore were talking about themselves. Table 18 shows this 
dichotomy.  
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Beliefs about the issue Reflections of psychological states about own self  towards an issue 
We should 
not clone 
humans 
View I’m against cloning humans. Position  
You should 
not buy to your 
brother a mobile 
phone because it 
would harm its 
health. 
Argument 
I’ve decided that you should not buy to 
your brother a mobile phone because most 
of the arguments I’ve encountered were 
negative.  
Explanation 
of decision  
 I would not clone my cat.  
 
Intention 
(Micromorality) 
I would not clone my beloved person 
because, if it would get sick again from the 
same sickness and died again, I would 
crash.  
Explanation 
of intention 
(Micromorality)  
Table 19: Socioscientific content: issue - self dichotomy 
The ground for such an analysis rests on a cognitivist view of moral reasoning. For 
non-cognitivists moral theorists such a distinction would not exist, as they support that 
when people utter moral sentences they are not typically expressing cognitive states of 
mind (beliefs) but they are rather expressing non-cognitive attitudes more similar to 
desires, approval or disapproval (Van Roojen, 2009; see APPENDIX A for further 
discussion on the issue). Even if the limits of this study do not allow a philosophical 
analysis that would ground a cognitivist versus a non-cognitivist view of moral reasoning 
- there are two reasons for distinguishing between beliefs about an issue and attitudes, 
desires, approvals or disapprovals:  
1. Firstly, the talk per se allows us to make such a distinction. “We should not 
clone humans” and “I’m against cloning humans” are encountered in the same 
lesson; the use of language permits us to distinguish between instances 
expressing a belief on one hand, and a standpoint, a position, a worldview 
perhaps of the agent, on the other.  
2. Secondly, if there is a possibility to describe the reflective part of the lesson we 
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have to make such a distinction. A belief of the type “We should not clone 
humans” has to be grounded with reasons. On the other hand, a personal 
reflection of “I’m against cloning” is further explored as an explanation of 
attitude, and it is usually followed by explanations rather than argumentation 
chains.  
Classroom talk had actually allowed distinguishing beliefs from reflections, defining 
when students were providing reasons for grounding a moral practical judgment and 
when they described their “passions” as explanations of adopting a specific view or 
action.  
Distinguishing beliefs from reflections allows us a second distinction about the 
context: this of micromorality and macromorality context (Zeidler et al, 2005). The 
micromorality mode, emerges when the issue set does not refer to a decision about a 
theoretical issue for a decision to be made (Should we clone humans?), but refers to a 
personal dilemma about the issue (Would you clone your dead cat?). 
The first question is an issue with possible viewpoints. The second though, is a 
personal dilemma. The answer to a personal dilemma, rests in a micromorality mode, and 
does not necessarily express a belief; it expresses an intention. Accordingly, grounding a 
decision upon a personal dilemma might rest on the level of explaining our psychological 
states that had driven us to such decisions, and has to be distinguished from advancing 
arguments as reasons for adopting or not a specific standpoint towards an issue that has 
been set in a macromorality mode. That’s why the utterance “We should not clone 
humans because it would create social confusion” is reconstructed as an argument, and 
the context is described as argumentation for persuasion (Reed and Walton, 2007) 
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whereas, the utterance “I would not clone my beloved person because if it died again, I 
would feel a lot of pain” is described as “explanation of intention” that rests in a 
micromorality mode. Even if the same “reason” is used, i.e. the agent implies that “I 
would not clone my cat because it would create me confusion with my original cat”, the 
reason explains the agent’s preference about performing an action towards a personal 
dilemma, rather than advancing a reason that does not support cloning animals. In other 
words, arguments and argumentation for persuasion refer to beliefs, cognitive states of 
mind, whereas intentions and explanations of decisions refer to non-cognitive states of 
mind and they can be better described as personal reflections.  
 
4.2.2.2 Beliefs or explanations of actions  
Another kind of reflection was encountered when the agents were 
explaining/defending their own actions. I use both the terms explaining and defending, as 
the agents were advancing explanations for their actions, by providing reasons that would 
also be used to defend their actions This study reconstructs this kind of talk as 
explanatory. The utterance “I go for hunting because it is a sport, it is a very good 
exercise” explains an action, as it refers to the person and not to a theoretical construct, 
the issue. However, as soon as another agent might argue in the sense “There are many 
other things to do for exercise than hunt!” he/she evaluates this action, and the 
argumentation chains that follow refer to action defence, a context similar argumentation 
for persuasion about the issue emerges.  
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Argumentation for action explanation though, even if it includes evaluation of 
actions, is a bit different from argumentation for persuasion. Defending our actions 
involves an action done.  Talking about the issue is about a decision for an action to be 
taken. This kind of analysis is supported by the view that reason alone cannot move us to 
action, since some other psychic state must be conjoined with a cognitive state to perform 
actions (Zagzebski, 2003 p.106). This actually can explain the fact that people might 
know what to do, but they do not all act in the same way. As Aristotle implies, even if the 
virtuous and the akratic (one that cannot hold himself) know the same thing in a sense, 
the latter does not appreciate the morally salient features of the situation because his 
judgment is clouded by desire (Zazebski, 2003).  
Respectively, analyzing our or others’ actions, falls into different kinds of talk than 
expressing our beliefs about an issue. Even if the talk takes the form of defence for the 
action taken, it still hits the person, his options and actions and not a reason for 
performing an action or not.  
The contexts described that were referring to SELF socioscientific content are 
summarized in Table 19 below. 
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Socioscientific Content: SELF 
Goal of the participant Socioscientific Context Example 
Inform the others about his/her 
position towards the issue  Positioning I am against hunting. 
Announce his decision upon a 
personal dilemma  
Intention/view 
announcement 
I would not clone my cat 
(micromorality) 
  
Explain/defend his/her decision 
upon a personal dilemma  
Intention 
explanation/Defence  
I would not clone my beloved person 
because the clone might get sick again 
and I would be very sad because of 
this (micromorality) 
Defend or counter an 
explanation of intention  
Argumentation for 
intention 
explanation/defence  
I would clone my dead cat to have it 
back.  
Yes, but you did not have any 
experiences with the cloned cat, 
cloning cannot bring YOUR cat back! 
Yes, but I would see it and since it 
would be the same I would feel the 
same as happy.  
Describe himself in action 
related to the issue, explain or 
defend this action  
Action citing 
Action 
explanation/defence  
I am a hunter because I like hunting, 
for me hunting is a sport. You walk, 
you go to the nature.  
Defend the explanation in case 
the others counter it.   
Argumentation for 
action 
explanation/defence  
I do not like hunting. I can go to 
shooting center instead. 
Yes, but shooting animals is not the 
same as shooting discs… 
For me practice is the same….shooting 
centers are situated in the nature, you 
still exercise…  
 
Cite and explain his/her 
preferences towards an action  
Preference citing 
Preference explanation  
I like mobile phones because they are 
fashionable.  
Explain his/her view (evaluation 
or reasoning)  
View 
explanation/defence 
I did not vote for this argument as 
being the best because I do not like it.  
Table 20: Socioscientific context related to self reflections  
 
4.2.3 Talking about the societal agents  
A similar context has been identified when agents of the classroom discussion were 
explaining or defending societal agents’ actions. In those cases they were abandoning the 
classroom disagreement space and entered the society space. The substance of the 
conversation was referring to scientists, hunters, their parents, members of the parliament 
and other society members that hold views, take decisions and perform actions described 
  272 
by the issue (i.e. hunt, hold a mobile phone, clone animals) or related to the issue (prevent 
their children from buying a mobile phone, abandon their dogs in the nature after hunting 
period, select special genes for cloning). This kind of talk can be described as “social 
inquiry”. The agents of the discussion try to understand human action, and define 
reasons, feelings and desires (motives) that might explain such an action. Many of the 
dialectical contexts referring to the societal members, resemble to reflection ones, as 
shown in Table 20.  
Socioscientific Content: Societal Agents 
Goal of the participant Socioscientific Context Example 
Inform the others about a 
society member’s view or 
position 
View citing  Members of the parliament are in favour of hunting 
Explain why society 
members hold a specific 
view 
View 
explanation/defence   
Members of the parliament are in favour of 
hunting because they need the votes from 
hunters.  
 
Inform about society 
members’ actions Action citing  
Hunters abandon their dogs in nature after the 
hunting period.  
Cite and defend 
explanations for society’s 
member actions 
Action explanation 
Argumentation for 
action 
explanation/defence  
Hunters go for hunting because they like it. They 
like it because they are in advantage towards 
animals, otherwise they would not like it so.   
Table 21: Socioscientific context related to societal agents 
 
4.2.4 Talking about their interlocutors (classroom agents)  
In the same way that the agents of the discussion talked about themselves or societal 
agents trying to cite, explain, and defend actions, desires, views and positions, they have 
talked about each other: the teacher has talked about the students, and students were 
talking about each other. The input for such a talk was the classroom discussion, and thus 
this talk rests in a meta-level. Teachers and students had used as primary data the inputs 
of the other students in the discussion and had reflected on them in various ways.  
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For example, when a student reacted in an argument about mobile phones’ impact on 
health “that is nonsense”, another student explained this reaction towards this issue -when 
prompted by the teacher, in his wish to buy a mobile phone for him, as shown in the 
following episode.  
“243. Student: Mobile phones are good for our health, our 
parents told this.  
244. Student 2: This is nonsense!  
245. Teacher: Why Kyriakos do you say that this is 
nonsense?  
246: Student 3: Because we like it.  
247. Student 2: I do not know (Why do I say that this is 
nonsense)  
248. Student 3: He says so, because he wants to have his 
own mobile phone 
249: Student 2: I like it sir…” 
 
Another context in which classroom agents have talked about themselves was this of 
micromorality. For example, when an agent advanced and explained/defended a decision 
towards a personal dilemma, the other agents might need to convince him to change his 
mind, advancing reasons that had to do with his own psychology. For example the 
utterance “You might even feel sad, if you saw the cloned one and think of your beloved 
original that is not in life” is a speech act referring to the student, but the goal of such an 
act has an argumentative nature and not a reflecting one. Accordingly, there were 
instances in which talking about their interlocutors did not have the goal of reflection, but 
one of attack. Students (very rarely) used as primary data their classmates’ inputs in the 
discussion to make inferences about their character, such as “Petros is an idiot for 
believing such a thing!” This type of utterance is one of attack and the dialogue might be 
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characterized as eristic (Walton and Crabbe, 1995) as it hits the person and not the 
argument.  
Conclusively, I can say that talking about agents, (self, classmates, society members) 
could be described as an effort to understand (own and other’s) views, positions, desires, 
preferences and actions and try to explain them. As the discussion evolved, explanations 
had to be grounded and then argumentation chains had evolved.  
Additionally, when the issue has been set in a micromorality level, intentions have 
been criticized under argumentation that would refer to the agents’ views, desires and 
preferences.  
 
4.3 How can “controversial issues” be described as context for functional 
scientific literacy?  
A summary of the above paragraphs indicates that the discussion about an action to 
be taken (the issue) has provided contexts related to the issue (argumentation for 
persuasion, deliberation, inquiry, informative) but also explanatory contexts related to 
classroom and societal agents and own selves’ desires, views, motives, intentions and 
actions, contexts that have taken the form of argumentation when those explanations have 
been dropped for several reasons, or needed further support. The kinds of beliefs 
expressed and the dialectical context described is shown in Figure 14.  
When dialectical context was defined as related to socioscientific content entities, it 
was evident that an additional analysis might further clarify the situation of controversial 
issues as situated in science education, especially when beliefs about the issue were 
expressed. How?  
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The analysis that enhanced the description of the dialectical context had already 
described the goal of the participant in the discussion about an issue in order to describe 
the agent’s context. Socioscientific context was described as the goal of the participant in 
relation to socioscientific content: when agents talked about the issue they might act 
under deliberative, argumentative or informative goals, but when they have talked about 
their selves and  other societal agents they have entered an explanatory context and the 
argumentation sections that followed aimed to ground the truth of such explanations, or 
evaluate actions, views and desires already held and expressed by societal members.  
At later stages of analysis though, the application of argument schemes enabled a 
refined description of dialectical strategies performed to achieve such goals.  This 
description had actually used a mutual interaction between a process and a product 
analysis of argumentation: a process analysis enabled the application of argument 
schemes and extraction of arguments as products, but respectively, the products provided 
the means for identifying the dialectical strategies used from the agents of the discussion.  
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Figure 14: Dialectical contexts related to beliefs about socioscientific entities 
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For example, the identification of an utterance/episode as argumentative enabled the 
application of an argument so as to extract argument as a product, but also enabled a link 
up of the next utterances as related to the specific argument scheme aiming to further 
support components of the argument cited.  
A theoretical input from the literature review revealed that practical argument 
schemes could be connected with special kinds of theoretical or moral 
reasoning/arguments that could further support them or counter them. The section that 
had grounded the argument typology scheme referring to practical reasoning (section 
2.4.2 of literature review chapter of this thesis) also cited considerations as to how those 
practical judgments are related to theoretical and moral reasoning that could further 
ground them in an argumentative discussion. The theoretical input alongside data 
instances from classroom discussion revealed several instances in which theoretical and 
moral reasoning had taken place for establishing practical judgments. The instances are 
presented diagrammatically in the Figures 15, 16 and 17, whereas the rest of this section 
will present the dialectical strategies that were identified and organized based on the 
reasoning presented above: their strength to support or counter (actually establish as 
true/valid/relevant) a component of the argument scheme to which they referred to.  
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Figure 15: Moral and theoretical reasoning related to means end practical reasoning 
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Figure 16:  Moral and theoretical reasoning related to practical reasoning from consequences 
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Figure 17: Moral and theoretical reasoning related to rule case practical reasoning argument scheme 
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4.3.1 Dialectical Practices as identified in the lessons  
4.3.1.1 Argumentation for persuasion  
As mentioned in the paragraphs above, the criterion that is used to classify dialectical 
strategies is their force towards a scheme of a practical judgment, aiming to 
establish/prevent a practice related to the action implied by the issue. However, in every 
dialogue, there are movements that are not directly related to the substance of it but refer 
to the formation of it as a process. Therefore, a first classification of strategies related to 
argumentation for persuasion has used the criterion of whether the strategy deals with the 
issue or the process of talking about the issue. This criterion, when applied, classified 
strategies in two broad categories: those that have an argumentative force, aiming to 
resolve the dispute, and those that do not have an argumentative force but still, essential 
for such a discourse to take place, as they force the start of it, and enable the agents and 
the chairman to effectively communicate with each other and process the products of 
their discussion. Table 21 shows the broad categories as described above:  
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Argumentation for persuasion: Typology of dialectical strategies 
General 
Force of 
Strategies 
Force Category/strategy Description 
Strategies 
aiming to 
resolve the 
dispute 
Argumentat
ive strategies 
that use reasons 
to convince 
Strategies related to 
means end practical 
syllogism 
Strategies aiming to establish the 
truth of the means, the end, the necessity 
and sufficiency of the means, the 
desirability-morality of the means and the 
end and accordingly, the establishment of 
alternatives.  
Strategies related to 
reasoning from 
consequences 
Strategies aiming to establish the 
truth and the desirability of consequences 
and also the advancement and 
establishment of solutions related to 
undesired consequences. It also includes 
calculations of consequences to the 
direction of overall utility.  
Strategies related to 
rule case practical 
syllogism 
Strategies aiming to establish the 
case as true, the rule as true and relevant.  
Meta level strategies 
related to the acceptance 
of an argument 
Strategies that deal with arguments as 
propositions, aiming to evaluate 
arguments in terms of soundness, 
relevance, and validity. 
Rhetorical 
strategies that 
use other means 
than reason to 
convince  
Personal attack 
Attack the person with the aim of 
insulting him/her as a means of dropping 
the reason he/she has advanced  
Appeal to pity 
(emotion) 
Raise emotional affection to convince 
the hearer towards a decision 
Strategies 
aiming to 
establish the 
argumentation 
process 
 
Sets case for dilemma Describes the case for the dilemma to be set 
Sets dilemma/issue Sets the dilemma/issue 
Cites claim for 
controversial 
issue/decision/definition 
Announces initial decision that marks 
the difference of opinion 
Positioning Takes a position that indicates difference of opinion 
Infers views/positions 
from discussion 
Infers agents’ positions from their 
talk  
Requests positioning Requests from interlocutors to reveal their position  
Strategies 
aiming to 
facilitate 
communication 
among 
members 
 
 
Informs about 
argument ownership 
Informs /reminds the group of the 
agent that had advanced the specific 
argument/reason 
Informs about the 
location of argument  
Informs the interlocutors about the 
issue/branch to which the argument to be 
advanced is linked to. It enables a large 
group of agents to deal with complex 
argumentative structures.  
 
Extracts arguments 
from argumentative 
session 
Performs a dialectical analysis of talk 
in order to extract arguments as products.  
Defends discussion 
analysis 
Defends the dialectical analysis of 
talk  
Requests discussion 
analysis acceptance 
Requests from the agent to 
verify/accept the discussion analysis  
Accepts/Denies 
discussion analysis  
Accepts/Denies analysis of own talk 
from another agent or chairman  
Table 22: Argumentation for persuasion: typology of strategies 
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Agents of the discussion are actually entering a process. This process has to be 
established; someone (in all lessons was the teacher) has to announce the dilemma or 
issue and the agents need to take their position for argumentation to start. Dialectic 
strategies like dilemma setting, positioning and positioning that, according to  
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) belong to the opening and confrontation stages 
of argumentation have been identified in the lessons (Table 22). 
 
Argumentation for Persuasion:  Strategies aiming to establish the argumentation process 
Dialectical strategy Example 
Sets case for dilemma  
My brother is 10 years old. He goes to the fifth grade of 
primary school. He is a very good student. He is our young 
brother. He wants a mobile phone as a birthday present.  
Sets issue/dilemma Should I buy my young brother a mobile phone?  
Cites claim for 
controversial 
issue/decision/definition 
We should clone animals.  
Positioning I’m against cloning people.  
Requests positioning Are you in favour, or against cloning animals?  
Infers views/positions 
from discussion 
You have cited that we should clone charismatic persons to 
advance technology. So, you are in favour of cloning.  
Requests argument 
ownership 
Do you agree with the argument that we need to hunt to 
control animal population? 
Who had told this argument?  
Table 23: Argumentation for persuasion: strategies aiming to establish the 
argumentation process 
 
When the discussion entered the argumentation stage the strategies were described 
towards their force to ground or drop a specific practical argument scheme: reasoning 
from consequences, means end practical syllogism and rule case practical syllogism. 
There were instances that the agents have used other rhetorical approaches to “win the 
game” either by trying to raise emotional empathy by calling the teacher to “feel pity” 
for her brother that needed a mobile phone, for example, or attacking the person that 
advanced a specific argument by citing that “he should have been crazy to advance 
such a position”.  
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Finally, as the discussion is organized as a group discussion with a chairman 
(teacher in all cases), and the inputs from several groups have to be organized so that 
all the members can access the products of the discussion, there are other strategies in 
which their force does not refer to the formation of a practical judgment, but to the 
communication of the products of such a discussion to the members of the discussion.  
The following tables provide examples of extracts where dialectic strategies have 
been identified. Each table presents the strategies identified for each dialectical 
context, and it is organized in categories according to criteria that are explained for 
each context. For readability purposes, examples provided are products of classroom 
talk analysis where permutation, deletion, addition and substitution process had taken 
place and therefore, do not have the form of episodes.  
Argumentation for Persuasion: Dialectical Strategies related to Reasoning from Consequences 
Category Dialectical Strategy Example 
Base 
Decision on 
consequences  
Defends a decision using 
calculations of consequences   
Since most of the arguments encountered 
about mobile phones were regarding negative 
consequences, you should not buy your 
brother a mobile phone. 
Defends a decision using 
consequences  
We should not clone animals because 
they would lose their value of being unique. 
Defend 
or counter 
the truth of a 
consequence 
Counters consequence as false  
Mobile phones do not harm health. 
Research does not find correlation between 
mobile phone use and brain cancer.  
Defends consequence as true  
Mobile phones harm health. A girl had 
died from brain cancer, and it’s believed that 
the cause of cancer was mobile phone use.  
Provides a solution to diminish 
consequences  
If we clone human beings, there is a 
possibility to clone really bad people, 
imagine if we clone Hitler! 
There is no problem. If Hitler was cloned 
then we can kill him! 
Defends  a solution advanced 
to diminish consequences(moral)   
It is ok to kill bad clones, because they 
do not have soul.  
Drops a solution advanced to 
diminish consequences 
A clone might be left alone in the society 
if the prototype that had created it for his 
own needs would die. There is no problem 
about it, we can make another clone. This is 
not practical. It’s not that easy to make 
clones.  
Evaluate 
action   
Evaluates  an action based on 
its consequences 
Hunting is not a good sport; it is dangerous; 
you might have accidents while hunting.  
Table 24: Argumentation for persuasion:  dialectical strategies related to reasoning 
from consequences 
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As presented above, the agents have based their decisions on single consequences, 
but also moved to a meta-level and calculated the overall benefit of multiple 
consequences. Being in argumentative context, agents had also dropped consequences 
not by providing them as false but by providing-creating solutions that could actually 
diminish them. Those solutions were put under moral and other kind of evaluation 
(being practical, cheap etc) and therefore, new loops of argumentation chains have 
emerged. Finally, the agents of the discussion based their moral practical judgments 
(good or bad) that were a step for a formation of a practical judgment, on 
consequences.   
As far as means end syllogism is concerned (table 24), agents used means end 
syllogism to ground a decision for performing an action: the action was evaluated as a 
means that could lead to a desirable end.  Means were further established as sufficient 
or necessary. Necessity was actually questioned in the light of alternative means that 
could lead to the same end. This brought new chains of argumentation, where 
alternative means also had to be grounded as sufficient, moral, convenient, and so on. 
On a meta- level where multiple means were presented, those means were compared 
by evaluation towards common criteria that had included, among others, moral 
judgments.  
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Argumentation for Persuasion:  Dialectical Strategies related to Means end Practical 
Reasoning 
Category Dialectical Strategy Example 
Base a decision 
on means  
Defends a 
decision using 
means  
We should hunt because we need to control 
animal population.  
Defend or 
counter the 
necessity/sufficiency 
of the means   
Defends 
means as 
necessary  
We need to have mobile phones as a means of 
communication. If we go to our grandparents for 
holidays, how are we going to communicate with our 
parents?  
Counters 
means as not 
necessary  
It is not necessary to eat meat. we can eat 
vegetables.  
Counters 
means as 
insufficient 
We should hunt to get food to survive. Hunting 
cannot provide us all the meat we need. we are not 
ancient people. Hunting can give only a small amount 
of meat that a family needs.  
Defend or 
counter the truth of 
the end  
Defends end 
as true  
There are cases that if you do not have a mobile 
phone you might be in danger. Once, we have been in 
a trip and the bus was broken. The driver had to call 
for help.  
Defend  or 
counter alternatives  
Defends 
alternative means 
as sufficient 
Your brother does not need to have his own 
mobile phones for own use. Adults hold mobiles and 
can use them to communicate. Since he is only 10 he 
will always be with an adult with him, either in 
private lessons or parties.  
Counters 
alternative means 
as immoral  
It is not fair to raise animals and then slaughter 
them, animals feel that you are going to protect them, 
love them they do not expect to slaughter them! 
Counters 
alternative means 
as insufficient 
Eating only vegetables is not enough for health; 
vegetables do not contain proteins. 
Evaluates 
means  
You cannot hunt for food. You have to abandon 
your job to do that.  
Defends  
alternative means 
as sufficient 
We do not have to kill animals to control animal 
population. Animals can control their population. In 
jungles that there are no human beings animal 
population is controlled.  
 
Defends 
alternative means 
as moral  
You do not have to hunt for a sport. You might 
go to shooting centres for enjoying the same activity. 
Shooting centres do not including killing live 
organisms.  
Meta -Level: 
Compare 
alternatives  
Compares 
alternative means  
You need not hunt. You can eat chicken or beef. 
However, you still have to kill animals either you 
slaughter, or hunt them.  
 
Table 25:  Argumentation for persuasion:  dialectical strategies related to reasoning 
from consequences 
 
When a rule case syllogism was advanced, the agents had to establish that the case 
was true so the rule could be successfully applied to the situation, otherwise it might 
be evaluated as irrelevant to it. Additionally, the truth had to be established as true or 
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valid in terms of moral reasoning. Those loops were actually loops of moral inquiry: 
the rule has been set under question and had to be established through argumentation.  
Argumentation for Persuasion:  dialectical strategies related to rule case practical  reasoning 
Dialectical Strategy Example 
Defends a decision 
using rules  We should not hunt birds. It is unfair for them.  
Defends case as true  
When you clone a person you do it without his permission, and this 
violates his rights because he might have a bad quality of life as a clone. 
We should not clone.  
Yes, but you can  ask them before cloning them 
No, the clone and the prototype are not the same persons.  
Defends  rule as true  It is unfair to kill birds because we are in advantage towards them: we are cleverer, stronger, holding guns… 
Counters rule as false  It is not unethical to kill birds. In nature animals kill each other also.  
Evaluates practice 
using rules  
We are born to be hunters; it is in our nature to be hunters. Hunting 
is not problematic.  
Table 26: Argumentation for persuasion:  dialectical strategies related to rule case 
practical syllogism 
 
When the discussion was moving to a meta-level the agents were not dealing with 
defending or grounding a premise, (consequence, case, means, end, rule) from a 
syllogism but actually were evaluating the argument as a proposition, either as 
irrelevant, relevant, sound, strong etc. Table 26 below presents those strategies.  
Argumentation for persuasion: Meta Level dialectical strategies 
Dialectical Strategy Example 
Drops argument (meta level) 
You should buy your brother a mobile phone 
because he wants to have one, you should feel pity for 
him.  
Yes, but I need a reason of why buying him a phone, 
tell me a reason.  
Drops solution (meta level) 
You should tell him when you buy him a phone to 
use it a few hours only. Yes but I did not ask for that, I 
need reasons of why buy him a phone or not. When I buy 
him one you might tell me what to do with it. 
Accepts 
argument/position/decision/solution/ 
alternative (meta level) 
Yes, this is a good point. I agree. 
Table 27: Argumentation for persuasion: meta- level dialectical strategies 
 
Finally, the agents, and especially the chairman, were trying to achieve better 
communication between them. They used strategies (table 27) that aimed to enable 
their interlocutors “follow” them and locate the place of the complicated structure of 
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the issue in which they were referring to. As a two way communication, 
argumentation had to be clarified from both sides as mutually understood: agents, or 
the chairman, expressed what they had perceived/analyzed as the meaning of their 
interlocutors’ talk and asked for verification of their analysis. On the other side, they 
might accept or deny such an analysis.  
 
Argumentation for persuasion: Strategies aiming to facilitate communication 
Dialectical 
Strategy Example 
Informs about 
argument ownership 
We should hunt to control animals’ population. This is Demetris’ 
argument.  
Informs about 
the location of 
argument  
What I am going to say does not refer to hunting for population, but refer 
to another issue, that Marios has raised before.  
Communicate/ 
verify the 
meaning of talk 
(Given classroom discussion) So what you are saying is that I should not 
buy my brother a mobile phone because it has radiation and will affect his 
health.  
Requests 
discussion analysis 
acceptance 
(Demetris: we should hunt to save food chain, and since little are needed 
for saving the food chain, not all animals will be the same)  
So Demetris, you are talking about cloning in a small population, do you 
mean that?  
Yes, I mean few animals to be cloned.  
Accepts/denies 
discussion analysis  
Valentina you have supported that we should not hunt. 
No, I had not supported that! 
But you have told that we have many alternatives than meat to eat! 
Yes, but I had not supported that we should not hunt.  
Table 28: Argumentation for persuasion: strategies aiming to facilitate 
communication 
 
4.3.1.2 Deliberation 
Deliberative strategies, that did not reveal any goal of persuading the other parties, 
but they rather contributed in the direction of deciding which was the best action to 
take upon the issue, have been classified into three broad categories, that actually 
define their contribution to the overall discussion. The agents had to bring in 
arguments in the discussion, organize them and finally calculate the overall situation 
in order to come up to a final decision.  
Even if arguments in this stage were not advanced in order to persuade any other 
party, they have been identified and established; consequences had to be established 
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as true and undesired but still this kind of syllogism did not conclude to perform or 
not the action.  
Deliberative strategies have been identified also within argumentation: while the 
students have been acting in an argumentative context advancing arguments in favour 
of or against a position, the teacher was using a parallel deliberative context, where 
she/he actually used the arguments as propositions, that had to be organized, 
evaluated, weighed and finally being calculated in order to advance a decision. In 
other cases, the students, even if the context was argumentative, had been actually 
deliberating since they just cited unlinked premises thereby identifying possible issues 
rather than defending or countering a position.  
Additionally, actions were evaluated across different disciplines. Hunting for 
example, was established as a sport, cloning was established as a practice different 
than regular. Morality was one of those disciplines: actions were morally evaluated as 
unethical, good or bad, but still those evaluations were not used to prescribe or not the 
action.  
As shown in the Table 28 below, many of the dialectical strategies are akin to 
those of argumentation of persuasion and refer to specific practical argument schemes 
(consequences, means to an end, and rules). The rest of them refer to the use of 
arguments as propositions. 
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Deliberation: Typology of dialectical strategies 
General 
force Force Dialectical strategy 
Establish 
potential 
arguments 
Establish 
consequences 
 
Consequences - Defends a consequence as 
true  
Consequences - Evaluates consequence as 
undesired/desired 
Consequences - Identifies possible 
consequences  
Consequences-Inquiries about consequences  
Evaluates action 
 
Evaluates action 
Means end - Evaluates action 
Rule case - Evaluates action 
Organize 
arguments 
 
Organize discussion 
content 
 
Places argument in issue organization 
Compares arguments  
Groups/classify arguments in terms of 
content  
Processes  arguments  
Move 
towards a 
decision 
 
Evaluate arguments  
 
Weighs argument 
Evaluates argument(s) as positive/negative 
Evaluates argument(s) as sound 
Calculate arguments  Calculate arguments  
 
Table 29: Deliberation: typology of strategies 
 
Table 29 below presents examples of such strategies. A note to be taken about the 
calculation of arguments is that this practice had taken several forms. There were 
cases where an argument was regarded as “positive” just because it could drop a 
consequence as false. For example, students evaluated as positive the fact that mobile 
phones cannot affect brain unless they are used for more than 12 years.  Those 
evaluations, even fallacious as far as logic is concerned,  ground further the typology 
of the strategy as a deliberative one: the argument is evaluated as positive in relation 
to its contribution to the calculation of overall utility, a deliberative process that 
enables the agents to come up to a decision about the issue.   
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Force  of 
dialectical 
strategy 
Dialectical strategy Example 
Establish 
consequences 
 
Consequences - Defends 
consequence as true 
Mobile phones affect hearing 
because they have an energy called 
radiation that is harmful for health.  
Consequences - Identifies possible 
consequences 
Children under 18 years old might 
be affected in the ear area if use the 
mobile phone more than two hours per 
day.  
Consequences-Inquiries about 
consequences 
What if we create a clone from a 
prototype that had a disease? Would he 
inherit also the disease?  
Evaluate 
action 
 
Evaluates action Hunting is a sport.  
Means end - Evaluates action Hunting is a pleasant activity.  
Rule case - Evaluates action It is unethical to kill birds. They are so small, trying to find their food… 
Organize 
discussion 
content 
 
Places argument in issue 
organization 
This argument does not refer to 
weather we should slaughter animals or 
not. It refers to why we should eat meat.  
Compares arguments 
What Athena says is the same that 
Nicolas said about animals: There is no 
point in cloning a beloved person since 
we are not going to have the same person 
back.  
Groups/classify arguments in terms 
of content 
So, you are also talking about health 
issues. Radiation affects brain. I’ll write 
it next to other health issues.  
Processes  arguments 
You have told that even if we clone 
a beloved person, he might die again, 
since he might inherit the disease. So, 
cloning cannot beat death. I’ll write it 
down: Cloning cannot beat death. 
Evaluate 
arguments 
 
Weighs argument 
I’ll put two minus signs next to 
health issues related to cancer. I think it 
is a very negative argument.  
Evaluates argument(s) as 
positive/negative 
We have found both negatives and 
positives. One negative is that they affect 
the communication between family 
members.  
Evaluates argument(s) as sound The better argument from all was about  
Calculate 
arguments Calculates arguments 
Both sides have arguments; positive 
and negatives; I think positives are less. 
Table 30: Deliberative dialectical strategies, examples 
 
4.3.1.3 Grounding Explanations of intentions, actions, views and desires  
As noted in the previous sessions of this subchapter, agents moved from talking 
about the issue to talking about themselves, agents (societal agents, and classmates) 
and their relationship to the issue. This relationship could be described as a view 
about an issue, a position towards it, an intention towards a personal dilemma related 
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to the issue and finally an action already performed (regarding the action implied by 
the issue or any other action related to it).  
As already supported, dealing with the agents and explaining their actions, 
intentions, views, positions and desires is a process aiming to explain rather than 
defend those psychological states. However, practical argument schemes can also 
enter this area of analysis because actions, intentions and desires might be explained, 
among others, with the use of ends (needs), consequences and deontological 
obligations of the agent (rules). As with argumentation for persuasion, means, 
consequences and rules have to further be grounded and established, so new 
argumentation chains emerge to ground those explanations.  
Furthermore, since those discussions take place within the context of a problem 
to be solved (take a decision about an issue) it is not clear whether ends, consequences 
and rules just explain the actions, intentions, desires and views, and do not serve the 
function of defending them as necessary or deontological. That’s why it is better to 
view them both as explanations but also as defence.  
Table 30 below presents the phases where those explanations have been cited 
down whereas table 31 presents the strategies used when argumentation related to 
those explanations had emerged.  
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Action-intention-view-preference - explanation/defence: Typology of strategies 
General force  Category Dialectical strategy Example 
Bring in 
and counter 
information 
about actions, 
desires, views 
and intentions) 
 
Declares decision upon personal dilemma 
(intention) I would not clone my dead cat. 
Informs about others’ actions/views  Hunters abandon their dogs when the hunting period is over. Senators support hunting.  
Informs about own action(s)  I hold a mobile phone 
Informs about own preference I do not like hunting 
Defends action as true  I have seen many dogs abandoned that did not look like homeless. They looked like hunters’ dogs.  
Defends desire as true My friends are always happy after hunting; hunters enjoy hunting.  
Counters action as false  
Hunters would not abandon a dog after hunting period is over; dogs are so 
expensive, they spent so much money for them, so much time to get them 
trained.  
Inability to 
express 
explanation 
 Inability to express explanation I do not have a specific reason of why I go for hunting.  
Explain 
(actions, 
desires, views, 
intentions) 
Use means other 
than reason to 
explain  
Explains/defends action  My uncle did not want her mobile phone and she gave it to me. That’s why I have a mobile phone.  
Use 
consequences to 
explain 
Consequences - Explains /defends  intention  I would not like to clone my beloved person because if he died again I would suffer, and I do not like that.  
Consequences - Explains/defends action My mother and father do not buy me a mobile phone because they do not want my health to get harmed.  
Use means to an 
end (needs) to 
explain 
Means end - Explains/defends view  Senators support hunters because they want their votes.  
Means end - Explains/defends action Hunting is my sport. That’s why I go hunting; to get exercised. 
Means end - Explains/defends preference I like hunting because it is adventurous.  
Use rules to 
explain  
Rule case - Explains/defends  intention I would not clone my cat if his behaviour was not good.  
Rule case - Explains/defends  preference We are created to be hunters, we have nails, we run fast, and that’s why we like hunting.  
Rule case - Explains/defends action  We became hunters because our parents taught us to be hunters.  
Table 31: Argumentation for action-intention-view-preference - explanation/defence: Typology of strategies 
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Argumentation for action-intention-view-preference - explanation/defence: Typology of strategies 
General force  Category Dialectical strategy Example 
Defend or 
counter  
explanations 
Use meta 
level strategies 
to drop 
explanations 
Drops explanation Ok your uncle had given you his mobile as a present. But why did you get it? Give me a reason for that (Your explanation is not a reason)  
Strategies 
aiming to  
ground/counter 
a  consequence 
based 
explanation 
Consequences - Counters consequence as false  You would not get bored to the cloned cat. If you are not bored to the original why get bored to the clone?  
Consequences - Defends a consequence as true  The clone gets the same gene as the prototype. If the prototype was sick and had died because of its sickness its very probable that the clone will die again.  
Consequences - Evaluates consequence as not 
predictable 
I do not have a cat. I do not know if I would get bored to a cloned cat or 
not.  
Consequences- Identifies possible 
consequences   
There is a possibility that the clone might be very different from the 
prototype, even a monster.  
Strategies 
aiming to  
ground/counter 
a Means end 
based 
explanation 
Means end - Counters means as false  I do not use a mobile phone for sending messages; I just need it to communicate with my mother.  
Means end - Counters means as insufficient Cloning cannot bring your cat back. It brings you another cat.  
Means end - Defends alternative means as 
sufficient You could buy another cat, or get a homeless cat, and still feel happy. 
Means end - Defends means as necessary  If you want to be a good hunter you need to be practiced with real birds, because it gives you actually the situation of hunting.  
Means end - Defends means as sufficient  
Cloning might not give me my original cat back, but still could give me a 
cat that would be the same in sight with my original. Seeing this cat would make 
me feel happy.  
Means end -Counters means as false 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministers do not need votes; they are not elected by people. Why need votes 
from hunters? 
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Argumentation for action-intention-view-preference - explanation/defence: Typology of strategies (continued from previous page) 
General 
Force Category Dialectical strategy Example 
Defend or 
counter  
explanations 
(continued) 
Strategies 
aiming to 
ground/counter 
a rule case 
based 
explanation 
 
Rule case - Counters rule as false  
It’s not our parents’ intervention what determines whether we are becoming 
hunters or not. My father was not a hunter until he became 40 years old, and he 
just tried one day after a friend had told him, he liked it and became a hunter.  
Rule case - Counters case as false   
Rule case - Counters rule as irrelevant It doesn’t make sense for me if we should eat meat or not. I go hunting for pleasure; I do not eat what I hunt.  
Evaluate 
actions 
Strategies 
aiming to 
ground/counter 
an evaluation of 
action  
Rule case - Counters case as false  
Rule case - Counters rule as false I do not go for hunting but not because of having  
Rule case - Defends case as true   
Rule case -Evaluates action  
Table 32: Argumentation for action-intention-view-preference - explanation/defence: Typology of strategies 
 
  296 
The previous section actually answers the first question of this study which is:  
How can “controversial issues” be described as context for functional scientific 
literacy? The answer now can be eventually cited down. 
A controversial issue is by definition an issue about which people disagree and it 
is always about a decision to be made. This decision is about an action. This decision 
is usually taken, or defended through discussion. Therefore, describing controversial 
issues as context can be done by describing the dialectical part of the lesson, the goals 
of the participants towards the discussion about the decision to be made. However, 
since the discussion might entail other related types of discussion, we have to identify 
whether agents talk about the issue -the decision to be made- or anything else. 
However, “anything else” can also be described as related to the issue and therefore a 
new construct is introduced in the analysis that refers to the socioscientific content.  
Finally, dialectical strategies performed to achieve dialectical goals can be 
described as related to achieving the goal of establishing a practical argument which 
supports one position related to the issue under discussion. In this way there is a way 
to merge a process and product analysis of argumentation in order to situate epistemic 
practices and epistemic content within dialectical practices as related to practical 
reasoning.  
In other words this study defines the situation of controversial issues in science 
education, as the description of how theoretical and moral reasoning is situated within 
practical reasoning. And this actually, in combination with the dialectical context 
definitions given above, answers the third question of the study. The application of 
such a definition has already provided a description of what is described as dialectical 
context. What remains is to describe the epistemic part and interrelate it to the 
dialectical. 
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4.4 Epistemic practice and epistemic content as situated in dialectical practice 
Epistemic practice description has been enhanced from the application of 
argument reasoning schemes alongside the use of Peirce’s (1990, as cited in 
Pietarinen, 2006) taxonomy of the Sciences. The application of argument schemes 
was successful, the typology described was actually the result of a continuous cyclical 
process: identifying instances from data as relevant to categories provided by the 
literature, or seek for categories in the literature that could successfully describe 
argument schemes emerged from data analysis. In this sense the typology used and 
presented below, is actually the result of a mutual interaction between classroom data 
and literature review regarding reasoning and argumentation, argument typology 
schemes, practical reasoning, moral reasoning, scientific reasoning and explanations 
and so forth.  
Examples of practical argument schemes are presented in table 32 below. 
Practical reasoning might indicate a specific moral stance, and therefore, the 
description and application of argument scheme has also enabled the description of 
the moral stance, or moral practice performed by the agents in the discussion.  
Ethics and moral reasoning in general have been grasped from practical argument 
schemes. As discussed in the subchapter defending the argument typology scheme 
moral reasoning could be described as deontological when rule based reasoning was 
identified, whereas means end and reasoning from consequences indicated a moral 
stance related to consequentialism. However, whether all practical arguments can be 
classified as moral is an issue. The issue has been resolved when epistemic practices 
had to be assigned in different disciplines. A discussion that will follow in section 
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4.4.1, presented after this section of the chapter, further elaborates the practical-moral 
distinction. 
 
Reasoning 
scheme 
Moral 
Practice Example 
Means end 
Defend an 
action as a means 
for another end 
(Utilitarianism)  
Mobile phones can be used for communication when 
your brother is going to parties alone. You should buy him 
a mobile phone.  
From 
Consequences 
Defend an 
action based on its 
consequences 
(Utilitarianism) 
Mobile phones have radiation that affects the brain. 
You should not buy him a mobile phone because it would 
affect his health.  
Rule Based 
Defend an 
action based on a 
rule (Deontological) 
You should protect your brothers’ health. Do not buy 
him a mobile phone.  
From 
Analogy * 
Defend an 
action based on an 
analogous example 
My cousin is in the same age of your brother and he 
has a mobile phone. You should buy him one.  
From 
Example* 
Defend an 
action based on an 
example 
Switzerland has allowed mobile phones for youngsters 
in schools. Cyprus should act accordingly. 
Authority* 
(Expert, source) 
Defend any 
type of conclusion 
You should buy your brother a mobile phone if his 
mother says so. 
* Free floating: can defend any type of conclusion 
 
Table 33: Examples of practical argument schemes 
 
Reasoning 
scheme 
Epistemic Practice 
/Moral Practice 
SDDS 
stage Example 
From criteria 
Defend an evaluation  
Defend a classification  
Defend a moral 
practical judgment   
Use 
readymade 
knowledge  
It does not worth to clone your cat since 
you will give a lot of money. 
A clone is not a regular person since he 
will not have two parents.  
There is no problem to kill a clone since 
clones do not have souls.   
Table 34: Example of normative argument schemes 
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Reasoning 
scheme 
Epistemic 
Practice SDDS stage Example 
Cause to effect 
Defend a 
prediction 
Explain a fact 
(present or past) 
(D-N 
explanation) 
Use readymade 
knowledge 
Mobile phones create electromagnetic 
fields.  
Exposure to radiofrequency 
electromagnetic field causes tissue heating  
Mobile phones will harm your brothers’ 
health.  
Effect to cause 
From sign 
Defend an 
explanation (I-S) of a 
particular fact, or a 
law , defend a 
postdiction 
Hypothesis 
generation 
Inference to the 
best explanation- 
diagnosis or 
hypothesis 
evaluation 
A woman has died of brain cancer.  
She has been using her mobile phone a 
lot  
Perhaps, the use of mobile phone was 
responsible for the brain cancer (generate a 
hypothesis) 
  
From time to 
causality 
Defend an 
explanation - a causal 
relation 
(Counterfactual 
account of causality) 
Hypothesis 
generation 
Every time I use my mobile phone, I 
have a pain in my ear.  
Mobile phones harm my ear.  
Evidence to 
hypothesis (From 
samples) 
From example* 
Defend a 
descriptive 
generalization (either 
explanatory or not 
explanatory) 
 
Hypothesis 
testing-Evidence 
evaluation 
 A Danish study about the connection 
between mobile phone use and cancer 
incidence was published. It followed over 
420,000 Danish citizens for 20 years and 
showed no increased risk of cancer. An 
increased risk of brain cancer cannot be 
established from the data. 
Statistical 
syllogism 
Predict a fact 
Explain a fact 
(D-S explanation) 
Use readymade 
knowledge to 
deduce a fact, or a 
categorical 
syllogism 
In 1000 people that were mobile phone 
users in the research 20 had brain cancer.  
If your brother uses his mobile phone he 
will have 2% risk to get brain cancer.  
From Analogy* Defend a generalization 
Hypothesis 
testing, Evidence 
evaluation 
People that have used microwaves a lot 
had health problems.  
Microwaves use the same technology as 
mobile phones  
Mobile phones will create health 
problems 
Appeals  
Authority* 
(Expert, source) 
Defend any type 
of conclusion Any stage 
My doctor says that mobile phones harm 
health.  
Mobile phones harm health.  
Popularity* 
Many people believe that mobile phones 
are harmful. 
Mobile phones are harmful. 
Emotion * 
Your brother wants a mobile phone very 
much. After all he is your young brother! 
You should do him the favour… 
. 
* free floating forms of arguments (can defend any type of conclusion, not only factual) 
Table 35: Example of theoretical factual argument schemes 
 
As shown in the tables above, the use of argument schemes typology has served a 
twofold purpose for this study: on one hand it had enabled the extraction of the 
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propositional content of the lesson, and on the other, it has been used when linked 
with the dialectical context to describe the epistemic and moral practice performed. 
Cause to effect arguments indicate for example causal reasoning related to the 
form of explanations and predictions, a distinction that was made based on 
contextualization cues. Deciding to describe theoretical factual argument schemes in 
terms of scientific endeavour aiming to establish a knowledge claim, or to use a 
readymade one for performing predictions and explanations is grounded as a 
sufficient way to describe epistemic practices situated in Idioscopy (Special Sciences 
as described  by Peirce (1990, as cited in Pietarinen, 2006) if a Weber’s (1904) 
account of social sciences is endorsed, which accepts that differences between the 
natural sciences and the social sciences arise from differences in the cognitive 
intentions of the investigator and not from the alleged inapplicability of scientific and 
generalizing methods to the subject matter of human action (Weber, 1904, as cited in 
Coser, 1977, p.21).  Even if there is a view that social sciences cannot establish 
objective truth in the way that natural sciences do, what both disciplines share is a 
method of a selection from the infinite variety of empirical reality towards theoretical 
generalizations. Both types of science involve abstraction (Coser, 1977) and have 
their focus on providing explanations for natural, social or psychological phenomena.  
Furthermore, the class of normative argument schemes has been capable of 
describing the Normative Science category belonging to Philosophy, but also a part of 
Sciences of Review (Peirce, 1990, as cited in Pietarinen, 2006) as shown in Table 35:  
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Areas Grasped by Normative Argument Schemes  
B. Philosophy, Normative Sciences  
Group 
of sciences Science 
Area of 
study Example 
Aesthetics  Beauty Animals will lose their value if all of them will be the same. 
Ethics  
Right and 
Wrong 
Conduct 
It is not ethical to kill birds because they have soul.  
Logic 
Speculative 
Grammar  
Objects and 
signs 
What you have told is an argument because it 
includes reasons for accepting something else. 
Critique 
(Logic 
Proper) 
Inference  
It is not logical to have two claims written on the 
board that have contradictory conclusions, both being 
true. 
Methodeutic 
(Speculative 
Rhetoric)  
Methods for 
exploring 
and creating 
submissions 
of truth  
Scientists had made research to provide a result that 
mobile phones are not related to brain cancer. What you 
indicate is just an incident about one girl that has brain 
cancer and it is only people’s belief that the cause is the 
mobile phone use.  
C. Sciences of Review    
Philosophy 
of Science  
Classification 
of sciences  
It is not Science’s job to decide about controversial 
issues. Other society groups have to engage and decide 
about this since it includes issues beyond scientific 
endeavour.  
Table 36: Philosophy: Normative Sciences as grasped by normative argument 
schemes 
The section that follows aims to describe the different areas of epistemic practice 
that have been identified in the lessons, and thereby answer research question 2 (What 
is the moral, reflective and cognitive part of the lesson?).  However, since those 
processes have to be described in the dialectical context in which they have been 
encountered (research question 4: What is the context for the moral, reflective and 
cognitive part of the lesson?) and since this context has already been described in the 
previous paragraphs, presenting the moral cognitive and reflective alongside the 
dialectic would enhance better communication of the results of this study. That’s why 
the following sections deal with presenting each epistemic area encountered in the 
lesson situated in the dialectical context in which it has been encountered.  
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4.4.1 Social/Private Policy: The base and reasoning schemes of the decisions  
Ethics according to Peirce (1990, as cited in Pietarinen, 1996) is classified in 
Philosophy and is regarded as the normative science that evaluates practice according 
to several principles of conduct. The question that rises here is: Are all evaluations of 
actions, or prescriptions about conducting an action ethical? Are they regarded as 
moral?   
Whitbeck (1998) supports that judgments about what the best action to take in 
several aspects of human conduct would be (i.e. the best way to survive in a 
professional environment) are not all moral or ethical ones. Examination of such 
codes of behaviour though, is important since they affect the opportunities of moral 
action (p.12). Accordingly, in another, yet unpublished version of his classification of 
the sciences Peirce (1943 as cited in Pietarinen, 2006) distinguishes between Ethics 
which is defined as the general principles of conduct, and Policy which is defined as 
the study of special problems arising in history, which further divides it in three 
distinct categories: Policy toward men, Religion (Policy toward superior beings) and 
Policy toward lower animals.  
In this sense, deciding what to do about a controversial issue is assigned as a 
practice that is not situated in Ethics but in Policy, as an applied art. Deciding if we 
would proceed with cloning, buying or not a mobile phone, hunt or not, are practices 
situated in Social Policy and not necessarily to Ethics.  
However, this distinction is valid only if we perceive as ethical only products of 
deontological moral reasoning which ground the rightness of an action based on 
moralities of obligation which is actually based on laws. Therefore, an action is 
considered as ethically evaluated if it uses laws that derive from nature (“living and 
acting according to rationally ordered nature” (Devettere, 2000, p.5), duties that 
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emerge because of the rights of other people, or from our commitment to theories or 
religion: since we are committed to a theory or religion, then by duty we should do 
what this theory’s principles and laws are implying. Additionally, actions are 
considered as ethical if they are performed according to virtues.  
An example of classroom discussion about slaughtering or hunting animals might 
enlighten the discussion.  
“264. Teacher: Should we hunt animals being in nature? Or 
should we raise them and slaughter them?  
265. Student: I think we should feed them and slaughter 
them because we know what we give them to eat and their food 
is healthy.  
266. Teacher: Fairness. Ethical. In nature. Imagine that you 
are the animals. Is it fair?” 
 
The prescription “we should slaughter animals instead of hunting them, since they 
are healthier” is perceived from the teacher as non-moral; that’s why he asks from his 
students to change their context into one of moral reasoning and consider the issue in 
its moral dimension, as he perceives it. The teacher needs his students to discuss the 
moral obligation of being “fair” to animals. However, students do not base the 
rightness of the action (it is better to slaughter animals) on duties but on 
consequences.  
One might support that students’ reasoning is moral; the rightness of the action is 
evaluated through its consequences, and therefore it is a kind of moral reasoning, 
actually utilitarianism, which accepts that moral obligation arises from what will 
benefit the most people and not from laws or duties. However, there is no cue here 
that students ground the moral obligation of the action.  They might ground the 
performance of an action when its consequences are evaluated, but they do not 
assume that this action is morally obligated. And in this sense, reasoning about an 
action to be taken cannot be classified as moral, unless moral-deontological principles 
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are used in the syllogism, or unless the agents defend the moral obligation on 
consequentialism-utilitarianism, as shown in the episode below:  
“445: Student 1: If we clone humans there is a possibility to 
clone really bad people like Hitler and this would be disastrous 
for the society.  
446: Student 2: Yes, but if a clone like Hitler emerges we 
can kill him! 
447: Teacher: Do you take a life so easily? Why? 
448: Student 3: There is no problem if we kill clones, they do 
not have a soul. This is my belief. 
449: Student 4: This is your belief, but not ours. 
450: Teacher: The clone will not be a human being? He will 
not have a life?  
451: Student 2: Yes, but teacher, what else could we do if a 
new Hitler emerged?” 
 
In this episode both moral practices described above are identified: Student 3 in 
line 448 grounds the morality of the action based on a law that regulates the rights of 
living creatures that do not have a soul. On the other hand, the student that has 
supported the solution of killing bad clones defends the moral obligation of the action 
in line 451 by citing that there is no alternative and the consequences that are to come 
are really serious for the society. In this way he evaluates consequentialism as resting 
above deontological considerations, thereby implying the moral obligation of action 
based on consequences.  
The discussion above implies the following:  
1. Discussing about what to do, eat an apple, wear a uniform at school, have a 
mobile phone, hunt, clone people are practices situated in Social, 
Organizational or Private Policy as an applied art that aims to regulate 
conduct. These practices may be based on deontological alongside utilitarian 
considerations.  
2.  Ethics on the other hand is the science that might evaluate the performance 
of this action as right or wrong. This practice might be done either by using 
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established moral laws of the community to evaluate the action, or by 
appealing to different moral systems such as consequentialism 
(utilitarianism, hedonism, altruism) as superior to deontological moral 
evaluation.  
3. Moral Reasoning describes the process of arriving to such laws used by 
ethics to evaluate conduct as right or wrong. In this sense discussing about 
Social Policy issues might be regarded as “morality in the making” akin to a 
“science in the making” (Kolsto, 2001a). The issue of cloning or not for 
example that has the status of a controversial issue of social policy might 
have the status of a moral law in some years. Whether women should vote or 
the black “race” be treated as slaves, have been controversial policy issues 
once. Today, they are resolved issues that hold the status of a moral law: we 
should not use the black “race” as slaves; we should not prevent women from 
voting.   
Practical claims therefore, that concerned decisions about the issues set in the 
classroom, are captured from the category of Social/Private Policy as presented 
above, and are presented primarily to other sciences, as all other sciences are going to 
be described as part of them (decide about an issue). Graph 2 presents the bases of 
practical judgments related to the issues. 
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Graph 2: The bases of the decisions about the issues  
 
As shown in the graph above, biological needs or biological consequences were 
dominant factors for students’ decisions. Social needs had also been the base for their 
decisions; social needs actually had grounded the action under discussion as a means 
for attaining those needs. Rules have also entered the discussion, but as discussed 
above not all rules were moral. Actually, rules had the following forms:  
a) Social/Private policy - conventional rules 
 Rules such “young children should get what they want”, or “good students 
should take presents for feedback”, are not actually moral even if they seem 
deontological in a child’s sense. They are actually conventional rules that 
regulate human conduct in different organizations, or groups of people 
(family, school etc)  
b) The principle of overall utility 
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 There were decisions that had the form of calculations in combination with 
the principle of overall utility (the benefit is greater than the cost) of the type: 
since your brother needs mobile phones, and since evidence indicates that 
there is no problem if the phone is used less than 5 hours daily, you should 
buy him a phone. As discussed before, the principle does not directly imply 
moral obligation, unless further argumentation is developed to establish 
overall utility as superior to other rules interfering with the discussion. 
Additionally, the principle does not only consider consequences, it might 
also calculate the benefit from using the action as means for needs and 
therefore this kind of reasoning is classified as a rule based (which applies 
the principle of overall utility) rather than reasoning from consequences or 
means end reasoning.  
c) Moral rules 
 Moral rules that establish the practice as unethical imply a moral obligation 
of not performing the action and therefore perceive a Social/Private policy 
issue as moral. Example of such a rule is “We should not treat other creatures 
in a way that we would not like to be treated”. This rule has been used to 
ground a prescription of not hunting.  
However, issues (hunt or not, buy or not a mobile phone to a young brother, clone 
animals and humans) were not the only issues of Social or Private Policy set down 
during the lessons. As argumentation chains had evolved, sub-issues emerged like: 
Should we eat meat? Should we select the genes for the clones? Should we slaughter 
animals? Which is better, slaughter or hunt? Should we kill bad clones?  Actually, 
issues like that had emerged when agents of the discussion had to evaluate and 
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establish a solution aiming to diminish consequences or when comparing alternative 
means. 
Examples of consequences, means, rules, calculations and appeals used for issues 
or sub-issues are presented in Table 36.  
The table indicates that biological, aesthetic, psychological and sociological 
consequences had bothered students and affected their decisions, whereas the actions 
implied by the issue have been used in arguments as a means for fulfilling biological, 
economic, sociological and psychological means. Furthermore, agents have based 
their decisions on rules, some of which have been conventional rules regulating 
parents’ and children’s relationships, for example, or moral deontological rules. 
Finally, calculations of pros and cons used in arguments with Informal Logic rules 
have been pointed to avoid the action.  
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Reasoning 
Scheme Disciplines that provided the data for the syllogisms 
 
Informal 
Logic Ethics Biology Aesthetics Economics Everyday 
Animal 
psychology Psychology Sociology 
From 
consequences   
Mobile 
phones will 
harm his 
health; you 
should not 
buy him a 
phone 
Animals 
will lose their 
value as all 
will be the 
same. We 
should not 
clone.  
   
If we eat only 
vegetables we get 
bored. We need to 
eat also meat for a 
change. 
If we clone humans 
then social confusion 
might emerge. We should 
not clone. 
Means 
end   
We have 
to hunt 
because we 
need  to eat 
meat  
 
Hunting is 
cheaper than 
buying meat to 
eat, and since 
we need money 
we should hunt. 
  
We should 
clone so when our 
beloved persons 
die, would have the 
opportunity to bring 
them back. 
We should buy 
mobiles to communicate 
with our parents when 
being in a place that they 
are not with us. 
Rule 
case 
Since 
negatives are 
much more 
than positives 
you should 
not buy him a 
phone.  
    
He is a 
very good 
student; you 
should buy it 
as a gift, 
feedback for 
his behaviour. 
Small 
birds struggle 
to find their 
food, life is 
already very 
difficult for 
them; we 
should not 
make their life 
harder.  
  
Analytic
al  
It is 
unethical to kill 
birds. We should 
not hunt. 
       
Appeals 
Emotion
al (to pity) 
Please buy him a phone, he wants it so much. After all, he is your young brother; you should feel pity for him! 
Table 37: The base and reasoning schemes for deciding about issues or sub-issues
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4.4.2 Moral Reasoning 
4.4.2.1 The situation of Moral Reasoning in Practical Reasoning  
Moral Reasoning describes the process of arriving to moral principles/laws and 
the ethical reasoning which refers to the application of moral principles to evaluate 
conduct as right or wrong. Moral principles are not always established but have to be 
negotiated as true and additionally as relevant for the case to be applied.  
As already indicated, an instance where moral reasoning has been identified was 
the case of agents expressing practical judgments (decisions) about the issues based 
on moral rules. In this sense the issues have been perceived as moral, and therefore 
moral principles were applied in order to prove the action as unethical/immoral and 
thereby prescribe agents perform it or not (It is unethical to kill birds and therefore we 
should not kill birds).  
The table below presents the frequency of the speech acts that indicated a moral 
practice and situates them in the dialectical context in which they have occurred. As 
already mentioned in the methods and methodologies chapter, the numbers are not 
discussed in any way; there is nothing to say within this study as to why the morality 
of alternative means has been more discussed than the morality of a solution that 
could diminish consequences, for example.  
The existence of numbers in according cells indicates the “instances” which the 
dialectic had provided for the morality to emerge. As numbers are results of this study 
are presented within the tables, as they could point to further hypotheses.  
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Moral Practice * as situated in Dialectical practice related to practical argument scheme 
Moral  
Practice 
Dialectical practice 
related to practical 
argument scheme 
Dialectical context 
  
Argumentation 
for action 
explanation/defence 
Argument
ation for 
persuasion 
Deliber
ation 
Evaluates 
practice 
Consequences - Defends  
a solution as moral  3  
Means end - Counters 
alternative means as immoral  7  
Means end - Defends 
alternative means as moral  5  
Means end - Evaluates 
action   1 
Rule case - Evaluates 
action 8   
Establishes 
the rules 
Rule case - Counters rule 
as false  10  
Rule case - Defends rule 
as true  13  
Counters 
rule as 
irrelevant 
Rule case - Counters the 
rule as irrelevant 1   
*Speech acts categorized as indicating  a moral practice  
Table 38: Moral Practice as situated in Dialectical practice related to practical 
argument scheme 
Moral Reasoning however has been identified in other instances as well. The table 
above indicates how Moral Reasoning as a theoretical practice has been situated in 
Practical Reasoning; in other words, in which instances of discussing the controversial 
issues the agents of the discussion have been engaged in moral practices. 
Evaluation of several actions as right or wrong, ethical or unethical has been 
captured from moral normative judgments (theoretical judgments). Those normative 
statements might have been used in deliberative sessions indicating that the agent was 
considering moral issues but not being ready to form a decision yet, but also in 
argumentative sessions as steps in the reasoning towards a practical judgment.  
Additionally, as indicated in the above table, moral reasoning emerges not only 
when the action that the issue implies was being morally evaluated but also in other 
subordinate chains of argumentation when a solution about a consequence or 
alternative means has been put under moral examination. Additionally, since the 
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principles used to evaluate actions were not accepted by the participants, new loops of 
argumentation have been used to establish those rules as true or valid.  
Another case that is described as an instance about Moral Reasoning is the 
evaluation of actions already performed by societal agents and even themselves. This 
opportunity is differentiated from evaluating an action for using this evaluation as an 
argument supporting or countering the decision towards it. 
Argumentation for action explanation/defence has been a context in which agents 
had morally evaluated several actions of societal agents: either the actions implied by 
the issue (hunt, hold a mobile phone) or actions related to the issue (abandon dogs 
after hunting period, kill swallows for practice etc) have been put under moral 
evaluation.  
4.4.2.2 The moral part of the lessons 
A first conception of the morality of the lesson can be captured from the analysis 
of Social/Private Policy, as presented in section 4.4.1. The conclusions of the analysis 
indicate that deontological morality was not the main concern of agents when 
grounding decisions about the issues. As already indicated, the decisions were based 
on needs and consequences (mostly social and biological) whereas the majority of 
rules that have been applied have been conventional and not moral ones.  
However, morality  has been identified in subordinate levels of argumentation for 
persuasion, in deliberative sessions where the morality of an action was set as  a factor 
to be considered as relevant for decision making  and as a means of evaluating 
societal agents’ and their actions. 
The following paragraphs describe the substance of the epistemic practices 
evaluating a practice as moral or not. As shown in the following table, agents have 
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used a majority of syllogisms in order to establish a moral claim concerning the 
morality of an action situated in different disciplines (cases). 
Structure of 
the syllogism Discipline of the case 
 A
ni
m
al
 
ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
 
Bi
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y 
Et
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et
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s 
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gy
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W
ar
 
 
Appeal to Divine 
Law      2    
Appeal to natural 
law    3      
Evidence to 
hypothesis       1   
From analogy   5       
Principled based 1 21  9 4  4 3  
Simple speech act         10 
Table 39: Structure and base of moral evaluative syllogisms 
 
Religion has been the base of syllogisms that had the form of an appeal to Divine 
law (Nuns eat meat. If our religion allows us eating meat then, what’s the point of 
discussing whether we should eat meat or not?) Additionally, metaphysical 
considerations about the status of humans as being hunters by determinism grounded 
the morality of hunting when appealed to a natural law (we are created to be hunters, 
it’s in our nature to be hunters; it is ok to be hunters).  
There were instances where the morality of an action was defended by the use of 
an analogy of another action already accepted in the society. For example, the 
morality of hunting animals was defended by the fact that every day we consume 
animals that have been killed and therefore, if consuming killed animals is ethical 
then hunting is ethical too.  
In other cases analogies from human morals to animals were transferred, 
indicating anthropomorphism. For example, an argument that there is no point 
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discussing about the morality of hunting animals, since animals are going to die one 
day or another, has been dropped by the use of an analogy indicating that humans 
struggle for extending their lives, and therefore such a practice should be applied for 
animals also. 
Moral rules have also been supported as valid when bringing evidence that the 
majority of people apply them. Taking in mind the previous example, the principle of 
respect to human life, has been supported as true by indicating how humans have 
developed medicine to help them safeguard or extend their lives. This kind of 
reasoning is indicated by the “evidence to hypothesis” structure of syllogism above. 
In this case the moral rule is the hypothesis to be proven as true. The evidence refers 
to the instances where this hypothesis is applied and proved as true.  
Finally, several principles have been applied to evaluate actions. Actions of 
humans and even animals have been situated in several cases as shown in the 
following table. The epistemic areas presented as columns of the table indicate that 
the cases about which a principle was applied could further be supported as true by 
the discipline that names the column. Consider the syllogism below:   
“An eagle hunts because it has no alternatives for food.  
(If you do not have alternatives then your action is morally 
defended: The right to live)  
An eagle is not unethical to its prey.” 
 
 
The fact that an eagle does not have alternatives for food is a case that is situated 
in Biology, the discipline that could ground it as true or not. When an ethical principle 
is applied to this case, actually is a complex principle indicating your right to live as 
superior to the right of the other creature to live, the action is evaluated as ethical. 
This kind of syllogism, principle based, is akin to the rule-case syllogism explored in 
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practical reasoning argument schemes (see chapter 2 section 2.4.2.3) with the 
difference that when the rule is applied to a case the result of the syllogism does not 
prescribe an action, but points to an ethical evaluation of that action. The following 
table indicates examples of cases situated in several disciplines which were evaluated 
in the light of ethical principles and had formed a moral practical judgment.  
 
Moral Reasoning: cases and disciplines in moral evaluative judgments 
Discipline of 
case Case Principle 
Evaluative 
Judgment 
Biology 
An eagle has no alternatives 
for food, he has to hunt and eat its 
preys 
Ethical Egoism: an 
action is morally right if the 
consequences of that action 
are more favourable than 
unfavourable only to the 
agent performing the action 
Eagle is ethical to its 
prey. 
War 
A human being is in 
advantage when hunts a bird, he 
holds guns, he is smarter.  
Principle of justice: (rule 
of fair play) Treat people 
fairly: treat equals equally, 
non-equals unequally. 
It is unethical to 
hunt birds.  
Sociology 
Human beings offer a lot to 
domestic animals: they provide 
them shelter and food 
Principle of Gratitude: 
the duty to thank those who 
help us 
It is ethical to 
slaughter domestic 
animals.  
Psychology 
A person that is alone might 
find company and be happy when 
hunts with other people. 
Principle of utility: An 
action is right as far as it 
promotes happiness or 
pleasure  
Hunting is a good 
practice.  
Animal 
Psychology 
Birds have (intentionally) 
harmed people by giving them the 
sickness of bird flu. 
Principle of 
Nonmaleficence: Do not 
harm yourself or other 
people. 
Birds are unfair to 
people. 
Metaphysics Clones will not have soul. 
Rights (principle proved 
as not applicable, irrelevant): 
acknowledge a person’s 
rights to life 
Killing a clone is 
ethical. 
Table 40: Moral Reasoning: cases and disciplines in moral evaluative judgments 
 
As the last example of the table indicates, there were cases where the practice was 
evaluated as ethical, not because of an application of a moral principle, but because a 
moral principle that could ground it as unethical has been proven as not applicable. 
Killing clones has been evaluated as ethical, since a deontological principle 
concerning the rights of the clone to life had been countered as not applicable, as the 
clones would not have soul. Another example of such a kind of moral reasoning is one 
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of a student that his action of hunting animals has been judged as ethical because the 
principle of “eating meat is unethical” could not be applied to his case since he hunts 
but does not eat the animals he hunts.  
Finally, there were students that did not perform a syllogism to ground their 
evaluation of the action, but they had just cited their evaluations as simple speech 
acts: “It is not right to clone”, “It’s unethical to kill birds”, and “Slaughtering animals 
is bad”, are examples of unfounded evaluative moral claims, simple speech acts. 
Summarizing the section about moral reasoning we might conclude that:  
• Moral Reasoning has emerged as an opportunity to ground decisions about 
the issues, solutions about a consequence and alternative means. It has also 
emerged when agents had considered the morality of their own actions, or 
other societal agents’ actions. Finally, the morality of an action was 
considered as a factor to be taken into account, within deliberative sessions.  
• Agents applied a variety of principles in a range of psychological, 
sociological, biological, metaphysical and other cases but also appealed to 
natural law or Divine law as methods of grounding the morality of an action. 
They also used evidence to support the principles/laws as valid for a majority 
of people and thereby ground their truth, or used reasoning from an analogy 
to establish an action as moral based on the ethical acceptance of another, 
analogical action as moral. Finally, they grounded the morality of an action 
by proving an ethical principle that could ground it as unethical, as irrelevant 
to the case.  
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4.4.3 Introspection (Self reflection)  
The following section will explore the instances in which the agents of the 
discussion had been engaged in practices of Introspection. Introspection, as used in 
this study encompasses both the process of learning about one’s own mental states or 
processes, but also the process of reflection on our character traits, even if there are 
contemporary philosophers of mind that do not believe that we can directly introspect 
character traits in the same sense in which we can introspect some of our other mental 
states (Schwitzgebel, 2010). 
Even if this process could be assigned in psychology as a discipline, it is 
differentiated from it, in the sense that when you learn about your mind 
introspectively, you do it in a way that no one else can do; you are the only one to 
have access to such information (Schwitzgebel, 2010). Actually, introspection is a 
term that literally means “looking within” (from the Latin “spicere” meaning “to 
look” and “intra” meaning “within”). 
 
4.4.3.1 The situation of Introspection in Practical Reasoning  
In some aspects the whole process of discussing a controversial issue can be 
regarded as an indirect process of introspection, since our beliefs are accessed, 
extracted and presented to the public. However, there are instances in which this 
process is done explicitly; agents of the discussion, apart from expressing beliefs 
about the issues, have explicitly talked about themselves and several aspects related to 
the issues. Actually this discussion has already been done within this study when 
contexts of beliefs about the issue have been differentiated from beliefs about own 
self (section 4.2.2). 
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The instances are categorized alongside five different categories of reflection and 
are related to accordingly specified contexts (see 4.2.2 within this chapter).  
• Views (view citing, view explanation/defence) 
• Positions (positioning-within argumentation for persuasion) 
• Intentions (intention citing, intention explanation/defence, argumentation for 
intention explanation defence) 
• Decisions (decision explanation/defence, decision making process 
description) 
• Actions (action citing, action explanation/defence, argumentation for action 
explanation/defence)  
A primary issue to be clarified is the description of those contexts as situated in 
practical reasoning aiming for taking a decision about the issue. For example 
positioning is an action performed with the dialectical goal of informing the 
interlocutors about the agent’s position towards the issue, but explaining one’s action 
does not carry any other dialectical force apart from explaining one’s action and 
thereby one might argue that the use of “action explanation/defence” does not rest at 
the level of dialectical context but actually describes the epistemic practice performed.  
However, connection lines might be drawn between argumentation for persuasion 
or deliberation, and contexts related to explaining and grounding explanations about 
own decisions, intentions, views, and desires.  
As already explored in session 4.2.2.2 explanations had the form of practical 
judgments (means end, from consequences, rule based). Means, consequences and 
rules were used not only to prescribe an action, but as causes that could explain the 
 319 
agent’s intention, or volition to perform such an action, and partly explain why the 
agent might have already performed that action.  
In this sense dialectical contexts that describe self reflections are not actually 
situated in practical reasoning but they are rather parallel to it. They use common 
elements (means, consequences and rules) but they use them for different purposes. 
Practical reason uses those to ground decisions; reflective practices, on the other, use 
them to explain own behaviour, mental and psychological states.  
I still need to clarify how those explanations emerged during a discussion about a 
decision to be made. For that purpose I have followed the instances in which mental 
and psychological states apart from beliefs about the issue of the interlocutors came 
up in the lesson and I have defined the connector lines between those two areas. The 
results of such an analysis are provided below. 
1. Positioning  
a. As a strategic movement: Agents take positions before the “battle”, declaring 
their viewpoint so the debate can start. Usually it is done after prompts from the 
teacher to do so. 
b. As a communication means: Students had to reveal their position so their 
interlocutors might better understand their argument to follow.  
2. Intention/action explanation defence 
a. When the teacher explicitly asked for explanation of students’ action  
In the hunting lesson, the teacher included a reflective session in the end of 
the lesson, in which he wanted to explore a claim which was actually supporting 
that we become hunters because our parents are hunters. In the argumentative 
session that followed students were engaged in practices supporting or 
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countering such a claim by appealing to their own explanations of action as 
hunters.  
b. When the issue was explicitly set in a micromorality mode by the teacher 
There were cases in which the teacher had planned and set down personal 
dilemmas, as a means to put the issue into micromorality mode and give the 
students the opportunity to engage in the discussion from a different 
perspective. Such example is the cloning lesson, which explored apart from the 
issue “Should we clone animals/ human?” the personal dilemmas “Would you 
clone your own pet?” or “Your dead son?  
c. When the teacher transferred the issue from macromorality to 
micromorality mode as a means for elaborating students’ arguments 
The episode below indicates an instance where the teacher had perceived 
students’ engagement in the discussion as resting in personal psychological 
reasons.  
“Teacher: Well, tell me arguments about why we should 
clone humans or not.  
Student: We should clone human beings because this would 
bring our beloved persons back.  
Teacher: You mean, for example, you would like to clone 
your dead grandfather to have him back?  
Student: Yes, since cloning can bring them back…” 
 
It is evident that in this case the teacher perceives the argument as relating to 
personal intentions and she furthers explores it by setting the issue to a 
micromorality mode.  
d. When students used their explanations of actions or intentions as 
arguments for the discussion   
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There were cases in which the transfer from argumentation for persuasion to 
action/intention explanation was done from students: students had entered a 
context of explaining their attitude as means to add an argument for persuasion. 
Consider the following episode, which had begun with the prompt of the teacher 
for citing arguments in favour of or against human hunting.  
“Student 1: We should clone human beings because we 
would have them back again.  
Student 2: Yes but if you bring a sick person back, wouldn’t 
he get sick again, and have the same pain?  
(…….) 
As far as myself is concerned, I would not like to clone a sick 
person and bring him back, watching him getting sick or dying 
again; this would cause me a lot of pain.” 
 
Students also used explanations of their actions as argumentation moves that 
could drop other arguments as irrelevant to the discussion. As mentioned in 
another case, a student citing that “Eating meat does not have any relation to our 
discussion; I do not eat what I hunt, hunting is a sport for me, it is not a means 
to eat”, actually evaluates the rule “we should not eat meat” as irrelevant to the 
discussion about whether we should hunt or not, by appealing to his own 
explanation of action; the latter can be analyzed as an argumentative move. 
e. As a pedagogical strategy of the teacher to bring more arguments in the 
discussion  
There were cases when students had no more arguments to add to the 
discussion. Teachers in an effort to bring more arguments to the discussion 
asked the students to explain the reasons of why they had performed the action 
implied by the issue (i.e. use a mobile phone) 
“Teacher: Ok, do you have any more arguments to support 
or counter that I should buy my brother a phone?  
(Students do not react) 
Teacher: Ok, tell me then how many of you have a mobile 
phone?  
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(Students raise their hands up) 
Teacher: Well I can see that many of you have a mobile 
phone. Tell us Maria, why do you have a mobile phone? 
Maria: I want to communicate with my parents, I did not 
want to play or send messages.  
Teacher: So Maria, tells us again about communication, it’s 
a reason already written in the board. Any other reasons? 
George, why do you have a mobile phone?” 
 
As shown in the above episode, the teacher needs reasons; arguments as 
propositions. She does not care if those arguments come up as dialectical arguments 
supporting a decision, or as explanations of actions and intentions. She therefore treats 
explanations as reasons, as arguments. 
The above instances draw a conclusion. The connecting line between 
argumentative and explanatory contexts (argumentation of persuasion and 
intention/action explanation) is evidently drawn: ends that need means to be achieved, 
consequences and rules explaining human action, can also ground the decision for an 
action to be taken and vice versa: since an argument with a psychological ground is 
set, it might be further explored as an explanation of intention, beyond its status as a 
reason grounding a decision. 
 
4.4.3.2 The introspective part of the lessons  
Introspective processes might be situated in Psychology as a discipline that studies 
and explains psychological facts (emotions, actions, desires etc.), grounds those 
explanations, and uses them as rules to predict future behaviour (intentions). As with 
all disciplines, those explanations are grounded in observations and in this sense self 
reflection processes are regarded as distinct from other epistemic practices situated in 
psychology: they refer to introspective strategies aiming to access information about 
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own self by looking “inside” and their substance as related to means, consequences 
and rules.  
 
Graph 3: Practical components of explanations about own actions, decisions, 
intentions and preferences 
 
The above graph indicates that agents explained their actions totally by the use of 
means (I have a mobile phone because I need to communicate with my parents). This 
is not peculiar, since we talk about actions that have already been performed. Perhaps 
consequences might drive an agent not to perform an action and therefore be able to 
explain her action, but as soon as those consequences have driven an agent to perform 
the action, they take the form of a need, an end to be attended. For example, the fact 
that endangered animals  are going to be saved if cloning animals is allowed, is a 
positive consequence of cloning establishment but since people adopt this practice, 
their action is explained not by consequences but by a means end syllogism: they have 
cloned animals to save the endangered species. 
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The following table further elaborates the content of introspective practices: 
which type of means, consequences and rules the agents used to explain their 
psychological, mental stages and actions.  
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Introspective 
practice 
Structure 
of syllogism Disciplines that could ground the means, consequences, or the case for the rules 
  Biology Biotechnology Psychology Informal Logic Sociology Other 
Explains/ 
predicts 
a fact (action, 
intention, 
decision, desire) 
 
Means 
end   
We like to 
discover how 
ancient people 
had lived in the 
past and that’s 
why we hunt. 
 
I have a mobile 
phone for 
communicating 
with my mum.  
 
Rule case    
Negative 
arguments have 
been much more 
than positive and 
this made me 
decide on the 
negative side. 
 
I am a hunter 
because my father 
was also a hunter.  
Consequences 
There is evidence 
indicating that mobile 
phones are related to 
increased danger for 
brain cancer; this had 
made me decided not 
to buy your brother a 
phone.  
Cloning 
might produce for 
me a monster cat; 
I would not clone 
my dead cat. 
If I had a 
cloned cat again I 
would get bored 
to it; I would not 
clone my dead 
pet.   
 
Mobile 
phones affect the 
relationship 
between parents 
and children 
within families 
and this made me 
decide on the 
negative side. 
 
Cause to 
effect  
The cloned 
cat would by 
exactly as my 
dead cat. 
Watching it 
would make me 
happy. 
I would get 
bored to the 
cloned cat; I do 
not like having 
the same pet for a 
long of time.  
 
Mobile 
phones are 
fashionable; all 
teenagers hold 
mobile phones. 
That’s why I like 
mobile phones. 
We always 
win when hunt 
that’s why we like 
it.   
Table 41: Introspective practices: structure and base of syllogisms 
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The last row actually explains emotions and therefore is somehow differentiated 
from ends, consequences and rules that actually guide behaviour. Ends, consequences 
and rules are actually causes for the action, and according to Aristotle might raise 
moral emotions (actually moral rules might do that). However, explaining our 
emotions is based on causal rules like “When I have something for a long time I get 
bored of it”, or “I want to have fashionable things” which are actually psychological, 
introspective rules that explain attitude and emotions.  
Finally, apart from explaining facts, agents also provided explanations as false for 
them. For example, a student had cited that “I do not have scruples for killing birds, 
this is not the reason I do not go for hunting” whereas there were cases where students 
rather justified rather than explained their actions. “I have a mobile phone because my 
uncle gave me his phone that he did not want” is an example of such a justification 
that was dropped from the teacher who asked “Yes but tell me a reason; the uncle 
gave it to you but why did you get it?” 
Summarizing introspective practices I might conclude the following: 
1. Introspection as used in this study captures more than emotional reflection. 
Emotions are explored through introspection, but as rules, consequences and 
means beyond psychological ones might guide behaviour, explaining one’s 
actions or intention captures more than emotions.  
2. Introspection was situated in practical reasoning as a practice that could 
inform about the agent’s position towards the issue as a strategic movement 
that enables the debate to start, or as a communication means that informs the 
interlocutors about the force of the argument to follow. Additionally, 
introspection was a means of importing personal, psychological reasons into 
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the discussion, and this was implemented by the students as an argumentative 
strategy but also from the teacher as a pedagogical means of adding new 
arguments to the pool of reasons, or further elaborating a student’s argument.  
3. Introspective practices included citing and explaining actions, decisions, 
intentions and views with the use of means, consequences and rules. Those 
explanations might further be grounded by explaining emotions that 
consequences, or the achievement of the end would create.  
 
4.4.4 Special Sciences (Idioscopy) 
This section aims to describe epistemic practices that belong to the special 
sciences’ category of Peirce, and include Physics and Psychics. As cited in previous 
sections of this study Special Sciences (Idioscopy) are classified by Peirce (1990 as 
cited in Pietarinen, 2006) as such since they resort to special experience or 
experiments in order to settle knowledge claims and are further classified to Physical 
(Natural) Sciences which are Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Geognosy and Astronomy 
and to Psychical which include Psychology, Ethnology, Linguistics, and finally 
descriptive Psychics (History, Biography).  
All those sciences resort to experience to ground knowledge claims, “Idioscopy 
embraces all the special sciences, which are principally occupied with the 
accumulation of new facts” (Peirce, 1905 as cited in Bergman & Paavola, 2003) 
Data analysis therefore followed the argument scheme typology to identify 
knowledge claims which could be situated in each discipline, and describe the 
epistemic practices used to establish or use such claims. A first problem to be 
addressed was the infusion of normative in addition to factual statements as belonging 
to special sciences, an issue to be discussed in the next paragraphs.  
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4.4.4.1 Normative or factual descriptive statements  
Data analysis revealed a problem regarding a special class of normative 
statements regarding health, or necessity. For example, the concept of health was 
regarded as problematic because it was not clear at first whether statements of this 
kind were descriptive factual or normative ones. For example the argument “Eating 
slaughtered animals is healthier as you can control the type of food they get, whereas 
animals you hunt are not so healthy because they might access poisoned food or not 
good quality food” could be both analyzed as a theoretical factual but also as a 
normative statement.  
Those kinds of statements were initially classified as normative since they reason 
from criteria, of what would constitute a healthy diet.  
Fact: Slaughtered animals eat controlled food.  
Value (criteria) Controlled food is healthy.  
Judgment: Eating slaughtered animals is healthy. 
  
Those criteria though could be connected with biological standards of being 
healthy, and therefore eating a good quality food and being healthy is perceived as a 
cause to effect factual statement that could be reconstructed as follows:  
You eat good quality food (cause) 
Good quality food ensures health (cause to effect biology law) 
You are going to be healthy (effect) 
 
The difference between the above structures of syllogisms is the nature of the 
concept of “health”. Is being healthy a quality, or is it a fact? In the second example 
“health” is not perceived as a quality by which facts can be evaluated but as a fact that 
might be true or not, an empirical statement that can be tested through reality.  
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The issue was further clarified with the following thoughts: the criterion of what 
constitutes healthy diet is one that might be established within biology as a discipline 
and it is an evidence based criterion. For example, the fact that some students had 
been poisoned from eating slaughtered animals’ meat was used as an example that 
could drop the law-criterion “Controlled food might ensure health” or “Controlled 
food is healthy” used to ground an evaluation/classification of eating slaughtered 
animals as healthy. Therefore, criteria in this case hold the status of a natural law, 
which can be further questioned and established when tested through reality.  
A second example of such normative statements regards the concept of necessity 
of an action situated in Biology, Psychology or Sociology. Establishing a means as 
necessary by pointing to alternatives is a practice that could be classified as reasoning 
from criteria:  
B is an alternative action, instead of action A for attending End C. (fact) 
Since alternatives the action is not necessary (criterion) 
A is not necessary (value judgment) 
 
Necessity in those cases is the normative evaluation with the use of the criterion of 
having alternatives. However, having alternatives or not is situated in each discipline 
to empirically ground it as true or false. Consider the following examples:   
a) People do not need to eat meat, they can eat vegetables                            
It is not necessary to eat meat.  
b) Your brother can communicate by using other people’s phone. 
It is not necessary to have his own mobile phone 
c) You could be happy by buying another homeless cat. 
It is not necessary to clone your dead cat.  
If vegetables can replace meat and preserve health is an issue situated in Biology; 
whether people can have access to other communication means is an issue situated in 
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Sociology; accordingly, whether people can be happy with a new pet is situated in 
Psychology. In this sense, the qualities used for evaluating necessity could be 
regarded as evidence-based norms situated in each discipline. In other words, 
evaluations of necessity hold the status of a law within different disciplines and can be 
tested through reality. The difference with the health example above is that those 
evaluations have a deductive nature. Since the law within a discipline is accepted 
(Vegetables can ensure a healthy body) then the necessity of an alternative might 
deductively set down (Meat is not necessary). Both statements are subject to truth and 
falsification through evidence.  
The discussion above has implied some considerations about Schellens’ second 
category of normative statements. As cited in the theoretical chapter that had 
grounded the argument typology scheme, Schellens (1985) classifies as normative 
arguments “arguments based on evaluative rules” where something is evaluated by 
referring to a certain quality, and “arguments based on rules of conduct”.  
Health is a certain quality, is a standard. Necessity and happiness are other 
qualities. However, health, necessity and happiness can be provided as true or not 
within different disciplines, and therefore, citing for someone as being healthy, 
necessary or happy does not necessarily indicate a normative, evaluative statement; it 
might indicate establishing a fact as true or not (meat is necessary for the body, 
hunting is a pleasant activity, mobile phones are necessary for communication).  
Argumentation chains that have followed such statements further support this 
consideration. Agents of the discussion had supported the “evaluation” or “fact” that 
hunting is pleasant by bringing examples of their friends that enjoy hunting and are 
very happy after a hunting day. Accordingly, they have brought causal arguments to 
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support that meat is necessary for the body since it has proteins, or had grounded the 
efficiency of vegetables by providing examples of vegetarians that are healthy.  
As a result of the above considerations this study has reconstructed as normative 
judgments belonging to the second class of Schellens (“arguments based on 
evaluative rules” where something is evaluated by referring to a certain quality) those 
arguments whose criterion or evaluation rule could not be settled down by evidence. 
Examples of such evaluative arguments are presented below: 
A cloned cat might cost 5000 pounds or more to be cloned 
5000 pounds are too much 
Cloning a pet is an extremely expensive sport. It is not worth it.  
 
Even if Economics as a discipline might evaluate the cost of 5000 pounds, the 
discipline would be a normative one and not an empirical one; it has to use the norms 
of the economy of the society at a specific time and place and evaluate the cost of a 
practice.  
I realize that the solution for such a problem would never be airtight. The fact-
value distinction is not new and the philosophical theories behind this distinction are 
puzzling. However, when it comes to data analysis method decisions have to be taken 
so, even in a blurry environment, the description of the reasoning and epistemic areas 
should be as accurate as possible.  
 
4.4.4.2 The situation of Special Sciences in Practical Reasoning  
The results of this study had revealed three special sciences whose knowledge 
claims had entered the discussion: Biology from Physics, Psychology and Sociology 
from Psychics (Introspection has been elaborated in previous section)  
The following graph shows the percentage of knowledge claims situated in each 
Science situated in Idioscopy, as identified in the classroom discussions.  
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Graph 4: Epistemic areas in the lesson 
As shown above, Psychology and Sociology had entered the classroom almost in 
an equal footing, whereas Biology was more dominant in the lessons. The question to 
be answered is how epistemic practices emerged as a result of the discussion of a 
controversial issue in the classroom? The graph that follows indicates the dialectical 
contexts in which propositional statements classified in each discipline have been 
identified.   
41%
28%
31%
Special Sciences in the lessons  
Biology Psychology sociology
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Graph 5: Special Sciences in dialectical context 
 
A first conception that this graph provides is that argumentative context was a 
place for Biology and Sociology to emerge, whereas Psychology and Sociology were 
the sciences that had grounded explanations of  
actions/intentions/decisions/views/desires of societal agents. Furthermore, inquiry as a 
practice about factual issues was restricted only in biological and not sociological or 
psychological issues whereas explanations of actions might further be grounded 
within Biology that might evaluate those actions as true or not. The following 
paragraphs elaborate the situation of Special Sciences in Practical Reasoning, but also 
the content for each discipline individually.  
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4.4.4.3 Biology 
4.4.4.3.1 The situation of Biology in practical reasoning  
 
Graph 6: Biology as situated in practical reasoning in the classroom discussions 
 
As the above graph indicates, the establishment of the truth of the consequence, 
the necessity of actions as means to a biological end and the sufficiency of means 
were the main instances where Biology has emerged. Another use of Biology as a 
discipline to establish a claim as true or not emerged when the teacher had appealed to 
a natural law to establish the morality of hunting:  
We are hunters by nature 
What is natural is good  
It is ethical to hunt. 
  
The case that we are hunters by nature had to be established by biological 
practices of classifying organisms by criteria. Therefore, chains of reasoning emerged 
to defend humans as hunters: nails, teeth, type of stomach etc. However, this was not 
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students’ initiative. Actually the teacher had been using his students to extract 
information about the human body to use it as evidence to support that humans are by 
nature hunters. This context has been named after “teachers’ guided argumentation”. 
However, it points to an instance that morality that appeals to natural laws has to be 
further grounded by epistemic practices situated in Biology or other disciplines that 
study nature.  
Another instance of Biology that derives from Moral Reasoning is the 
establishment of cases where moral rules are applied, as true or not. A human being is 
being evaluated as unfair to animals because of being in advantage when hunting, and 
additionally because he hunts without necessity. On the other hand, animals are not 
evaluated as being unfair because they do not have alternatives, or they do not store 
food for later use. If animals have alternatives and whether they store food or not are 
cases situated in Biology.  
Actually many moral cases that had to be established through Biology were 
instances emerging from anthropomorphism. Students were observing animals, trying 
to cite inferences about their behaviour, even animals’ “motives” and “perceptions” to 
evaluate human actions as unethical to animals, or even evaluate animals’ actions.   
Finally, an instance for Biology was when students had perceived the issue of 
hunting as problematic as it would be disastrous to human population. That’s why 
they had produced solutions for eliminating this bad consequence by citing that 
“human hunting should be done with limits and regulations”. More types of solutions 
are going to be elaborated in the Sociology section that follows.  
 
 
 336 
 
4.4.4.3.2 Reasoning schemes and SDDS (Scientific Discovery as Dual Search 
(Klahr, 2000 as cited in Zimmerman, 2007) stage 
The results indicate that agents had used causal reasoning (explanations or 
predictions) but also examples and evidence (defending a descriptive generalization) 
to establish the truth of a consequence or the necessity or sufficiency of means. This 
means that they had either used readymade knowledge to explain why a consequence 
is true and thereby defend its prediction, or further explain it as true, or they had 
perceived it as a hypothesis to be tested through reality and therefore, they had 
brought evidence and examples to indicate it as true.  
For example the necessity of meat for the body was defended with explanatory 
and evidence based means. Citing that meat contains proteins which are essential for 
body growth explains why meat is essential for people whereas citing that nuns or 
other vegetarians are healthy actually provides evidence for defending such a claim as 
true. In the first case the connection between meat and health is established; the causal 
law that relates them is accepted and applied deductively to provide the necessity of 
meat as a means for health. The latter syllogism though perceives the claim that meat 
is essential for health as not accepted/established. It can be tested through reality and 
therefore examples and evidence might prove it as true or false.  
An additional syllogism that was used to provide consequences as true, reasoning 
from effect to cause indicates an even more complex structure: there were cases in 
which agents had formed new hypotheses within the discussion about claims under 
question.  For example the fact that research was contradictory about mobile phone 
use has been used by  students as an effect indicating that some other factors might 
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affect the results, such as the type of the organism of each person. The discussion is 
further elaborated with the following episode presented in Table 41. 
Episode lines Syllogism /Epistemic practice / SDDS stage 
24. Student: Well, …ok I would also want to have a mobile 
phone but my mother and father do not buy me a mobile 
phone because there is an energy that harms our system.  
 
25. Teacher: How does it affect our system?   
26. Student: Radiation  
27. Teacher: So, mobile phones affect our system because 
they have radiation…. 
Cause to effect/use readymade 
knowledge  
299. Teacher (after a lot of activities and when two 
contradictory claims were cited and written on board) 
So, finally…have a look at the board. Please consider the 
two first sentences and the last one. Do you find anything 
problematic there? (students do not react) 
 
300.  Teacher: The first two sentences. Is there any problem 
that both of them are written there?    
301. Teacher: What does the first sentence says: Mobile 
phones create health problems like brain cancer.    
302. The second sentence says that there is no relationship 
between mobile phone use and brain cancer. Is it logical 
that both sentences are written there?   
Prompts for  hypothesis 
testing/evidence evaluation  
376. Student: I think that may be if you go often to the doctor 
you might not get brain cancer. If you do not go….  
Effect to cause / comes up with 
an alternative hypothesis given 
anomalous evidence /hypothesis 
generation 
377. Teacher: No, this is not the meaning of this. Who wants 
to say anything else?  Drops context  
378. Teacher: Health problems. Do mobile phones eventually 
cause them or not?    
379. Student : Both cause and do not cause - 
Evidence to hypothesis/ Inability 
to defend a descriptive 
generalization  
380. Student: Research indicates that they create problems 
that affect the brain.   
Cites available 
evidence/Defends a descriptive 
generalization/ Hypothesis 
testing-Evidence evaluation 
381. Teacher: But your team has cited that there is no 
relationship between brain cancer and mobile phone 
use.  
Cites contradictory 
evidence/Defends a descriptive 
generalization/Hypothesis 
testing-Evidence evaluation 
382. What do you mean by “it does not affect”. What should 
I believe now? Do mobile phones affect health or not? -  
Prompts for  hypothesis 
testing/evidence evaluation  
383. Student: It might cause problems, it might not.  
Evidence to hypothesis/ 
Inability to defend a 
descriptive generalization 
384. Teacher: Oh, this the meaning you get? That research 
implies that it might cause, but it might not cause? This 
is the meaning?  
Drops generalization  
 
385. Student: I believe that your brother should not get a 
mobile phone. Since he is 10 years old mobile phones 
affect brain cancer, you should not buy him a phone.  
Out of SDDS stage:  
Claim is accepted, used as 
negative consequence to 
ground decision  
386. Teachers: Yes, but this research you are using now 
supports that mobile phones affect brain cancer until 12 
Prompts for  hypothesis 
testing/evidence evaluation 
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years old, but Angelos had cited down information that 
supports that mobile phones might not cause brain 
cancer.  
387. Student: But teacher, they had done research to prove 
that (mobile phones  do not cause brain cancer)  
From criteria/ Evaluates 
evidence/Hypothesis testing -
Evidence evaluation 
388. Teachers: Who has cited down that until 12 years 
mobile phones affect brain? Is it an unfounded claim or 
is it a product of research? Someone has done research 
before telling us so?   
Prompts for evidence 
evaluation  
389. Student: No, it does not say how they found it. It just 
says that there is a relationship….. 
Cites available evidence/ 
Hypothesis testing - Evidence 
evaluation  
390. Teacher: They talk in general. They do not tell us how 
they came to support such an issue. However, in the 
other case they have told us in detail what they have 
done. They have studied what? People that had brain 
cancer and people that had not. And they tell us that 
they could not find a relationship between brain cancer 
and mobile phone use. So what do you believe, mobile 
phones affect or do not affect?  
Cites available evidence 
Prompts for hypothesis testing  
391. Student: I believe that they affect health.  
Defends a descriptive 
generalization/Hypothesis 
testing-Evidence evaluation  
392. Teacher: Even if research supports that they do not 
affect?   Prompts for evidence evaluation  
393. Student: Teacher, there is a woman that had died from 
brain cancer, and people believe that mobile phones 
caused the cancer.   
Appeal to widespread common 
belief/Defends a descriptive 
generalization/hypothesis testing 
evidence evaluation  
394. Student: But they did not make research!  
From criteria/Evaluates 
evidence/Hypothesis testing-
evidence evaluation  
395. Teacher: Wait, wait tell us again what you have said.   
396. Student: This one describes that they have taken 
people, observed them, checked them and they have 
seen that it does not affect health   
 
397. Teacher: Hm….  
398. Student: But also people to tell that they believe 
something it means that some type of research has been 
done.   
From criteria/ Evaluates 
widespread common 
belief/Hypothesis testing-
evidence evaluation  
399. Teacher: You want to say that people do not say 
something accidentally, and even if we find some 
claims written down there is evidence behind them 
even if they do not cite it down? Hm…  
 
400. Student: Teacher, in my handout cites that if someone 
has already brain cancer and uses mobile phone, then 
there he is under the danger that his cancer would get 
bigger in faster way.  
Cites available 
evidence/Hypothesis testing -
evidence evaluation  
 
401. Teacher: Ok, here we have something different. It says 
that if I have a cancer and use mobile phones then the 
cancer will get bigger. - 
Evaluates relevance of 
evidence/Hypothesis testing - 
evidence evaluation  
402. Student: But teacher does this mean that we, students 
that have mobile phones and use them are under danger 
to get brain cancer? - 
Statistical syllogism/Predicts a 
fact/Use readymade 
knowledge  
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403. Teacher: No, but it says you that there is a possibility. 
It says that somebody believe that that there is a 
possibility that mobile phones will create health 
problems for you, and others that they do not believe 
this. That is research based results.   
Statistical syllogism/Predicts a 
fact/Use readymade 
knowledge  
404. Teacher: What should I do now? I need to decide….  Prompts for decision  
405. Student: Teacher, I think that I am getting what is 
going on….  
406. Student: I think… it might depend on the system of 
each person?   
Effect to cause / comes up 
with an alternative hypothesis 
given anomalous evidence 
/hypothesis generation 
407. Teacher: We do not know this yet. Scientists had not 
decided yet if it depends on each person’s body.  
Appeal to scientific 
authority/Defend a descriptive 
generalization/Hypothesis 
testing-evidence evaluation  
408. Student: Teacher, perhaps mobile phones create brain 
cancer, because …let’s say….like this incident when 
this woman had died and had said that it is from mobile 
phones….perhaps mobile phones had created this 
cancer…. - 
From effect to cause/Defends 
an explanation/ hypothesis 
generation 
409. Student: Teacher, I think you should not buy him a 
phone, because I think even if there are 90 positives for 
an issue and 10 negatives, and one of negatives is that 
you are going to die then this one should make you 
decide… 
Out of SDDS stage: Defends a 
decision using calculations of 
means and consequences  
 
Table 42: Agents of discussion being in different stages of scientific inquiry 
 
The consideration of the episode above implies the following:   
• Contradictory evidence might not necessarily drive students to evaluate 
evidence across epistemological criteria. 
• Contradictory evidence can be the data which an agent might use to come up 
to a new explanatory hypothesis that identifies other variables as relevant to 
the issue  
• Contradictory evidence might not be evaluated, even ignored, in the light of 
other explanatory hypotheses that support one of two sides of contradictory 
evidence.  
• Contradictory evidence might lead students to conclude a claim of “yes and 
no”, in other words making them unable to draw a descriptive generalization 
which was a hypothesis that had driven evidence collection.  
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• Additionally, agents might accept one of the two contradictory claims 
without a problem and therefore use them as readymade knowledge and 
engage in the following practices:  
o Perform a statistical syllogism for predicting or explaining 
facts (What about us that we have mobile phones? We might 
get brain cancer!)  
o Use it as a fact (consequence) to ground decisions (You 
should not buy him a phone since health effects are very 
serious).  
Evidence based syllogisms were not the only ones used to defend a descriptive 
generalization. As shown in the following graph agents of the discussion had used 
several means to support a fact as true or not.  
 
Graph 7: Structure of syllogisms in Biology 
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Analytical arguments imply the use of readymade knowledge that had been 
advanced to drop a prediction or an explanation as false. The modification of 
Schellens’ (1985) category to include analytical arguments was a step that actually 
derived from the instances presented above. Deductive disjunctive arguments (of the 
type Either A or B; A; not B) have been used to establish necessity as true or false for 
several biological cases (either hunting or Nature can control animal population; 
nature can control animal population; therefore hunting is not necessary), to evaluate 
the efficiency of several means to an end ( the cloned cat would be the authentic or a 
different one; cloning cannot bring back your authentic cat; cloning cannot bring your 
cat back) or evaluate the possibility for a consequence to occur (either something is 
definite or possible; research indicates that there is a possibility that mobile phone use 
is going to create health problems; it is not definite that you are going to harm your 
health if you use mobile phones)  
Furthermore, the truth of a fact has been established through appeals. The graph 
above indicates three different appeals:  
• Appeal to expert opinion:  
Scientists have decided that the meat or milk of cloned animals would not 
be a threat to health.  
There is no problem with cloned animals’ meat or milk.  
• Appeal to widespread common belief: 
I believe that mobile phones create brain cancer because there is a girl 
that died from brain cancer and people believe that the cause was mobile 
phone use.  
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In this case there is a loop. The student appeals to a widespread common 
belief but he does not appeal in a type of “I believe that mobile phones harm 
because people say so” but he actually explains the widespread belief in an 
effect to cause reasoning. In this sense, the belief is grounded, but still the 
case is classified as an appeal to common belief.  
• Appeal to evidence: (continuing the previous argument) 
But teacher, they have done research to prove that mobile phones do not 
create brain cancer! 
The use of appeal here does not have the meaning of appealing to 
authorities or emotions and not to reasons to establish a claim. However, the 
term appeal here indicates that the explanation or hypothesis is defended not 
by a statistical syllogism, or an evidential support descriptive generalization 
but it specifically addresses the authority of evidence upon other sources of 
knowledge and thereby is classified as an appeal.  
Analogies were also a means of providing the truth of a statement. An analogy for 
example has been used to defend the efficiency of alternative means for controlling 
animal population, other than hunting. A student advanced the reason that “Animals 
will die one day or another, they are going to be extinct; there is no reason to hunt 
them to eliminate their population”. This argument has been dropped by the analogy 
that human population is not controlled by physical death and therefore, by analogy, 
animal population cannot be controlled by physical death. Even if the analogy might 
be evaluated as fallacious since humans do not eat each other (at least in literal level) 
it still indicates a specific type of reasoning.  
 343 
Finally, agents have used examples to ground the truth of a statement. “I am a 
vegetarian and I am fine”, an argument cited to establish the truth of the claim that 
“Meat is not necessary for the human body”, alongside other examples such as “In 
jungles that there are no human hunters animals are not overpopulated” are instances 
of arguments from examples that use an instance as critical to be used to prove the 
truth of a number of instances (Arguments from example). 
The following table summarizes the discussion above and provides examples of 
reasoning schemes, epistemic practices and dialectical practices assigned to Biology 
as a discipline.  
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Biology in the lessons: Epistemic practices situated in dialectical practice 
Epistemic 
Practice 
Structure of 
syllogisms 
Dialectical 
Practice Example 
Predicts a fact 
Analytical argument 
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence  
(There is a possibility that cloning might produce for me a monster cat. I would not clone my 
cat.)  
Yes, but cloning uses DNA to create identical cats. There is no possibility to get a monster cat.  
Cause to effect  
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
If we clone  an endangered animal it will be able to reproduce itself and thus raise a critical 
number  
When animals are above critical number they will be able to reproduce themselves 
We will not clone a lot of animals to save the food chain.  
(to drop the consequence :All animals will be the same and therefore they will lose their value)  
 
Statistical syllogism 
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
There is evidence indicating that mobile phones might cause cancer if used from children 
under 12 years old, so there is a possibility that your brother might get brain cancer if he uses a 
mobile phone.  
Calculations 
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence  
There is evidence indicating that mobile phones do not harm if used less than 5 hours per day.  
Your brother spends more time at schools where mobiles are forbidden, and so many hours 
doing other things, so there is no possibility to use it more than 5 hours per day.  
Your brother is not going to be harmed if he will get a mobile phone.  
Explains a fact 
Analytical argument Establish the necessity of means  
(We should clone to control animal population.)  
Yes, but physical death can control animal population, so hunting is not necessary. 
From analogy Establish the necessity of means  
 Human hunt and control animal population in the forest.  
Other animals act as humans, are hunters and control animal population in jungles.  
Analytical argument  Establish the truth of  a case  An eagle eats only what it needs, it does not store food for later use.   
Cause to effect 
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
Mobile phones have radiation. 
Radiation affects human brain. 
Mobile phones harm human brain.  
Cause to effect   Establish the necessity of means  
Meat provides proteins which are not included in vegetables. 
Proteins are essential for body growth 
Meat is necessary for our health. 
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Biology in the lessons: Epistemic practices situated in dialectical practice (Continued from previous page) 
Epistemic 
Practice 
Structure of 
syllogisms 
Dialectical 
Practice Example 
Defends a 
descriptive 
generalization  
From example  Establish the necessity of means  
I am a vegetarian and I do not have any health problem. 
Meat is not necessary for being healthy.  
From analogy Establish the necessity of means  
Physical death cannot control human population; therefore 
Physical death cannot control animal population. 
Analytical Establish the necessity of means  
We can eat vegetables for surviving. 
There is no need to eat meat.  
Evidence to 
hypothesis  
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
There is evidence that mobile phones affect hearing after 5 hours daily use.  
Mobile phones will harm your brothers hearing.  
Appeal to common 
spread wide belief 
 
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
I believe that mobile phones cause brain cancer because a girl had died from brain cancer and 
people believe that the cause was mobile phone use.  
 
Appeal to expert 
opinion 
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
I believe that weather mobile phones affect health depends on each person’s organism. 
No, scientists have not decided yet about such a claim.  
Appeal to evidence 
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
I believe that mobile phones create brain cancer. 
Yes but they have made research to cite such a claim (that mobile phones DO not cause brain 
cancer)  
Defends an 
explanation Effect to cause  
Establish the 
truth of a 
consequence 
The evidence about mobile phones and brain cancer is conflicting.  
There might be another factor affecting the study, which is each person’s organism.  
Table 43: Epistemic and dialectical practices in Biology 
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As a summary I can cite that Biology was the discipline to establish the truth of 
the consequences, the truth of natural laws used in moral appeals to natural laws, the 
necessity or sufficiency of means to biological ends and finally, an area in which 
solutions of negative consequences have been established. It has also been used to 
establish as true cases in which moral laws have been applied to evaluate an act as 
immoral. Agents of classroom discussions had applied several reasoning schemes 
when concluding in Biology claims: reasoning from criteria, causal reasoning, 
evidence to hypothesis, appeals to authorities, widespread common belief, evidence, 
effect to cause reasoning and calculations are the schemes that describe students’ 
reasoning. Students accordingly have been engaged in several epistemic practices: 
they had used readymade knowledge to perform predictions and explanations, they 
had formed explanatory hypotheses and had defended explanations and descriptive 
generalizations. Results also indicate that agents of the discussion have been 
simultaneously, within the same episode, in different stages of SDDS (Klahr, 2000 as 
cited in Zimmerman, 2007) with others being in the hypothesis generation stage, 
others in hypothesis testing and evidence evaluation, and finally, others that did not 
enter the space at all, and without a problem used non-established claims as 
established to defend predictions or ground decisions.  
 
4.4.4.4 Psychics: Sociology 
4.4.4.4.1 The situation of Sociology in practical reasoning  
   Sociology has been identified in argumentation for persuasion and argumentation 
for action explanation/defence (Graph 8). I regard that the first instance describes how 
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Sociology is situated in practical reasoning whereas the second describes a parallel 
emergence of Sociology, for explaining societal agent’s actions.  
The following paragraphs aim to describe the situation of Sociology in practical 
reasoning and also identify the instances in which Sociology has emerged.  
 
 
Graph 8: Sociology within or parallel to practical reasoning 
As shown in the graph above, Sociology has been the discipline in which the truth 
of sociological consequences, the necessity and sufficiency of means to social ends 
(needs) had been established as true. Additionally, instances appeared when social 
needs were put under consideration and agents had to provide them as true or not. 
There were cases where social consequences were perceived by students as a 
problem to be solved. For example, the fact that there is a possibility to clone really 
bad people like Hitler had driven students to cite solutions of the type “Governments 
should decide who to clone so this is a controlled process; with this process it would 
be impossible to clone people like Hitler” or, “If a bad clone emerges, then we can kill 
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him!”. The creative type of thinking here rests to the fact that from a problematic 
situation a solution is created (actually not one but a number of solutions might 
emerge to solve the same situation). This type of thinking though is complex and 
includes beyond the proposition of the solution, its test towards its capacity to 
diminish the consequence. This latter kind of reasoning could be therefore 
reconstructed as a syllogism of the type “Governments should decide who to clone; 
governments control process and do not make mistakes; there is not a possibility to 
clone Hitler again”. However, it was not possible to assign to a single utterance a 
double type of syllogism. In this sense I regard that the epistemic practice of 
“producing solutions” both encompass creative thinking of producing the solution, but 
also critical thinking to test its effectiveness. That’s why the truth of the statement “if 
governments decided, then Hitler would not come up again” is regarded as a fact 
situated in Sociology, and the fact that “if we hunt with limits animals would not be 
extinct” in Biology.  
Another case where Sociology has emerged was when agents were turning the 
context into one of explaining human actions/intentions/views and preferences. 
Human actions are social facts; in the lessons there have been cases that not all agents 
of the discussions believed those facts as true. For example students countered the fact 
that hunters abandon their dogs after the hunting period, or defended that children use 
their mobile phones for playing games by the use of personal experiences as 
examples. Those practices are assigned to Sociology as a discipline that could provide 
them as true or not (Do hunters really abandon their dogs? Do children really misuse 
mobile phones?). Actions’ explanations though are a practice situated in Psychology 
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and therefore the way by which this parallel context emerged is going to be discussed 
in the Psychology section.  
However, there were cases where the explanations of actions or views were based 
on social facts and the needs of humans. For example the explanation that parliament 
members support hunting  because people in that country are poor and therefore they 
need hunting for survival was countered because the country referred in the argument 
was Greece, which was not regarded as  a poor country (at least was not some years 
ago when the lessons had been taught). In this instance, explanation of action has a 
means end structure of syllogism: people have certain needs and that’s why they hunt. 
Sociology is the discipline to establish the necessity of means and the sufficiency of 
means for social groups. In this case means are not used to ground a decision about 
the issue, but they are used in an effort to reach a true explanation for human action. 
In this sense, action/ explanation/defence might be a form of Psychological inquiry in 
which Sociology is the discipline that can provide the truth of the facts (actual needs) 
that drive people to actions.  
 
4.4.4.4.2 Epistemic practices and syllogistic forms within Sociology  
Epistemic practices situated in argumentation for persuasion have already been 
analyzed in the Biology section; the practices situated in Sociology are akin to those 
of Biology with the difference that the facts that are to be established are not 
biological, but sociological ones.  
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Graph 9: Structures of syllogisms in Sociology 
A first remark about the graph above is that evidential support is completely 
omitted from students’ generalizations of social facts. Evidence has not been brought 
up as to whether societal members perform actions, or if the actions are really 
necessary or sufficient for enhancing the ends, or for performing predictions of future 
consequences in the social pane.   
Social facts have been established by the use of examples which actually were 
students’ experiences, and analytical arguments which actually indicate the deductive 
use of already accepted social facts/laws. For example, students had defended the fact 
that mobile phones affect human relationships by pointing to instances from their 
personal life where children do not spent time with their parents because of using 
mobile phones as games; they had also defended the truth of an action, i.e. the fact 
that policemen do not apply the law for hunters from personal experiences. The 
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necessity of means has been done by appealing to other social facts/laws that were 
actually indicating another action as sufficient to fulfil needs and therefore when used 
deductively countered the necessity of the action as means to an end (needs).  
It is interesting to mention the instance of “appealing to personal belief” above, 
even a single one. A student grounded the truth of an action by just pointing “I believe 
that such a thing happens; this is my belief” to ground the action that hunters abandon 
their dogs in nature. 
Causal explanations were used to ground the truth of social consequences. Causal 
laws of sociology have been applied to several cases to provide a social consequence 
as true or not. The following table indicates such examples:  
Structure of causal explanations used to predict social consequences 
Area that 
supports the case 
as true 
Case (Cause) Social (Cause to effect) Rule  
Social Fact 
(Effect) 
Biotechnology 
The clones need time 
to grow up; they come up 
as newborn babies. 
Social confusion rises 
because two persons are 
identically the same 
There is not a 
possibility to have 
social confusion. 
Sociology 
Adults spend a lot of 
time talking to mobile 
phones with associates 
when being at home and 
they do not spent time with 
their children. 
Spending time with 
someone is a factor 
affecting human 
relationships 
Mobile 
phones destroy 
family 
relationships 
Sociology 
Children might talk to 
their parents when those 
travel abroad or be in their 
jobs 
Spending time with 
someone is a factor 
affecting human 
relationships 
Mobile 
phones strengthen 
family 
relationships 
Politics Governments will decide who to clone 
When governments 
decide then mistakes are 
avoided 
There is no 
possibility to have 
Hitler as a clone 
to the society. 
Table 44: Structure of causal explanations used to predict social consequences 
 
As in the case of Biology where the use of science as technology (clone, hunt, use 
of mobile phones) was causally connected with certain effects in the natural world 
(animal population, health), the use of technology in the above cases was related to 
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certain social effects. This has been done when the case of possible use of technology 
was regarded as a cause that under social norms would provide some effects.  
The examples in the table above concerning human relationships show how the 
same causal law might point to contradictory conclusions when applied to different 
cases. The fact that family members might strengthen their relationships or not with 
the use of mobile phones was supported with the same law (spending time affects 
human relationships) that the fact that family members lose their relationships 
because of the use of mobile phones has been used to point to the contradictory 
conclusion. The law about human relationships has been applied to different cases and 
therefore had produced a different outcome. As the teacher in the classroom has 
recognized: 
“You are talking about the same thing, but under different 
circumstances”.  
 
Furthermore, causal explanations were used to defend the truth of an action 
(Hunters would not abandon a dog in nature for which they had paid a great amount 
of money). 
Finally, agents of the discussion did not come to form any new explanatory 
hypothesis by which a social fact would be explained and they did not reason from 
effect to cause or from signs to form an explanatory hypothesis for social facts.  
Summarizing the Sociology section I cite down the following:  
• Sociology has been the area that had validated social consequences, 
established the necessity and the efficiency of social needs. 
• However, as the lessons moved from argumentation for persuasion to 
contexts aiming to explain societal members’ actions and views, Sociology 
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has been the discipline to ground those actions as true, or establish the cases 
used to support explanations of actions as true. 
• The structures of syllogisms used in Sociology reveal that actions and 
explanations had been defended by the use of causal and non causal links; 
however evidential support was limited to the use of personal examples and 
not evidence. The results indicate that agents have used readymade 
knowledge to explain and predict facts alongside examples and deductive 
syllogisms to support social facts or explanations as true.  
 
4.4.4.5 Psychology  
4.4.4.5.1 The situation of Psychology in Practical Reasoning  
Psychology was not a discipline that enabled argumentation for persuasion in 
terms of establishing consequences, means or rules. As indicated in Graph 2 (The 
bases of the decisions about the issues) there was only one case where a psychological 
means has been provided as a reason to ground decision about hunting: “We have to 
hunt, because in this way we feel like great men, it is a means for us to feel that we 
have achieved something!”  
The table below indicates this fact: Psychology is not situated within Practical 
Reasoning but is situated in contexts aiming to explain human action and desires that 
actually are contexts parallel to those of grounding decisions about an issue. 
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Dialectical Practice Dialectical Contexts 
Dialectical practice 
Action 
explanation/ 
defence 
Argumentati
on for action 
explanation/ 
defence 
Argumentati
on for 
intention 
explanation/ 
defence 
Preference 
explanation Reflection 
View 
explanation/ 
defence 
Establish the sufficiency of means/alternatives   2 2       
Establish the truth of a consequence     1       
Establish the truth of an explanation   5 2       
Establish the truth of means    3         
Evaluate the relevance of the rule      3       
Explain preference       1     
Explain/defend action/intention/decision 15 2       6 
Infer students' views/decisions/positions         5   
Describe students’ views/decisions/positions      
 
  10   
 
Table 45: Psychology in dialectical contexts 
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However, there was a case where Psychology was a discipline that has been used within 
argumentation for persuasion. Agents of the discussion had to identify the position of their 
interlocutors in cases where this was not apparent. Inferring the other’s position or comparing the 
other’s positions from their initial positions are practices situated in Psychology that hold 
argumentative weight. The teacher and the students have been observing each other; they were 
considering others’ arguments and accordingly had drawn conclusions about their views towards 
the issue. The following example describes such an instance:  
“You have told us that mobile phones harm health; so you are against 
buying my brother a phone”  
“Most of you have been against human cloning in contrary with your 
position about animal cloning, where most of you have cited a positive 
position.” 
“None of us has voted for an argument as being the best argument that 
was lying in the opposite side of his /her position.” 
 
The above examples describe agents of classroom discussions as psychologists in the field: 
agents either collect evidence, or join it with psychological laws to form explanations of 
interlocutors’ behaviour. The fact that a student had cited a negative consequence drove the 
teacher to the conclusion that the student was against buying a mobile phone for her brother (a 
conclusion that might be questioned if we accept that the student might act under a deliberative 
context). Additionally, the fact that students did not recognize the strength of arguments beyond 
those supporting their own position can drive us, or the teacher to draw conclusions about 
children’s cognitive psychology.  
However, reflection, as this context was named after, was not the main domain where 
Psychology was identified. Psychology has been the discipline to explain and ground 
explanations about societal members’ actions. In which instances though did such contexts 
emerge in the classroom?  
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The instances identified for Psychology were akin to those identified and described about 
Introspective practices. Actually, explanations of actions have been used as argumentative moves 
to evaluate other arguments as irrelevant and as a means to bring arguments into the discussion, 
as indicated by the following episode.  
14. Teacher: I want you to tell me what you think about this issue, 
before reading anything. Should I buy a mobile phone for my brother?  
15. Teacher: Alvinos, tell us what you think. 
 16. Student: No, you should not buy him a phone because he is 
young and mobile phones affect young children. 
17. Teacher: What do they affect Alvinos?  
18. Student: His hearing.- 
19. Teacher: Ok, they harm hearing. Next student please.  
20. Student: Ok….I would like to have a mobile phone but my 
mother and father do not buy me a mobile phone because there is an 
energy affecting the human system... 
 
 
In this episode the student actually explains her parents’ actions in order to cite an argument 
in the discussion. (Of course she acts in a deliberative mode, she adds reasons but not with a 
strong argumentative force of convincing others not to buy a phone, but to consider them along 
with other issues). There were cases though, where others’ explanations of actions were used to 
drop arguments as irrelevant, and thereby move the discussion to another sub issue.  
For example, in the hunting lesson, when students were in an argumentative session trying to 
defend hunting or not by discussing the necessity of hunting as a means to control animal 
population, a student cited:  
But teacher, I think it is an activity that people really enjoy!  
 
This input of the student turned the discussion into one of exploring hunting as a sport and 
grounding explanations about why people really hunt. The student’s input into the discussion can 
be either evaluated as a fallacious movement, but also as an indirect argumentative move: he 
actually evaluated the issue of controlling animal population as irrelevant for the issue of hunting 
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or not. The student perceives that hunting is not a means of animal population control but as a 
means of pleasure, and therefore evaluates the discussion as irrelevant. The argumentative force 
of the utterance can also be grounded by the use of the term “But”. This cue actually lets us 
perceive the move as argumentative.   
There were cases where informative sessions about an issue had proven not as neutral as they 
had the potential strength to turn explanations of actions into reasons for supporting decisions. 
For example, the teacher of the cloning lesson had included in her informative session 
explanations of the type “Scientists clone because they want to save endangered animals” and 
“Another reason that drives people to clone recently, is because this practice can bring them back 
beloved pets”. Such information/explanations were turned into arguments when the 
argumentative session started.  
Actually students used the teachers’ information as reasons to support cloning animals (we 
should clone to save endangered animals, have beloved pets back). This instance does not carry 
any dialectical strength and does not situate explanations of actions into practical reasoning; 
however, it indicates that the two contexts, explanations of actions and argumentation for 
persuasion hold the same structural components - real needs that drive societal agents to perform 
actions (means to an end) and  use them with different dialectical strength (counter-defend or 
explain). Therefore, one context might be a feeder for the other: action explanation feeds 
argumentation with reasons supporting actions, whereas argumentation provided by agents might 
reveal reasons that guide behaviour of societal members.  
A final instance where Psychology emerged was when the teacher had explicitly set the issue 
under a micromorality mode and the students had to explain/defend their intentions towards the 
issue. For example when a student explained his intention of cloning a beloved pet because of his 
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need to have his own pet back to be happy, other students countered the efficiency of cloning as 
a means that could make the other agent happy, as the cloned animal would not be the original 
with which they had common experiences. Conclusively, the sufficiency of means to a 
psychological need, or the truth of psychological consequences have been explored when the 
issue has been put in a micromorality mode; chains of argumentation that had the purpose to 
support or counter intentions about a personal stated dilemma have been evolved indicating 
epistemic practices situated in Psychology.    
4.4.4.5.2 Epistemic practices and syllogistic forms within Psychology  
Psychological facts and explanations have been defended by the syllogistic forms presented 
in the graph that follows:  
 
Graph 10: Structures of syllogisms and epistemic practices in Psychology 
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As shown above, a variety of syllogisms have been employed to explain or predict 
psychological facts, defend descriptive generalizations (either explanatory or not) and even 
defend psychological explanations.  
A primary consideration is to refine the role of Psychology as explaining human action. 
Psychology is regarded as the discipline to ground the truth of explanations such as “People hunt 
because they want to experience the ancient way of life, to get the excitement of being a 
primitive man”. However, it is not clear whether “Scientists clone to save endangered species” is 
actually a psychological fact. This study reconstructs them as belonging to Psychology, because 
motivations are actually psychological in the sense that they drive us to action, even if they do 
not always aim to achieve a psychological end. In other words, examining motivation, or 
explaining human action is assigned in Psychology as a discipline, but this does not exclude that 
human action can be explained as resting on social or personal needs that fell beyond 
psychological ones. 
The following table shows the components of such explanations of human actions:  
Types of explanations of societal members’ actions 
Type of 
explanations Disciplines 
 Biology Psychology Sociology 
From 
Consequences 
My parents do not 
buy me a mobile phone 
because it harms health   
Means end 
Ancient people had 
to live; they hunted to 
survive. 
People need their 
beloved pets back; that’s 
why they spent so much 
money to clone dead pets.   
My friends go for 
hunting because they find 
company; they have a 
good time with friends.  
Rule case 
Human beings are by 
nature hunters; that’s 
why they hunt.  
People have criteria 
and that’s why they keep 
some animals for pets and 
some for slaughtering.  
We become hunters 
because our parents are 
hunters  
 
Table 46: Types of explanations of societal member’s actions 
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Consequences and needs have been cited to explain human behaviour. There were also 
instances where rules were cited as guiding human behaviour. For example, the teacher who set 
down the claim in the hunting lesson “We become hunters because our parents are hunters” had 
actually provided a rule to explain human behaviour, which was further grounded in an 
argumentative session that had followed. 
Motives have also been explored within classroom discussion. Consider the following 
episode:  
500. Student 1: Teacher, I want to talk about something different 
501. You might die, and the new cloned man still exists and nobody 
would like to use this man because he was useful only to you. You might 
die….  
502. Student 2: Yes, he would stay alone 
503. Student 1: Yes... 
504. Student 3: After a few years… 
505. Student: No problem! We can create another clone to keep him 
company! 
506. Teacher: Ok now. The super defender of cloning people has made 
the process of cloning a human akin to making a sandwich.  
507. “We can make another one, another one, another one” 
 508. We have said that we might use cloning to bring our beloved 
persons back, but we haven’t said that this process is the simplest in the 
world. It is not so easy to make clones and animal cloning entails a lot of 
unsuccessful efforts… 
 
The teacher somehow attacked the student that had advanced the solution of “creating 
another clone in case the prototype dies and the clone stays alone” by inferring that his reason is 
actually a way to support cloning, in that “You are so much in favour of cloning that you  made 
cloning seem so easy”. In this sense the teacher actually interprets and evaluates the rhetorical 
strategies applied from the students on a psychological basis.  
Furthermore, Psychology has explained and grounded explanations of human sentiments, 
and used such explanations to defend predictions.  
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When you kill an animal and you go to get it…you feel great, because 
you feel that you have done an achievement. You feel that your bullet has 
been used for something….  
You are going to see the cloned cat and remember your own one, but 
still not being able to have it…the original I mean. You might even be sad 
to look at the cloned cat.  
 
Explanations and predictions had also been defended or countered in the light of available 
evidence that most of the times had taken the form of examples, (experiences), analogies and 
deductions from other accepted psychological facts.  The following examples present some 
instances where explanations or predictions were defended as true or false:  
Almost all hunters I know personally have their fathers as hunters. I 
believe that it is the fact that our fathers are hunters that drive us to such 
an action (Evidence to hypothesis)  
You have not been bored of your cat until now, why would you get 
bored of the cloned cat? (From analogy)  
I am a hunter but my father is not a hunter. I just went one day with my 
uncle and I liked it so much that I continue to go, even if my father does not 
go   (From example)  
 
Finally, there were cases where the practices employed within Psychology had the form of 
forming a hypothesis. The fact that students and teachers were drawing conclusions about their 
interlocutors’ positions when they appeal to their arguments is a form or reasoning from sign. 
Agent A uses argument B. Agent C perceives the use of argument B as a sign of a specific 
position of Agent A. In this sense this practice is classified as one of hypothesis generation 
within Psychology. Another case in which agents moved from an effect to an unobservable cause 
was when some of the students’ arguments were processed to ground further hypotheses. For 
example, the fact that a student mentioned that “you might even be sad when you see the cloned 
cat” drove the teacher claim/hypothesize “So, we never forget our old cat, even if we have a new, 
cloned one”.  
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Summarizing the results about Psychology which actually terminate the discussion about 
Idioscopy, I can say that:  
• Psychology emerged when agents of the discussion observed and analyzed their 
interlocutors’ behaviour, when the agents used explanations of actions as means to bring 
reasons into discussion that would evaluate an argument as irrelevant, or add arguments 
to the pool of reasons in a deliberative mode, and finally, when the teacher explicitly set 
the issue under a micromorality mode and the students were acting as psychologists 
trying to predict their classmates’ psychological states when they would perform the 
action implied by the personal dilemma, and therefore drop or support the 
explanation/defence  of their intentions.  
• The structures of syllogisms used in Psychology reveal that actions, intentions and 
emotions had been defended by the use of causal and non causal links. Actions were 
explained by the use of means, consequences and rules whereas psychological rules 
were used as causing human emotions in different cases. The explanations provided 
though have been further defended or countered by the use of analogies, examples and 
evidential support.  
 
4.4.5 Other disciplines  
4.4.5.1 Informal Logic  
The branch of Informal Logic encompasses both the branch of normative logic as perceived 
from Peirce (1990, as cited in Pietarinen, 2006) which can evaluate the truth and soundness of 
arguments, but also what we call as “Rhetoric”. As   Blair and Johnson (1987) define, Informal 
Logic is the branch of logic whose task is to develop non-formal standards, criteria, procedures 
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for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, criticism and construction of argumentation. A slight 
difference from Peirce’s category of Logic Critic, the first branch of normative logic is that 
Informal Logic includes the norms of argumentation construction. According to Peirce’s 
taxonomy though, argumentation construction norms would be a branch of Methodeutic. 
Actually, the difference is slight as Informal Logic and Methodeutic are described as normative 
sciences that use criteria to evaluate the products or the processes of inquiry. Since a decision is 
to be made, methodeutic about argumentation and decision making process is not included in the 
description of the practices of Informal Logic.  
Informal logic was a discipline practised more by the chairman of the discussion, the 
teacher, who was taking the role of analyzing classroom discussion, organizing its content and 
sending it back to the classroom for better comprehension. However, it is not regarded as a pure 
teacher’s strategy because it holds a dialectical beyond its pedagogical dimension: analyzing 
what an interlocutor had said is a step in our reasoning when we are engaged in an argumentative 
discussion and we have to counter or further support our interlocutor’s sayings. Additionally, as 
a communication means, we have to make sure that what we have understood is what the 
interlocutor really meant.  
Finally, argumentative discussions are complex structures; we need processes of organizing 
their content so as to move i.e. from an argumentative session to a deliberative one where 
arguments collected need to be organized, evaluated and calculated.  
The practices described above were not performed only by teachers; actually, students had 
also been engaged in such practices. However, since this study presents the results as 
opportunities, I would support that Informal Logic is an opportunity when discussing a 
controversial issue; whether this area could be achieved by students as well it is rather a matter 
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of pedagogy (i.e. assigning the role of the chairman to students, or do not have a chairman at all) 
but also of Psychology (are the students capable of doing it?). However, describing the Informal 
Logic part of the lessons does not rest in the area of Psychology or Pedagogy. It rather rests on 
the curriculum level: Informal Logic is a part of the cognitive charge of the lesson either 
performed by the teacher or the students.  
Data analysis describes Informal logic practices as being situated in Practical Reasoning as 
follows:  
 
Graph 11: Informal Logic as situated in practical reasoning 
 
The results indicate that the analysis of argumentative talk was mainly done for the purposes 
of facilitating communication between group members, a practice that did not carry any 
dialectical weight beyond this. However, there were cases where this analysis was not accepted 
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by the interlocutors; analysis of argumentation from one party was therefore perceived as a 
manoeuvring from the other party that rejected the analysis as not true (I did not say that!).  
An issue that is of interest for further analysis is the kind of analysis performed by the agents 
and especially the teacher, the way that forces this analysis to students and students’ reactions 
towards such an analysis. Actually, an analysis of this kind falls within the scope of pedagogy 
which is not further explored here.  
Arguments have been evaluated for several purposes. A careful consideration of argument 
evaluation instances had provided the following cases:  
• Argument evaluation: an argumentative meta-level strategy of dropping 
arguments  
 
Arguments have been evaluated mostly about their relevance to the topic under 
discussion. The following episode provides example for such an instance.  
8. Student: I think we should hunt because in such a way we control 
animal population 
9. Teacher: Anyone else who wants to tell us something related to 
Nicholas argument?  
10. Student: I think that we have to eat, to survive, that’s why we need 
to hunt. 
11. Teacher: Yes, but Nicholas had said something else. He told us that 
we have to control animal population. Any other arguments on this issue? 
 
However, there were cases were the teacher’s analysis had evaluated the arguments of 
students as not being guided by reason and therefore had rejected them as “not reasons”. 
An example is provided below:  
34. Student: Please teacher, buy him a mobile phone, he is piteous….  
35. Teacher: Why Petros, why do you tell me to buy him a phone?  
36. Student: Because…if he is a good student…. 
37. Teacher: He is a very good student. And his exams are excellent.      
Beyond this.   
38. Student: If his behaviour is also good, why not?  
39. Teacher: He is well behaved also. Does this mean that I have to 
buy him a phone? I need you to justify why I should buy him a phone or not  
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40. Student 2: No teacher, do not buy him a phone.   
41. Teacher: Petros, I want you to tell me a reason why I should buy 
him a phone or not.  
 
This episode indicates that the teacher does not perceive appeals to pity as reasons 
and therefore rejects the student’s arguments as not being reasons by asking him to cite 
reasons for buying or not a phone for her brother. However, after the student’s pressure 
she wrote on the board the reason “Because he is a good student”.  
• Argument evaluation: a deliberative method of identifying their relationship 
towards the issue and their weight 
Within deliberation parts of the lesson teachers asked students to explicitly evaluate 
arguments in terms of being “positive” or “negative” for the decision towards the issue, 
or as being very important, or less important. The two lessons that employed such 
practices followed a similar path: both teachers used the argumentative sessions of their 
lessons as a method to create a pool of arguments that had to be evaluated, weighed and 
calculated somehow in order for a decision to be made. Since this activity had to follow 
argumentation sessions, only a few minutes were left for that and therefore we do not 
have any information of how arguments were evaluated; we had the evaluations (I 
believe that the most important argument is the argument about having our beloved 
persons back-cloning lesson) but we did not have explanations or further support for 
such evaluations.  
Beyond argument evaluation agents used arguments as propositions to group and organize 
them according to several criteria. For example, teachers acting as chairmen  grouped arguments 
when those were cited by the students in argumentative sessions so deliberation might be 
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enhanced in the following parts of the lessons. The episode below provides an example of 
thematic grouping of arguments.   
65. Student: No, because mobile phones might harm him.  
66. Teacher: So, you tell us no because of health issues. I therefore 
write down: Health reasons. Andrew. 
67. Student 2: If he plays all day with his mobile phones it might 
affect more his brain and …. 
68. Teacher: So, you also cite health reasons. 
 
Finally, there were cases when arguments were grouped because of being similar, or being 
evaluated as “opposite”. 
Summarizing, Informal Logic has been used to reconstruct and analyze argumentative talk 
as a communication means that the chairman had provided for group members and as a means of 
accepting or rejecting such an analysis. Furthermore, it was the discipline that evaluated 
arguments as irrelevant, reason-based within argumentative sessions, or as positive-negative, 
strong-sound in deliberative sessions. Deliberation also used Informal logic for comparing and 
grouping arguments according to thematic criteria, and finally for weighing arguments in terms 
of importance as a means for thoughtful decision making. 
 
4.4.5.2 Methodeutic 
Methodeutic is defined by Peirce (1905 as cited in Pietarinen 2006) as the third branch of 
Normative Logic, “the study of the proper way of arranging and conducting an inquiry”. The 
results had revealed two types of Methodeutic within the lessons: one referring to norms about 
conducting a scientific inquiry, and the other about conducting a thoughtful decision making, 
establishing a decision or argumentative process.  
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Graph 12: The situation of Methodeutic in practical reasoning 
 
A first issue to clarify is the establishment of the argumentation/decision making method as 
done explicitly in the lessons and as done within argumentation for persuasion. In the first case, 
the teacher had informed students about the structure of the task and had informed them about 
how decisions were to be made, or argumentative sessions would start and move on.  
For example the teacher that taught mobile phones had said “I need more information to 
decide whether I should buy my brother a mobile phone. Do you get it? The issue here is 
knowledge. Decisions need knowledge”. Accordingly, students cited in latter sessions of the 
same lesson that “It is not the number of arguments that is of importance, but the weight of them. 
If there are hundreds of positive arguments but the one negative is that I would die if I used 
mobile phones, then what’s the point of counting them?” This place of Methodeutic in this case 
is akin to what Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) describe as the opening stage of 
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argumentation where the interlocutors, among others decide how to solve their difference of 
opinion, even if teachers used this kind of reasoning in latter stages of the lessons as concluding 
remarks.“Those issues (controversial) are too complicated; it’s not so easy to form an opinion 
about them and keep it stable; we always have to get into inquiry about them” (cloning lesson) or 
“Now I am going to my house I am going to consider all those arguments, weigh them, calculate 
them and take a decision; I hope you follow the same process”.  
However, there were cases that Methodeutic was used as a norm to evaluate arguments and 
therefore is situated within argumentation for persuasion, in the confrontation stage. Agents of 
the discussion, and especially teachers, evaluated arguments as not following a proper method of 
argumentation or decision making process and therefore this practice is akin to those of Informal 
Logic’s ones. For example, when a student in the cloning lesson advanced a question-argument 
about whether scientists could clone humans from dead persons, the teacher ended the session by 
advancing the reason “We should not discuss issues about which we are not sure”. In this sense 
she advances a rule for decision making or argumentation “Talk about what you are sure about” 
which is further used to drop argument as not “discussable”. In another case, the same teacher 
evaluated a student’s claim that “there is no possibility that such an action happens” with the 
methodeutic norm “Never be sure about anything”.  
Finally, there were cases that instead of individual arguments, the decision making process 
was evaluated. When a student cited that “We should ask his mother for buying him a phone or 
not”, the teacher had advanced the norm “His mother does not have a problem. However we 
should provide arguments for her”. In that way she describes a decision making process that 
should be based on arguments rather than authorities’ decisions, she cites a methodeutic norm 
and applies it to evaluate an argument or a suggestion from students.  
 370 
 
The second instance of methodeutic refers to the evaluation of methods of acquiring 
evidence. Though small in scale, there were instances in which students had evaluated the source 
of evidence as indicated in the Biology inquiry episode as presented in Table 41 (Agents of 
discussion being in different stages of scientific inquiry). Evidence has been evaluated as valid 
because it has been a result of research, and widespread common belief was evaluated as not 
valid because of its not research-based nature. Accordingly,  in the cloning lesson the teacher  
explained why the claim of “Consuming cloning animals’ meat or milk is safe” could not be 
established as true or not, since nobody has consumed at least for a decade such meat or milk, 
thereby  using methodeutic norms to evaluate the truth of knowledge claims. 
Summarizing the Methodeutic part, I conclude that Methodeutic was used to establish and 
use norms for argumentation and decision making process and for evaluating knowledge claims. 
Norms about argumentation and decision making process have been advanced in the opening 
stage of argumentation to establish the process. They have also been used as evaluative means of 
argumentation and decision making process in several cases. Finally, norms about scientific 
inquiry have been applied to evaluate the validity of contradictory evidence.  
 
4.4.6 The start of any inquiry: Asking questions  
This final part of the results chapter aims to describe a non-propositional epistemic practice 
that marks the start of inquiry for several disciplines: the practice of asking questions. Those 
questions do not refer to prompts of the teacher that had the pedagogical goal of engaging 
students in the discussion. The questions that this session describes resemble what Chin and 
Malhotra (2008) describe as the cognitive process of generating research questions, which is 
classified as an authentic inquiry process. 
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The results indicate that students generated potential research questions while being in 
informative sessions and had actually started to deliberate about issues.  
Teacher, can you take two persons and put them into one with cloning?  
The above question is potentially a research question: it might spark a whole discussion, or 
even experimentation stage if expressed by a scientist in a laboratory. The context that the 
question has raised is a deliberative, or even an argumentative one: the student gets informed 
about cloning practice as a problematic situation, since clones might not have parents in the 
conventional form that we are used to, and she wonders whether cloning might include a two 
parents’ DNA donation.  
Similar questions have been raised in argumentative sessions also. Students have set down 
research questions, given the problematic of the situations:  
- Would the milk and meat of cloned animals be of good quality? Dangerous for 
health? (cloning lesson) 
- Are we going to suffer from brain cancer because we are using mobile phones? 
(mobile phones lesson)   
- Can natural death control animal/human population? (hunting lesson)  
Even though the last question has been stated from the teacher, it was set down as a start of 
an inquiry cycle, in which the teacher participates in equal footing. As he says:  
“It was a subject (physical death as capable of controlling animal population) that was 
raised from a student and I have to say that I was not prepared for this argument. I had to 
explore it with students, hear their thoughts, and come up to a conclusion….” (Teacher of 
hunting lesson)   
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Sociological and psychological inquiry also started with the use of similar questions by 
classroom agents.  
-Why do adolescents need mobile phones?  
-What are the consequences in society if cloning is allowed?  
-Why do we enjoy hunting?  
Questions like the above have been raised from teachers and students as well, marking the 
start of an inquiry session that could serve the purpose of establishing parts of a practical claim 
as true. In the same way that students were engaged in practices such as defending or generating 
explanations and predictions in order to establish components of practical claims (needs, rules 
and consequences) they also generated research questions that their answer would establish a 
knowledge claim capable of being used to those argumentative chains.  
The inquiry though was not restricted in factual issues situated in the natural, social or 
psychological world. Students and teachers identified potential conflict points, thereby marking 
the start of a social policy inquiry, or a moral inquiry:  
-Who will decide who is going to be cloned?  
-Which criteria should we use when selecting who to clone?  
- A person might be a brilliant scientist, but how can I know if he is of a good character?  
The cognitive process described above is one of identifying potential problematic situations; it 
actually sparks the start of a discussion of a minor controversial issue resting on a lower level in 
relation to the general issue of cloning  that has been stated as a central issue. And it is in this 
sense that those questions are regarded as an authentic practice of entering a Social Policy 
inquiry, which is actually a deliberation about an action to be taken.  
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In analogy, agents of the discussions identified moral issues that had to be further inquired 
into:  
-How did we end up treating some animals as pets but others as food?  
-Should we eat meat?  
-What should we do if a really bad man emerged as a clone?  
This kind of inquiry might be named as a “moral inquiry” according to a cognitivist view of 
moral reasoning, where moral rules are products of latest inquiry in the same way that natural 
rules emerge from scientific inquiry.  
As already discussed in the theoretical part of this thesis, argumentation and inquiry have 
interchangeable roles: argumentation provides the claims that have to be inquired into, but as 
inquiry starts new chains of argumentation emerge so as alternative explanations are to be 
excluded and knowledge claims are established.  
The results of this study just verify the connection between argumentation and inquiry stated 
above: the controversial issues discussions have been a place where scientific (natural, social, 
and sociological), social policy, or moral inquiry had sparked because agents had to establish 
knowledge, practical or moral claims. Those claims might have already been used in the 
discussion as arguments grounding decisions and students had put them under question; others 
had to be established as true so as they would successfully be used in following arguments 
(inquiry was preceding argumentation and its role was to establish components of arguments). 
As soon as those claims were put under question though, new chains of argumentation emerged.  
  In the same way that the agents of the discussion engaged in epistemic practices of generating 
and defending explanations, hypotheses and predictions, being situated in different stages of the 
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scientific inquiry cycle, they also sparked the beginning of those cycles: they generated questions 
- subjects of inquiry either for Natural or Social Sciences, Ethics, or Social Policy.  
A final note for obstacles for such an analysis had to be taken. Differentiating “pedagogical” 
from “dialectical” questions was really difficult, and in many cases, I had the perception that 
teachers’ questions had both dimensions. Defining the border lines between Pedagogy and 
Inquiry is far from blurry. I have to cite that for the purposes of this study, a “minimally” 
pedagogical analysis had taken place: since what I need to describe is the “cognitive charge”, the 
epistemic practice performed within the discussions, I need to analyze a lot of teachers’ 
questions as inquiry, because the teacher (even for pedagogical purposes) as an individual needs 
to make an analysis of the issue and come up with questions- identify knowledge claims that are 
not established, or for which science or morality is still in the making and need further 
exploration. Put in its simplest form, my argument supports that the identification of claims to be 
further investigated is an epistemic practice that is described as the initiation of any inquiry 
cycle. Even if this practice is performed for pedagogical purposes, it precedes pedagogy and 
might somehow be distracted as a standalone practice of the teacher holding a specific cognitive 
charge.  
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5. Discussion 
 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the results in relation to their capacity to answer the 
questions of this study. Furthermore, it aims to discuss the implications of the results in the light 
of different frameworks that relate to controversial issues and the science curriculum. The 
contribution of the study that rests on a methodological level regarding tools for situating 
controversial issues in the science curriculum and reconstructing argumentative talk in science 
classrooms, alongside its theoretical contribution to the discussion about controversial issues and 
the science curriculum is going to be explored. Finally, limitations and suggestions for further 
research are going to be discussed.  
This study has been designed within the problematic situation of implementing controversial 
issues in science curriculum as a means to provide information from classroom based practice, 
that would be a result of teacher’s designed and implemented curriculum, and interpret such 
information with the use of theoretical conceptualizations from disciplines that philosophize 
about scientific enterprise and study discourse and practices beyond science education. 
The problematic of the situation as being narrowed in this study, refers to the different 
perspectives regarding the situation of controversial issues in science curriculum, the goals and 
priorities of such an implementation, though the results of this study might also be used  as 
hypotheses for investigating issues of pedagogy. 
However, this study had to address two major methodological problems, which finally were 
added as purposes of this study: the first one was to conceptually define “the situation of 
controversial issues in the science curriculum” as a construct of distinct epistemological areas 
and the second one refers to the use of appropriate tools that would enable such a description. 
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Both methodological problems have been examined within this study through a process of 
mutual interaction between analyzing classroom data, search in the literature about conceptual 
tools that would be able to describe the emerging categories and on the other, by identifying new 
areas implied by the literature and apply them in data analysis. The mutual interaction between 
data analysis and literature review has finally created the theoretical construct presented in the 
data analysis and results of this study.  
The questions of this study have been addressed so they could describe the methodological 
alongside the conceptual orientation of the study. The following section will discuss the 
theoretical implications that derive from the results, thereby fulfilling the aim of this study: 
inform the discussion about the implementation of controversial issues in the science curriculum 
with insights from implemented curriculum in authentic classroom environments.  
5.1 What do the results say about implementing controversial issues in the science 
curriculum?  
The following paragraphs aim to analyze the results and interpret them within the main 
frameworks that relate controversial issues and the science curriculum. In this sense, the 
discussion of the results takes also the form of implication about theory related to controversial 
issues and the science curriculum, as will be shown in the next paragraphs.  
A note however, has to be taken before the discussion: a critical discussion about the 
limitations of each framework in a theoretical level is already done in section 2.2 of the literature 
review of this study. What is to actually discuss here are the theoretical and practical 
implications related to each framework that the results of this study draw. Therefore, this section 
actually discusses the results as related to specific frameworks; it thereby contributes to the 
discussion presented in section 2.2 by providing instances from classroom data that could affect 
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our theoretical conceptualizations about sub issues, thereby enhancing our critique about several 
frameworks related to the implementation of controversial issues in the science curriculum. 
That’s why the results are examined through the lenses of each theoretical framework separately.  
5.1.1 Science education for citizenship: Science view for thoughtful decision making 
According to this perspective, teaching with or about controversial issues is done under the 
use of science as a lesson, unique and indispensable, that could make a significant contribution to 
citizenship education (Wellington, 2004, p.34; Crick Report, 1998, p.35; Ractliffe & Grace, 
2003). Students should base their decisions on science, according to this framework, which is 
interpersonal, and rooted in a community of scholars, based on accumulated evidence, open to 
scrutiny and falsification (Wellington, 2004, p.36). 
A first implication of this study that derives from theoretical conceptualizations about moral 
reasoning is that such a view is actually moral, and could be described as utilitarianism. Basing 
our decisions solely on science, can be interpreted that we base our decisions on issues that can 
be answered by science: factual issues that can be resolved with the use of evidence. As 
Wellington (2004, p.36) argues, all the ethical and moral decisions we have to make about the 
distribution of resources, feeding the world’s population or preserving the ecosystem of the 
planet are grounded in the physical and natural world and therefore are grounded in science. 
However, the results of this study reveal the obvious: agents of the discussions based their 
decisions not only on factual issues, (consequences and necessity of means) but also on moral 
issues (the obvious refers to the fact that controversial issues are by definition issues that cannot 
be resolved by the use of evidence alone). By which means can we ground utilitarianism as the 
core moral stance, and move-convince students to adopt it as superior to other moral stances? 
Would we like to do it?  
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The results of this study actually, indicate that utilitarianism is a moral stance of a lot of 
students. Actually, deontological, moral rules did not dominate, and they were not a part of 
students’ arguments grounding decisions about the issues presented in the lessons, even if the 
two of them carry a heavy moral charge (cloning and hunting) in the society. Actually, in the 
cloning lesson there was not a moral consideration about cloning. Moral and metaphysical 
considerations came up when solutions had emerged.  
Those results are contradictory with other results about students and socioscientific issues. 
The influence of values in the decision making process is evident in primary school 
(Lymbouridou and Constantinou, 2003), middle school (Hogan, 2002), high school (Zeidler et al, 
2002), college students (Sadler, 2004, Sadler and Zeidler, 2004) and adults as well (Bell & 
Lederman, 2003). Studies have shown that values and ethics embedded in the circumstances the 
students faced had a primary impact in their decision making. The research in other words 
indicates what Sadler & Donelly (2006) have also documented: students construe the 
controversial issues under the consideration as moral problems. 
In this study however, biological and sociological needs and consequences were dominant in 
students’ decisions. Furthermore, even if some issues have been presented from the teacher to be 
elaborated as ethical, like “Should we eat meat?”, “Should we kill small swallows for practice?” 
they have not been perceived as moral by students (moral in the deontological sense). Students 
had established such actions as right or wrong based on the calculation of their consequences, or 
their capacity to fulfil human needs (the need to be healthy, the need to have a good and effective 
practice).  
I cannot assume that the results of this study hold a generalization force and can ground a 
psychological result of the type: Students do not perceive issues as moral. However, they 
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indicate that such a stance is probable, or that not all issues that concern students and are related 
to the issue under discussion are moral. The results support that there is a room for such a 
framework to be applied.  
However, if the term “science” in the above framework refers to natural and not social or 
psychological sciences then the scope is narrowed in a great sense. How can the social part be 
distracted from the physical one? How can one be more concerned with the consequences that 
affect the environment or his health but not for social consequences that might affect his 
relationships with other people? Why someone should be concerned with biological and not 
social needs? I do not have an answer to present, but I would like to mention that such an effort 
might be unnatural, and difficult to achieve in classroom settings. How can “Informed decision 
making” be narrowed as a term, so as to include only issues that refer to needs and consequences 
that might be grounded by natural sciences?  
A different implication about this framework that the results draw, is that if such a shrinkage 
takes place -eliminate the discussion in factual issues situated in natural sciences -  then we really 
lose a great opportunity to deal with factual issues that could be grounded by natural sciences, 
but do not actually emerge as biological/environmental needs or consequences. The results 
pointed to several instances where Biology has been used as a discipline to ground facts as 
“true”. Social consequences were based on facts that could be grounded in Biology or 
Biotechnology as a discipline. For example, whether the clone would come up as a baby, or 
would carry the diseases of its prototype are issues that Biology has been used to ground them as 
true. However they might not come up if students did not perceive issues as social to cite the 
social consequence of confusion, or as emotional so as to be concerned with how they would feel 
if their beloved person -coming as a clone- would die again. To put it in a general statement, our 
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emotions and social consequences are based on facts. Those facts though have to be established 
in an argumentative environment. In this way by bringing our emotional or social concern into 
the disagreement space we allow science to take its place and provide the truth of the causes that 
might affect our emotions or the wider social space.  
Additionally, there were specific types of moral reasoning that needed Biology to ground 
their components as true. Naturalism moves syllogistically by looking at nature, implying laws 
and evaluates human action accordingly to those laws as moral or not. Naturalism needs also to 
be grounded in Biology.  
In this way this study contributes to our understanding about Ethics, Natural Sciences, 
Social Sciences and emotional issues by implying that those are actually intersected: facts are 
used with emotions or moral rules to imply, evaluate or explain action. Those facts might be 
questioned in an argumentative session and therefore have to be established within the Natural, 
Social or Psychological sciences. Additionally, moral rules might be established in facts and 
therefore have to be further elaborated in natural or social sciences. In other words, the existence 
of emotions, or morality might be an authentic opportunity for Natural and Social Sciences to 
appear in the lesson.  
There is a view that the demarcation of curriculum in disciplines is not children oriented, 
since children regard the world as a whole and they do not separate their thoughts in a way a 
curriculum developer might do. This line of thought actually situates controversial issues as 
multidisciplinary, or rather interdisciplinary; the discussion of controversial issues is an 
inseparable construct of epistemic practices situated in several disciplines that all contribute to 
the formation of the decision about an issue. Again, separating the natural sciences’ part from all 
other parts might constitute a shortage of cognitive charge used to perform epistemic practices 
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situated in other disciplines, that rest on empirical data not deriving from the natural, but from 
the social or psychological world. 
 
5.1.2 Controversial issues for science education: Epistemological issues in focus  
According to this framework, controversial issues are a means of fostering epistemological 
issues in science education. Students should be able to ask for evidence and clarify whether a 
claim is supported by evidence at all, or whether it is merely a guess, an assumption, or personal 
opinion or impression (Kolsto, 2001a, p.309). Additionally to the previous framework, 
socioscientific controversial issues are regarded as a fine opportunity for the teacher to initiate a 
discussion on the differences between knowledge claims from frontier sciences and established 
consensual scientific knowledge and on the different aspects of the nature and epistemology of 
scientific knowledge (Kolsto 2000; Ryder, 2001). 
The results of this study that refer to epistemological understanding can be grasped from the 
Methodeutic science. The results had revealed two types of Methodeutic within the lessons: one 
referring to norms about conducting a scientific inquiry, and the other about conducting a 
thoughtful decision making, establishing a decision or argumentative process.  
It is remarkable that evidential support was not the main engine that has driven classroom 
discussions. Most evidential support to descriptive generalizations had the form of examples, 
students’ experiences.  
Students considered evidential support only within the mobile phones lesson which was 
explicitly designed so as to include contradictory evidence, and students had not dealt with the 
issue until the teacher had insisted on deciding between two contradictory claims regarding brain 
cancer and mobile phones relationship. The results indicate that when students came across 
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contradictory evidence, they were simultaneously, within the same episode, in different stages of 
SDDS: some students were in the hypothesis generation stage and others in hypothesis testing 
and evidence evaluation stage. Finally, a group of students did not enter the hypothesis space at 
all; without considering contradictory evidence they perceived used non-established claims as 
established and actually had used one of the two contradictory claims to defend predictions, or 
ground decisions about the issue.  
 There are studies that perceive akin reactions of students towards evidence as shortcomings. 
For example, students are described as distorting scientific evidence to adjust to their prior 
beliefs without being aware of doing so (Sodian et al, 1991, p.759, Bell 1995, p.13), or  
dismissing scientific knowledge as irrelevant to decision making when reasoning about 
controversial issues (Zeidler et al, 2002), ignoring data that they ought to consider when 
evaluating claims or assimilating such data in ways that do not damage their current theories 
(Sandoval 2001, p.1, Chinn and Brewer, 1998, Klahr et al, 1990; Kuhn et al., 1998 as cited in 
Sandoval 2001, p.15). In contrast, this study perceives those instances as potential opportunities, 
expected routes that the discussion might take if contradictory evidence is presented.  
This study does not have the means to question the claims provided by scholars above as 
true or not; however it questions the evaluative weight they put on such practices. If scientists 
might come up with a new hypothesis when confronted with contradictory evidence, why should 
children not do so? And if contradictory evidence is always tested against current theories, why 
do students’ naïve theories have to be (if they can be) ignored when evaluating contradictory 
evidence? How might alternative hypotheses, that might hold the status of accepted knowledge 
by participants, be used in the light of contradictory evidence? Is there ever any scientist 
collecting evidence about a hypothesis without holding beliefs about the issue or other related 
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issues? How would he come to form a hypothesis at all if such a conceptualization would not 
exist?  
The practical implication from above considerations is that epistemological issues 
concerning evidence evaluation are only a part of hypothesis testing and have to be reconsidered 
alongside other practices situated in this stage, which are testing the results in relation with 
previous theories or alternative hypotheses, or coming up to new hypotheses that might explain 
contradictory evidence. Evidence can only be judged as plausible or implausible in relation to 
current knowledge, theory or belief (Zimmerman, 2005, p.36). Designers of curriculum cannot 
assume that the evidence evaluation phase can be seen as a standalone phase of hypothesis 
testing.  
Furthermore, as the results show, participants might ignore the issue about which evidence is 
contradictory since other reasons might be more relevant or stronger for them towards a decision 
about an issue. Agents might even resolve it in one way or another in order to move on with their 
decisions about the issue. In other words, the claim for which evidence is contradicting might not 
be their main concern. In this sense the socioscientific might be a distraction for the 
epistemological.  
I am not sure if I would advise someone who really wants to deal with issues concerning 
evidence evaluation to use socioscientific issues as a context (socioscientific issues in the sense 
we are using it here: a process of discussing about a decision to be made for an action).  
Controversial issues might be used as the spark for such a discussion but I am not sure if a result 
of the discussion “Should I do A?” could explicitly lead or enhance an inquiry or evidence 
evaluation environment where the claim “Does A really causes B?” is explored. This route could 
be taken if we are really situated in a utilitarian moral stance and therefore we need to define the 
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truth of the consequences or means, and additionally, if the consequence or need we explore is so 
important that it diminishes all other consequences or needs that this action might create or fulfil.  
On the other hand, really considering the truth of consequences in a map of needs, 
consequences and moral stances are attitudes that science education is called to cultivate within 
the notion of “thoughtful decision making”. Using controversial issues as a context is an 
opportunity of assigning authenticity in science classrooms. However, how one might survive in 
such a situation is a pedagogy issue, and cannot be answered within this study. Perhaps new 
research, aiming at this specific point, the exploration of epistemological issues, as a matter of 
pedagogy and curriculum and not explicitly as a matter of students’ abilities (because there is a 
considerable piece of evidence referring to the latter, i.e. the cognitive processes when examining 
anomalous evidence (Chinn & Malhotra, 2002), skills in coordination of theory and evidence 
(Kuhn, 1989), the influence of values in decision making (Hogan, 2002; Sadler, 2004, Sadler and 
Zeidler, 2004; Zeidler et al, 2003; Gray and Bryce, 2006)) would  give further instances that 
could draw useful implications for curriculum developers and pedagogues. This piece of research 
should not derive from students’ interviews; we do not need to draw conclusions about how 
students come to decisions. We would rather investigate how evidential considerations are 
explored within controversial issues in classroom settings, a process which actually might be a 
special focused replication of this study.  
5.1.3 Focusing on the ethical aspects of Science: Moral development of students   
This framework derives from the need for “humanizing” science education since traditionally 
it is not related to ethics and morals. Teaching has been described as “moral by nature” meaning 
the very essence of good teaching involves the ethical and moral development of young people 
(Loving, et al., 2003, p.183) and therefore students should be given opportunities to explore 
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beyond scientific understanding (what we know, we can do) and ethical judgments (what we 
believe we should do), which could contribute to the moral development of students (Fullick & 
Ratcliffe, 1996; Hall, 2004).  
The results of this study indicate that such a humanization can be done when students 
consider the morality of the action for which the decision has to be made, but also when they 
enter the wider societal space and evaluate actions already performed by societal agents or 
themselves. Additionally, since the principles used to evaluate actions were not be accepted by 
the participants, new loops of argumentation have been used to establish those rules as true or 
valid.  
Furthermore, even if students might not perceive the issues as moral at first, the results 
indicate that there are also other instances where morality can be explored: when consequences 
are diminished by solutions, those solutions might be put under moral consideration. 
Additionally, alternative means have to be established as moral to be accepted as alternatives. 
Clones as creatures with souls that have the right to live, were only considered as an issue when 
a student had cited the solution that “There is no problem if a bad clone emerges, we can kill 
him!” No one had mentioned the issue of the status of the life of a clone as an argument 
supporting cloning or not.  
The results above can be used for other frameworks as well in a diverse way: either you 
include it in initial lesson plans or not, morality might emerge from anywhere! In this sense it is 
an unavoidable aspect of the issues that might come up one way or another.  
Another implication of the results is that not all students perceive issues as moral and a 
moral question might be answered in terms of utility. Whether we should eat meat or not, or 
slaughter animals was not perceived as moral by all students. Even if the teacher had advanced 
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such questions in a need to explore morality in deciding what is the right thing to do, 
deontological was replaced by the utilitarian. However, as already explored, utilitarianism is a 
moral stand, and ethical egoism - deciding if something would be beneficial for us without 
regarding others’ benefit- is another. How can we survive when moral stances contradict with 
each other? How would we explore situations where utilitarian demands contradict with Divine 
laws, natural laws, or other deontological principles? 
 In the lessons there was not a meta-level discussion which would lead to a hierarchy of 
moral stances, or to morals as contradicted with means and consequences. However, this would 
be a core of moral reasoning or a moral character education. Those instances were not 
encountered in the lessons. 
However, there was room for a meta-level discussion, especially when arguments from 
deliberative or argumentative sessions have been collected and organized, but still not explored 
in order to point to a final conclusion. Specifically, the argument evaluation, or argument 
weighing activities in the end of the lessons of cloning and mobile phones could be further 
extended so those evaluations and weights would be used to ground a final decision.  When 
arguments are there and agents act in a deliberative mode, they have to weight, calculate and 
prioritize consequences, needs and moral rules to reach a decision. In the case they act in an 
argumentative mode they have to use those calculations and priorities to defend their decision or 
position. This activity though was not included in the lessons due to the limitation of time and 
therefore we do not have information of how it could go further.  
A final remark about morality and the discussions is that the whole process of discussing 
what to do about a societal issue is an instance of “morality in the making”. Since the issue of 
what to do is set under question, and students are called as equals to contribute to the formation 
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of the decision to be taken, rather than subjects to which ready-made solutions would be forced, 
they participate in the process of establishing morality that can be applied to contemporary issues 
that previous generations might not have encountered.  
 
5.1.4 Socioscientific discourse for the cognitive, psychological, social and emotive growth of 
the child  
The main difference between this framework and the others refers to the engagement of 
students’ emotions not as obstacles but as essential in a notion that implements socioscientific 
issues in science curriculum since students should not decide about what should or should not be 
done under a notion of macromorality (Rest, et al., as cited in Zeidler, et al., 2005, p. 359) but 
they rather engage in the resolution of socioscientific controversies in a level of micromorality: 
their emotions alongside their beliefs are considered as important in the decision-making 
procedure. 
The results indicate that students entered personal reflection not only when the issues were 
set under a micromorality mode but also when they themselves switched the context into one of 
micromorality as a means to evaluate the relevance of the discussion for themselves or for 
societal members, and also as a means to add arguments in a neutral based discussion that were 
related to their own psychological state.  
The switch of the teacher to a micromorality mode is evaluated as a successful means of 
enabling emotional reflection and personal conjecture with the issues. But as shown above this 
was not the only instance of such a personal involvement. And as with all results of this study, 
this implication can be read upside down: even if you turn the issue to a micromorality mode, or 
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not, students might perceive it as such in their need to express how they locate themselves within 
the issue.  
An additional context that has emerged from this study is that of explaining not only one’s 
intentions but also other societal members’ actions, views and desires. Actually both contexts, 
micromorality and action explanation/defence hold the same purpose within the discussions: they 
make the discussion relevant to the person engaged in the discussion or the societal agents of a 
specific time and place that have to decide or already perform actions related to the discussion. 
Hunters do not hunt to eat meat to survive nowadays, and therefore this explanation can be 
turned into an argument that evaluates the discussion about the necessity of hunting as a means 
for food as irrelevant. Additionally, emotions of students created by special experiences (a girl 
that had lost her mother because of brain cancer) might drive them to be very careful in future 
decisions as they are afraid to have the same pain again. 
Another implication drawn from the results of this study is that micromorality, 
action/decision/view/desire explanation and argumentative contexts, are interrelated: the 
connector line between argumentative (about the issue) and explanatory (about self or other 
agents) contexts rests on the basic blocks that both contexts hold: ends (needs), consequences 
and rules. Those elements explain human action but they can also ground the decision for an 
action to be taken and vice versa: since an argument with a psychological ground is set, it might 
be further explored as an explanation of intention, beyond its status as a reason grounding a 
decision.  
The practical implication of such a claim is that, even being fallacious, or being evaluated as 
“subjective” or “emotional” in contrary to “factual”, or “objective”, reasons that guide us to 
action or raise emotions to us, can also be used to ground a decision about an issue. In this sense 
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the pedagogical use of those contexts (micromorality, action/decision/view/desire explanation) 
might be a feeder of arguments that could enrich classroom discussion under special 
circumstances.  
The results also indicate that not all reasons used to explain human action are of emotional 
character. People base their intentions and actions also on consequences and needs that fall 
beyond psychological ones. And it is in this sense that those contexts might feed the argument 
with more reasons, psychological or not. 
A final, but not minor implication has to be presented down. As curriculum developers we 
might include those issues for cultivating critical thinking, moral reasoning, and epistemic 
reasoning but students might perceive them as personal. This implies that apart from their minds 
we distort their sentiments also; and this might be harmful in cases that we might cause them fear 
and even panic about issues under discussion. The students’ anxiety about them as users of 
mobile phones was explicitly cited: “But teacher, are we going to get brain cancer because of 
using mobile phones?” Whether such anxiety is useful or not is a matter of discussion, but this 
could be an argument that could even prevent the discussion of issues that might create such 
emotions, especially for  young ages.  
A final, concluding remark about the contribution of the study to the theoretical discussion 
of controversial issues in the science curriculum is that this study had revealed the basic 
structural components in which the complexity of controversial issues teaching is built: 
consequences, needs (ends) and rules. The goals of the participants when referring to needs, 
consequences and rules have been identified and described: agents in classrooms discussion have 
used rules, needs and consequences to ground decisions about an issue, to explain societal 
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agents’ and own selves’ actions, desires, decisions, views and positions, or own intentions, or to 
ground solutions in problematic situations.  
The study has also shown that those components are actually the driven force that had 
changed the context in the classroom discussion from argumentative to explanatory of human 
action as those contexts might be familiar and could provide those components or establish their 
truth as perceived by individuals, societal groups and own selves. Actually, this contribution of 
the study is important for pedagogy; identifying potential consequences, rules and needs related 
to the action implied by the issue might be a safe way to plan lessons, to predict students’ 
behaviour towards possible connections to personal and social issues. It could also help the 
teacher identify the reasons behind the change in the context in the classroom discussions and 
thereby be able to survive within the chaos of the situation. In other words, if as educators we 
interpret the change in the context from students as the need to elaborate rules, needs and 
consequences in the social or personal pane, then we might easily be able to catch up with the 
change and find ways to bring the discussion back to what is of interest in terms of functional 
scientific literacy.  
Summarizing the above paragraphs I conclude that:  
• This study has decomposed controversial issues into their component parts: 
consequences, needs and rules. By doing this it has shown that: 
o The different disciplines come up because they have the capacity 
to establish the truth of structural components of practical reasoning 
(consequences, needs and rules). 
o Disciplines are intersected within controversial issues discussion: 
facts are used alongside emotions and rules to imply, evaluate and explain 
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action. When put under question, those facts have to be established within 
Natural, Social or Psychological Sciences. Even morality might be grounded 
on facts.Since we know the reasons of the intersection of the disciplines we 
have a means of resolving the complexity that emerges because of the 
interdisciplinary nature of controversial issues. We can also use this 
information when designing curriculum either for humanizing science 
curriculum, use science as a discipline that could answer specific questions, 
or focus on epistemological issues.   
 
An additional implication of those results is that teachers can be used as curriculum 
designers. I have to suggest that I regard the results presented above, among others, as the 
contribution of teachers in the implemented curriculum. In other words, I believe that the 
teachers who were not necessarily committed to a framework of science education for citizenship 
or any other framework, had allowed instances of emotional reflection and social consideration 
that pointed to instances as opportunities of factual claims subject to verification or falsification. 
Those results might not have come up if teachers had to implement a readymade curriculum that 
might have been narrowed in Natural Sciences.  
Another contribution of the teachers is that they specifically addressed social and 
psychological issues within the lessons. This provided instances that reveal that students might 
perform practices with the same epistemological status, i.e. predicting and explaining facts, use 
examples to ground descriptive generalizations or form new hypotheses based on observational 
data, but they have used those practices within the discipline of Sociology or Psychology, instead 
of Natural Sciences. 
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This study therefore provides an example of a small scale innovation that implies that 
teachers’ contribution in curriculum development is vital; teachers, due to their pedagogical 
knowledge, or any other personal or professional orientation, might perceive any innovation in 
different terms than a curriculum developer might do. This difference can not only be interpreted 
as a shortcoming, or as a simple transformation of the proposed innovation. Teachers’ input, as 
shown in this study, might also enlighten the designer’s perspective by providing further aspects 
of the innovation that the designer’s commitment to specific theoretical frameworks might not 
provide.  
Furthermore, this study is an example of a professional development model that uses teachers 
in the innovation phase as designers and not as subject to top-down delivery from “experts”. 
(Gray &Bryce, 2006) Unfortunately, the limits of this study do not allow the analysis of 
teachers’ reflections during the video stimulated recall sessions, so as useful results about their 
professional development might be described. Even if this study had provided teachers with 
opportunities to identify and clarify their own beliefs about teaching science (Lumpe et al, 2000) 
the study uses this model of professional development as a priori principle to be applied in its 
setting, rather than a field to be tested. However, the data collected during the study allows 
further analysis towards this direction, and this points to a route for further research.  
Concluding the session about the theoretical contribution of this study I have to cite that the 
discussion above has been enhanced because data analysis has been capable of providing the 
categories necessary for such a description and interpretation. The following paragraphs aim to 
discuss the methodological contribution of the study towards its capacity to provide the 
theoretical and methodological tools sufficient to describe the situation of controversial issues in 
science education. 
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5.2 Methodological contribution of the study 
This study had to address two methodological problems: the first one was to describe 
controversial issues and functional scientific literacy as distinct epistemological areas so the first 
could be described as context for the latter, and the second one was to find appropriate tools to 
describe the two areas and their relationship. The following paragraphs aim to discuss the 
answers that this study has given for the epistemological differentiation between controversial 
issues and science education and also describe the methodological contribution of the study for 
the description of those areas.  
5.2.1 How can “controversial issues” be described as a context for functional scientific 
literacy?  
The answer that has been given to this question is one that actually defines the two areas 
(controversial issues and science education) as resting in different epistemological levels: the 
functional scientific literacy is perceived as a concept resting in an epistemological level, 
whereas the controversial issue has been equated with the discussion about a controversial issue 
and therefore is perceived as an entity resting in the dialectical level.  
This answer is not actually new in the science education area, since there are studies that 
have already made a distinction between argumentative process and epistemic actions 
(Pontecorvo and Girardett, 1993; Jimenez-Alexandre et al., 2000) A primary fact that had to be 
noted is that those distinctions were not apparent to me, and therefore the conceptualizations 
from such studies could not actually be used, unless struggles in describing the context of this 
study had emerged.  
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However this study has a main difference between Pontecorvo and Girardett (1993) or 
Jimenez-Alexandre et al (2000) studies. The studies mentioned above do not actually describe 
processes, but products of talk. Actually these scholars use warrants, claims, and backings as 
“argumentative operations”. Whether an utterance is a claim or a warrant is a result of a product 
analysis of argumentation and actually does not inform us about the dialectical strength of the 
utterance; it cannot describe the goal of the participant towards the issue, or the pre-stated 
argument. Therefore “argumentative operations” are not capable of describing the dialectical 
aspect of the lesson. 
This study captures the dialectical aspect as the goal of the participant towards a pre-stated 
claim or argument. The answer was given after insights from areas that describe argumentation 
as a process like Rhetoric (Aristotle (Rhetoric); Mbasakos, 1989), Pragma Dialectical 
Argumentation Theory (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1989; Van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2000; 
Van Eemeren, et al., 2002) or situate the decision about controversial issues into specific types of 
dialogue (Walton 1990; 1992; Walton & Crabbe, 1995). 
The contribution of the research in this direction is valuable: it both defines controversial 
issues as the dialectical context, a decision that can be further grounded on the fact that 
controversial issues are by definition issues that involve discussion about a decision to be taken, 
and also reveals and uses some tools that were not apparent in science education research, like 
the types of argumentative talks that actually describe the goals of the participants (Walton & 
Crabbe, 1995)  
Those tools however, were not tailor-made for use in educational settings; they could not be 
easily applied in classroom discussions where the participants were not committed to any role, or 
they did not equally participate, since a teacher was also interfering in the process. This study 
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had also solved this problem by mapping the issues that classroom discussion has taken and by 
relating them to the main issue under discussion, therefore finding a way to describe as distinct 
the process of discussing a controversial issue from anything else that has been discussed in the 
classroom.  
The knowledge gained from studying argumentation as a process has defined the term of the 
“socioscientific content” used in this study. The term actually defines the components of the 
argumentative process (agents, issue, process, products) and enables the description of the 
content level of the discussion. Agents might talk about the issue, about themselves, about the 
process they have to follow or they are following, and might also engage in a meta-level 
discussion manipulating the products of their discussion. This kind of analysis has enabled the 
situation of specific types of argumentative dialogues (argumentation for persuasion, 
deliberation, inquiry, informative) to talk that was referring about the issue.  
An input from moral reasoning literature and practical reasoning has enabled the description 
of what actually the agents have been doing when not talking (arguing, deliberating, informing, 
inquiring) about the issue. Controversial issues always involve an action to be taken; agents 
might perform actions, have beliefs about the implementation of such actions, or desires. The 
input of the literature was really helpful in distinguishing argumentative from explanatory 
sessions, and also in distinguishing between explanations/defences of actions, intentions, views, 
and desires.  
The contribution of the study in this area is of great importance as it provides a means of 
decomposing the discussion in its component parts and thus provides a tool for making simpler 
complex argumentative discussions. The figure below that describes the results about the 
dialectical contexts related to beliefs about socioscientific content entities (already cited in the 
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results chapter) is a tool to be used to identify the goal of the participant in a complex, 
multileveled and multilayered discussion that takes place in classroom settings. All three lessons 
presented in this study, even different in a lot of aspects, could be described (actually had 
provided) the following map-construct.  
 
 
 
Figure 18:  Proposed tool for analyzing complex argumentative discussions in classroom 
settings in terms of dialectical context categories  
 
In this sense, the above theoretical construct is available to be used as a tool for analyzing in 
a primary level a complex argumentative discussion that takes place in classroom settings, 
though it has to be tested and modified with the use of further data.  
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5.2.2 How can moral, emotional-reflective and cognitive processes be described in socio-
scientific lessons? 
The answer to this question was extremely difficult to find due to my limited engagement 
with issues related to moral reasoning, Psychology and other areas beyond science education. 
Defining the border lines between the disciplines was extremely difficult due to different 
philosophical orientations related to the place of emotion and reason in moral reasoning and the 
definition of the moral aspect of practical reasoning. Conceptualizations from literature review 
carry the limitations of the conceptual means of the reviewer and in this case, trying to define 
and describe the moral or reflective part of the lesson while being in the science education area, 
was difficult. This difficulty was revealed both in the data analysis chapter, but also to the results 
chapter where categories were further defined and described.  
However, argument schemes’ typology alongside Peirce’s (1905, as cited in Pietarinen, 
2006) classification of Sciences have been successfully applied to classroom data and had 
enabled the description of the sciences-disciplines which the agents of the discussion have used 
to ground their claims; Philosophy (Moral Reasoning-Ethics), Logic (Informal Logic and 
Methodeutic), Introspection and Idioscopy (Biology, Sociology, Psychology) and the applied art 
of Social/Private Policy were the areas described to capture and “decompose” the 
interdisciplinary into its component parts. 
 Zeidler’s and Keefer’s (2003) theoretical construct about the situation of socioscientific 
issues in scientific literacy, though really helpful for the initial steps of data analysis for this 
study, could not be used as exact because its components (moral reasoning, emotional reflection, 
cognitive development) are considered as overlapping categories: personal reflection 
(Introspection) includes studying internal states beyond emotions and moral reasoning is based 
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beyond emotion and volition to cognition as well and therefore cannot be excluded from 
cognitive development.  
The answer to the above question therefore is the following: epistemic practices assigned in 
different disciplines can be described with the use of argument schemes which capture the type 
of reasoning. The type of reasoning alongside the dialectical context might indicate the exact 
epistemic practice performed by the agent (i.e. the reasoning scheme of cause to effect might 
indicate an explanation, or a defence for a prediction of a fact). The type of the reasoning 
captured (practical, theoretical normative, theoretical factual) is further used as a criterion to 
identify the type of the discipline -science in which it can be situated, since there are disciplines 
that are by definition normative (Ethics, Logic) or factual (Idioscopy), always according to 
Peirce’s (1905) classification.  
The use of argument schemes typology as a tool to capture epistemic reasoning and 
assigning it in different disciplines with the use of Peirce’s (1905) taxonomy, is regarded as one 
of the results and contributions of this study since the selection and modification of Schellens’ 
typology (1985) has derived from a mutual interaction between literature review import about 
several argument typologies (Aristotle (Rhetoric); Hastings, 1963; Schellens, 1985; Van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Freely & Steinberg, 1965/2008; Walton, 1996, 2008),  and 
instances derived from classroom data. Furthermore, the connection between syllogistic forms, 
epistemic practices and the SDDS stage is also a contribution of this study which was based on 
conceptualizations from theories about moral reasoning, scientific reasoning, the nature of 
scientific explanations and accounts of causality as those are presented in Appendices A, B and 
C.  
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 In this sense the argument typology scheme, sufficient to describe epistemic reasoning and 
practice, was the result of theoretical thought done within this study which actually refers to the 
merging of different disciplines, so that the tools of one discipline (Dialectics, Informal Logic, 
Logic) might be modified to describe practices that were of interest in another discipline 
(Science Education). 
This study therefore, has actually fulfilled one of its initial aims: it has used theoretical 
conceptualizations from disciplines that philosophize about scientific enterprise and study 
discourse and practices beyond science education. In this way this study contributes to the area 
of science education research related to argumentation and controversial issues teaching by 
proposing a modification of an existing methodological and conceptual tool (Schellens (1985) 
typology of arguments) and connecting it with certain epistemic practices situated in different 
areas of scientific inquiry (with the use of the SDDS model (Klahr, 2000 as cited in Zimmerman, 
2007), relating it to epistemic practices. This is a tool that can be used for grasping epistemic 
processes within a lesson, but also for reconstructing argumentative talk in complex classroom 
discussions.  
Even if there are a lot of typologies used within science education studies, I believe that 
Schellens’ modified typology has main advantages compared to other, similar typologies that 
deal with reasoning schemes (i.e. Means & Voss, 1996;  Duschl et al, 1999 modified Walton’s 
(1996) typology): 
• It distinguishes between practical and theoretical reasoning in a primary classification 
level and therefore it is suitable for describing the relationship between controversial 
issues and science education since the former relates to the practical and the latter to 
the theoretical.  
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• It provides a classification for practical argument schemes which refers to means, 
rules and consequences which is very helpful in decomposing argumentative 
discussions about controversial issues that include a decision about an action to be 
taken.  
• It follows a consistent classification criterion: the nature of the conclusion. It 
therefore allows the analyst easily to apply it, even if this claim has to be grounded by 
other analysts rather than me.  
 
The fact that the typology has been modified so as to include analytical arguments enables the 
analyst to use the argument scheme as unit of analysis for complex argumentative discussions. 
This solves the problem of distinguishing what would be a warrant and what a backing if a 
Toulmin’s (1958) argument pattern is to be used for analysis: backings are regarded as 
arguments supporting the warrant, qualifiers as arguments countering the generalization of the 
argument (taken as proposition) .  
The use of the typology, finally, has enabled the description of argumentative operations as 
related to the type of argument scheme to which they were referring. For example, a move from 
a participant aiming to drop an argument concerning consequences has been described in detail 
as the process of countering the truth of a consequence; a move aiming to further ground a means 
end argument has been described as one of defending the necessity of means and so on. This 
kind of description has actually merged the process and the product part of argumentation and 
had enabled the answer of a vital question of this study: describing the situation of controversial 
issues in science education. What has been described actually was the vice versa: what epistemic 
practices -situated in different disciplines- have been used by students when performing moves 
 401 
such as the establishment of the necessity of means, the truth of the consequences, or the 
relevance of the rule to a case.  
Finalizing this session, I would suggest that the tools that this study provides can be used to 
analyze classroom talk in science classrooms that is not necessarily connected to a discussion 
about a socioscientific controversial issue. The aims of the study required distinguishing between 
practical and theoretical reasoning. The argument schemes used to capture theoretical epistemic 
reasoning and the connection of those schemes with specific epistemic practices within the 
scientific inquiry are applicable in any science lesson in which theoretical knowledge claims are 
explored, either in the hypothesis or in the experiment space.  
Evidence evaluation, for example, is a practice that takes place not only when contradictory 
evidence about a controversial issue is presented, but also when alternative hypotheses are used 
to explain a single phenomenon, or when contradictory evidence from classroom experimental 
data might emerge. Identifying the argument scheme in a specific classroom episode allows the 
researcher to access and analyze the syllogism of the student(s), locate the student in the 
according stage of scientific inquiry and accordingly evaluate the syllogism within the context of 
the discussion.  
The above conceptualizations might point to an implication about teacher development: 
being able as a teacher to analyze classroom talk is a vital skill that could contribute to several 
domains. This study suggests that since argumentative talk analysis has enabled the researcher to 
analyze and describe epistemic within the dialectic, the skills for such an analysis might be 
useful for pedagogues in their effort to survive in the chaotic of classroom discussions and 
accordingly react to students’ contributions in the discussions. In other words, this study suggests 
that argumentative talk reconstruction might be a useful component in teachers’ professional 
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development towards the dimension of controversial issues implementation in science education. 
In a more generic form this argument suggests that enabling teachers to act as analysts of 
classroom talk in categories relevant to epistemic practice would help them improve their 
pedagogy related to functional scientific literacy. This argument however, does not emerge as a 
direct implication of the results of this study. It is rather a hypothesis to be tested with teacher 
development programs that will aim to enable teachers understand, analyze and evaluate 
classroom talk in terms of its epistemic quality – argumentative or not.  
Summarizing the above paragraphs I suggest that this study has managed to define and describe 
the situation of controversial issues in science education. The study has adapted tools that are 
used to analyze argumentation in informal settings and had modified them so they could be 
applied in classroom settings and provide information that could be valuable for science 
education research,  
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This research has dealt with the description of the situation of controversial issues in science 
education, and therefore had to adopt a general view that could identify and define Natural 
alongside Social or Psychological Sciences, Ethics, Logic and other disciplines within the 
discussion about a controversial issue. Due to its general orientation though, it might have 
missed a focused special scope that could give information that would be of interest of 
researchers looking for specific aspects of scientific argumentation, or for quality in 
argumentation.  
A shortcoming of this research also, related to the above statement, is that it does not have a 
lot to say about evidential considerations since teachers had not dealt in great depth with issues 
related to evidence in the lessons. On the other hand, if teachers had dealt only with evidence 
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based issues I might not have been able to create the tools and constructs that this study proposes 
for analyzing a controversial issue discussion in a science classroom. However, as cited in a 
previous section of this chapter, new research, aiming at the exploration of epistemological 
issues, as a matter of pedagogy and curriculum and not explicitly as a matter of students’ 
abilities, would give further instances that could draw useful implications for curriculum 
developers and pedagogues. Further research might investigate how evidential considerations are 
explored within controversial issues in classroom settings, a process which actually might be a 
special focused replication of this study.  
The tools presented above are created and applied within the limitations of this study. A 
question about the applicability of such tools though, refers to their complexity. There is a need 
for presenting those tools to the science education community, so they can be available for use, 
and therefore be criticized both in theoretical but in practical terms as well. Other researchers 
need to apply such tools to provide information about the difficulties and their limitations.   
The typology of argument schemes, for example, is a tool to be tested by processes of 
application by other researchers, with different conceptual frameworks, to other lessons so that 
missing categories might be indicated or problematic categories might be identified. The same 
remark stands for the socioscientific content and context construct and for the adaptation of 
Walton’s and Crabbe’s (1995) typology of argumentative dialogues.  
As noted in the beginning of this section, this study had to provide a general framework in 
which functional scientific literacy would be described. However, I realize that the tools 
presented above might not be of special interest for those who are really interested in specific 
aspects of scientific argumentation and especially about quality in argumentation. The tools used 
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in this study might be merged with other typologies that examine for example the levels of 
complexity in the arguments (i.e. Erduran et al., 2004), the type of evidence used and so on. 
Summarizing the discussion of the results I can cite that this study has fulfilled its aims to 
solve the issue of situating controversial issues in science curriculum and describe this situation 
as to contribute to the discussion about the implementation of controversial issues in science 
curriculum, by using teachers as designers of the proposed curriculum. This process has 
successfully implemented conceptualizations from other disciplines and therefore it contributes 
to the need for science education research to be informed by other disciplines that deal with same 
issues but from different perspectives. Due to the general orientation of this study, further studies 
that would concentrate on special issues that have been raised, such as the place of 
epistemological issues in the decision making, could further contribute to the aims of this study.  
The study is situated in the hypothesis space: it has used classroom instances as primary data 
which would lead us to conclusions related to our questions. We still need more instances to 
further collect data about such a complex environment and contribute to the discussion about 
pedagogy. This study has contributed to the start of this process: it has broken down the complex 
into its structural components. We still need research to cite suggestions about how those 
components could be synthesized in ways that serve our aims as science educators.  
As a final remark, I would say that what is presented is one part of the story. Unfortunately, 
this study has not explored the results from the students’ lenses. I believe that a rich investigation 
of the way that the discussion had affected students’ beliefs and understandings about the issues, 
might further enlighten us about silent changes that take place because of the discussion of a 
controversial issue in the classroom. We might have observed students defending a particular 
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standpoint and analyzing their utterances at a specific time and place, but we do not know how 
the beliefs of their classmates might affect their beliefs and positions. 
We might find it extremely difficult to find methodologies to grasp such an internal process. 
However, those silent processes might be one of the strongest arguments for including 
controversial issues in the science curriculum, as one of the teachers had suggested in the 
interviews: 
 
“It is very important to feel the democracy; the freedom to express 
myself under no criticism and the opportunity to hear others expressing 
a contradictory to me claim that I could not think before. I might stand 
to support my thesis because my commitment assigns me such a role, 
but in the end of the discussion I might already start to change my 
mind…After all, we can never know how the participation of such a 
democratic process might affect them, not now, but in future years when 
they will act as future citizens” 
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APENDIX A: Moral Reasoning 
Moral reasoning is one of the areas of functional scientific literacy related to the teaching of 
controversial issues, as explored in the chapter “controversial issues and the curriculum”. For 
methodology, but also discussion about pedagogy reasons I need to explore concepts related to 
meta-ethics, theories explaining where our ethical principles come from, dealing with the role of 
reason in ethical judgments and the meaning of ethical terms themselves (Fieser, 2006).  
This exploration will provide insights into the process of moral reasoning and enable us to 
describe this process in order to capture the “reasoning” aspect of moral reasoning. I also need to 
deal with normative ethics, as those might help us explain the moral standards that students and 
teachers use in the classroom in order to regulate right and wrong conducts. The exploration that 
follows is an insight into meta-ethics and normative ethics conceptualizations needed to describe 
a process of applied ethics: the discussion of a controversial issue in a classroom.  
 
i. Meta-ethics 
a) Objectivism and Relativism 
Α very first issue concerning moral reasoning is the metaphysical question whether moral values 
are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like area, or are simply human conventions. Two directions, 
objectivism and relativism provide different answers to this issue. Proponents of objectivism 
hold that moral values are objective in the sense that they exist beyond subjective human 
conventions; they additionally claim that moral values are absolute, eternal, stable and universal 
insofar as they apply to all rational creatures around the world and throughout time (Fieser, 
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2006).  
Objectivist views have impacts on the epistemological status of moral judgments. Moral 
realism for example, suggests that facts about what is morally obligatory - moral judgments - and 
facts about what the case is, are not distinct: facts about what ought to be the case are facts of a 
special kind about the way things are, and thus a process of making certain moral judgments is 
an example of a process of discovering moral facts (Jacobs, 2000, p.141). 
Within objectivism one might find Divine law theories. Those theories assume that moral 
values exist, but those are related to an authority that produces those values. The divine 
command theory is inspired by a notion of a powerful God who wills all moral values into 
existence (Fieser, 2006).   
On the other hand, relativism suggests that morality does not exist independently of humans. 
Relativists view morality as a human construction. Not only norms about good and bad but also 
other  fundamental concepts such as rationality, truth and  reality are regarded by relativists as 
relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework and paradigm, form of life, 
society, or culture (Bernstein, 1983, p.8).   Consequently, there is no overarching framework by 
which we can rationally adjudicate or univocally evaluate competing claims of alternative 
paradigms.  
 
b) Cognitivism 
Moral reasoning has been described under three different dimensions: thinking, feeling and 
willing (or cognitive, affective and volitional). Those three dimensions have been appealed to as 
basis for making moral decisions (Poole, 1995, p.18).  
Cognitivists assume that a moral judgment is a product of inquiry, a reasoned guided process. 
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They share the view that moral sentences are subject to truth or falsity, and that the state of mind 
of accepting a moral judgment is typically one of belief (Van Roojen, 2009). Cognitivists do not 
deny that there is indeed a role for sensibility in the account of morality. They rather share the 
view that feeling and desire have a role in moral judgment but not a role that is clearly separable 
from the role of cognition (Jacobs, 2000, p.134).  
According to cognitivists view, ethical beliefs are part of inquiry. Even if ethical wisdom 
embedded in our traditions is a rich source for discerning what is good or bad, moral traditions 
fail to guide us because our predecessors never experienced or even thought about challenges 
regarding new techniques and technology: we are on our own, as we are the first generation to 
encounter these situations (Devettere, 2000, p.5).  
The process of establishing and using moral judgments is parallel to what Toulmin (1958) 
has described as warrant establishing and warrant using arguments. Principles and duties 
sometimes dictate a particular judgment and the particular judgments will sometimes modify, 
revise, or supplement the prima-facie principles and duties (Devettere, 2000, p.15). A true belief, 
is defined as one that, “no matter how much further we were to investigate and debate, it would 
not be overturned by recalcitrant experience and argument” (Peirce, 1901 as cited in Misak, 
2004). Moral judgments then fall within the scope of truth, knowledge and inquiry and our 
ethical beliefs might well aspire to truth, as our beliefs in science, mathematics and other 
disciplines do. 
This view for establishing moral beliefs also has an experimental grounding. Psychological 
experiments provide findings that distinguish moral rules - products of “late inquiry” - when 
compared with conventional rules.   
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• Moral rules have an objective, prescriptive force; they are not dependent on the 
authority of any individual or institution. On the other hand, conventional rules are 
viewed as arbitrary or situation-dependent, and can be suspended or changed by an 
appropriate authoritative individual or institution. 
• Moral rules are taken to hold generally, not just locally; they not only proscribe 
behaviour here and now, but also in other countries and at other times in history. 
Conventional rules are often geographically and temporally local; those applicable in 
one community often will not apply in other communities or at other times in history 
(Nado, et al., 2009).  
One might easily parallel the process of establishing a moral belief to that of establishing a 
natural law in science. Established moral laws are analogous as established natural laws, whereas 
discussion that establishes moral principles resembles the “science in the making” process.  
Accordingly, moral beliefs can be used to provide explanations for social policies and 
actions. As Humphreys (2006) cites,  
“if a woman is stoned to death because of a cultural attitude, for 
example, these laws, policies, and customs must be taken as givens - 
they were in place when the events occurred and they play a central 
role in explaining them” (p.44). 
 
c) Non-cognitivism  
Non-cognitivist theories do not agree that there are moral properties or moral facts that could be 
true or false. Moral judgments, according to non-cogntivist theories are rather expressing desires, 
approval or disapproval.   
We can find two main theories within non-cognitivism: emotivism and prescriptivism 
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(Marturano, 2006). Emotivism interprets the process of moral judgment as one of depending on 
feeling and desire. Therefore moral assessments involve our emotions and not our reason. 
According to Hume (as cited in Jacobs, 2000, p.131) moral judgments are based on moral 
emotions: emotions that recognize the situation as morally relevant by identifying morally 
relevant features in ones’ environment, in order to be reasoned about. Reason might be of service 
in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume's words, "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the 
passions" (Hume, 1739-1740 as cited in Fieser, 2006).  
Emotivists think of moral terms in grammatically assertive utterances that function primarily 
to express emotion and perhaps also to elicit similar emotions in others; they thus assume that 
moral evaluation such as “right”, “good” or “virtuous” signs a non-cognitive pro-attitude such as 
approval or  preference (Barnes, 1933; Ayer, 1952; Stevenson, 1946 as cited in Van Roojen, 
2009). However, there are views that confront that those assertions might not have a true or false 
value: if moral assertions can accurately or inaccurately reflect our feelings, assertions of this 
type can be true or false (Arrington, 2001, p.135). In this sense emotivism might be compatible 
to moral subjectivism.  
On the other hand, prescriptivists hold that a normative sentence is used for 
uttering overriding universalizable prescriptions (such us: You should not steal!) (Marturano, 
2006). Those prescriptions do not bear any cognitive meaning such an assertion or a description 
(of the kind it is not right to steal) but they are just used to utter prescriptions.  
ii. Normative ethics  
Normative ethics involve arriving to moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. The 
key assumption in normative ethics, according to Marturano (2006) is that there is only one 
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ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. 
Moral theories, as Pettit (2002, p.95) supports, involve two different components: first they 
put forward a view about what is good or valuable, though they do not all make this explicit and 
may even resist talk of the good and then, they provide a theory of the right. A distinction made 
by Pettit, is that theories of right are not concerned with which properties are valuable but with 
what individual and institutional agents should do by way of responding to valuable properties.  
 
a) Deontological theories 
Deontological theories are related by the emphasis they place on moral obligation, or duty. 
Behaviour in accordance with our moral obligation is considered morally right; behaviour not in 
accordance with our moral obligation is considered morally wrong (Devettere, 2000, p.17). 
Deontological theories are sometimes called non-consequentialist, since principles in these 
theories are obligatory, irrespective of the consequences that might follow from our actions 
(Fieser, 2006). Moralities of obligation are moralities of law. Those laws appear in different 
forms.  
Natural theories view nature as permeated by a rational order, and therefore conclude that 
ethics is “living and acting according to rationally ordered nature” (Devettere, 2000, p.5). 
Naturalism claims that by looking at the nature of the world and the nature of humankind, certain 
moral truths can be discerned (Poole, 1995, p.18). In this sense universal principles are derived 
from the law of nature and known by all. Therefore, actions contrary to the natural law are seen 
as immoral (Devettere, 2000, p.7).  
Right-based theories support that our moral obligations come from individual rights, the 
right to life, the right to choose, for example, possessed by all people (Devettere, 2000, p.8). In 
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this sense, rights have the epistemological status of a law. Agents justify ethical judgments on 
the basis of such rights: if someone has the right to live, then a rights based theory obliges us to 
respect that right. Rights and duties therefore, are related in such a way to the rights of one 
person and the duties of another person (Fieser, 2006).  
Theories of autonomous law support that we act according to the moral law we give to 
ourselves. Within this theory one might find Kant’s theory of a single categorical imperative 
which can be expressed as “Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end” (as cited in 
Fieser, 2006).  
Finally, there are theories that appeal to laws from authorities such as God’s laws, as those 
create the moral obligation in our lives (Poole, 1995).  Those are views of commitment and 
assume that since you are committed to a theory or religion, then by duty you should do what 
this theory’s principles and laws are implying. Christians are committed to Christian law and 
Jewish to Jewish law, communists to communist principles and so on.  
 
b) Consequentialist Theories 
Consequentialism is the view that normative properties depend only on consequences (Sinnot-
Armstrong, 2006). The moral rightness of acts depends only on the consequences of that act and 
therefore, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-benefit analysis of an action's 
consequences (Fieser, 2006). Fieser, (2006) refers to three different types of consequentialism:  
• Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more 
favourable than unfavourable only to the agent performing the action. 
• Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more 
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favourable than unfavourable to everyone except the agent. 
• Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more 
favourable than unfavourable to everyone.  
Utilitarianism, shares the view that moral obligation arises from what will benefit most people. 
In that sense, the moral worth of an action is determined by its contribution to overall utility: an 
act is morally right if that act maximizes the good, that is, if the total amount of good for all 
minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act 
available to the agent on that occasion (Moore 1912, as cited in Sinnot-Armstrong, 2006).  
c) Virtue theories  
Theories of this group are related by the emphasis they place on the good of the person 
performing the action. Instead of obligation, the key notion in ethics of the good is virtue. 
Virtues are the feelings, habits and behaviours that do in fact create good life (Devettere, 2000, 
p.17). Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics) has described a man who was not seeking to identify the 
fundamental principle of right, but one who exercises practical reasoning enabling him to lead a 
flourishing or excellent life. What lead such a life, are certain enduring states of character (the 
virtues) that enable him to understand moral judgment and action (Jacobs, 2000, p.134).  
Virtue Ethics however, place less emphasis on learning rules. They rather stress the 
importance of developing good habits of character assuming that once one acquires such habits 
he will then habitually act in a virtuous manner (Fieser, 2006). Aristotle (as cited in Fieser, 2006) 
argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, that regulate our emotions. He also   
distinguishes moral virtues from intellectual virtues: moral virtues have to do with feeling, 
choosing, and acting well, whereas intellectual virtue is identified as a kind of wisdom acquired 
by teaching.  
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  APPENDIX B: Scientific reasoning  
Defining scientific reasoning is difficult and for some scholars like Laudan (1984) is even 
impossible, as “the aims of science vary, and quite appropriately so, from one epoch to another, 
from one scientific field to another, and sometimes among researchers in the same field” (as 
cited in Regt & Dieks, 2005). Scientific thinking has been described under different approaches 
and scholars do not agree to a single definition.   
According to Zimmerman (2005) there are two main approaches for scientific reasoning 
determination: one focused on the development of conceptual knowledge in particular scientific 
domains, and a second focused on the reasoning and problem solving strategies involved in 
diverse activities, such as hypothesis generation, experimental design, evidence, evaluation and 
drawing inferences (p.4). 
i. Stages of scientific inquiry 
According to the second approach, scientific thinking involves the application of the methods 
or principles of scientific inquiry to reasoning or problem-solving situations (Koslowski, 1996 as 
cited in Zimmerman, 2007). 
Inquiry is a central entity that describes scientific endeavour and is described as “a 
knowledge building process in which explanations are developed to make sense of data and then 
presented to a community of peers so they can be critiqued, debated, and revised (Driver, et al., 
2000; Duschl, 2000; Sandoval & Reiser, 2004; Vellom & Anderson, 1999 as cited in Sampson & 
Clark, 2008, p.450). The main goal of scientific inquiry is the acquisition of knowledge in the 
form of hypotheses or theories that can serve as generalizations or explanations (Zimmerman, 
2006). 
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Klahr (2000) has proposed a framework (the SDDS model: Scientific Discovery as Dual 
Search) for scientific discovery. According to this model, scientific discovery is accomplished by 
a dual-search process that takes place in two related spaces: the hypothesis space and the 
experiment space. The third process of the SDDS model involves evidence evaluation, where a 
decision is to be made for the acceptance, rejection or modification of the current hypothesis 
given the evidence gathered (as cited in Zimmerman, 2007). 
This view is compatible with Peirce’s (1900 as cited in Flach, 1996) perception of scientific 
inquiry as having three stages, each one representing three distinct forms of reasoning:  
Stage of scientific inquiry Reasoning 
engaged 
Coming up with a hypothesis to explain initial observations  Abduction  
Form predictions from a suggested hypothesis  Deduction  
Estimating the credibility of that hypothesis through its predictions  Induction  
Table 47: Stages of scientific inquiry and reasoning engaged 
 
The process has been represented diagrammatically by Flach and Kakas (2000b):   
 
Figure 19: The three stages of scientific inquiry (source: Flach and Kakas, 2000b, p.7) 
What is missing from such models though is the process of communicating the results and 
validating them through criticism of a community of peers.  A process to be added therefore, is 
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one of argumentation: a knowledge building and validating practice in which individuals 
propose, support, critique, and refine ideas in an effort to make sense of the natural world (e.g., 
Driver, et al., 2000; Kuhn, 1993 as cited in Sampson & Clark, 2008, p.456). Additionally, in 
order to have a full account of scientific reasoning, one has to describe the application of 
products of scientific discovery, theories, laws and principles as those used in new situations. 
The processes of hypothesis generation, prediction generation, evidence evaluation and 
explanation generation, and finally argumentation, as well as reasoning types engaged in each 
stage are going to be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
  
a) Hypothesis space  
According to Peirce’s theory (1900 as cited in Flach, 1996), abduction is the process of 
forming an explanatory hypothesis, given a number of observations (Flach, 1996, p.3), a kind of 
guessing by a process of forming a plausible hypothesis that explains a given set of facts or data 
(Walton, 2001, p.148). The process is described as non algorithmic, as the abductive suggestion 
might come up like a flash, however it is a logical inference since it has a logical form of:   
“The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be 
a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is 
true.”(Peirce as cited in Flach, 1996)  
 
Another view of hypothesis generation is that of the “best explanation” given a set of data: 
Abductive inference has often been equated with inference to the best explanation (Harman, 
1965, pp.88-89) and has the following syllogistic form:  
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“H is a hypothesis. 
D is a collection of data. 
H explains D. 
No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does. 
Therefore H is probably true” (Harman, 1965, as cited in Walton, 
2001, p.147).  
 
A case described by Harman (1965) that describes abduction as the best explanation, is that 
of a scientist inferring the existence of atoms: “When a scientist infers the existence of atoms and 
subatomic particles, he is inferring the truth of an explanation for various data he wishes to 
account for” (p.89). 
On this perspective, no restrictions are put on the form of the hypothesis: it may be either a 
particular fact or a general rule (Flach, 1996, p.3). Additionally, this notion of scientific 
hypothesis describes a non linear process of hypothesis generation, experimentation and 
evidence evaluation. As Zimmerman (2007) cites, either prior knowledge, or some observations 
(via experimentation) are taking place before constructing an initial hypothesis. Flach (1996) 
also cites that there might be several intuitions regarding hypothesis from the inferential 
perspective: they can be explanatory, accounting for part of the evidence, or confirmatory, 
extracting regularities implicitly present in the evidence (p.5).  
b) Hypothesis testing - evidence evaluation  
The third process of the SDDS model involves evidence evaluation, a process that is 
described as the decision made on the basis of the cumulative evidence to accept, reject, or 
modify the current hypothesis (Zimmerman, 2007).  
Peirce (1900 as cited in Flach, 1996) describes this stage as “induction” and describes it as 
the process of confronting a hypothesis, through selected predictions, with reality: 
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“(…) an experiment (…) is a question put to nature (…). The 
question is, “Will this be the result?” If Nature replies “No!” the 
experimenter has gained an important piece of knowledge. If Nature 
says “Yes,” the experimenter’s ideas remain just as they were; only 
somewhat more deeply engrained.” (p.3)  
 
This process is what Toulmin (2003, p.113) has defined as a “warrant-establishing” 
argumentation, a process that Newton (as cited in Toulmin, 2003) describes as “rendering a 
proposition general by induction”, “using our observations of regularities and correlations as the 
backing for a novel warrant”. In a simple sense, covariation is one of the bases for making 
inductive causal inferences: if a factor and effect have a covariation, then they are likely to be 
causally related and if not a causally between the two is less likely (Koslowski, et al., 1989, 
p.1316).  
Anomalous data might be reconciled with an explanation or theory, often by modifying the 
explanation to account for the anomaly. Kuhn (1989) has argued that the heart of scientific 
thinking lies in the skills at differentiating and coordinating theory (or hypotheses) and evidence, 
a process that involves a comparison of results obtained through experimentation with the 
predictions derived from the current hypothesis (as cited in Zimmerman, 2007). As Toulmin 
(2003) cites:  
“We begin, by establishing that a particular relation holds in a 
certain number of cases, and then, “rendering it general by induction”, 
we continue to apply it to fresh examples for so long as we can 
successfully do so: if we get into trouble as a result, he says, we are to 
find ways of rendering the general statement “liable to exceptions”, i.e. 
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to discover the special circumstances in which the presumptions 
established by the warrant are to rebuttal” (p.113). 
 
The process of accepting, rejecting, or modifying current hypothesis however, goes beyond a 
simple inference between data and hypotheses, events and phenomena. Both children and adults 
have rich theories and beliefs that are used interdependently to make inductive causal inferences 
in a scientifically legitimate manner (Zimmerman, 2005, p.42). The objects of scientific 
discovery are not “objects of nature”, are not “revealed in an obvious way by reading the book of 
nature”, but rather, “they are constructs that have been invented and imposed on phenomena in 
attempts to interpret and explain them, often as results of considerable intellectual struggles” 
(Driver, et al., 1994 p.5).  A hypothesis testing process therefore moves to an evidence 
evaluation one, a coordination of theory and evidence.  
If we deny this process of coordination, we leave apart a great part of reasoning and might 
conclude, like Peirce (1990 as cited in Flach, 1996) that hypothesis testing- as solely empirical- 
cannot be included in the “reasoning”, “logical part” of scientific inquiry. Reasoning in scientific 
discovery, according to Peirce’s latest theory, is entirely carried out by abduction (to come up 
with a hypothesis) and deduction (to make predictions). Induction does not have an analogue in 
the syllogistic perspective, since the process of evaluating a given hypothesis against reality is 
not reasoning at all (Flach, 1996, p.3). In Peirce’s words (1990):  
“Induction consists in starting from a theory, deducing from it 
predictions of phenomena, and observing those phenomena in order to 
see how nearly they agree with the theory’; it ‘does nothing but 
determine a value” (as cited in Flach, 1996).  
 
 452 
 
Koslowski (1996), among others (Chinn & Brewer, 2001; Zimmerman, 2007) rejects an 
empiricist framework for scientific discovery where when covariation obtains, hypothesis is 
seriously taken, but when it does not, hypothesis is either adopted, or refined.  Even if 
covariation is evident, covariation might not be seen as an indicating cause but as merely 
artifactual; without the availability of a plausible process, causation is unlikely to be seen as 
taking place (Koslowski, 1996, p.12).  
Evidence can only be judged as plausible or implausible in relation to current knowledge, 
theory or belief (Zimmerman, 2005, p.36). There are cases where theoretical considerations 
dictate rejecting (or at least questioning) the data themselves, i.e. as resulting from unsuitable 
measures (Koslowski, 1996, p.14). In this sense, explanations are not evaluated in isolation; they 
are judged in the context of rival alternative accounts.  
Josephson and Josephson (as cited in Walton, 2001, p.141) define the factors upon the 
judgment of likelihood of a hypothesis, as associated with an abductive inference is based upon.  
Those factors are listed: 
1. How decisively the hypothesis surpasses the alternatives 
2. How good the hypothesis is by itself, independently of considering the alternatives (we 
should be cautious about accepting a hypothesis, even if it is clearly the best one we 
have, if it is not sufficiently plausible in itself) 
3. Judgments of the reliability of the data 
4. How much confidence there is that all plausible explanations have been considered (how 
thorough was the search for alternative explanations) (as cited in Walton, 2001, p.141).  
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This process is not identical to evaluating deductive or inductive inferences; it is not a linear 
process of testing hypothesis, accept it if “nature says yes” or “reject it if nature says no”. As 
Walton (2001) cites: 
“collection of new facts may suggest a new explanation that may 
even be better that the one now accepted. The conclusion is an 
intelligent guess based on what is known at some point in an 
investigation that, in many cases, should continue” (p.142).  
 
Another issue that is to be discussed about hypothesis testing is one between covariation and 
causation. In real scientific practice, scientists are concerned with causal mechanism - the 
process by which a cause can bring about an effect, rather than rely on covariation of the cause 
and the effect.  As Koslowski (1996) has pointed out: 
“We live in a world full of correlations. It is through a consideration 
of causal mechanism that we can determine which correlations between 
perceptually salient events should be taken seriously and which should 
be viewed as spurious” (as cited in Zimmerman, 2005 p.3) 
 
Brewer et al. (1998, as cited in Russ et al, 2008) describe the mechanical explanations as 
causal models that go “beyond the original regularity” of the phenomenon (p. 127)).  
Nevertheless, causation cannot always been established.  A direct causal connection might 
be impossible in cases where the two correlated events are too far apart in space and too close in 
time for a signal to connect them; an explanation of such correlations in terms of a common 
cause is impossible (Regt & Dieks, 2005, p.145).  
The relationship between causation, statistical relevance and types of explanations is going 
to be further explored in Appendix C.   
 
 454 
 
c) Scientific argumentation  
Argumentation in science is regarded as a knowledge building and validating practice in 
which individuals propose, support, critique and refine ideas in an effort to make sense of the 
natural world (e.g., Driver, et al., 2000; Kuhn, 1993 as cited in Sampson & Clark, 2008, p.456).  
A model of scientific argumentation is given by Pera (1994 as cited in Bricker & Bell, 2008):  
A scientific debate has three key participants:  
“a proposer who asks questions, nature that answers, and a 
community of competent interlocutors which, after a debate hinging on 
various factors, comes to an agreement upon what is to be taken as 
nature’s official voice”, a process that is constrained, although not 
dictated by nature (p.481) 
 
Sampson and Clark (2008) conceptualize a scientific argument as having three interrelated 
components: an explanation (similar to Toulmin’s claim), evidence (similar o Toulmin’s data), 
and reasoning (a combination of Toulmin’s warrants). Their framework, as they cite (Sampson & 
Clark, 2008, p. 406) is a Toulmin-inspired framework similar to frameworks adopted by a 
number of other researchers in science education (e.g., Kuhn & Reiser, 2005; Lizotte, et al., 
2004; McNeill & Krajcik, 2007; Osborne, et al., 2004 as cited in Sampson & Clark, 2008, p. 
406) and is presented in the figure below. 
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Figure 20: Argumentation-explanation framework (source: Sampson & Clark, 2008, p. 
406) 
According to this framework, the core scope of a scientific argument is to set a scientific 
explanation as valid. This is done by citing available evidence that confirms the hypothesis, but 
also explaining how the evidence supports the explanation and why the evidence should count as 
support. The evidence component of the framework refers to observations or experimental data 
that is used to support the validity or the legitimacy of the explanation, and it is distinguished 
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from mere information as it needs to be used to either show  a trend over time, a difference 
between groups, or a relationship between variables (Sampson & Clark, 2008, p.462). 
Any criteria used for this model, the boxes outside the “argument”, though, could create a 
new cycle and perhaps different kind of argumentation. For example the models, theories and 
laws are not always given, or accepted by all members of the community and counter-
argumentation might spark on the light of different theories that might point to alternative 
explanations. The selection of the theory to be used, for example, could be an issue for further 
argumentation. Additionally, standards of evidence could be an issue of argumentation, as those 
do not hold as stable, given laws, but are also negotiated, revised and adapted to the specific 
situation within the scientific community. 
Additionally we could broaden this framework by replacing “scientific explanation” with 
“scientific ideas”:  hypotheses, theories and predictions. Scientific endeavour does not deal only 
with scientific discovery and the evaluation of explanations, but also deals with the use of such 
explanations, once established, to theories and deduce predictions for future facts. Hypotheses, 
theories and predictions are essentially claims, while the data, warrants, backings, rebuttals and 
qualifiers are the components and conditions of “evidence” (Zeidler et al, 2003, p.111). 
Latour and Woolgar (1979, as cited in Bricker and Bell, 2008, p.481) designed a 
classification system to account for the different types of such claims -statements found in 
scientific papers:  
• Type 5 statements: They denote “a taken-for-granted fact” (p. 76) and contain no 
clarification verbiage because it is assumed that everyone understands these statements.  
• Type 4 statements: They denote explicitly framed relationships between entities. 
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• Type 3 statements: They contain modalities (e.g., “generally assumed,”“possibly”), 
creating the impression that these statements are less certain (those are statements that 
scientific review of articles contain) 
• Type 2 statements: Those contain more modal qualifiers and seem more claim-like than 
fact-like (Found more often in drafts explicating research that are being circulated in the 
laboratory). 
• Type 1 statements: They contain actual speculations and these are used only in one-on-
one discussions or at the very end of papers.   
Accordingly, scientific endeavour is regarded as a means of changing statement types from 
one to the other through further research and argumentation practice. Furthermore, when 
statements are accepted, they are used to predict new facts or revise theories. According to 
Toulmin et al. (1984) scientific argumentation produces two types of arguments: regular and 
critical: in regular arguments, “the goal of reasoning is to establish a factual conclusion by 
appealing to currently accepted scientific ideas” (p. 333) whereas critical arguments on the other 
hand are those employed “when scientists challenge the credentials of current ideas” (Toulmin et 
al., 1984, p.332, as cited in Bricker & Bell, 2008 p.483). This is similar in pedagogical practice, 
according to Russell (1983) to the distinction between explaining a law or theory in the first 
instance and subsequently using a law in problem solving or laboratory activities: once a warrant 
has been established, its backing is implicit in the use of the warrant to reach conclusions (p.33). 
Scientific endeavour aims therefore in the establishment of facts, theories, predictions and 
explanations for the natural world. This model in contrast with the goals of everyday 
argumentation has led to descriptions of scientific argumentation as non-dialectical in the sense 
that scientific argumentation is rather knowledge-building oriented than persuasive oriented 
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(Sampson & Clark, 2008).  Duschl (2008) also refers to three forms of arguments: rhetorical 
which are “oratorical in nature and are represented by the discursive techniques employed to 
persuade an audience”, analytical, that are grounded in theory of logic and finally dialectical, that 
occur during discussion or debate and involve reasoning with premises that are not evidently true 
(p.162).  
According to Duschl (2008) even if there is a general agreement that all three forms of 
argument are used in science, only dialectical and analytical that have their focus on evidence are 
more exacting and representative of high quality scientific argumentation (p.163). This is 
compatible with an ideal view of scientific argumentation which involves no real conflicts of 
interest; there are not any permanent winners or losers as a result of their resolution: having a 
personal stake in one’s work is not an issue because scientists argue solely to build sound 
theories for the collective good of the enterprise (Bricker & Bell, 2008, p.485). Of course, this is 
an ideal model; scientists do have personal goals and might include rhetoric in order to persuade 
for their arguments.  
However, what has been described under this session as “scientific argumentation” refers 
more to this “high standard”, idealized model of scientific argumentation than to real scientific 
practice.  
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Appendix C: Scientific Explanations  
Scientific knowledge in many domains, (explanations of the behaviour of electrical circuits, 
energy flow through ecosystems, or rates of chemical reactions), consists of formally specified 
entities and the relationships posited as existing between them (Driver et al, 1994, p.5).  
Information and events about those entities can be linked by different kinds of connections, 
including causal, contrastive, analogical and inductive links (Chinn & Brewer, 2001, p.31 as 
cited in Zimmerman, 2005). When the links are established and accepted by the scientific 
community, we do not talk about hypotheses anymore, but rather explanations. The types of 
links that explanations represent are classified through several systems. I will start this review of 
theories about scientific explanations from Hempel (1965), as latest theories have been 
established and base their criticism on this model.  
iii. The deductive nomological model  
Hempel (1965) has distinguished two major classes of explanation: A Deductive- 
Nomological (D-N) class, and a Probabilistic, or Inductive Statistical one (IS). As the names 
suggest, these are closely related to deductive and inductive forms of arguments respectively 
(Bell & Staines, 1981, p.40). According to the deductive-Nomological Model, a scientific 
explanation includes an explanandum, a sentence "describing the phenomenon to be explained" 
and the explanans, "the class of those sentences which are adduced to account for the 
phenomenon (Hempel, 1965, p. 247). 
Hembel (1965) stated that for the question 'Why did event E occur?' event E is explained 
deductively from general laws and initial conditions (as cited in Park & Han, 2002, p.595). The 
model rests on two components: its deductive nature (D) and the nomological. (N): "the 
explanans must contain at least one "law of nature" and this must be an essential premise in the 
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derivation in the sense that the derivation of the explanandum would not be valid if this premise 
was removed" (Woodward, 2009). 
Hempel (1965) distinguishes between explanations of particular facts and explanations of 
general regularities (Hitchcock & Salmon, 2001, p.477). 
  
a) The role of laws in d-n model  
Scientific understanding of phenomena requires theories; scientists have to be able to use 
theories in order to generate predictions and explanations (Regt & Dieks, 2005, p.148). Theories 
therefore, provide general causal laws that are used deductively to explain an event as being a 
case with initial conditions related to the law, a practice very common to biological and 
behavioural sciences (Bell & Staines, 1983, p.40).  
The process is also described by Toulmin (2003, p. 113) as "warrant-using" arguments: 
When a statement in physical theory is established by testing it in sample situations, both data 
and conclusion are independently known, are then rendered generally by induction, and are 
finally applied as a rule of deduction in fresh situations to derive novel conclusions from our 
data. In this model, or case of scientific explanation, an inference takes place that shows how 
observable phenomena can be deduced from basic premises which are the well-specified 
postulates of theory. Reasoning from those postulates is to be achieved by the inference rule of 
deductive logic (Reif & Larkin, 1991 as cited in Park & Han, 2002, p.596).  
According to Hempel (1965), any scientific explanation should include, as one of the 
premises, a law of nature (as cited in Hitchcock & Salmon, 2001, p.470). The D-N model is 
based on established laws. However, causal explanations might come up also “accidentally” with 
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no use of such laws. As Hempel (1965) cites we can distinguish between generalizations that are 
only "accidentally true"- (All members of the Greensbury School Board for 1964 are bald) and 
those that are "laws" - (All gases expand when heated under constant pressure) (as cited in 
Woodward, 2009). Accordingly, we might classify two types of explanations: every day 
explanations that are single-causal and scientific explanations that are law-based. However, as 
Woodward (2009) argues, the boundaries of the category “scientific explanation” are far from 
clear. Actually, Woodward believes that this model of explanation is not an attempt to 
reconstruct the structure of explanations but is rather only meant to apply to explanations that are 
properly regarded as “scientific”.  
 
b) Deductive nomological as argument -syllogism type: the deductive 
nature  
Bell & Staines (1981) classify the deductive-nomological model in the “argument type” 
model of explanation (p.41).  The argument model indicates the way by which statements in 
explanation can be evaluated: scientific explanations must meet the condition that "explanatory 
information adduced affords good grounds for believing that the phenomenon to be explained 
did, or does indeed occur" (Bell & Staines, 1981). The structure of explanation then, is similar to 
an argument: the explanans support the explanandum as the premises support the conclusion in 
an argument.   
Long before Hempel (1965), Aristotle (Posterior Analytics) was another philosopher who 
has held that causal explanations are deductive inferences of a special kind. In the Posterior 
Analytics, Aristotle distinguishes a special sort of deductive inference - the demonstrative 
syllogism. This type of syllogism, according to Aristotle, has premises that are “true, primary, 
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immediate, better known that and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as 
effect to cause” (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics). As Jeffrey (1971) cites, the affinities between 
the Hempelian and Aristoteleian accounts of explanation may be obscured by differences in 
terminology: Aristotle speaks of syllogism, Hempel of deductive inference; and Aristotle speaks 
of knowledge, Hempel explanation (p.104). However, as Jeffrey (1971) cites, the knowledge that 
Aristotle means is connected with cause, it is the sort of understanding that is conveyed by causal 
explanation.  
 
c) Deductive statistical explanation (D-S)  
The second type of explanation, within Hempel’s nomological model is the deductive 
statistical explanation. Deductive nomological and deductive statistical explanations (D-S) share 
the same structure (as arguments): their premises contain statements of initial conditions and 
law-like generalizations. Their difference rests on the nature of the laws used in the premises, 
and to the truth of the conclusion given the truth of the premises. The laws in a deductive 
nomological explanation are universal generalizations, whereas the laws in IS explanations have 
the form of statistical generalizations (Mayes, 2005). Respectively, deductive statistical 
explanations involve a deduction of a “narrower statistical uniformity” and thus they provide 
conclusions of a high probability but not certainty. Hitchcock and Salmon (2001) give the 
following example for this kind of explanation:  
“We can explain why atoms of carbon 14 have a ¼ probability of 
surviving for 11.460 years because the half-life of that species is 5.730 
years. In this case we explained a statistical generalization about all 
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C14 atoms by deducing it from the statistical law that any C14 atom has 
a probability of ½ of decaying within a period of 5.730 years 
(regardless of age)” (p.470-71). 
 
In terms of inference, as Hitchcock and Salmon (2001) support, there is little need to 
distinguish deductive-statistical from deductive explanations, since there are no special 
difficulties for deductive explanation of statistical generalizations on the basis of statistical laws. 
As we can explain scientific phenomena deducing them from more fundamental general laws, we 
can also have deductive explanations of statistical laws on the basis of more basic statistical laws 
(p.472).  
d) Inductive statistical explanation (I-S) 
Hempel (1965 as cited in Woodward, 2009) recognizes a third type of explanation, which 
calls inductive-statistical or I-S explanation. According to him, those explanations involve the 
sumsumption of individual events (like the recovery of a particular person from streptococcus 
infection under (what he regards as) statistical laws (such as a law specifying the probability of 
recovery given that penicillin has been taken).  
As another example,  Hitchcock and Salmon (2001) cite the explanation of why a particular 
weed withered by citing the fact it received a dose of a herbicide, even though we know that the 
herbicide is not invariably effective: this means that the withering is related probabilistically to 
the herbicide treatment but it is not necessary by it (p.470). Those kinds of explanations as kinds 
of arguments show that given the particular circumstances and the laws in question, the 
occurrence of the phenomenon was to be expected; and it is in this sense that the explanation 
enables us to understand why the phenomenon occurred (Hempel, 1965, p. 337, as cited in 
Woodward, 2009).  
 464 
 
So, when it comes to an explanation of a particular fact and not a law, deductive 
nomological and inductive explanations can be reconstructed as arguments to the effect; the fact 
to be explained was to be expected on the basis of the explanatory facts (Hitchcock & Salmon, 
2001, p.472). However, the two types of explanations have important differences. The difference 
is that deductive explanations might be represented as deductive arguments whereas I-S 
explanations as inductive.  But what does this distinction mean?  
Firstly, inductive logic is non-monotonic as compared to deductive inference, where you can 
add any further premises to a valid argument with no change in its validity (Hempel as cited in 
Hitchcock & Salmon, 2001). With inductive arguments, new, further information might make the 
explanation collapse (Bell & Staines, 1983, p.47; Hitchcock & Salmon, 2001). As a result, two 
explanations belonging to the I-S model might come to a contradictory conclusion, a case that is 
not possible to be found in a deductive argument. As Hempel says “the concept of statistical 
explanation for particular events is essentially relative to a given knowledge situation” (Hempel, 
1965, p.402 as cited in Ruben, 1992, p.151). Hempel (1965) introduced the concept of the 
“requirement of maximal specificity” for I-S explanations, as new information might point to a 
different, even contradictory explanation.  
A second vital difference is that D-N model can be used to explain both specific phenomena 
and general state of affairs (as described by the laws), whereas the I-S model is only indented to 
explain certain events or phenomena (Bell & Staines, 1983, p.47). That’s why there are views 
that describe I-S explanations as incomplete D-N explanations. According to this view, I-S 
explanations cannot provide statistical generalizations that are invoked to them; this has to be 
done in the deductive way of D-N explanation (Bell & Staines, 1983). However, this view of I-S 
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explanation as incomplete D-N is tantamount to determinism, the doctrine that events are 
completely determined by antecedent conditions, a view that, as Hitchcock and Salmon (2001) 
support, is highly questioned by modern physics - i.e. quantum mechanics- that suggest that there 
are events occurring by chance and their outcomes are not completely determined by previous 
conditions.  As they cite:  
“Our theory of statistical explanation should at least leave open the 
possibility that the world is actually intdeterministic. In that case, there 
might be statistical explanations that are complete- not merely 
explanations that, on account of our ignorance, fail to achieve full D-N 
status.” (p. 473) 
  
Accordingly, (Ruben (1992) argues that the argument that I-S explanations are complete and 
not incomplete D-N ones, needs a metaphysical backing and some form of nondeterminism 
(Ruben, 1992, p.151).  
In this sense, explanations belonging to the I-S model explaining a particular event, are 
regarded as complete and resemble  what Peirce (1900 as cited in Flach and Kakas, 2000b) calls 
as abductive inference. Walton (2001) supports that Peirce’s notion of abduction, even though 
presented as different from the notion of inference to the best explanation presented by Harman, 
it is actually not. The examples that he uses along with various definitions and characterizations, 
suggest that abductive inference and inference to the best explanation can be taken to be 
equivalent notions (p.147). Flach and Kakas (2000b) also support that Peirce’s syllogistic view 
of abduction or hypothesis provides a special form of explanation as the result (taking the role of 
the observation) is explained by the case (is the explanation) in the light of the rule as a given 
theory (p.5,11). 
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This line of reasoning, distinguishes statistical explanations as described by the I-S model 
from mere correlations. Actually, views that do not interpret I-S explanation as abductive 
inference pointing to the best explanation for an event, actually do not find anything of 
importance in distinguishing two different models (D-S and I-S) of explanations. However, the 
discussion in the literature raises an important claim: inductive statistical “explanations”, that are 
not interpreted as inference to the best explanation but are rather statistical generalizations, are 
not explanatory (Bell & Staines, 1983; Flach & Kakas, 2000a). Particular events, especially in 
psychological and social phenomena, are explained by means of probabilistic or statistical 
explanations. However the explanation does not explain why the event has occurred: it might 
only assert that the likelihood of an event is high, given some other occurrence (Bell & Staines, 
1983).  
As Flach and Kakas (2000a) argue, if induction provides explanation at all, these 
explanations are of a different kind and do not depend on a particular theory. They therefore, do 
not provide any insight to why things are so: the rule that every parent of John is a parent of 
John’s brother does not explain parenthood (p.11). Jeffrey (1971) also supports that only in 
certain cases where statistical explanations act as “statistical mechanical” can be regarded as 
inferences (p.105-106). Inductive generalizations are therefore, not really explanatory; they are 
rather arguments that bring forward “good grounds for believing that the phenomenon to be 
explained did or does indeed occur” (Bell & Staines, 1983, p.45).  
Another important difference between abductive inference and inductive generalizations is 
that they serve different purposes within the scientific discovery space. An application for 
example of abductive reasoning is used with problems such as diagnosis: abduction is used to 
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produce a reason, according to some known theory of a system, for the observed phenomenon, 
whereas a typical inductive task would move from a collection of observations which are judged 
according to some background information to be similar or related to a hypothesis that aims at 
providing generalization of the observation (Flach & Kakas, 2000a, p.12).  
e) Criticism for the D-N model  
The strength of deductive explanations however, is limited as it rests on the application of 
laws and theories and does not point to new directions. A criticism therefore for deductive 
explanations is that they cannot discover anything new (Kantorovich, 1993, p.65; Flach & 
Kakas, 2000b, p.8). As Kantorovich (1993) explains: “Even if the laws of nature were theorems 
in a deductive system, deductive logic without the guide of a suitable heuristic would not hit 
upon an interesting, useful, theorem”. He also supports that deductive logic is not a method at all, 
since the discovery of a deductive proof is not a deductive process, as one has to find or even 
invent the steps in the proof. Accordingly, Flach and Kakas (2000b) support that deductive logic 
is rather “Logic of the Finished Research Report” rather than “Logic of Discovery” (p.8).  
This criticism however, refers to the strength or capacity of D-N explanations and not to the 
D-N explanatory model.  There are other criticisms though, which do question it. For example, 
the argument that not all causal connections might be provided by rules or laws, limits the scope 
of deductive explanations. According to this view, not all explanations apply laws, but they 
rather employ generalizations, that sometimes satisfy too few of the standard criteria to count as 
laws (Woodward, 2009). Woodward cites as examples explanations from sciences such as 
biology, psychology, and economics, which are full of generalizations that appear to play an 
explanatory role and yet fail to satisfy many of the standard criteria for lawfulness.   
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Additionally, there is another view which supports that the D-N model cannot explain 
causes, or mechanisms: deductive inference that relates laws and statements of the phenomena to 
be explained in D-N models, cannot capture, according to these views, the reasoning involved in 
understanding how a given mechanism produces the phenomenon (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 
2005, p.427).  
Those two objections have created two different models of explanations: the model of 
counterfactual (Woodward, 2009) and mechanistic approach which are going to be briefly 
discussed below.  
iv. Counterfactual approach - Woodward  
The counterfactual approach takes it that causes make a difference to their effects. This 
difference-making is cashed out in terms of counterfactual dependence (Psillos, 2004 p.2916). 
This approach therefore is based on invariance that rests as a key idea in Woodward’s account of 
explanation (Sober, 2006, p.45). Humphreys (2006) explains as follows the establishment of 
causation between two variables:  
“Suppose that there is a relationship between two variables that is 
represented by a functional relationship Y=f(X). If the same functional 
relationship f holds under a range of interventions on X, then the 
relationship is invariant within that range. The intuition underlying this 
kind of dependence is that if we can exploit this invariance to control 
the effect, then we have a causal relation.”(p.40)  
 
In particular, Woodward's interventionist counterfactual approach takes the relationship 
among some variables X and Y to be causal if, where an intervention changed the value of X 
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appropriately, the relationship between X and Y would remain invariant and the value of Y 
would change (Psillos, 2004, p.2916). An important aspect of Woodward's position is that 
interventions are allowed to change not just values of variables that occur in regularities but can 
change the mechanisms that produce those regularities (Woodward. 2009 as cited in Humphreys, 
2006, p.42). 
a) Laws and mechanisms according to the counterfactual model  
According to this model, the laws of nature are not to be taken as standard (Woodward, 2009 
as cited Humphreys, 2006, p.43). Explanations generated by this model do not appeal to laws 
and thus, it has a greater capacity than the D-N model to capture explanations of the social 
sciences that do not use top-down rules but rather rule-governed individual based models 
(Humphreys, 2006).  
As the D-N model distinguishes between laws and accidental generalizations, this model 
distinguishes between possible and actual causes. Woodward draws a distinction between causal 
generalizations that describe types of events and singular causal statements that describe token 
events, as shown in the following examples:  
“Types of events:  Short circuits cause electrical fires. 
Token event: This short circuit caused this electrical fire.” (Sober, 
2006, p.44) 
 
Woodward (2009), as Sober (2006) cites denies that these differences between the two 
statements show that there are two concepts of cause. He rather views the types of events as 
possible causes of fires whereas the token level claims as describing the actual causes of a fire.  
This discussion brings us to the distinction of induction and abduction. Whereas the latter 
points to an unobserved event and acts as hypothesis generation (This short circuit caused this 
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electrical fire), the first resembles to a statistical generalization, used as explanation (Short 
circuits cause electrical fires). Sober also defends the idea that  type-level and token-level claims 
involve different concepts of cause (Sober, 2006), viewing the type-level claim from the point of 
view of a probabilistic theory of causation, whereas he takes token events as sometimes being 
related causally even though the probabilistic requirement is not satisfied.   
An issue concerning this model is the invariance between two variables that depend on a 
third one. As Sober (2006) cites, until we discover the third cause we think of the two of them as 
cause to effect (Sober, 2006, p.46). Sober also disagrees with the claim that explanatory factors 
are necessary for their effects and finds a contradiction of this claim with other claims that 
coexist in the same theory that argue that generalizations provide deeper explanations the more 
invariant they are.  
Third, the claim that explanatory factors are necessary for their effects can clash with 
Woodward's (2009) other thesis that generalisations provide deeper explanations the more 
invariant they are. As he cites:  
“What should we say if the theory of ideal gases is less invariant 
than the theory about the individual molecules? Is the micro-story 
better because it is more invariant or worse because it cites factors that 
aren't necessary for the macro-effect?”(p.47)  
 
b) Mechanistic approach  
The mechanistic approach takes it that causes produce their effects, in terms of mechanisms: 
two events are causally related if and only if there is a mechanism that connects those (Psillos, 
2004). Literature advocating the use of mechanisms to explain phenomena, generally describes 
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them as identifying the process between causes and effects (Russ, et al., 2008).  In this sense 
mechanistic reasoning can be regarded as a “causal reasoning”, that acts as an explanation: it 
explains the process by which a cause brings out an effect (Koslowski, 1996 as cited in Russ, et 
al., 2008).  
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) give the following definition for mechanistic explanation: 
“A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component 
operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible 
for one or more phenomena (p.423).  
The counterfactual approach uses events and variables to be the basic entities that compose 
the explanation. In the mechanistic approach, on the other hand, processes rather than events are 
the basic entities in a theory of physical causation (Salmon, 1984 as cited in Psillos, 2004, 
p.296). Whereas Salmon restricts his theory only for physical causations, Glennan’s mechanistic 
theory is broad enough to include higher than physical mechanisms, such as social ones 
(Glennan, 1966, as cited in Psillos, 2004).  
The mechanistic approach is very important in sciences like biology. In biology, identifying 
phenomena precedes and invites explaining them: biologists explain why by explaining how 
(Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p.442). However, as they cite, not all scientific explanations 
involve appeals to mechanisms or and not all explanations in biology could take the form of 
identifying the responsible mechanism. Additionally, according to Glennan’s view (1966, as 
cited in Psillos, 2004) mechanistic approach cannot explain all laws in physics. Actually, 
Glennan (1966, as cited in Psillos, 2004, p. 302) makes a distinction between the fundamental 
laws of physics and “mechanically explicable” laws: laws that are underpinned by a mechanism 
and characterize all the special sciences and “much of physics itself” (p.50).  
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c) The criticism for mechanistic approach  
A shortcoming for the mechanistic approach is that mechanistic explanations are non-
predictive constructs (Peters, 1991, p.168). As Peters argue, theories are only tools to describe, 
predict and manipulate nature. Mechanistic explanations fail to predict or manipulate nature and 
may not even describe it as if research breaks observed phenomena into separate mechanisms of 
cause-effect relations.  It is unlikely that these can ever be reassembled into a functioning whole.  
Additionally, the capacity of mechanistic reasoning to establish a causal link is also 
questioned. The issue is related to the way that the nature of causality is perceived. As Peters 
(1991) cites, causality has so many, easily confused interpretations that it is easier to avoid 
causal terminology.  
Psillos (2004) describes the nature of “cause” adopting David Hume´s view of causation. 
According to Hume, “experience only teaches us how one event constantly follows another, 
without instructing us the secret connexion which binds them together, and renders them 
inseparable”, and thus the alleged necessary tie between cause and effect is not observable 
(p.66).  In that sense, causation is an intrinsic relation among events (the secret connexion) but 
that we can only get at some extrinsic marks of it. Therefore, according to Psillos, (2004) the 
mechanistic approach, but also the counterfactual approach fail to tell us what this relation is as 
for none of them renders causation an intrinsic relation (p.292). However, both of them are 
compatible, in the effort to provide a causal explanation.  
Mechanistic considerations can help the counterfactual approach to deal with the endogenity 
problem (when effects are treated as causes), to help testing the stability assumptions (unit 
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homogeneity, temporal stability) that are necessary for the counterfactual inference and finally, 
especially in qualitative research to help dealing with possible confounders, as in qualitative 
research it is possible that that the explanatory variable is correlated with a confounding variable. 
However, mechanistic approaches rest on a different level than counterfactual ones.  As Psillos 
(2004) argues:  
 
“There is an asymmetry between the two accounts we have been 
discussing: mechanisms need counterfactuals; but counterfactuals do 
not need mechanisms. In other words, mechanistic causation requires 
counterfactual dependence but not conversely. It is in this sense, that 
the counterfactual approach is more basic than the 
mechanistic.”(p.306)  
 
Finally, the capacity of mechanistic approach is viewed as limited by the fact that not all 
explanations are causal. Even if many scientific explanations cite information about causes, there 
are views that do not take the notion of causation as primitive to the theory of explanation. 
Hempel (1965), for example was unwilling to simply say that X figures in an explanation of Y if 
and only if X causes Y (as cited in Woodward, 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 474 
 
Appendix D: Glossary of abbreviations 
Abbreviation  Meaning  Page  
AAAS American Association for the advancement of Science 27, 49, 70 
CYBC Cyprus Broadcasting Cooperation  26 
D-N 
explanation 
 
Deductive –Nomological Explanation (Hempel, 1965)  160, 163, 299, 
460,464,465,467,468,469 
D-S 
explanation  
Deductive –Statistical Explanation (Hempel, 1965)  163, 299, 462, 466 
GMF, GM  
 
Genetically Modified Food 38, 41, 59 
ICT tools  Information Communication Technology tools  23, 24, 28 
IRF talk Initiation-Response-Feedback type of teachers’ guided  
talk in the classroom  
256 
NGOs Non Governmental Organizations  45, 51, 52 
SDDS Scientific Discovery as Dual Search –Model for 
scientific inquiry (Klahr, 2000)  
134, 148, 155,163, 164, 
223, 224, 225, 298, 299, 
336, 337, 339, 346, 382, 
398, 399, 447, 449    
SSI Socioscientific Issues  12, 68, 73, 80, 81, 257, 
261 
STS  Science  Technology and Society  27 
 
